GROUNDLESS

Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier

GREGORY EVANS DOWD



VISIT…

Groundless

Early America: History, Context, Culture
Joyce E. Chaplin and Philip D. Morgan, Series Editors

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Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier

Gregory Evans Dowd

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Groundless

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Introduction

The Mohawk Assaragóa understood that rumor had power. As he spoke in 1763, his distant western Seneca kinsmen were fighting the British Empire, and he derided their motives as the work of rumormongers: "You are too apt to listen to false News, and idle Stories." Such stories—sometimes true, sometimes false, but always of uncertain origin—had flown across the frontiers for generations. They frequently warned of colonial intentions to enslave, dispossess, and eliminate Indians (often through disease). Assaragóa offered stern counsel: "pay no Regard to them."[1] Like many of his listeners, this book ignores that advice.

Facing potent and plausible rumors in eastern North America during the British colonial and early U.S. national periods, Assaragóa had brilliant company. George Washington consciously resisted "flying reports," and yet he fell prey to them. Benjamin Franklin, a master of information, deliberately manufactured grossly inaccurate tales and surreptitiously spread them. Groundless news gave shape to the sixteenth-century European exploration of the continent and to the eighteenth-century American decision to break with Great Britain; such news is reflected in the Declaration of Independence. Flying reports, as rumors were called in that day, demanded the attention of Cherokee leaders, Ojibwe historians, British colonial governors, and American radicals, and they demand our attention, too.

In this book, I treat a variety of circulating, uncertain stories that concerned health, wealth, violence, and subordination. Christian missionaries infected Indians with smallpox, plotted to enslave them, and coveted Indian lands. Soldiers, settlers, and traders sent illnesses in a variety of packages to destroy native people. Aristocratic European powers conspired with Indian Nations, and even with slaves, to rob the liberties of seaboard settlers. Insurgent provincial farmers scalped British soldiers, and gouged their eyes for good measure. British officers purchased once-bonneted women's scalps,

packed them by the bale, and shipped them to their superiors. Gold, once panned in the Appalachians by Indian slaves laboring under the Spanish lash, remained underexploited in the streambeds of mountainous Indian Country. The enemy loomed over the next ridge. The smallpox epidemic began with this slave or that massacre. Traitors among us conspired with our greatest foe.

This is no comprehensive encyclopedia of the bogus; that would fill a library, perhaps a server. Rather, it examines a selection of unverified tales told by colonizers and Native Americans that punctuated eastern North American history from the sixteenth century to about 1850, a colonial, imperial, and highly contested era. The stories tell of the extraction of mineral wealth, the exploitation of slaves, the sexual abuse of women, the expectation of imminent violence, the mastery of disease. They remind us of the bewildering but pressing needs of a colonial setting: to appropriate or retain resources, to command or defend one's own labor, to protect family, to defeat adversaries, and to evaluate indigenous or imperial strengths. Groundless stories demand our regard, for they, however unreliable, commanded as much attention in early America as did crops, weather, and shipping news. Groundless stories both shaped and reflected perceptions on the colonial and early national frontiers. Because those tales found their way into manuscripts and publications, they strikingly reveal perceptions to us.

Further, they influence us. Rumor can evolve into legend, and legend can shape history, despite the efforts of historians to ground work in good evidence. Legends, as narrative expressions of culture, shape the expectations of politicians, villagers, citizens, soldiers, and scholars. As a minor counterpoint to my larger investigation of rumor and legend in history, I ponder certain rumors and legends that surface as history in present historical writing. This should be unsurprising. Much official colonial correspondence about Native Americans amounts to the circulation of rumor; colonial agents in the field reported much hearsay that featured the speech of both Indians and colonists. Settlers, soldiers, missionaries, and traders spread rumors about Indian designs, conspiracies, attacks, beliefs, and secrets, and these flying reports landed on paper and fixed themselves in pen and printers' ink. Crown subjects and republican citizens captured in writing a surprising abundance of similar Native American news. Contemporaries of Assaragóa, Washington, and Franklin understood that rumor had power: groundless tales might shape lives—and might take lives.[2]

The Frontlines of Rumor Scholarship

This book joins an enormous literature on rumor, mostly nonhistorical. That said, those historians who have grappled with rumor stand among our most revered. Rumor scholars appear among the early founders of the modern discipline. Take Marc Bloch and Georges Lefebvre, who in the first third of the twentieth century sought a window into the elusive realms of popular perception and found it in rumor. Bloch suggested as much in his profoundly influential *The Historian's Craft* (1932): rumor might provide access to social consciousness. Georges Lefebvre's *The Great Fear: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France*, also published in 1932, remains a classic among works on the French Revolution. Mapping the spread in 1789 of an enormous panic, Lefebvre narrated rumor's power, employing electrical metaphors (circuits, currents, relays) to describe the rapid spread of stories about the imminent descent of "brigands" upon rural villages. Such false tales, he urged, had genuine historical consequences. They spurred political action and revealed popular opinion during the French Revolution. Local popular sentiment that was already stimulated against the aristocracy, not some malefactor's manipulations, ignited and charged the idea that brigands would soon invade the hamlets. Following Bloch and Lefebvre, historians of early modern and revolutionary France have in particular kept rumors alive in their studies of conflicting ideologies, even into our own time.[3]

Bloch's work on rumor, less well-known than Lefebvre's, more directly addresses this book. Recalling his own experiences in the First World War, Bloch in an early essay imagined a map of the shifting "Front," or, more accurately, the area just behind the trenches. His fictional cartographer shaded the area with crosshatching and marked it as the rumor-making zone. In this zone, near the roar of mechanized war, kitchen talk, delivery truck conversation, nervous chatter, and intense prisoner interrogation held sway.[4] Authorities held soldiers and civilians at bayonet point; the censor plied his trade. The Front, for Bloch, generated robust rumor, which became a regular part of the soldier's kit. Rumor, for Bloch, should fascinate historians because rumor, even false news, must accord with the understanding of those misinterpreting and sharing the unfounded information. To thrive, rumor needs a bruiting ground, a human group, a collection of minds at work. The rumor is never, in this view, entirely the work of one person, or the result of one error; it is the child of the rumorers en masse.[5]

The social nature of rumor grabbed the interest of social scientists in the latter half of the twentieth century. They criticized earlier psychological models that treated rumors as matters of either flawed perception or informational degeneration. In other words, they doubted that rumors stemmed from either an original mistaken observation or the deterioration of once-accurate news as it passed serially from person to person in the fashion of a children's game of telephone.[6] An influential French student of rumor argued persuasively in the 1980s that rumors do not usually pass serially, but run along webs of communication with many "loops in the process."[7] This, after all, is how we talk when we do so in groups. It is increasingly how we write, perhaps especially in a digital age. But even before the triumph of the electronic machine, writers toed no straight line. Eighteenth-century printed narratives circulated along loopy, collective networks—the very kind that speed the course of rumor. Reprinted, commented on (in speech or writing), plagiarized, bowdlerized, eighteenth-century narratives rarely leapt from pen to press to reader, before coming to a full stop.[8] As Lefebvre recognized early on, rumors depend less on lines of communication than they do on circuits and exchanges.

Bloch's early interest in the social origins of rumor lay atop his interest in the extreme social context: war. His piece reviews other writings about false news that the First World War generated; he sought historical sense in the flying reports that had punctuated his own and others' battleground experiences. He turned new attention to the idea that in times of crisis, compelling problems found symbolic solutions in what he somewhat reluctantly, since it seemed so "metaphysical," called the "collective consciousness." Commenting on Bloch early in this century, one cultural historian agrees that "hearsay goes into overdrive at times of war." War, he observes, creates a "state of permanent curiosity." War besieges combatants and noncombatants alike with vague and unreliable reports, forcing them into what Bloch had called the "work of interpretation." Bloch had implied that the act of rumoring both constructed and reinforced collective identities. Rumors, he said, not only belong to the "public character" but also "represent the public character." After all, a rumor "does not spread, it does not take on life, unless it harmonizes with the prejudices of public opinion. It then becomes a mirror in which the collective consciousness surveys its own features."[9] This reflection, this matter of common identity, also interested the most insightful and arguably the most influential American student of rumor, late twentieth-century sociologist Tamotsu Shibutani.

Shibutani's *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (1966) considers identity, rumor, and war. A young victim of anti-Japanese American hysteria and federal wartime relocation, a prisoner at the Tule Lake concentration camp, Shibutani later wondered at the power of rumor, and he determined, with generosity of spirit, to understand those who spread unsubstantiated reports: "The concept of the enemy is often constructed by projecting onto it all the attributes most hated or despised in one's own group; the enemy thus becomes the exact opposite of oneself." This act, which is sometimes today called "othering," is manifestly a component of group identity formation. It especially inhabits and sustains the social psychology of wartime rumor. Much as Bloch evokes the metaphor of the mirror (in which rumorers survey the features of their collective consciousness), Shibutani evokes the psychoanalytic metaphor of film: rumor tellers project images onto their foe. Both Bloch and Shibutani wrote in an age more friendly than ours to psychoanalysis, but their work hardly depends solely on that system of thought. Historians, writing in a later age, can find evidence from even the distant past that confirms both Shibutani's and Bloch's insights: a rumoring group in wartime spoke as much of itself as of its opponent. It identified itself and defined itself as it spoke of its enemy, and perhaps of the enemy within.[10]

I take on a host of such revealing rumors about frontier war and violence. Indian rumoring about settler intentions to spread disease, for example, embodied concerns about susceptibility; Indian rumors about missionaries' intentions to enslave them embodied developing identities of spirituality and race. Settlers' talk of treacherous Indians embodied fears of colonial treason and colonial division; talk of almost impossibly skilled Indian warriors embodied the pervasive sense of colonial martial failure. Exaggerated rumors of an enemy's strengths unmistakably point to the reporters' collective sense of their own weakness.

Shibutani's greater contribution redefines rumor; he examines what most authorities had previously seen as a product of human frailty (rumor itself), and, without denying its dangers, he draws attention to the role in rumoring of intelligence and creativity. Rumor, he writes, "is not an individual creation that spreads, but a collective formation that arises in the collaboration of many." Shibutani agrees explicitly with Lefebvre and implicitly with Bloch that rumor is the product of a collective effort, and he adds that the effort is inquisitive: rumor dealers seek to understand unexplained events or ambiguous conditions of life. Like Bloch, he suggests that contexts of uncertainty

are particularly critical, and he emphasizes that purveyors of rumor are engaged in the work of an intelligent and social species. Rumor, in any pure form, results from "the social interaction of people caught in inadequately defined situations. To act intelligently such persons seek news, and rumor is essentially a type of news." Or, as an information expert later neatly packaged it in the 1980s: "rumors do not *take off* from the truth but rather *seek out* the truth."[11] This does not mean they have actual agency, but that they probe reality, often with effect. Bloch, to be sure, had recognized that such "interpretive work" by a group goes into the making and sustaining of rumor, but he worked in a tradition that still connected that interpretive work to an initial, flawed "perception itself."[12] Here, Shibutani and others do not so much dispute Bloch as they add emphasis to what Bloch also understood as the main reason for scholars to reconnoiter the rumor phenomenon: the rumor depends less on an initial perceptual flaw than on the rumoring group's sense of ambiguity and its determination to establish a reliable understanding of a dangerous world. The Front had been such a world for Bloch and his fellow soldiers. Early American frontiers, as colonial settings, often presented such worlds to natives and newcomers.

The relationship between the two Latinate words, "Front" and "frontier," is direct: they share roots in the militant history of empire.[13] At their worst, early American frontiers took on the character of the Front, with opponents facing off over a shifting, blood-soaked no-man's land. On such frontiers at war, populations formed and re-formed their group identities, sometimes through the device of rumor. On American frontiers, as on the Front, violence often threatened, and governing authorities frequently failed to protect their people. Native leaders made deals with colonists that went bad, to the bitter dismay of their followers. Colonial leaders encouraged migrations to their backcountries, but did not offer security. On the frontiers, for Indians and settlers alike, even authorized news carried doubt. In the absence of trusted sources, rumor filled cabins, jumped from canoe to shore, shook cornstalks, buzzed forts, and hurtled down wagon roads.[14] What is more, authorities—printers, colonels, governors, and Indian leaders—became rumorers themselves.

Shibutani, like Bloch, considered the troubled relationship between governing authorities and a rumoring population, noting, "The development of rumors, though sometimes embarrassing and at times even disastrous, is an indication of independent judgment and of the unwillingness" of people to passively accept "formally approved" reports.[15] If those exchanging rumor

endeavor to make sense of events for which intelligence is inadequate, and if governments fail to protect, the unprotected will rarely trust the governors. A prominent scholar of rumor sees in it "a relation to authority: divulging secrets, suggesting hypotheses, [rumor] constrains authorities to talk while contesting their status as the sole source authorized to speak."[16] In the same vein, a prominent historian of eighteenth-century France more recently observes that rumors, expressed by a skeptical populous, can pass "judgments" and express "opinions on society and political affairs." Such opinions might well stand at odds with official commentary. What is more, the rumors might take "established forms"; they might follow "motifs" that give "them force and logic." Far from unstructured or random, she notes, rumors often assume recognizable patterns, difficult to dislodge and familiar to those who rumor. They not only construct but also reinforce identity.[17]

The Front, and the men and women who frequented the rumor-making zone to its rear, formed an unstable social world, and Bloch knew it. It shared this characteristic with both the mushrooming city neighborhoods of eighteenth-century Paris and our own early American frontiers. The cyclical power of rumors both to make and to reinforce identities, as well as to sharpen the divisions between "us" and "them," not only intensified in such tumultuous environments, it also fragmented and localized approaches to the questions of trust and truth. Bloch observes that rumors not only flourished quite independently of the authorities at the Front, they also prospered where the multitude distrusted authority, a condition that censorship and other efforts to control speech only enhanced. In the context of obvious propaganda and state control of print, verbal rumor gained acceptance even as it contradicted official pronouncements. Bloch, in this sense, anticipated the findings of an influential American scholar of East Africa whose work on late colonial vampire legends concerns a very different imperial setting from that of the present volume. Reluctant to use the term "rumor" because of its pejorative connotations, she turns the matter of grounded evidence on its side. East African twentieth-century reports that Britons secretly harvested African blood thrived because they met local "standards of evidence." The stories faced hard questioning as they circulated. The tales met resistance, too, as they worked their way through diverse populations, but that resistance, when coming from already suspect colonial authorities and their employees, at times only reinforced the tales' veracity.[18] Perhaps colonial officials protested too much.

In contrast to this transatlantic range of investigators, from Bloch and Lefebvre through Shibutani to current historians, who all see in rumor the

historical evidence of human experience and intelligence, another branch of scholarship considers rumor, above all, as a problem to be solved, as a danger to be faced and addressed. In the middle third of the twentieth century researchers pondered, and others ponder again today, the damage that false rumor does, particularly in turbulent, democratic America. Attempting to counter the influence of groundless stories during the Second World War, American officials under the advice of social scientists established rumor clinics to circulate counter-information. Facing riots in the late 1960s, American municipalities reached for the phone, setting up rumor hotlines that individuals could call for the truth. These efforts to combat "rumor" with "authorized" news have not been demonstrably successful; perhaps their impact is simply unmeasurable.[19] Unimpressed by the poor results of such efforts, sociologist Patricia Turner and social psychologist Gary Alan Fine conclude, with many historians, that rumors grow from the thick loam of history, social structure, and experience; rumors have force because they match expectations, sometimes better than the authorized news that would dismiss them. Before ridding the nation of its frequent racial rumors, they urge, first rid the nation of the structures of race.[20]

Because of the wild profligacy of rumor in a digital age, interest in rumor management has recently rebounded. A pair of prominent legal scholars suggests new methods to combat the proliferation of inaccurate, politically and socially volatile rumors. They observe that our age has spawned varieties of extremist groups, whose members tend to inhabit conversational echo chambers in which increasingly strident and deceptive stories take hold. They controversially propose the "cognitive infiltration" of such groups to introduce "informational diversity." Elsewhere the team's leader has advocated techniques for undermining the plausibility of rumor tellers—for example, exposing a rumor's propagator as having little faith in the rumor itself. Today, as on early American frontiers, the problem of rumor continues to call for authoritative solutions.[21]

Rumor, a form of "news," an urgent communication, is defined by a weakness of evidence—though this is not always clear to the traders in rumor. Rumor's very definition is slippery. A recent work sensibly refuses to offer a strict definition, advancing instead a rough one: rumors are "claims of fact . . . that have not been shown to be true, but that . . . have credibility not because direct evidence is known to support them, but because other people seem to believe them. So understood, rumors often arise and gain traction because they fit with, and support, the prior convictions of those who accept them."[22]

Groundless Rumor and Legend

Rumor is often viewed as without foundation, as literally groundless: it flies upon expectations more than upon truths. People on all sides of the early American frontiers knew this, equating rumor with movement and flight. The Cherokee Outacite in 1751 described his people's rumoring: "their Doggs, and their Hoggs, and themselves, run mad." In 1768 Pontiac, the famed Ottawa, associated rumors with "bad birds," a metaphor that often appears in English-language renditions of Indian speech, and that fascinatingly resembles an association found in Ecclesiastes, a biblical book known to many colonists. South Carolina Governor Glen in 1751 expressed surprise that Cherokees attended to "groundless reports." Groundlessness and flight evoke rumor's speed and its power. In early modern English, as in the Old Testament, "rumor" often evoked notions of uproar, tumult, or disturbance. The associations in Europe go deeper than Christianity; Antiquity's Virgil noted that Fama (or Fame), the personification of rumor, flies.[23] Translating Virgil into late Stuart-era English couplets, John Dryden warned that rumor,

> from small beginnings grows:
> Swift from the first; and ev'ry Moment brings
> New Vigour to her flights, new Pinions to her wings.
> Soon grows the Pigmy to Gigantic size;
> Her Feet on Earth, her Forehead in the Skies . . .
> Swift is her walk, more swift her winged hast[e]:
> A monstrous Fantom, horrible and vast.
> As many Plumes as raise her lofty flight,
> So many piercing Eyes inlarge her sight;
> Millions of opening Mouths to Fame belong,
> And ev'ry mouth is furnish'd with a Tongue,
> And round with list'ning Ears the flying Plague is hung.
> She fills the peaceful Universe with Cries;
> No Slumbers ever close her wakeful Eyes;
> By Day, from lofty Tow'rs her Head she shews,
> And spreads thro' trembling Crowds disastrous News;
> With Court Informers haunts, and Royal Spies;
> Things done relates, not done she feigns, and mingles Truth
> with Lyes.[24]

The goddess Rumor in England on the cusp of the eighteenth century. Winged, head in the skies, covered with tongues, ears, and eyes, she projects fearsome power. Detail from engraving by Pierre Lombart, in Dryden's verse translation of *The Aeneid* (1697), plate facing 303. Courtesy Special Collections Library, University of Michigan Library.

As groundless rumor shades into news, rumor also shades into legend. For rumor may come in patterns, it may time and again take flight, rising in revised form, adjusting to the new currents blown by its host population, and it may do so repeatedly, across generations. This observation is itself ancient. Hesiod, writing in the eighth century BCE, put it in verse:

> Of all the rumors ever spread, not one has ever died
> Completely; she herself's a kind of goddess, as you see.[25]

Immortality aside, a signal strength of rumor is that, for all its currency, it can become an embedded social fact. This aspect of rumor is one powerful reason for the tremendous, famous, and even ancient difficulty faced by those who would control or dispel false reports. Hesiod, again, put it strongly:

> For rumor is an evil, insubstantial, light, and vain
> Easy to raise but hard to bear, and hard to put aside.[26]

Some of the rumors that surface in this book, or some of their constituent elements, outlasted and continue to outlast human lifetimes, a pattern that poses the question of "legend." To name a claim "rumor" is to call into question its truth, its origin, its authorship; the same holds for legend. Rumor draws force from its currency—from its bearing on events at the time of its telling. Legend is historical; it draws force from its explicit claim to cultural authority. Both rumor and legend can only thrive in a medium, a social context, of shared expectations, Since the early twentieth century we have called this medium, variously, worldview, collective consciousness, ideology, mentality, discourse, episteme, expectation, and even hegemonic discourse—vast academic disputes inhabit the commas between these words and phrases.[27] I sidestep the semantic fray, exploring the stuff of the rumors and legends themselves.

A category of rumors, as folklorists identify it, takes on patterns and narratives sustained through generations. There are scholars who call this patterned form of rumor "legend," as in an "urban legend" or a "contemporary legend"; others dispute the usage. Scholars seeking tidy definitions for the terms have not come to much agreement, especially in defining where rumor ends and where legend begins. Most agree, though, that "legend" implies a narrative, usually of a historical nature, that culminates in some conclusion; the contemporary currency of the story and its lack of conclusion, by contrast, power "rumor." Most acknowledge that the term "legend" suggests something passed down generationally, even if it is simply the resurrected skeleton of an old story that is fleshed out with current concerns. Sociologists or folklorists writing about "urban," "contemporary," or "modern" legends generally acknowledge that these are simultaneously rumors. As legends, these groundless stories carry certain formulaic elements from the past, they ad-

here to a certain structure that, however flexible, has high durability, but they also ride on the currents of contemporary concern, uncertainty, and ambiguity that characterize rumor.[28] Some psychologists and sociologists have debated whether rumors can stabilize into more traditional legends—the believed but unreliable folk tales of the past.[29] One folklorist even suggests that the reverse is possible, that an old legend can degenerate into a core statement without much in the way of narrative or conclusion, that is, into a rumor. In this view, legends and rumors may feed each other. Another folklorist largely agrees, observing that rumors and legends differ "only in the degree of completeness, the variants together contribute to individual narrative forms."[30]

Rumor and legend overlap, then, as classifications of professional folklore studies. "Urban legends" or "contemporary legends" have become established as subcategories of both rumor and legend. To say, for example, that a nearby fast-food chicken outlet serves up fried rat, to convey that an alligator or python creeps in the next subway tunnel, to spread bigoted stories about Jewish plots in France or Roman Catholic or, today, Muslim, conspiracies against the U.S. Constitution, is to speak with varying intensity of emotion in the language of rumor and legend. Each old, often hateful, story retains its elemental framework as it circulates anew in a contemporary context. Formulaic in content, like legends, such rumors claim an urgency lacking in narrated legend.[31]

Curiously, Bloch preferred in his 1921 piece the word *légend* to *rumeur*, without distinguishing between the two at all. Of course, he wrote in French; the cognates are inexact: his word for "history" could be the same as ours for "story." Bloch certainly distinguished professional history from legend, but we cannot doubt that historians inhabit cultures. However professional in training, however careful with our sources, we historians are susceptible to collective expectations that can lead us to mistake old ungrounded stories for real events. Our stories, our histories, confront the forces that shape traditional legend.[32] The experiences of the American frontiers left early republican citizens with deep expectations that still inform scholarly interpretations.

Although this book concerns itself with legends, some of which still live, it does not set out to dent the new field of memory studies. The word "memory" occurs infrequently within this text, and when it does, it generally refers to living memory, that is, to a proximate past. This study shares some genealogy with works in memory studies, and the work confronts some of that field's central issues: the representation of suffering and atrocity; the impor-

tance of countervailing narratives about the past; and the deployments of the past for social, political, and cultural purposes (especially for constructions of identity). The mediation of the past, through legend, bears on memory studies, too. But where works in memory studies lean on more recent appropriations of historical events and places—through various commemorations, monuments, or exhibits, for example—this work mainly seeks to investigate the power and significance that literally groundless rumors and legends held in their own day, even if some of those tales persist and distort history. Memory, as the academy tends to have it today, is rooted in sites; rumor is less grounded. It has its head, with Fama, in the clouds.[33]

Although groundlessness is characteristic of rumor, although rumor and legend thrive in such preconditions as dangerous prejudice, it is important to recall that rumors can be true. Even false rumors may contain elements of truth.[34] On these points scholars, from lexicographers to psychologists, generally agree. Dictionaries define "rumor" less by its relation to truth than by its lack of evidence. As it circulates, a rumor is always "unverified or of uncertain origin"; to its tellers and hearers, it has neither identifiable source nor "known authority for its truth," it is "not based on definite knowledge," and it lacks "clear evidence" for its "truth." Definitions for "legend" are remarkably similar: a legend is "an unverified story," it is "historical though not verifiable," or it is "a body of such stories" (as in the legend of El Dorado, the so-called Black Legend, or even the Arthurian Legend). Whether a single tale or a collection, a legend is "unauthentic" and "popularly regarded as historical."[35]

As rumor shades into legend, it also shades into speculation. Indeed, the words "idle" and "foolish" attach themselves with ease to either "rumor" or "speculation." Most speculation is not properly rumor. Speculation makes no truth claim and it marshals what evidence it has. But much rumor is practically speculative. Claims of truth in rumor are often accompanied by admissions of doubt: "I have heard," "it is said," "Though I do not know how they know, they say that . . ." And so on. Like speculation, rumor can serve to ferret out the truth.

The Experiment

This work rides upon the wings of Fama to survey early eastern North American frontiers for three and a half centuries from the sixteenth forward. It takes opportunities from its encounters with rumor and legend to tell new

stories about history and, sometimes, about the writing of history. It treats some of these stories along longitudes; that is, it follows them, as they recur through time. British colonists and republican citizens spoke in optimistic rumors about lost Spanish mines in Indian Country; they spoke in fearful rumors of Spanish, French, or even British efforts to subjugate them through the deployment of Indian gunmen. American revolutionaries rumored about British efforts to have them scalped, while British soldiers reversed the tale. Native Americans rumored about colonial intentions to unman the men, to violate the women, to enslave the people—or to destroy them all, with disease. Such serious stories cascaded down the centuries. Yet other rumors rode upon specific and immediate concerns, generating highly local panics. I treat a few such episodes, examining particular stories around a particular murder or a specific hoax. The study holds, with the foundational scholarship of the early twentieth century, that rumors and legends bear witness to widely shared beliefs and understandings. It mostly concerns the beliefs and understandings of diverse peoples in the colonial and early national eras; sometimes it confronts the beliefs of our time.

We begin in the North American Southeast, with rumors and legends of gold from the sixteenth century to the American Revolution. We end, again in the Southeast, with a dark story of gold in the Jacksonian age of Indian removal. Between these dangerously gilded bookends, *the study* covers much of eastern North America. It dwells somewhat more on the Cherokees of the Great Smoky Mountains than it does on the Ojibwes of the Upper Great Lakes, and it focuses more on those two groups than on others. But it is not a history of either people. The book moves as far northeast as Baffin Island and as far south as peninsular Florida as it examines not only the quest for gold, but the centrality of slavery, the fear of disease, the struggles among empires, and the concerns with violence, status, and autonomy.

Historians strive, according to our professional training, to "get it right" and to "keep the facts straight." But as we hold beliefs, and as we share these with others who often reinforce them, historians can fall prey to the forces that propel flying reports and sustain legend. Attention to rumor demands that historians attend also to their expectations for the past, allowing the research to upset them. As I have chased down rumor and legend, as I have pursued bad evidence and captured it for analysis, I have reached unexpected conclusions about both the early American frontiers and how we think of them today.

1. Gold: The Legend in Black

The great lake disappeared. Nestled within the southern Appalachians, for more than a century it anchored vibrant Indian communities, where men and women wore ornaments of gold, silver, and pearls, easily found in a nearby stream that fell from the highlands and drained toward the Atlantic. By the seventeenth century, when England planted permanent colonies along the southeastern North American coast, steel-clad Spanish conquerors had already subdued these Indians of the Appalachians, forcing them to extract precious ores in Iberia's expansive and cruel quest for empire. Someday, many English said, they or their descendants would get their hands on those riches. The enormous lake, greater in surface area than Lake Champlain or any of the Finger Lakes of the Northeast, but perhaps not so large as either Florida's great Lake Okeechobee or the truly Great Lakes of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, vanished before the age of the American Revolution. But the dreams of gold and the stories of Spain did not disappear with it. The lake drained away harmlessly to nature, harmlessly to man. The dreams of gold, by contrast, destroyed many a life. First a rumor, then a legend, the lake survives where it always and only truly existed: in imaginative texts and skillfully executed sixteenth- and seventeenth-century maps, tinted with gold, described in Latin, and often associated, vaguely, with Spain.[1] The dreams of gold opened the colonization of North America, and they open this book. At the book's close, they come true.

Early English colonists and later American citizens long recalled the sixteenth century as a Spanish era, characterized by quests for riches and abuses of Indians. The stories generally focused on the West Indies, Mexico, and Peru, but their range extended surprisingly northward and westward beyond Florida and into the southern Appalachian Mountains and Lower Mississippi Valley. Told increasingly during the Elizabethan era and still with fierce conviction after the Glorious Revolution, recurring rumors and early legends of

Spain and gold cast both negative judgments and a jealous eye on real and imagined Spanish conquests, abandoned Spanish enterprises, and discovered but neglected unmined treasures lying beneath Indian Country. The stories concerned the highly symbolic substance, gold (along with other precious metals), and they had an allure that exceeded national vanity and religious bigotry; they promised great wealth in its most fundamental form.[2] This chapter follows these stories about Native Americans, great interior treasures, and—often—Spain, into the eighteenth century; the book's conclusion will pursue the stories from the Revolution into the Jacksonian era of American Indian removal.

The stories of Spanish activity in the North American Southeast fit into a larger body that gained notoriety in the twentieth century as the Black Legend. The modern title, *La Leyenda Negra*, coined by Spanish nationalists in the late nineteenth century, aptly captures a critique of British and Anglo-American prejudice. An amalgam of stories and images rather than a single narrative, the Black Legend descended generationally from the Elizabethan era well into the period of professional historical writing. It held, as the late David Weber put it, "that Spaniards were unusually cruel, avaricious, treacherous, fanatical, superstitious, cowardly, corrupt, decadent, indolent, and authoritarian." Historians since the mid-twentieth century have generally scorned it as a thin, sanctifying concoction—poison to any professional history.[3] In the Tudor and Stuart eras, however, when Catholic Spain and Protestant England often stood at odds, readers might easily accept Richard Hakluyt's ordinary accusation that Spaniards possessed "fame-thirsty and gold-thirsty minds." English writers deplored Spanish cruelty as they argued for England's maritime expansion. The stories spoke beyond cruelty, they spoke to riches, and Spain's dazzling rise to world authority impressed readers with fabulous tales of gold. Stories of Spain in America justified and enticed the English westward enterprise.[4]

This chapter examines those nuggets and jewels that sparkled within the stories of eastern North America from the Age of Discovery through the Age of Revolution. Gold and silver lined the Black Legend's dark cloud as it cast its shadow across the North American seaboard. Rumors of gold and other riches, notions of Spanish encounters with mineral wealth, cast a colonial spell on this Indian Country, and the magic worked for centuries. A recurring legend, for example, that Spain had once found treasures that still awaited rediscovery in eastern North America, appears as history in a foundational late nineteenth-century work on Cherokee history and culture. American

anthropologist James Mooney asserted that Spain knew definitively of and actually exploited Cherokee gold mines in the southern Appalachians: "the existence of mines of gold and other metals in the Cherokee country was a matter of common knowledge among the Spaniards at St. Augustine and Santa Elena, and more than one expedition had been fitted out to explore the interior." Mooney accepted reports from his own day of the rediscovery of long-forgotten Spanish mine shafts in the Great Smoky Mountains; he considered the history of Spanish gold digs in the Appalachians as a "fact," hidden "from the outside world." As Mooney well knew, the southern Appalachians did contain valuable metals and crystals; indeed, gold discoveries in the 1820s would grievously endanger the Cherokee Nation. But Mooney's fact was Anglo-American legend, and as of this writing, good evidence for successful Spanish colonial mining operations in the Appalachians has yet to pan out.[5]

Other scholars have approached stories of lost colonial treasure in eastern North America for evidence of the early American Republic's rural folk culture, its popular religion, and its experience of rapid economic change. They have identified scores of legends of lost treasure—including those of abandoned Spanish mines—in the southern parts of the Old Louisiana Territory, and they find in these stories rationalizations for the Anglo-Americans' efforts to take the continent.[6] This chapter adds that in the North American Southeast, such legends did more than reveal patterns of early American thought, important as that is. They propelled incursions that decimated populations and encouraged colonization. The book's conclusion reveals that the stories attended the deadly expulsion of thousands of people from their homelands.

Spain and the Southeast

From 1513 to the 1570s, the Spanish encounter with southeastern American Indians produced stories of riches that lay in the land. Francisco de Garay, who commissioned the exploration of the Gulf region in 1519, introduced early rumors of eastern North American gold to readers.[7] Garay reported a pleasant and productive land, dotted with towns, watered with "many rivers carrying fine gold, as the Indians demonstrated by certain samples," among them the ornaments they wore in pierced body parts.[8] The stories evolved into legend after 1521, when two Spanish caravels, hovering far to the east on the Atlantic off the southeastern North American shore, lured hospitable

people aboard and carried them off as slaves. One of the captives gained the name Francisco de Chicora, the forename conferred on him at his christening by Roman Catholics. He fell into the hands of Lucas Vásques de Ayllón, a powerful figure in the Spanish West Indies. With his new master, in 1523 Chicora crossed to Spain, where, learning Spanish, he told of North American lands that abounded with mineral wealth, Mediterranean fruits, a race of giants, and a stub-tailed species of human. More accurately, he spoke of rich soil and pearls. His stories encouraged Ayllón's organization, promotion, and deployment of an expedition of five hundred colonizers, who left Española in 1526, landing in what we now call the Sea Island area of Georgia and South Carolina. They met disaster as their vessels wrecked with a near total loss of provisions. Chicora and others similarly enslaved retook their freedom, abandoning the isolated colonists. The venture collapsed, and only 150 people returned to Spanish territories, leaving behind a dead Ayllón. Importantly, Ayllón had sought more than mineral riches, as the presence of colonists, livestock, and Dominican missionaries attests. But he had believed that beneath Chicora's stories of wealth lay "the treasure that had been granted him."[9] Hoodwinked by his former captive, he lay dead without treasure in the North American Southeast, a place the Spanish continued to call Chicora. Europeans did not bury Chicora's stories with Ayllón. While in Spain, Chicora had met the chronicler of the Indies, Pietro Martire d'Anghiera (Peter Martyr), who published his tales, which circulated in various European languages. Europeans read that precious minerals and pearls lay near Chicora.[10]

The most densely settled part of eastern North America, the Southeast hosted hierarchical chiefdoms, characteristic of what archaeologists style the "Mississippian" cultural tradition. Gold did not enrich the Mississippian peoples, but they, their descendants, and many of their Indian neighbors placed a high value on certain reflective objects that might, according to their sacred traditions, energize the powers of an "Upper World," presided over by the sun, moon, thunder, and many other benevolent forces. Native peoples of this southeastern tradition employed shiny mica and polished copper for ritual and ceremonial purposes. They wore pearls—the freshwater variety formed in river mussels. Crystals, if not diamonds, also lay in the region, the coasts of which Spain increasingly buffeted in the sixteenth century.

The ill-fated 1528 Spanish expedition of Pánfilo de Narváez charged a major relay in the rumor history of America. Narváez landed in Tampa Bay on April 2, 1528, and his men scoured the first village they came upon for

gold, opening graves and finding nothing but a small "gold drum." With pantomime, shouts, and torture, they interrogated the local Timucuan people, showing samples of gold and demanding more. The desperate victims explained to the invaders, presumably through gestures and signs, that the people of "Apalachen" to the north possessed everything "the Christians valued." Narváez and the main body of some three hundred men pursued their improvised interpretations overland into Appalachee Country. Three months later, they reached Apalachen (the vicinity of modern-day Tallahassee), but they found neither gold nor much hope of reuniting with the ships from which they had separated themselves months before. Their *entrada* degenerated into a desperate retreat, a starved quest by hundreds of wretched invaders who, without knowledge of longitude, greatly underestimated the distance, 1,300 miles along the coast, of their goal, the nearest Spanish mainland post at Pánuco. Torn between a hostile countryside and the open waters, they ingeniously assembled and embarked in rough coastal craft, boats unworthy of the open sea, else they would have aimed for Cuba. Two of the four vessels got as far as modern coastal Texas, still less than halfway to the goal. From there, four men alone of the entire expedition are known to have returned to Spanish territory, not, however, to Pánuco, and not along the coast. Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca left an extraordinary account of the journey into the interior, and with his fellow travelers he brought back stories of golden cities. Those fables mainly concerned the American Southwest, widely known and beyond the broad scope of this book.[11] But the Narváez expedition left another, less-known, breathing legacy to the rumor history of eastern North America: a fifth survivor, Juan Ortiz.

Ortiz had remained in Florida with Timucua Indians, and over the next eleven years he thoroughly learned their Muskogean language. Ortiz would have his own things to say to the next Spanish *entrada*. Led by Hernando de Soto, some seven hundred men, half of them mounted, landed at Tampa Bay in the late spring of 1539. The true stuff of legends in black and gold, veteran of the colonial invasions of "Darien, Panama, and Nicaragua," veteran, too, of Pizarro's fantastic exploits in Peru, de Soto possessed a commission to conquer the province of Florida. Soon after landing, his force found Ortiz, and for the next two years, until his death on the Arkansas River in the winter of 1541–1542, Ortiz provided the expedition with a crucial link in a chain of translation from several Indian languages, through Timucua, to Spanish. Along that brittle chain, through Ortiz's ears and tongue, flowed Indian rumors of riches beyond.[12]

Rumor did not require Ortiz, however; it was more a collaborative Spanish creation than an error in translation. At Anhaica (what is now Tallahassee), the Spaniards attempted conversation with an Indian slave who spoke a language unintelligible to any in the group. His interrogators understood him to describe the vast gold-mining province of "Yupaha." The boy's apparent description of the northern Indians' metallurgy left the interrogators so convinced that one chronicler remarked that if the youth had not seen the techniques with his own eyes, then the devil must have "taught him." And yet, the youth spoke in "signs." As the Spanish read the refinement process into the child's gestures, they, like Narváez before them, improvised, and their "improvised news" encouraged de Soto's deep penetration of North America. Clanking after rumor through the interior, the *entrada* presents the classic case of rumors gone bad.[13]

In the spring of 1540 de Soto and his men marched to their great objective, Cotifachequi on the Savannah River in the Piedmont. There they indeed found freshwater pearls, stripping many of them from graves. What's more, they found a flourishing Mississippian polity headed by a "queen." But they found no precious metals. As de Soto's band moved westward and upland pursuing more stories of riches, a member claimed to have found "a bit of gold" in a stream. Ortiz provided the translation when a native leader—anxious to remove invaders who had already demanded thirty women for their sexual pleasure—reported that in Chisca, to the north, Indians worked both copper and a useless, soft metal that resembled copper, though "of much more perfect color." Yet as the expedition pushed through the mountains and valleys of the Southeast toward the Mississippi River, it got nothing but stories, and it shrank through desertion and death. De Soto himself died in 1542, not long after Ortiz, whose death brought babel. Contemporary Spanish chroniclers would condemn de Soto for his cruelty, and they would hoist his fruitless example as a warning to those who would imitate Pizarro. But de Soto's history of rape, murder, extortion, and ignoble death mixed dark deeds with southeastern gold. Still bearing the promise of gold, the survivors' reports opened opportunities for European rumor.[14]

The Spanish discussion of southeastern riches animated French efforts, about which the English would soon read. René Goulaine de Laudonnière planned to acquire the "good quantities of Gold and Silver" said to be enjoyed by Florida's Indians. He led the establishment of French Fort Caroline, composed of some three hundred Huguenots, in July 1564 at the Atlantic

mouth of the St. John's River in Peninsular Florida. And they did find real gold among the indigenous Timucua people, who had gathered it, not in streambeds or mine shafts, but in the wreckage of Spanish ships. Laudonnière knew that shipwrecks formed a source for Timucua jewelry, but he also believed that indigenous gold lay in the Appalachians. Echoing the stories of Chicora, he heard of a beautiful city under the leadership of Chiquola. Laudonnière's associate, Jacques Le Moyne, drew and illustrated a map of the entire Southeast in 1565, and he placed the town of "Apalatci" in what would become known as the Appalachian Mountains. Here Indians obtained silver grains. Belgian Theodore DeBry published a version of Le Moyne's map, and based on Laudonnière, Le Moyne, and earlier Spanish accounts, he engraved a 1591 image of the Indians' "Mode of Collecting gold in the Streams Running from the Apalatcy Mountains": they waded into the shallows, plunged hollow reeds into streambed, and extracted heavy baskets' worth of the precious metal. Laudonnière's own confused account identified a "streame of golde or copper," which the Indians mined with reeds for "grains of copper and silver." He understood that the "mountains of Apalatcy" contained "mines of perfect gold."[15]

Pedro Menéndez de Avilés led Spanish forces to conquer and destroy the French colony in September 1565. Menéndez executed most of the Protestants. He then embarked on an enterprise based on the grossly mistaken impression that the Atlantic coast of the Southeast could provide useful access to the very real Zacatecas silver mines of New Spain. To determine this overland route, he sent Juan Pardo into the interior on two *entradas* (1566–1569) from the Atlantic coast across the Appalachians. These expeditions ruled out any easy road to Mexico, but they left behind more stories: crystals and probable silver lay in the southern highlands of eastern North America. Such stories, such recurring rumors, had surfaced before and would resurface again.[16] The English read in Richard Hakluyt's volumes of "mountains of golde and Chrystall Mines," known to Spain but as yet unexploited, "named Apalatci," which lay near some enormous lake. The same volumes contained stories of Pizarro, who returned with such quantities of gold from Peru that his men shoed their horses with the ore. As the late historical anthropologist Charles Hudson put it, "As time went on . . . these bits of information were embellished through telling and retelling to create the 'Legend of Chicora,' which told of fabulous wealth that could be had in the land."[17] Remarkably, the poorly grounded stories lived through the entire British colonial era in southeastern North America.



There are elements of Le Moyne in this English version of a Dutch map that elaborates on the fictitious, waterfall-fed lake, from which Indians mine riches. Note the activity in the illustration, evocative of both Le Moyne and English tales from the days of Roanoke. [Arnoldus Montanus] in John Ogilby, Virginiae partis australis, et Floridae partis orientalis interjacentium regionum Nova Descriptio, in John Ogilby, *America* (London, 1671). William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

Northern Echoes

The rumors grabbed French and English Christians even as these Christians kidnapped Indians. Jacques Cartier sailed from France to North America, in several voyages beginning in 1534. On the first, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, he seized two young Iroquoian-speaking men, Domagaya and Taignoagny, whom he brought back to Europe both as proof of his success and as sources of information. Like Francisco de Chicora a decade earlier, they survived Europe and made the return crossing with Cartier on his second expedition, which sailed up the broad St. Lawrence River in 1535 as far as Cape Diamond

(modern-day Quebec City). Cartier there returned them to their distraught families and to the community of Stadacona Indians. Amid palpable tensions between the French seamen and the highly suspicious Iroquoians, other Stadaconas, signaling and pointing to objects, supposedly told the mariner remarkable stories of the interior. "[W]ithout encouragement" they took silver and gold items adorning French officers and "shewed us that such stuffe came from the said River." The French and Stadaconas improvised the false news that farther in the interior lay the kingdom of the Saguenay, where city-dwellers dressed in cloth and held a "great store of gold and red copper."[18] Perhaps kernels of truth lay in the hybridized pod of stories: impressive villages of other Iroquoians did mark the interior. Native Americans in the Great Lakes region (as in much of North America) did value "the luster and reflective quality of crystal and shell."[19] Indians did trade widely in copper—including copper mined in the Great Lakes. The stories impressed the navigator, and he wanted them heard in France, so he kidnapped ten Stadaconas—men, women, and children—and carried them captive across the Atlantic, where they did not long survive.

On the strength of these stories, King Francis I sponsored a third expedition, expressly so that Cartier might gain "knowledge of the Country of Saguenay," which boasted "great riches, and very good countreys." On this voyage, Cartier failed to reach rumored Saguenay, and the aggrieved and mourning Stadaconas whom he met again in the St. Lawrence Valley proved decidedly uncooperative, unwilling to accept his lies about the fate of their people. Giving up on Saguenay, Cartier reported the presence in the St. Lawrence Valley of many false riches (imagined veins of gold, "stones like Diamonds," signs of silver), and he returned to France with quartz crystals that put embarrassing exclamation points behind the mariner's subjection to Iroquoian rumor and forever tarnished his reputation. For a time, when one spoke in France of "Canadian diamonds," one meant worthless rock crystal.[20]

The false news of great interior riches reached an outrageous peak in the narrative of David Ingram, published in Richard Hakluyt's influential 1589 edition of *Voyages*. The story had it that Ingram, lost somewhere near Florida in 1568, wandered thousands of miles northward to near Cape Breton, discovering lands so rich that the inhabitants, though poor in cloth, wore silver on one wrist and gold on the other. Filled with absurdities and falsehoods, the account speaks mainly to the widespread belief that plentiful riches lay north of Mexico in some fabulous city. Such recurring talk led a

later and more successful colonizer, Samuel de Champlain of France, contemptuously to note that "those who mention it never saw it."[21]

English navigator Martin Frobisher needed no transatlantic fables to misguide him; his expedition proved able to unleash rumors on its own. Seeking a northwest passage to Asia, Frobisher sailed in two small craft in 1576 to the bays, fjords, and glaciers of enormous and mountainous Baffin Island. A very fine mariner, even by the high standards of England, he was no diplomat, and he quickly alienated the indigenous people, to whom he soon lost five men. He was no geologist, either, and where he lacked expertise and knowledge, rumor filled the gaping voids. Believing he had discovered in Frobisher Bay the desired Northwest Passage to Asia, he returned to England, carrying with him a captive Inuit man, who fell ill and died shortly after disembarking. Frobisher also carried samples of black stone, thought to contain gold. Chronicler George Best wrote, "the hope of more of the same golde Ore to be found, kindled a greater opinion in the heartes of man to advance the voyage again." Rumors that gold lay beneath the Arctic surface prompted heavy investment in two impressive future voyages, explicitly for mining, undertaken in 1577 and 1578.[22]

The two expeditions later heaved homeward toward England, laden with around 1,550 tons of worthless rock. The second of the three expeditions also carried three captives, a man, a woman, and a child. Frobisher had tried to take others, and received an arrow in his buttocks during a scuffle on ice. The various accounts of his expeditions are full of kayaks outpacing English vessels and outraged Inuit scrambling away before Englishmen less nimble in the Arctic.[23] Frobisher's expensive failures both cooled the brief European ardor for northern gold and contributed to new mineralogical theories that associated precious metals with the sun's heat, hot climates, and southern latitudes—closer to the Spanish Empire. Future voyagers to America's colder parts thought of futures in fish, furs, and farms. Indians and their lands might provide wealth; gold, not forgotten, lay chronologically in the past and geographically to the south.

Virginia, Carolina, Georgia

When English and French voyagers entered southeastern North America, they still rumored of gold and Spain. Actual gold and silver shipped from and transshipped across the Americas attracted much English attention. Silver mines in Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico produced unprecedented riches,

exported in heavy ships that splashed to Spain along predictable, potentially vulnerable, sea-lanes. In several earlier voyages between 1562 and 1568, John Hawkins had exploited other Iberian weaknesses. He had plundered African coastal towns and Portuguese slavers. He had taken African people as slaves, crossed the Atlantic, and exchanged them in Spanish American ports for precious stones and metals. A decade later, Hawkins' collaborator, Sir Francis Drake, had successfully and directly plundered Spanish treasure fleets.[24]

The stories of Appalachian gold in greater La Florida suggested to some English hopefuls that they might imitate rather than plunder Spain. Military beachheads, followed by colonies, would be the seat of exploration and exploitation. Indians alienated by Spanish exploitation would rally to the Elizabethans. With a charter from Queen Elizabeth, Sir Walter Raleigh cosponsored several expeditions to the islands, banks, and shoals of coastal North Carolina from 1584 through 1587. These Roanoke voyages, intended partly to establish a privateering station aimed at Spanish shipping, also chased the possibility of more reliable riches; indeed, the queen expressly reserved the right to a one-fifth portion of gold and silver. On the first expedition, the Englishmen met Roanoke people who wore pearl bracelets and copper ornaments; they harvested the pearls locally, the copper they obtained in trade. Philip Amadas and Arthur Barlow closely observed in 1584 a headpiece on one leading Indian, too jealous to let them handle it; the item seemed to be made not of copper but gold, for "it would bow very easily." When Thomas Hariot described the expeditions in his *Brief and True Report* (1588), he falsely identified copper mines in the region; he also claimed that an Englishman had obtained a great many pearls, which happened to spill overboard on a voyage to England "through extremity of a storme." He echoed Laudonnière, though he claimed to have heard it directly from Indians, that in the interior were "mountains and rivers that yeeld also white grains of metall, which is deemed to be silver."[25]

Ralph Lane, a leader of the second, and disastrous, English expedition to Roanoke Island, sought more than copper or freshwater pearls. In 1586 he journeyed with forty men up the Roanoke River in pursuit of a rumored mining country called "Chaunis Temoatan." It lay beyond the country of the Mangoack people, and in it a stream ran rich with a copper-like metal, but softer and paler. Lane sensed gold. Indians simply caught the rich ore in bowls as it fell down the cataracts, and they possessed it in such abundance that they plated their homes with it. Lane never came close to reaching Chaunis Temoatan, for Indians prevented his passing. Seeking precious metals in the

interior, he found hunger in his belly. He had expected to command food from the inhabitants along the way, but they rejected the English. Shortages forced him to return to Roanoke Island, where his colony thoroughly alienated the native people with its constant demands for food. Violence and threatening famine forced Lane and most of the Englishmen to return to England. The fate of the weak, hungry, fifteen-man garrison he left behind is unknown. The Roanoke colony established the following year, a true settlement of men, women, and children, vanished more famously from history, but rumors of interior riches survived all calamities.[26]

"Gold was the big issue," historian Karen Kupperman writes of Jamestown, the first enduring English settlement in North America (1607). The colony's best-known early leader, John Smith, ridiculed his fellows' debilitating searches for gold, arguing that other work took priority. He scorned those who had come in search merely for "a lumpe of gold." He scolded the colonists for having "no talke, no hope, no worke, but dig gold, wash gold, [and] refine gold," as, like Frobisher before them, they loaded troughs with worthless ore and filled a stout hull with mica. Smith critically distinguished his hopes for English prosperity from that of imperial Spain, modeling his hopes, not on Spanish galleons and chests of treasure but on wooden Dutch ships and cargoes of fish. All this has earned him the respect of hard-working moderns. But Smith also had gold on his mind. He pursued rumors of precious metals to the Potomac River. He described in the Chesapeake region "such glittering tinctures that the ground in some places seemeth as gilded," though he conceded that, in his judgment, they revealed only "probabilities." And Smith did not speak for the full Virginia Company, which after all, actively recruited metallurgists and assayers for the enterprise.[27]

In speculating that Virginia would yield gold, the company's notions reflected science. As Kupperman notes, Smith's contemporaries understood that "the products—animal, vegetable, *and* mineral—would be the same" in any given latitude. The sun, according to the Virginia Company, stood "under god the first cause both of health and Riches."[28] Kupperman explains the concept that the sun's power and warmth both cultivate "gold, silver, and precious stones within the earth and draw them to the surface."[29] The idea echoed down the seventeenth century; as late as 1668 Governor Berkeley of Virginia hoped, in western explorations, to find "some mines of silver; for certaine it is that the spaniard in the same degree of latitude has found many."[30] Early modern thinkers speculated, then, that latitude made mineral wealth. Since rich strikes of precious metals had taken place at certain

latitudes, other strikes must follow in other places at the same latitudes. Spanish experience appeared to corroborate this; the English colonists pored over sketchy maps drawn from accounts of Spanish explorations, and they too posited Indian cities with nearby mines in the southern Appalachians.

As England established late seventeenth-century colonies in the Carolinas, the rumors of wealth in the interior found their way into metropolitan offices and archives. Less famously than sixteenth-century Spanish explorers, prominent English thinkers, a full century after Juan Pardo, entertained hopes for quick riches in the Appalachians, and these hopes found expression in rumor. Inland "discoveries" of gold by one Henry Woodward gained the attention of England's chancellor of the exchequer, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Ashley, a noted political writer, an employer of John Locke, and a Carolina proprietor. King Charles II had in 1665 bestowed on Ashley and six other proprietors a vast land grant that encompassed much of the Southeast south of Virginia, including "all Veins,sand Quarries, as well discovered as not discover'd, of Gold, Silver, Gems and Precious Stones . . . to be found within the Province," provided that the Crown receive "the fourth Part of all Goods [gold] and Silver Oar." Ashley, who would later, as the Earl of Shaftesbury, gain fame as an opponent of Catholic absolutism, had his eye in 1670 on Woodward's "discoveries" of gold. By letter, Woodward notified Ashley that he had undertaken an expedition in the summer of 1670 to "Cufytachyqj," that is, to de Soto's Cofitachique, which lay in the midst of a "second Paradize." Woodward assured his lordship that he had almost reached the mother lode. Ashley in reply cautioned Woodward to avoid in further correspondence any open references to precious metals, but to use code: "Pray call gold alwayes Antimony and Silver Iron by which I shall be able to understand you without any danger if your letters should fall into other hands." In 1674 Ashley further wondered if Carolinians might gain as allies the Kashita Indians, a "powerful nation said to have pearl and silver." These rich Kashitas, Ashley darkly speculated, might help Carolina eliminate other troublesome tribes.[31]

As Woodward rumored brightly and Ashley speculated darkly, John Lederer published an imaginative promotional tract, *The Discoveries of John Lederer from Virginia to West of Carolina and other Parts of the Continent* (1672), in which the Appalachians appear as an Indian Country groaning with "unwrought silver" and cratered with old, disused, "Spanish mines." Lederer found the "Ushery" Indians living near an enormous, brackish, lake in the Appalachians. While Lederer probably did travel from Virginia



The legendary Lake Ushery, based on the explorations of John Lederer, is renamed Ashley Lake in honor of a Proprietor. Gone are the map's explicit references to gold, but John Ogilby copies, from the map in the previous figure, the illustration of Indians harvesting riches from the waterfall-fed lake. John Ogilby, cartographer, James Moxen, engraver, "Description of Carolina," 1672. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

into the Appalachians, much of his account is fancy, and the lake is clearly based on maps and writings that reach back to Laudonnière and Le Moyne. Many were taken in. Among those who swallowed the lake was John Locke, or perhaps he went along with Lederer's fictions, as they would promote his lord's colony. Locke sketched a map or endorsed a sketched map that included the phantom body of water. Cartographers soon changed the lake's name from Ushery to Ashley, and though as early as 1682 it vanished from more accurate maps, it continued as a presence as late as 1719, in John Senex's widely distributed atlas.[32]

South Carolinian James Moore, who would become governor in 1700, searched without success for Lederer's mines in 1690. In 1698 Charleston

investors, still encouraged by Lederer's misinformation, ordered a new party of prospectors to comb the difficult terrain. The prospectors mounted the expedition, but their "Indian hunter" ran off, leaving them without either meat or interpreter. Moving up the Savannah River toward the mountains in 1699, they covered 170 miles, until one of their number, a "Mr. Good," drowned, and the expedition collapsed. Returning to Charleston without discoveries of Spanish mines and without gold, they found something remarkable: a European man. They found him in an Indian trading village at the river's fall line. Possibly a French deserter, this Jean Couture claimed the skills of "Goldsmith and jeweler." He briefly stirred the colonial government with a new mixture of rumor and fact.[33]

Historian Tom Hatley describes him as a "veteran of LaSalle and Tonti's explorations who had deserted the French to become a free-lance trader."[34] If true, Couture had already completed an arduous journey from the St. Lawrence to the Great Lakes and now to the southeastern Atlantic coasts as he accompanied the Carolinians to Charleston. For his strenuous efforts, he landed in jail, where the colonial governor, James Moore, treated him "barbarously" and grilled him about riches. The governor no doubt had cause to confine a potential enemy. Couture, for his part, later stated that the governor cared only for his knowledge of the interior's fabled mines. In fact, Moore had become deeply skeptical about the presence of Spanish mines, and he attributed all the talk to the presence of a false-silver stone that glittered in the Savannah River. Seeking freedom from Moore, Couture secured the services of two men, Edward Loughton and Richard Tranter, to plead for his release with the Board of Trade, the British committee charged with colonial matters. Couture promised to lead a new expedition that would prove the presence of the rumored interior wealth. Couture and his partners explained that Couture had explored lands a "hundred Leagues beyond the Appalleche Mountains," where he had found, in the streams, "fine gold in small grains of different bigness." He had "taken up four pound weight of Gold with my own hands," along with many "blew stones . . . which he verily believes were Lapis Lazuei." The Indians had shown him "many Pearls . . . of different sizes and some of good oriental color," which they had gathered from a "very Great Lake." As proof of all this, he had collected many samples in a box, which thieves, alas, had stolen (though he hinted to the board that the governor's secret discovery of the box had prompted his interrogations).[35] Couture, in short, read a well-mapped legend, with its grains of precious minerals, its placer-gold streams, and its great lake.

John Lawson's *A New Voyage to Carolina* (1702) echoed the Couture affair to suggest that mineral riches lay in the mountains beyond the Piedmont. Lawson discussed, in the ambiguous language of rumor, "some Discoveries of rich Mines in the mountanous Part of this Country." Only because the colonists lacked skilled mineralogists and only because the discoveries lay at a distance, the English had postponed their exploitation until "a more fit Opportunity happens." Lawson confidently predicted that Carolina would eventually produce mineral wealth. In "all new Countries," he asserted, it took time for the colonists to discover underground sources of wealth, and especially in a country like Carolina, where the Indians did no mining, "being a Race of Men least addicted to delving." But if the Indians scorned the spade, Lawson also suspected that they withheld information. Always willing to draw exact maps of the region, they refused to share knowledge of minerals in the land, and for good reason: they had learned that the English coveted "Silver and other Metals." As he put it, "say they, if we should discover these Minerals to the *English*, they would settle at or near these Mountains, and bereave us of the best Hunting-Quarters we have." If prudent Indians would not share their knowledge of the land, Lawson nonetheless believed that in time the English would find in the western parts of the colony "as good if not better Mines than those the *Spaniards* possess in *America*."[36]

Lawson likely had Couture in mind when he rumored recent discoveries. Couture's account, in any case, blends old European legend with an emerging pattern of rumoring throughout the southeastern borderlands. Couture, a trader, brought Indian news to colonists, who alerted the colonial government, which became enough involved to inform England, where the recorded false news survives to this day, bound in old leather. With dreadfully poor information of the interior, English settlers on the Atlantic rim paid close attention to all news, including rumors of mineral wealth, and their discussions often reached the legislatures, the governors' councils, the governors, and the metropolitan Board of Trade.

Investors also speculated—in the financial sense—about precious metals in southern Appalachian streams, putting their money where rumor's many mouths were. In 1711 William Byrd of Westover, a prominent Virginian, "procured a patent" from the governor's council in Williamsburg "for the gold mines" rumored to exist in New Kent County. The following year, he noted in his diary "news" of the discovery of a silver mine, which Governor Alexander Spotswood reported to the Board of Trade as having revived a "general opinion . . . that there are gold and silver mines" near the southern

reaches of the mountain chain. Simultaneously legend and rumor, the false report conformed to its earlier manifestations in many details; and yet, when the information hit William Byrd's ears, he called it "news." Formulaic in content, it was legend dating to the century of Chicora; urgent in currency, it was rumor.[37]

Even the greatest speculative disaster of the era carried rumors of gold. In 1717 the French Duke of Orleans chartered John Law's Compagnie d'Occident, also known as the Mississippi Company, the central player in the so-called Mississippi Bubble (1717–1720). That grave financial crisis shook Paris, France as a whole, and investors across Europe. Best known for his radical experiments with paper money, the Scottish financier Law also coveted the hard stuff: he followed precious metal. Echoing the notion that latitude meant gold, promoters of the company stressed the likelihood of strikes in Louisiana, and Law himself asserted that he owned samples of indigenous Louisiana gold.[38] Even as Law pioneered the edgy financial arrangements of the dawning age of capital, he nurtured the old legends of the so-called Age of Discovery.

Like founding Virginians and founding Carolinians, the founders of Georgia saw a Spanish sheen in gold. To be sure, Samuel Eveleigh, one of the leading promoters of the colony, realized that the surest way to colonial wealth lay less in extracting unproven minerals from hills than in extracting certain labor from African slaves. Nonetheless, in a 1735 letter in which he argued for the opening of Georgia to black slavery, he also reported rumors, laced with the day's best scientific reasoning, about anticipated mineral wealth of "vast Consequence to the British Nation." He had sent out prospectors to the "Cherakee Mountains," and he expected to provide James Ogelthorpe with "Some Samples of Metals in June Next." And not just any metals, but "Silver and Gold and other Metals," along with "Diamonds and other precious Stones." In the passive language of rumor, he reasoned this way: "I was informed some years since by a Credible Person, that the Richest Mines of Gold in New Mexico, lay in the Latitude of Thirty Six and Thirty Seven, [Right] Opposite to California, but that the Indians that possessed the Country were always at Warr with the Spaniards, so they gott but little of it." Eveleigh considered it likely that "the Cherakee Mountains being in the Same Latitude, . . . may contain the Same ore."[39]

Within a decade, two licensed Carolinian traders with the Cherokees, James Maxwell and Cornelius Dougherty, petitioned for colonial mining rights to a large tract of land in the Cherokee Nation. In 1743 they claimed that

they had long searched for "Mines and Minerals in the Cherokee Mountains and have lately had the good fortune to discover very good symptoms and appearances of Iron Tin Lead and Copper with a Mixture of Silver."[40] The government of South Carolina again buzzed about metals in the mountains, and the Georgia trustees in England soon joined the talk, as did the British Board of Trade. The idea emerged that even unfounded rumors of precious metals might do South Carolina some good.

Brief tensions over the petition first arose between South Carolina's upper and lower houses of assembly. Both houses doubted the evidence for the claimed strike, which was mere hearsay. Daniel Crawford testified that "Mr. Russell's son in the Cherokee Nation" had told him both of the discovery and that younger Russell had seen two "bars of silver refined from Cherokee silver ore." The upper house remained unconvinced: "an Enquiry did not appear to have been made, sufficiently by the committee, into the fact itself, whether a silver mine was discovered or not." Yet the body saw some benefit in the rumor, for it would encourage the immigration of "white men." The lower house, by contrast, worried about the threat the proposed mines might pose to the security of the colony—by drawing the interest of hostile France. A joint committee of the two houses met and concluded that by luring European Protestant settlers, the rumors of silver might both deflect French ambitions and Anglicize the Indians all at once: "such a number of whites among the Indians constantly residing, and having frequent intercourse with them, would by degrees introduce English customs, and manners among them, and possibly also intermarriages, between them which would be the most Effectual way as the French had already Experienced, of Securing those People in their own interest." The strategic political harmony around the productivity of rumor collapsed, however, on another question: if the rumors proved true, who should profit? William Bull, the lieutenant governor, declared that any work on interior mines required the Crown's express permission. By April 1744, the Board of Trade would announce that it concurred with Bull. The Georgia trustees in England, meanwhile, catching wind of the debate, insisted that if the silver mine indeed existed, "it is within the Province of Georgia."[41] The rumors set one government branch against another, one colony against another, and colony against metropolis, as colonizers argued over a fiction that they thought politically useful, that they doubted, but that they could not entirely disbelieve.

By this time, South Carolina both depended on race-based slavery and commonly spoke of "whites" as did no other British North American col-

ony. That the joint committee of the South Carolina legislature in the mid-1740s wrote favorably of "intermarriages" among "whites" and "Indians" as a manner of both Anglicizing the Cherokees and securing their alliance speaks loudly of the distance Carolinians saw by this time between independent Indian peoples and imported African slaves. Carolinian racism extended to Indians, but as it developed, it did so differently. Over the coming century, it would extend harshly, too. For gold would emerge in Cherokee Country, gold would indeed draw many "white men" into the Cherokee Nation, and intensifying racial prejudice would not overlook Cherokees, not even those of European ancestry. That, however, remains the subject of the conclusion of this book.

Speculation about mineral wealth in Cherokee Country survived the entire British colonial period. In 1756, while constructing a fort in the Overhills section of the Cherokee Nation, engineer John William Gerard De Brahm looked on the country as an "American Canaan," loaded with probable "metals, minerals, fossils and stones." The land yearned "for the hands [of] industry to receive its hidden treasures, which nature has been collecting and toiling since the beginning ready to deliver them up."[42] De Brahm may have spoken in metaphor, and he only speculated, but when George Milligan Johnston published his "Short Description of the Province of South Carolina" in 1770, Londoners could read that the Cherokees' mountains contained "Crystals of a beautiful water [luster or transparency] inferior only to the diamond."[43] De Brahm saw no great lake in Cherokee Country, but it may be worth observing that the section of the Little Tennessee River Valley on which he constructed British Fort Loudoun has long since been flooded, along with much of the rest of the greater Tennessee Valley, and there are today chains of immense, dammed lakes throughout the Southeast.

Shortly before the outbreak of the American Revolution, two additional episodes capped the colonial career of southeastern rumors of gold. From Tallysarn, Wales, one John Evans petitioned the king, seeking a grant to mine the deposits of "Gold and Silver" that he knew with certainty awaited him in several American regions. Evans claimed expertise in mineralogy, testifying that he had assayed North American samples that produced the precious metals. His screwy geography identified one region as "on the South side of the River Ohio or River Wabash and the East Side of the Missisipi." But another region, "behind the Carolinas," resonated with the entire fanciful history of eastern North American gold. He had come to these "Discoveries" by way of "a person or persons there who by long and Friendly Intercourse

with the Indians of those parts has assured your petitioner of his Friendship and Assistance." Not long after, another petition reached Crown officials. This one came from the Great Smoky Mountains, where the Cherokee trader William Turner claimed not only an expertise in mineralogy, but also the full knowledge of the Cherokee language and the full confidence of the Cherokee people. Indeed, they so trusted him that they had agreed to reveal their knowledge of "*almost* inexhaustible quantity's of Gold and Silver contained in a great number of Mines," and they conveniently required nothing in return "in lieu of this immense Treasure" but "common necessaries." Turner claimed that he had hired an assayer who had positively assessed two samples. He included with his petition the specialist's report, a supportive written "talk" by Towecke, a Cherokee leader of the region known as the Middle Settlements, and a recommendation as to his own trustworthiness and skill by Lieutenant C. Taylor, formerly of the South Carolina Independent Company, stationed at Fort Prince George near the Cherokee town of Keowee.[44] It had been more than two centuries since the drawing of the first maps fancying the mineral-rich land of Apalatcy.

Indians took note of all this activity. Their deepening experience with the British Atlantic encouraged their own interpretations of the British colonial quest for gold. The Cherokee leader, Saluy, criticized his British allies for paying "lazy, deformed white men with big bellies . . . a great deal of the [whites'] beloved stone for bearing the great name of warriors." A decade later, James Adair closely paraphrased the speech in his *History of the American Indians*. Cherokees understood the value Europeans placed, he wrote, on the "beloved yellow stone." William Bartram, who toured the region on the eve of the American Revolution, described Cherokees as "extremely jealous of white people traveling about their mountains, especially if they should be seen peeping in amongst the rocks, or digging up their earth."[45]

Rumoring in the English language of southeastern gold not only survived the American Revolution, but intensified during the early Republic, and it retained its Spanish inflection. The rumoring had abetted the English colonization of North America, just as it would abet the Jacksonian American dispossession of the Cherokees. This chapter has raised the Black Legend not to question the violence of Spanish colonialism but rather to examine its golden allure in the English-speaking world, particularly in the southern hills. Thoughts of gold brought thoughts of Spain and of Indians. What's more, rumors of the subterranean riches in the southern highlands drew frequent and eager "discoverers." Highly persistent, the rumors and legends

fed off one another, and they frequently led to bloodshed. When the rumors panned out, when prospectors indeed struck gold in Cherokee Country in 1829, the United States took actions that gave the lie to vibrant but yet unnamed Black Legend. The great Republic exposed southeastern Indians to "stormes of raging cruelties" of its own, legalistic, design.[46] Long before that gold rush, Indians faced an onslaught of invasion, sickness, and enslavement, which became fearful sources of their own rumors and legends.

2. Pox: The Blanket Truth

Smallpox blankets. A brace of fighting words, it is both a sentence and an emblem. Warm and tortuously killing, the ultimate insidious gift, the microbial Trojan Horse, the broken treaty par excellence: for Americans of a certain persuasion, smallpox blankets perfectly embody colonialism. Yet their symbolic force is surprisingly new. And their message is a far cry from other surprisingly enduring colonial images that put epidemics in the hands of an allied or angry God. Professional scholars tend to tread carefully on the subject of smallpox as weapon or judgment, as marker of colonial malevolence or indigenous deficiency, but they can trip nonetheless on the cultural hard wire of legend.

Disease accompanied war and forced removal.[1] Epidemics, which some scholars have described as accidental assassins beyond human responsibility, and which others have viewed as predators on some inherent indigenous weakness, have more recently been firmly attached to the dislocations of war. Slave raiding that for a half-century after 1670 wracked the Southeast, for example, generated at least one massive smallpox epidemic. Generations later, the American Revolution gave the same virus a joy ride.[2] Long before even these events, Indians said colonists killed them with sickness. Curiously, they rarely mentioned blankets. Colonists by contrast often faulted Indians themselves. Colonizers left most records, and history has not shaken free.[3]

This chapter attends to stories of smallpox and to the role of those stories in legend and history. It focuses on both indigenous and colonial stories about disease, stories that held humans accountable, stories in which men unleashed the plagues, deliberately, negligently, or by provoking the supernatural. The chapter first examines a range of early American rumors of disease, providing a brief sense of the interpretations available to Indians and colonists. Along the way, the chapter explores the critical question of blame: how might seventeenth- and eighteenth-century peoples have considered human re-

sponsibility for disease? The chapter then turns to the surrender of Fort William Henry in 1757, which produced a powerful colonial story of smallpox that has infected professional history. The story is "colonial" in two senses: it originated before the American Revolution and it rationalizes Indian dispossession. The third set of stories flips this pattern; instead of modern historians falling prey to rumor and legend, it finds a legend sprouting from historians' carefully documented works. Published histories, this chapter finds, form a major source for the contemporary smallpox blanket legend. Between 1870 and the mid-twentieth century, archival research established beyond doubt that the garrison at Fort Pitt attempted in 1763 to infect enemy Delaware Indians with smallpox. That crime, previously unknown, generated among the literate American public a much broader legend, rich with symbolism.

Rumor bears a metaphorical resemblance to disease: it spreads rapidly through anonymous vectors, and it thrives in large assemblages. In the late seventeenth century John Dryden's verse translation of Virgil's *Aeneid* called rumor "the great Ill" and "the flying plague." Both rumor and disease are ephemeral but recurring. Both love war and commerce; both also love love—charitable, familial, affectionate, and sexual. In this effort to look at rumors about disease, the lines between groundless rumor (with all its contemporary force), unsubstantiated legend (with all its cultural power), and professional history (with all its technical prowess) are easily breached.[4] The history of disease raises enormous problems of evidence, and it therefore opens much room for interpretation. No less than our continental predecessors in the eighteenth century, we, professional historians, stitching our stories from ambiguous and incomplete data, sew with threads of ideology, with what passes for common sense. It should not surprise us that we sometimes advance culturally forceful but groundless stories as empirical history, that we propagate and legitimate them, that we rumor and spin yarns.

Holding Europe to Account

Indians regularly pinned responsibility for the new diseases on Europeans. English adventurer Thomas Hariot stated as early as the sixteenth century that disease left the Indians in "wonderful admiration" of the English who visited North America. Hariot, cruising in the 1580s through the coastal waters of North Carolina and Virginia, found that when disease and other misfortune struck the people, "they would impute to us the cause." Strange

diseases encouraged the leader of the Roanoke Indians, Wingina, to request that the English prove their fidelity by deploying the scourges against his enemies. The English understood that Indians associated them with illnesses even before the sun rose on an enduring English colony.[5]

That inglorious 1607 sunrise, at Jamestown in the Chesapeake Bay region, produced few if any Native American stories in which colonists unleash epidemics, and the lack is no wonder. The settlers displayed few special powers over disease: they died in droves, and for decades, but yet kept spilling out of English boats. Indians observed colonists in the prime of life shivering with agues and fevers or shrinking with bloody fluxes. Powhatan, the regional leader, did indicate to Englishman John Smith that the land had been swept by epidemics before the Jamestown settlement, and although Smith took it as God's work, Powhatan himself blamed neither the English nor their god. The region's Indian people likely suffered an onslaught of new diseases, and it stands to reason that the poor health of the settlers put the natives at risk.[6] But the records do not reveal a native conviction that the newcomers had any mastery over disease.

If Powhatan did not suspect the English of killing by contagion, the early Virginia colony did, we know, wield other insidious weapons. A Jamestown captain committed the first known stealthy mass murder of Indians by fatal, English-colonial gift. Captain William Tucker served chemically poisoned white wine to almost two hundred Indian delegates at a peace treaty: "after many feigned speeches the peace was to be concluded in a health or two in sack [wine] which was sent of purpose with Captain Tucker to poison them." After the toasts and drafts, as the two hundred Indians collapsed in agony, the colonists fired on others less affected, killing "two kings" and some fifty more. One settler called the affair "a great dismaying to the bloody infidels."[7] At the time, Europeans shunned poison as a weapon of war. Within a few years of the Virginia action, Dutch jurist Hugo de Groot, or Grotius, stated in his *Law of War and Peace* (1625) that "from old times the law of nations—if not all nations, certainly those of the better sort—has been that it is not permissible to kill an enemy by poison." But by the 1620s, Tucker and other Virginians so killed Indians. Some Virginians even mooted the death of all regional Indians. When colonist John Martin penned a proposal that he lengthily titled "The manner howe to bring in the Indians into subjection without making an utter extirpation of them together with the reasons," he proposed mass murder. What's more, his text contains this ambivalent sub-

heading: "Reasons why it is not fitting utterly to make an extirpation of the Savages yet."[8] Yet?

Yet, as much as colonists spoke even in the early seventeenth century of all-out destruction and as much as killing by poison resembles killing by disease, mass poisoning is not rampant germ warfare. Colonists would have understood the meaning of the first phrase, but not the second. They had no confident capacity to handle diseases. When accused by Indians of such mastery, they honestly denied it. Thomas Hariot explained to the Roanoke weroance, or leader, Wingina, that the English had no such power. It lay only with God, who would not "subject himself to anie" petitions that He visit pestilence upon an enemy. When a half-century later Narragansett sachem Canonicus similarly charged English intruders in the Narragansett and Massachusetts Bay regions with deploying disease, Roger Williams likewise denied culpability, attributing it all to "the hand of the one God," and reminding the Narragansett that the English, too, collapsed, by the thousands, before divine displeasure with their sins.[9] Largely powerless before epidemics, with little understanding of disease, the early English colonists had no sense that they could control or design an outbreak. Abetting a contagion's spread to native villages, they knew, put their own settlements at risk.

Canonicus and Wingina, separately attributing to Hariot or Williams special powers over disease, did not see them as mad scientists wielding weapons of mass destruction. They did not mention infected blankets. Instead, they questioned the Europeans' very humanity, wondering if wicked nonhuman persons might have come to their shores.[10] When few visiting English became ill during an epidemic along the North Carolina coast, some Indians, Hariot noted, "could not tell whether to think us gods or men." But what manner of gods? Perhaps Hariot's English appeared to the southeasterners as malevolent spirits: the physical, deadly, inhuman, deceptive incarnation of unstable, shape-shifting corruption that sometimes assumed human form. "Some therefore were of opinion," Hariot went on, "that wee were not borne of women, and therefore not mortal, but that wee were men of an old generation many yeeres past then risen againe to immortalitie." Hariot knew that Indians held these English immortals without glory and with deep alarm: "Some woulde likewise seeme to prophesie that there were more of our generation yet to come, to kill theirs and take their places." The other-than-human English, if "gods," were "gods" or spirits of a very bad sort. They did not circulate blankets, but they shot diseases "out of our pieces from the place

where we dwelt, and killed the people in any such towne that had offended us . . . [no matter] how farre distant from us soever it were."[11]

Indian charges of European witchcraft frequent the colonial record. Missionaries, in particular, faced them. The *Jesuit Relations*, particularly from the Huron (or Wendot) mission of the Ontario Peninsula, form the largest body of recorded accusations in which Europeans infect Indians. Facing an epidemic in 1636, some villagers pointed to the act of writing as a form of sorcery: some charged that "since you have described our country, our rivers, our lands, and our woods, we are all dying, which did not happen until you came here." "There is no black malice of which we are not accused," wrote Father Paul Le Jeune from Huron Country in 1637. Rumor spread among the Algonquian speakers to the east of Huron Country that Samuel de Champlain, founder of Quebec and self-designated leader of an Algonquian-Huron alliance, was a witch who had claimed, before dying, that "he would take the whole country" with him when he passed away. Native Americans suspected "Monsieur de Champlain of procuring their death at his own departure." Hurons rumored that the French meant to sacrifice "every one of their bodies," in retaliation for the death of the renegade French trader Etienne Brûlé.[12]

One of the few pre-revolutionary era rumors of the malevolent deployment of an infected blanket comes from this period, but it is no tale of a gift. Jesuits heard Hurons rumor that "our French had bewitched [*ensorcelé*] a cloak or a robe, and buried it" where Hurons might discover it, plunder it, and carry it away, "which they did," bearing to their homeland "the pestilence and contagion."[13] Hurons also rumored that kettles, trade items and markers of things European, had been poisoned and bewitched. These two references to malicious tampering with ordinary trade goods, a central feature of more modern stories, spread in the seventeenth century along with many other forms of European corruption: "They say that we have infected the waters, and that the mists which issue thence kill them; that our houses are fatal to them, that we have with us a dead body, which serves us as black magic." The Jesuits suffered accusations that sprang from native traditions, as when Hurons held that the priests kept and fed a monstrous serpent, or a toad "all marked with pits," which radiated some malady. In an accusation that resonates with one that Hariot recorded in an earlier generation, Hurons rumored that the priests kept a malady in a firearm and could shoot "it wherever we would." Some Hurons took aim at Christianity itself, claiming

that to kill native children, French men, hidden in the "horrid depths of the woods," used metal awls to pick at the image of a "little child," a likely reference to an image of the infant Jesus, linking Christians with smallpox. They even suspected that the "tabernacle" of the Eucharist somehow radiated death. The charge that epidemics erupted from "French witchcraft" circulated for more than a century.[14]

The priests attributed the rumors to particular authors, to conspirators among their foes, who deployed them as "the most powerful weapons."[15] Understanding, like Roger Williams, that God worked the carnage, the Jesuits honestly denied any culpability for death by disease; the contagions challenged and mystified them. Attributing the devastation to Providence, they struggled not to confine God within their cramped capacities but instead chose to embrace the divine mystery: one saw in the mysterious deaths of the baptized the "secret, but ever adorable, judgments of God." A judgment against whom, and for what purpose, the priest did not guess. He observed, though, that while Indians died, missionaries remained to breathe "life in the country of the dead." The fact provided "a source of sweet contemplation."[16]

Better known than Jesuits for such Providential interpretations of natural events, the English Puritans who settled what is now New England in the seventeenth century also doubted their own capacities to know God's will, although they tended more explicitly to see the epidemics as God's way of assisting the English.[17] As for how Indians viewed the plagues, Puritan colonists wrote far less than did Jesuit missionaries. Nonetheless, they left some evidence of the Indians' explanations. According to William Bradford, for example, Squanto, the famous Patuxet Indian who allied with and joined the community of Puritan Separatists at Plymouth, attempted to gain influence over the neighboring Pokanoket Indians by capitalizing on rumors that the English wielded malevolent powers. Bradford's Squanto claimed that he had learned how to access these dangerous forces, "putting the Indians in fear and drawing gifts from them to enrich himself, making them believe he could stir up a war against whom he would, and make peace for whom he would." But more than that, he led the Pokanoket people to believe that he could prevent English witchcraft: "Yea, he made them believe they [the English] kept the plague buried in the ground, and could send it amongst whom they would, which did much terrify the Indians and made them depend more on him, and seek more to him, than to the Pokanoket leader, Massasoit."[18] The English stored pestilence with the dead and beneath the ground, an underworldly

place of corruption and malevolence. Although the stories underscore the danger posed by Europeans, they say nothing of smallpox blankets.

Blankets do surface later in the seventeenth century, when founders of Pennsylvania met with Lenapes at Burlington, New Jersey, and learned of the rumor that English traders had sold them smallpox-infected match-coats. Match-coats are trade blankets, so the smallpox delivery system that we most reference today indeed appears in the early English colonial record. Since trade and gift exchanges overlapped considerably, especially in early trade settings, we can reasonably chalk this up as a smallpox-blanket gift story. Curiously, the very Lenapes who reported this rumor dismissed its veracity, pointing out that the smallpox outbreaks had preceded the arrival of English traders.[19] Horribly, descendants of Delaware Valley Indians would actually receive smallpox blankets at Fort Pitt to the west in 1763.

The charge that colonizers deployed disease could culminate in the extreme rumor that Europeans intended to kill all Indians for their lands. Dekanissore of the Five Nations Iroquois League relayed that very rumor at a private meeting with Governor Robert Hunter, outside a formal conference being held in Albany between the League and New York in 1717. Hunter had just complained to the Indian delegates that Seneca members of the League had permitted France to erect a fort in their lands. Hunter had reproved the League for attending to wicked French rumors of "an evill design of the English against you."[20] Dekanissore privately explained that the Iroquois never simply swallowed such stories, but investigated them. They had learned in Pennsylvania that the sovereigns of Great Britain and France had together agreed "to cutt of all the Indians of North America" in order to "make room for their people to settle upon this continent." Dekanissore, moreover, considered it plausible that the British colonists had the previous fall deliberately released "the Small Pox," causing "great mortality." Hunter could deny English intentions, but the League would continue its efforts "to discover if possible who has been the occasion of sending that contagion among us."[21] Without alleging a method, the Iroquois lodged a striking charge that English colonists, perhaps in league with France, killed with smallpox.

From the late sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, the idea that Europeans murdered with disease regularly found its way from native rumor into European writing. As historian D. Peter MacLeod has observed, "by the mid-eighteenth century, the link between European contact and epidemics was long established, and outbreaks of epidemic disease were frequently attributed to witchcraft performed by Europeans."[22] By the late eighteenth

century and into the early nineteenth century, the colonizers shared the charge of witchcraft with their Native American allies and, especially, with Native Americans who had converted to Christianity. As early as 1751, a young Delaware woman in the Wyoming Valley of the Susquehanna River attributed the sickness and death among her people to the manipulation of spiritual "poison" by "their old and principle men." The cooperation of Wyoming's leaders with colonists likely raised her suspicions and gave them traction among the people of the valley.[23]

The missionaries of the United Brethren, or the Moravians, operating in the Susquehanna Valley and Ohio Country, recorded in the 1770s that leading members of their Lenape, Munsee, and Mahican congregations stood accused of witchcraft by rumoring Indians. In these cases the rumorers alleged a native, not a European, method; the accusers referred to it as a "wicked, dangerous medicine," purchased from the Nanticokes, who had gained a reputation for witchcraft by mid-century. But the accusers simultaneously pointed to converted Christians as the disseminators of the "strong poison."[24] A generation later, as the Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa rose to prominence after 1805, he similarly accused individual Indians connected with missionaries or agents of the United States of using poison and "bad medicine" to destroy Native Americans. His accusations and those of his followers resulted in some six to twenty-five deaths, a high range by any eastern North American standard for executions of accused witches. The killings coincided with rumors of a smallpox epidemic.[25] Echoing Tenskwatawa to the north, The Trout, also known as Le Maigouis, in 1807 called settlers of the United States "children of the Evil Spirit. They grew from the scum of the Great Water when it was troubled by the Evil Spirit." The Trout's Evil Spirit bears a relationship to the mythological water snakes and underworldly great serpents that brought chaos to the Native American East.[26]

It did not take a unique cosmology, however, for Indians to gain or to act on their accurate understanding that colonists had brought them disease. Indians before the Revolution often held mere humans without invisible powers accountable for epidemics. Nor did the colonists' intent require much scrutiny. Individual guilt mattered little as Indians concluded that an outbreak began with colonists; responsibility and accountability mattered far more. Motive, intent, and individual suspects, interesting as these issues might be, did not have much relevance to the demand for justice, for the condolence and the compensation that might restore order, or for the retaliation that might mean war. Indian judicial traditions did not dwell on intent

or motive in the adjudication of a killing. This was true of killings that took place within families and communities, and even more so of those that took place between communities. Legal historian Rennard Strickland notes that for the eighteenth-century Cherokees there "were no degrees of murder"; the community's response did not depend on "whether the death was accidental or deliberate."[27] Cherokee concerns centered on questions of responsibility and liability. Who caused the deaths fed the more important question: what clan, village, ally, or enemy might right the wrong or suffer the consequences of its neglect? Indians across the East shared in general terms this broad understanding of collective accountability, and they did so well into the American national period. British agents in 1795 encountered such understandings, far to the north, in Great Lakes Country. At the Treaty of Greenville between the United States and numerous tribes of the Old Northwest, "a great proportion of the chiefs who attended" began to die mysteriously shortly after the meeting. A British agent speculated that they had been "poisoned by some of their own People who disapproved of the Treaty," but most Indians "said they were poisoned at Fort Greenville where the treaty was held," thus implicating the United States, the host of the meeting.[28] The host bore the responsibility and liability; identifying the particular killer or his motive was not particularly relevant. Native Americans accurately understood that great epidemics had come across the seas in wooden hulls. Colonists in that sense had infected them; the question of intent meant little to peoples who, when faced with the death of relatives, did not place intention weightily on the scales. Outsiders had killed; they must account. This could mean war, but it could also mean generous exchanges and peace.[29]

Following the devastating Cherokee smallpox epidemic in 1738–1739, one of the worst of their history, in which, according to contemporary accounts, something like a fifth of the population died miserably, Cherokee explanations ranged widely. The widespread sickness so debilitated the Nation that crops went untended and famine threatened. Some Cherokees pointed to internal causes, saying that the abuse of alcohol compounded the problem presented by the epidemic. Others blamed the epidemic on Cherokee young men and women who had violated certain sexual taboos. Some, in a pattern that colonists often shared, blamed African slaves.[30] But a single charge most worried British officers. It held that "Traders from Carolina" had carried "Rum and Small Pox" into the Nation. General James Oglethorpe, leading the English at Georgia, heard the charge directly from Cherokees, who

"demanded Justice from all the English, threatn'd revenge, and sent to the French for assistance." Seeking Cherokee aid against the Spanish, Ogelthorpe bowed to Cherokee norms and restored the alliance by sending 1,500 bushels of corn into the Cherokee valleys. The Carolina traders' intent did not surface in the charge, but even accidental contagion meant liability and calls for retaliation or restoration.[31]

English colonists recorded but did not accept that they bore responsibility of any kind for the illnesses, casting responsibility on the Indians themselves. Indians, many English averred even in the seventeenth century, had weak bodies. As Joyce Chaplin has put it, they "lacked the physical ability to thrive in their own homeland."[32] Or, as the Providential vein of thought had it, they had not gained the favor of God. Both views have had a real hold on historians, who have fallen prey to certain myths about the relationship between Indians and visitations of smallpox. A truly mindless virus too often, even today, attains purpose and judgment.

Legend Makes History

As war consumed lives in eastern North America, smallpox feasted with it. Indians, settlers, and soldiers alike felt its unmannered and thoughtless company. A maker of history, smallpox seeks no fame, maintains no records, tells no legends, leaves no trash in middens, and marks no bones. Historians and archaeologists know it only from the reports of its human prey. Mobile, groundless, reproductive, and catchy, like rumor, it spreads through human hosts alone. Rumors about smallpox spread like the disease, and they caused "things to happen almost as if they happened in nature."[33] But where smallpox cannot speak, rumors, sometimes whispered, come also in full voice. They can become legend, and they can shape history.

Smallpox stalked eastern North America during the Seven Years' War. It slithered through the northern campaigns before 1759, and in that year it thoughtlessly volunteered to kill in the Cherokee campaigns to the south. Stealthy and lethal, stowing away in the bodies of mobile gunmen, sailors, traders, and refugees, smallpox, in its careless fashion, commanded wartime attention from Cape Breton to Charleston to Michilimackinac.[34] Indians and colonial peoples alike—miserable sufferers, pockmarked survivors, and those who escaped infection—sought meaning in this force of nature that itself intended nothing, and yet infected thousands.

Historians seek meaning, too. The campaign of 1757 produced the iconic episode of the Seven Years' War in America, perhaps the iconic episode of all colonial North American wars: the fall of Fort William Henry, followed by the Indian assault on the surrendered British and British colonial troops. Some nine hundred Native American men from the Upper Great Lakes and an almost equal number of Indians from the St. Lawrence Valley joined close to six thousand French and French Canadians to overwhelm the garrison at the southern end of Lake George (now in New York) in early August 1757. The action formed a node of rumor and legend, inspiring literary fiction and film. Its dramatic elements include desperate British resistance, futile hopes for relief from nearby Fort Edward, skilled Indian interference with British communications, masterful continental French siege techniques, sustained bombardment, British fatigue, the presence of women among the besieged, a surrender on honorable terms, safety promised by a noble French general, and all this martial glory desecrated by the famous Indian attack on the shocked and surrendered Britons and colonials. Historian Ian K. Steele explores the origins and meanings of the "massacre" (the word blunted always in his careful and thorough work by quotation marks). Various participants, Indian and French, brought clashing goals to siege, and these differences led to disaster. Steele assesses its probable causes; the numbers actually killed, captured, and wounded; and the escalation of the all-too grisly incident in rumor, legend, and literature.[35] Instead of the Anglo-American tale in which brutal savages attack both Old World nobility and the common American man, Steele interprets the horrible incident as the shoddy result of divergent expectations, as the lamentable culmination of many "betrayals." Notably, Steele does not indulge in a morality tale that grew out of the event and that established itself in English-language writing on the Seven Years' War. A protagonist in this legend is mindless smallpox, which stealthily strikes those very Indians (and later their families) who had, on August 9 and 10, killed or seized as captives the paroled British soldiers.

A masterful, reliable, and authoritative volume on the Seven Years' War, after a lengthy description of the post-capitulation carnage, puts it this way: "The western Indians would discover too late that the English and provincials at William Henry had been suffering from smallpox, and thus that the captives, scalps, and clothing they brought back carried the seeds of a great epidemic, which would devastate their homelands."[36] Another prolific scholar recently judges that "by massacring helpless soldiers the Indians brought mass death upon themselves."[37] The legend has such strength that even

champions of American Indian studies have added to its force: "the Indian warriors who took their tokens of bravery from the helpless patients in the hospital and the disarmed prisoners suffered retribution harsher than any court of law could have inflicted. They scalped victims of smallpox, and acquired that fell disease themselves." The contagion spread "among their families and friends, unwittingly creating another massacre that probably killed more of their own peoples than they had murdered among their enemies."[38] Rarely do historians so frequently tie an epidemic's origins to so specific a military event as the plundering and killing of the surrendered troops, and even more rarely is that event so charged with cultural power.

The story has deep roots.[39] Eight months after the siege, the commanding French general, the Marquis de Montcalm, wrote from Montreal that a "number of the Upper Country Indians, who came last year to the expedition against Fort William Henry, died of the small-pox on their way home. The English had it." His Indian allies might have escaped illness, he insisted, "had they been willing to believe the French General [Montcalm himself] and not plunder the baggage of the English."[40] He posits a counterfactual argument: had his Indian allies honored his terms (in the making of which, as Steele makes clear, they had no part), had they not plundered most and killed some of the surrendering garrison, smallpox would have ignored them. This hypothesis circulates in the bloodstream of professional history, but it should, on its face, fail.

Indian villagers in the western Great Lakes also held that smallpox arrived with the hundreds of warriors returning from the Lake George campaign. Yet Menominees, Ojibwes, Ottawas, and Potawatomis did not identify Fort William Henry as the exact source of their infection. According to French sources, Indians held instead that the French exposed them to the fatal contagion. According to a French colonel, "custom in such a case is to say that the nation which called upon them has given them bad medicine." By early 1758, Menominees west of Lake Michigan, blaming the French for the outbreak, threatened vengeance on French garrisons, whose officers already worried about the disease's role in alienating other good Indian allies.[41] This morality tale lodges another charge of betrayal against French fathers, noble generals, and supposed allies. But a third story would prove almost as durable in Upper Great Lakes Indian Country as the viral retribution tale has proved among historians.

This story emerged quickly: the *British*, not the French, had "had thrown that *Medicine* on the Indians." Montcalm had such reports from "different

Councils held at Michilimackinac, Detroit," and other scattered posts.[42] A decade later, the Schenectady trader Cornelius Vanslyke, having spent several years in the mid-1760s as a captive among the St. Joseph River Potawatomis, listed smallpox as a factor in Great Lakes' Indian hatred of the British. Potawatomis, he said, still rumored that "the great Number they lost of their People at the returning from Lake George in 1757, was owing to the English poisoning them, and giving them the small Pox, for which they owe them an everlasting ill will." Vanslyke, who said *nothing* of the Indians having contracted the disease from scalps or booty, described instead continuing flying reports, which he attributed to the French, that the English would "destroy them by poison, small pox &ca, which the Informant says they [the Potawatomis] believe, as much as can be." This story of British malevolence lived for generations.[43]

This third tale contains no sense of Providential punishment, nor does it indulge as modern writers might in notions of irony or poetic justice. Although all three agree that western Indians contracted smallpox in the course of the Lake George campaign, the agreement stops there. Some historians find invisible, silent, and archaeologically evasive smallpox in the torn scalps and plundered blankets belonging to Fort William Henry's victims; some Indians have found the malignant scourge in the wickedness of the French officers or the sorcery of British subjects. As for the superiority of professional history over native narrative: not on this score.

Smallpox did ravage the western Great Lakes. By the fall of 1757, a French field marshal had heard that the western Indians who accompanied Montcalm had returned to their homes with smallpox, "where it made astonishing ravages." Missionaries and officers in the Great Lakes region confirmed the outbreak, as do scholars who have studied Roman Catholic burial records from such places as Michilimackinac. Ottawas, Ojibwes, and Potawatomis suffered, and they would not again contribute such large numbers to French campaigns.[44]

The Upper Great Lakes villagers had traded and worked with the St. Lawrence colonies for generations by 1757. Even Michilimackinac and Sault Ste. Marie existed more as hubs of association with the Atlantic world than they did as stranded isolates. They regularly traded with Montreal, Detroit, the Prairie West, and Illinois Country. Indian men paused at such places on their way to combat in Ohio Country or New York. Although most tellers of the stories of smallpox seemed to agree that the Great Lakes-area Indian epi-

demic had some relationship to the Lake George campaign, the specific sources of infection will remain unknown. But let us assume that the epidemic did originate, as the taletellers have it, with the hundreds of men who served in Lake George campaign. Did they acquire smallpox precisely through their siege of Fort William Henry, or more pointedly in the course of the post-surrender mayhem on August 9 and 10? Put another way: did the Indian men who carried the epidemic homeward inhale the virus from the anguished breath of the men they attacked those August days, and/or did they inhale the virus from the scabby plunder, scalps, and infected captives taken after the garrison's fall? Or, to ask it counterfactually (with Montcalm): had Indians behaved like noble European officers, had they, in violation of all their expectations, stood by and honored the gallant soldiers who marched in arms from the fort, would they have escaped smallpox? Ask the question any way and the same answer returns: we cannot know. Yet we speak as if we can, and do.

In published form, the dominant story first appears in a widely circulated 1778 book by Jonathan Carver, who, mixing modern irony with providential theory, associates the western Indians' epidemic directly with Fort William Henry: "I mean not to point out the following circumstance as the immediate judgment of heaven, and intended as an atonement for this slaughter; but I cannot omit that very few of those different tribes of Indians that shared in it ever lived to return home. The small-pox, by means of their communication with the Europeans, found its way among them, and made an equal havoc to what they themselves had done . . . [T]hey died by the hundreds. The few that survived were transformed by it into hideous objects, and bore with them to the grave deep-indented marks of this much dreaded disease." He wrote this a decade after the fact.[45] That British and provincial forces, including prisoners carried to Canada, also succumbed to the illness, complicates the ironies of history and the judgments of Heaven, for smallpox takes no part in the politics of war.[46]

Some of Fort William Henry's soldiers probably had smallpox when it fell in 1757, but we lack close evidence of such infection. The best historians remain vague about the details. Steele, who accepts that smallpox weakened British resistance, indicates that one uncaptured New Hampshire soldier died of smallpox while en route to his home after the siege. He points as well to a story told by the famous Robert Rogers of the Queen's Rangers. Rogers, who rarely let truth get in his way, later wrote that "My brother Captain

Richard Rogers died with the Small-pox a few days before this fort was besieged, but such was the cruelty and rage of the enemy after their conquest, that they dug him out of his grave, and scalped him."[47]

Pierre Pouchot, a former commander of French Fort Niagara, seemingly corroborates Rogers's story. Pouchot may have met Potawatomis returning homeward from the siege, men who "carried with them a disease which killed many of them." Pouchot explained how they had contracted the illness: "Seeing freshly dug graves, a number of them exhumed the corpses to take their scalps. Unfortunately, some of them died of smallpox. The germ immediately spread among the Indians. The Poutéotamis nation . . . was almost wiped out by the epidemic."[48] Pouchot did not witness the events of August 1757; he wrote in 1769—a dozen years after the event—and in deliberate response to British allegations against the French. His memoir, infected by Carver's English rumor, has, in turn, infected our histories. While one can acquire smallpox from the dead, the virus much prefers to fly on the moist breath of the living.

There are few English-language siege "journals." All describe the Indian attack on the sick and wounded after the surrender. But not one mentions smallpox at Fort William Henry: not during the attack, not as a factor in the condition of the garrison, not at all. Steele puts the number of scalps taken from the hospital at seventeen, and he notes that before the surrender some twenty-seven Regulars and perhaps forty Provincials had been wounded in the siege itself. We cannot know how many of these roughly seventy-seven wounded may have been in the hospital on August 9 and 10. When the documents mention the terms of the capitulation, they assign to the French the responsibility to care for British sick and wounded, again without mentioning smallpox.[49] A French priest, present at the siege, recalled two months later the Indian attack on the "few sick soldiers in the casements," without naming the soldiers' sicknesses. Decades later, a French officer recalled that some Indians "entered the hospital, where a number of sick and wounded too weak to join the column were inhumanely massacred for their scalps." Again, he misses smallpox; malaria may equally well have troubled the fort. Similarly, the first frantic then resigned dispatches from Fort Edward say nothing of smallpox or sickness at either fort, though they do reference conditions and troop strength at each place. This lack of sources proves nothing: smallpox could simply have escaped the interest of writers more concerned with responsibility for the fall of the fort and the episode that followed. But

the point remains that we do not know how many, if any, of the sick attacked after the surrender had the dreaded disease.[50]

Of those who died at Fort William Henry, only a small fraction of remains has been studied. Five skeletons belonging to men murdered and gruesomely mutilated while languishing in the hospital reveal that at least four had sustained serious injuries and wounds shortly before August 9, while a fifth "may have been hospitalized due to some illness that is not apparent in his remains." These and other remains suggest that the fort's defenders endured privations, diseases, and hard labor; they exhibit evidence of muscle tears (from overwork), battle wounds, infection, arthritis, herniated disks, dental abscesses, tuberculosis, syphilis, and anemia. Smallpox does not mark bones. But other causes clearly sent many defenders to the hospital.[51]

If we lack direct evidence of smallpox at Fort William Henry, we have it for neighboring British Fort Edward. In July the pox struck units at Fort Edward that would later send men to reinforce Fort William Henry. The Massachusetts soldier Jonathan French languished at Fort Edward under the throes of the disease while most of his unit deployed northward, endured the siege, and suffered the famous attack on August 10. French states in his unpublished "journal" (actually a memoir) that on July 18 he encountered one John Shaw, who had the disease. Nine days later, French himself fell ill with stomach pains and fever, and diagnosed with smallpox on July 31, he lay in Fort Edward's hospital. He recovered on August 10, the very day of the most explosive violence, but he remained in Fort Edward's hospital until August 29 because he continued to suffer from what he called agues and fever, perhaps malaria. He does not reveal the number of men who lay beside him in the hospital due to smallpox, but he does state that during those thirty days the disease killed twelve men.[52]

Given the amount of traffic in late July between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, it seems safe to assume, as historians have, the presence of the disease at the latter fort. Jonathan Frye, for example, had marched to Fort William Henry on the south end of Lake George from Fort Edward on the Hudson in the company of more than one thousand Royal Americans, Independents, and Massachusetts Provincials, almost doubling the size of the garrison when they arrived, less than a day before the investment began. Some of Frye's own troops remained behind at Fort Edward with smallpox. Most of his troops stood in the thick of the post-capitulation chaos. With all the troop movements and other exchanges between the posts in late July and

very early August, particularly with the advance, on the eve of the siege, of men from clearly exposed units, we might conclude fairly that the virus hitched a ride to Fort William Henry. As Steele points out, some of the British captives taken from the fort died of smallpox as captives in Canada, though these would have had to have contracted the disease after the surrender.[53]

Assuming, from this indirect evidence, that smallpox infected some defenders of Fort William Henry, the questions remain: Was the violence at Fort William Henry essential to the Indians' epidemic in the West? Or might the disease have spread through other vectors, with or without the bloodshed of August 9 and 10? Montcalm, who saw the Indians' disregard of his demands as the cause of their infection, left room for doubt, for in stating that the "English had" smallpox, he did not specify which English. Not all English captives taken by Indians during the Lake George campaign were taken on August 9 and 10, nor were all taken from Fort William Henry. Indeed, many, captured before the surrender, came from clearly infected Fort Edward.

Fort Edward and Fort William Henry sat in a broader region infested with the virus. Montcalm, before the campaign and still in Montreal, had news in mid-July of smallpox "prevailing" at Albany and the two forts. He apparently learned this from prisoners taken largely from the neighborhood of Fort Edward. This information, incidentally, lends credence to later Indian charges that the French willingly exposed Great Lakes Indians to smallpox. What's more, it demonstrates that the war offered abundant opportunities to the virus as it blankly sought the mucous membranes of live human bodies in 1757. The record shows extensive regional infection. From May through August, that year, Sir William Johnson, attempting to rouse the Six Nations Iroquois to support the British against Montcalm, noted outbreaks of smallpox at the Upper Susquehanna River town of "Aughquagages" and at the Mohawk River towns of "Mohawk Castle" and "Connojahary," the latter a town perhaps 60 beeline miles from Fort William Henry. He learned further, from the warrior Little Abraham that a Mohawk party had scouted for the English toward the fort, leaving their families' home in the Mohawk Valley, which "had the Small Pox very bad at the time." Around Fort Johnson, wrote Johnson in mid-July, smallpox "rages very much in this part of the Country." French-allied Native American parties, we know, had been boldly raiding the area since the winter, fighting and capturing men from the Mohawk Valley and from Fort Edward. As early as June, advance French and Indian units, seeking information and disrupting British communications, took

prisoners (as well as scalps) belonging to Fort Edward. On July 26 French and Indian scouts (including some from the Upper Great Lakes) took 32 scalps and a prisoner from Fort Edward, and another 160 prisoners and scores of scalps when they crushed New Jersey Provincials under John Parker. The party of English-allied Mohawks under Little Abraham lost the revered warrior Moses to captivity that August.[54] Late July and early August, then, saw many actions independent of the surrender in which French-allied Indians captured their enemies. If the Indians' epidemic began with the Lake George campaign, some of these engagements may have spread the disease. Put another way, without the catastrophic surrender, more than one hundred British prisoners and at least one Mohawk from an infected town fell into Indian hands, and scores of scalps came with them.

Even more telling: the epidemic, far from confined to these two forts south of Lake George, nor even to the Mohawk Valley, where it raged, battered Canada to the north, as some Indians knew at the opening of the campaign season. Recalling in his memoirs the organizing of the campaign, Niagara's commander, Pierre Pouchot, writes that as commanders in the Great Lakes area fitted out Indian parties to join expeditions at Montreal, many fighters turned back on learning that "smallpox" prevailed "in some places," and "they were deeply afraid of that disease." Smallpox appeared not only in the region below Montreal, but also at the garrisons of Niagara and Frontenac.[55] Smallpox erupted, too, in Pennsylvania in the spring of 1757. Delegates from the Iroquois Six Nations, who had refused to meet in smallpox-infested Philadelphia, met instead with colonial officials at Lancaster. The change of venue did no good for the lead Iroquois negotiator Scaroyady. Smallpox killed him. Smallpox, in short, blanketed the northern theater in 1756 and 1757, a function more of general war than of specific massacre. The virus lay stupidly but effectively in wait along the paths that carried fighters of all nations between the Great Lakes, Montreal, and the southern end of Lake George. We cannot know where or when each infected Indian contracted the disease.[56]

Fort William Henry surrendered on August 9. The brutalities began that afternoon but exploded the following day, when Indians killed scores of the garrison, as many as 185 men, plundering many more, taking hundreds captive. If the Indian epidemic had its origins in this violence, when would the symptoms have first occurred? From the time the victim first inhaled the virus, it would have remained concealed for, roughly, eleven days, surfacing on August 20 or 21. By August 25, the infamous rash would occur, and by September 4, some men would begin to die.[57] In the meantime, they would

have infected others among their comrades, who would fall ill in serial groups and carry the contagion home to the Great Lakes. Perhaps this happened; but there are other possibilities. The record tells us that many of the western Indians, driving up to five hundred prisoners and carrying much booty, reached Montreal in mid-August, and there they spent two weeks celebrating their victory and dealing with the governor.[58]

Diarist Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville, in Montreal on August 19, describes them in unflattering terms, and he later reports that the western Indians left the city at the end of September. If any had contracted smallpox on August 10 or from prisoners in the immediate wake of the event, they would have been radiating the infection by the time of their departure, but again, the record says nothing about smallpox. A letter of October 21, written by a Jesuit priest, Father Pierre-Joseph Antoine Roubaud, who accompanied about half of the Indians to the St. Lawrence region, does not mention smallpox. One might speculate that these mission Indians, having lived among the French Canadians, near Atlantic-oriented ports, and therefore experienced with a disease that had been raging for more than a year in Canada, had more immunity than the western Indians. One might also turn this around, suggesting that they, only recently infected, infected the western Indians themselves, without the assistance of Fort William Henry or its legendary smallpox-ridden graveyards and hospital.[59] The first recorded news of the western Indians' infection comes from a letter from Fort Niagara dated November 12, three months after the siege. It states that "The smallpox has made great ravages again among the Indians of the Far West. A number will be forced to winter at Niagara."[60] Hundreds of miles from Lake George and three months after the event, the letter cannot attach the epidemic specifically to Fort William Henry.

We do not know, though we can fairly guess, that smallpox infected Fort William Henry. We do not know, though we may surmise, that smallpox infected any of the English prisoners or any of the grisly booty on August 9 and 10. We do not know, though it seems likely, that smallpox sickened any of those in the fort's hospital. We do not know, though it could be, that any Indians contracted smallpox from an English-speaking soldier of the fort. Educated guesses might make history of the legend, but they do not. For we do know that the disease provided vast opportunities for exposure elsewhere. Potawatomis and Ottawas west of Detroit who, according to Bougainville, claimed to have gotten the illness in the country of the French, raised a reasonable possibility.[61] The hypothesis that some Indians contracted smallpox

in the course of handling booty and prisoners from the fort makes sense, but that the surrender and its bloody aftermath formed the most important source of the western epidemic is far more than a hypothesis; it is a legend with cultural force, and we should beware of any "tradition that passes for history."[62]

Strong is the story that desperate killers contracted punishing smallpox as they heartlessly tore clothes and scalps from their infected enemies. Like an urban or contemporary legend, the story arises in other colonial tales. John Adams indulged in the form in a 1776 letter to Abigail, his wife. Reflecting on the terrible defeat of Continentals invading Canada earlier that year, he blamed smallpox more than "Britons, Canadians, and Indians together." Weirdly echoing the story of Fort William Henry, he offered this "small Consolation, that the Scoundrell Savages have taken a large Dose of it. They plundered the Baggage, and stripped off the Cloaths of our Men, who had the Small Pox, out full upon them." The loving couple could anticipate a viral visitation upon their enemies.[63] Such sentiments, alive and well by the 1750s, fed the developing native tradition that had colonists deliberately dispatch illnesses to wipe out the natives. During Pontiac's War, which followed close on the heels of the Seven Years' War, the accusation that smallpox belonged to the British rang from Detroit to the Lower Mississippi. Pontiac, reportedly quoting the Delaware Prophet Neolin, declared to his followers on the eve of the conflict that "If you suffer the English among you, you are dead men. Sickness, smallpox, and their poison will destroy you entirely."[64] The Americans would share this disreputable role with the British following the Revolution.

History Makes Legend

British Regular and militia officers at Fort Pitt intended to infect their Indian enemies with smallpox when they gifted a visiting enemy delegation with two blankets, a handkerchief, and linen taken from the fort's smallpox hospital in June 1763. Their superiors, at a distance, also discussed the possibility. This atrocious act definitely happened. Current debate centers not on the act or who did it because that is definitively established. Scholars instead question its efficacy, its uniqueness, and the judgments to be rendered.[65] We have overlooked an odd detail.

The episode, however known today, remained quiet for generations. The culprits did not crow about their covert deed. They noted it in a few

documents unintended for public consumption. Nor did their intended victims speak of it in any reasonably direct way; English deception worked; the targeted victims knew nothing specific, or at least said nothing that found its way into the record. Indians did occasionally rumor that colonial powers planned to kill them with smallpox through blankets and more often through other means, but there is no direct reference to Fort Pitt and 1763. That would wait until 1870, when historian Francis Parkman first brought portions of the story to light in the sixth edition of his history of Pontiac's War. His paid researcher, working overseas in the British Museum's newly acquired personal papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet, identified the disturbing evidence. It lay in correspondence of early July 1763 between the colonel, then heading with reinforcements to Fort Pitt, and his superior, General Jeffery Amherst, in New York. The exchange mooted and concluded to attempt infection with blankets. Curiously, as historian Elizabeth Fenn has pointed out, lesser officers had already done the deed at Fort Pitt, and weeks earlier. She surmises that, given the apparent independence of the high officers' correspondence from the actual deed, the use of smallpox blankets must have been discussed more widely in the British army.[66] But they did not much discuss it openly.

Of regional Indian discussions of the smallpox blanket, the closest record may be from twenty-five years later, during the confederation period of U.S. history. In October 1788, as Northwest Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair sought to recruit Indians for the Treaty of Fort Harmar, his envoys to the Sandusky Valley encountered the rumor among Wyandot and Seneca-Mingo peoples "that we intended, when they came here, to kill them all, either by putting poison in the spirits we gave them or communicating the small-pox with blankets." This rumor came with a source: the English-speaking son of Abraham Kuhn, a notable Lower Sandusky Wyandot, had, the rumor held, returned from of all places, Pittsburgh, the site of the British Fort Pitt in 1763. There Kuhn had overheard "two men" talking of the American plot. Note that the rumor mentions not only Pittsburgh, but also Kuhn, who had fought against the United States during the Revolution and who knew very well of criminal American atrocities against Indians in 1782; his name could only attach weight to this genocidal rumor.[67]

The Indian and colonial peoples of eastern North America in the late eighteenth century did, then, discuss smallpox blankets. But they did so among other means, and they did not attach the crime specifically both to the Forks of the Ohio and to 1763; no such recollections, at least, entered the

written record. The current American smallpox blanket legends, on the other hand, gain great power in part because of that singular and true episode at Fort Pitt. They owe a debt to the writings of Parkman, who is the odd father of the blanket truth. He revealed for the first time in 1870 that the high-ranking officers had decided to deploy pox via blankets. In 1924 historian A. T. Volwiller added important evidence by publishing the journal of Captain William Trent, trader and militia officer, who noted on June 24, 1763, that he and British Captain Simeon Ecuyer had actually presented the two blankets and a handkerchief to two leading Delaware Indians, hoping it would create an epidemic. Historian Howard Peckham employed that journal in 1947 in his volume on Pontiac's War, which went through several popular editions and remains in print. Peckham did not cite yet another astonishing document sent by Trent to the British high command: a receipt—for reimbursement. Trent sought recompense for the cost of the items he deployed, as he put it indelicately, "to convey Small pox to the Indians." His manuscript invoice, approved by British officers from Fort Pitt's captain to the commander in chief in New York, Thomas Gage, was only published in limited circulation in the 1940s, but it gained wider circulation in March 1955, when it appeared at Donald H. Kent's instigation and Bernard Knollenberg's urging in the back pages of the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, forerunner to the *Journal of American History*. Popular writer Alvin Josephy widely broadcast the episode in his hit volume *The Patriot Chiefs* (1961). When activist scholar Vine Deloria Jr. published the explosive best-seller *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (1969), a foundational work in Native American studies, he could state vaguely but accurately that "In the old days blankets infected with smallpox were given to the tribes to decimate them," and that "smallpox infected blankets were given to the tribes by the English." Between Parkman and Deloria we find the long incubation and broadside release of the smallpox blanket into American culture, following the thorough if not absolute burial of the actual deed at Fort Pitt.[68]

In short, the well-documented British colonial deployment at Fort Pitt of blankets, handkerchiefs, and bed linens to infect Indians indiscriminately with smallpox remained as obscure to Indians as it did to pre-sixth-edition (1870) U.S. citizens and all but a few British subjects. Native Americans did not include British Fort Pitt in stories of smallpox, nor did Anglo-Americans for that matter, until decades more passed. However accurately the Fort Pitt affair reflects on the character of eighteenth-century empire, it sits uneasily in a discussion of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Native American

stories about that epidemic. Indians at Detroit in these very years blamed vast sickness on the "Conjurations of the English, a sett of Barbarians, Wizards, [and] Conjurers." But they said nothing of Fort Pitt, of smallpox, or of blankets. Instead of infecting cloth, English wizardry troubled "the Air." Far to the south, a Tunica Indian, excusing his attack on a British expedition ascending the Mississippi in 1764, alleged that "The French, our brothers, have never given us any disease, but the English have scarcely arrived, and they have caused nearly all our children to die by the smallpox they have brought." The Tunica referred to pestilence in the Lower Mississippi, not the Upper Ohio, and there is no blanket, no venomous gift.[69] Regional Indians and others did allege, as they had before and would again, that colonizers deployed pox's invisible commandoes. But they did not generally sally in blankets out of British forts.

Indians may well have told smallpox-blanket stories of Fort Pitt that went unrecorded in handwriting or print.[70] Indians may have remained silent about the atrocity because they could not bear to contemplate the event.[71] Certainly the coordinates of time and space—so vital to history in a Western sense—might simply have been unimportant to Indians who conveyed knowledge to their people.[72] But Indians widely alleged other episodes of the colonial manipulation of disease; there is good evidence that eastern North American Indians had been charging colonizers with unfamiliar infection since at least the 1580s. As I've already pointed out, rumors circulated in the first century of colonization that colonists fired disease out of guns, infected kettles with it, or kept it buried somewhere only to release it now and again. Sometimes, too, Indians said, the intruders convinced their god to spread disease. In the eighteenth century Indians more commonly said that colonizers deliberately dispensed disease along with their poisonous liquor, and European Americans faced allegations of witchcraft. Infection by gifted cloth—clothing as well as blankets—occasionally surfaces in these rumors of murder by deadly illness before 1870, but it does not form anything like a dominant theme.

Liquor, the cask, and the bottle have, in eastern Native North American stories, been just as common a delivery system for smallpox as blankets. The American ethnographer John Swanton recorded and translated a Koasati story in the early twentieth century that refers to a spiritual dimension in which animals and people freely converse. "It was desired that there should be no sickness in the world, so all the sickness was collected and put into a bottle and shut up." The people planned to have a creature take it and leave

it "far up in the sky," and at length a snipe confidently volunteered to do so. "He went straight up with it and disappeared. However, in a little while he came back still carrying it. While he was holding it he dropped it, it burst, and everything that causes sickness scattered about. Sickness came to be everywhere."[73]

Liquor destroyed health and altered the mind. It could rapidly weaken the body. Unscrupulous traders adulterated it. All this made the bottle an object of obvious contemplation for those wondering about how the colonizers sent out diseases. It is no accident that when Cherokees lost perhaps a fifth of their people to the smallpox epidemic in 1739, they blamed not only the pox but also "too much Rum brought up from Carolina."[74] In the Great Lakes region far to the north, the contexts in which alcohol entered Indian communities only added to its insidious characteristics. Traders did not generally exchange hard drink for furs and skins. Instead, liquor lubricated the trade as a gift, or traders reciprocated with liquor for another intimate and sociable item: food.[75] That both men and women provided traders with food, that the trade in rum and brandy deeply disrupted many Indian families, that it disordered moral strictures and contributed to sexual assault, illicit sex, and violent infighting (all of which could involve the traders themselves) were social facts all too well known.[76] It is understandable, then, that ardent spirits overpowered woven blankets in eighteenth-century stories of mass murder.

Rum cannot transmit the virus; blankets, on the other hand, can under the right circumstances transmit the contagion. Encased in its hard protein shell (or capsid), the viral genetic matter might, if moist and unexposed to such dangers to it as sun and salt, retain its latent destructive potential within the scabs or crusts left by its human host. In the mid-eighteenth century, colonial efforts to prevent the spread of the "contagious distemper" included the airing and cleansing of all manner of "Goods, Wares, Merchandizes" brought into a colony from an infected locale. An individual traveling from such a place might lose her or his clothes altogether, and be "shifted" with a new set. Until well into the twentieth century, before the actual virus had been identified by electron microscope, physicians considered dirty laundry and other such unclean items as its most effective transmitter. But the virus actually prefers (in its literally mindless and heartless way) to travel in beads of saliva, flying airborne through a cough, a laugh, a sigh, or a conversation, into the respiratory tract of the next host. It is possible to inhale the dormant virus while shaking out a blanket, and it might begin its nasty work. But during the twentieth century, epidemiology discounted (without eliminating)

the value of dirty laundry to smallpox. Smallpox blankets interested medicine less as they interested legend more.[77]

Fort Pitt's smallpox blankets entered widespread American legend when historians put them there. Real, they reflect the covert intentions of British and British American officers to exterminate enemy Indians of the frontiers. Real, they fell into obscurity for more than a century. Revealed, they contributed to the development, especially in the twentieth century, of a broader American smallpox-blanket legend that went way beyond Fort Pitt. Not incidentally, Fort Pitt's handkerchiefs and bed linens vanished, and for good reason. After the American Civil War, the now dated epithet, "blanket Indians" disparaged those who resisted federal "civilizing" policies. The blanket attached symbolically to Indians; the hankie and linen did not.[78]

No person observed the smallpox virus in the eighteenth century, not even with the aid of the most powerful optical compound microscopes. Into that tiny, dangerous, unseen, unthinking, unfeeling string of genetic material Indians and settlers alike poured meaning. Indian stories sounded with settler accountability for smallpox and for the terror and destruction it wrought. Colonial stories echoed with themes of divine assistance and just deserts. The late nineteenth-century rediscovery of Fort Pitt's real smallpox blankets spawned in the twentieth century the various smallpox blanket legends that exaggerate genuine atrocities and condemn what facts damn deeply enough. But an obverse legend, casting smallpox as retribution on France's Indian allies for their atrocity at Fort William Henry, infects even the best professional history. That polemicists wield legend is unsurprising, that legend wields history is a caution to both its writers and its readers.

3. Slaves: Colonial Fear

The Black Legend of Spanish imperial power, tinged as it was with gold, outraged and encouraged the English, whose colonial enterprises would produce new dark tales. With some justice, as we have seen, Native Americans told their own stories of evil, holding colonists accountable for devastating epidemics. While Indians rumored that colonists sought to eliminate them in fact, American citizens scripted powerful fables that erased Indians in myth. Perhaps the most powerful of these Anglo-American fables, the "frontier thesis," endures to this day despite steady scholarly assault. It remains an American commonplace that the West meant freedom, that the frontier yielded liberty. Skeptical researchers have long described a far more complicated history, recognizing that the mythical American wilderness was actually a land full of indigenous societies and history. What is more, they have increasingly revealed that the early settler frontiers meant both freedom and slavery, that the calloused hands that gripped the broadaxes and built the cabins belonged not only to homesteading men seeking freeholds and bonneted women seeking communities of faith, but to subordinates who would remain landless or enslaved whatever work their strong arms performed. Africans and their descendants constituted the overwhelming majority of slaves in the British North American colonies. Unfree European laborers, indentured or bonded servants, generally owed four to seven years of servitude; they came in droves as the American Revolution approached. Native Americans also suffered servitude or slavery; thousands even became merchandise for export and sale. American Indian slavery now forms a strong subtheme in early American history.[1] This chapter turns to that history and its myths.

The fact of Indian enslavement, so contrary to the old U.S. American myth that the frontier bred simple freedom, produced rumors and legends of its

own. This chapter, one of four that consider themes of slavery, begins with a survey of eastern North American Indian slavery from its origins through the mid-eighteenth century. Indian enslavement predated colonization, but its form and function radically changed—especially in the Southeast—as it became violently enmeshed with the expanding markets radiating out of the Atlantic. As colonial societies based squarely on chattel slavery then emerged, Indians told dark stories about the colonists' oppressive intentions that mirrored those they spoke of disease. Some registered deep mistrust about their colonial alliances. This chapter looks into such stories of slavery from the seventeenth through the mid-eighteenth centuries. There was nothing idle in the reports; they not only arose from slavery, they altered its history.

The Transformation of Indigenous Slavery, 1607–1715

In eastern North America, well before colonization, many Native American communities forcibly incorporated war captives into their societies: adopting them, enslaving them, or separating them off into tributary villages. English colonists witnessed an exemplary pattern in Virginia as early as 1608, when the most powerful regional leader, Powhatan, organized a surprise assault on "the people of Payankatank." Although they were Powhatan's tributaries and thus under his protection, the Payankatanks had committed some unspecified violation. In a punishing raid, Powhatan's commandoes trapped, killed, and scalped twenty-four male villagers; they carried off the women, children, and the male religious leader (or weroance). All these captives, on delivery to Powhatan, "became his prisoners, and doe him service," wrote the admiring English captain John Smith. What Smith called "service" we can call "slavery." It was American Indian slavery, with indigenous roots. It involved domination, exploitation, status, power, cruelty, economics, and exchange. But it had little to do with investment or the mercantile capitalism emerging in Smith's England. Nor, despite its emphatic dehumanizing of its victims, did it involve that powerful and imaginative system of classification: race. It was less institutional, less clearly hereditary, and more fluid than what would later emerge in Virginia. Whatever slavery was among Indians before colonization, it would greatly change in the course of the following two centuries. Smith, not incidentally, escaped the same fate at the same hands, for Powhatan had briefly enslaved him. Earlier in his life, oddly, he had escaped a similar fate at rather different hands, for Turks had enslaved him in Istanbul.[2]

The expanding European settlements drastically intensified the Indian experiences of both mastery and servitude, particularly in the Southeastern Woodlands. Among other changes, the condition of slavery became hereditary—even in some southeastern Indian societies that remained politically independent of the Atlantic empires. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, moreover, the condition of slavery became increasingly racial. As late as the 1770s, Emistisiguo, a Creek warrior born to an enslaved mother, could rise to Creek Indian leadership, a remarkable achievement in the face of Creek matrilineal kinship patterns that could have denied him all status as a person. In the decades that followed the American Revolution, this sort of transition to freedom would become increasingly difficult for the children of enslaved women, particularly those of African descent, among the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees.[3] Emistisiguo had been born, probably before 1720, into a hurricane of instability; slavery formed the eye of the storm.

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, slave raiding and trading characterized the intergroup relations of Indians and the colonists who settled South Carolina. Slavery, once a mere byproduct of war, once a major insult to enemies, became for many Indian peoples war's primary goal. From the 1670s to about 1715, stimulated by the demands of the new colony of South Carolina, slave-raiding gunmen increasingly bound and drove their agonized captives toward the quarters of European colonists, who might receive the prisoners in exchange for alliance, arms, ammunition, and valuables. And then, in a pattern with no pre-colonial precedent, the slaves, once delivered into the hands of the colonists, became capital. Many benefits accrued to the new owner, who could leave the enslaved woman to heirs, invest in her for growth, exploit her labor, or sell her for a profit. No longer a marker of prestige or a mere producer of wealth, she—for most enslaved Indians traded to Europeans were women in the early years—was wealth herself, she was merchandise, she was an investment.

She might cover terrific distances. Sweat stinging her rope-burned neck and wrists, her downcast eyes falling occasionally on the chaffed and bound neck of the woman before her, she might stumble toward coastal Charleston or Port Royal, hundreds of miles from her destroyed home, later to clamber in painfully chafing irons aboard wooden ships, still later to face hard labor and an early death, sweltering on a faraway island. She faced abuse, physical, sexual, and emotional. Over the course of the eighteenth century, as Native Americans no less than African Americans reckoned with slavery, they reckoned with its full implications.

In the course of that one generation until 1715, patterns of Indian slave raiding, slave holding, and the exchange of slaves underwent a literal sea change. Nothing prepared the region for the Indian slave trade that violently erupted out of South Carolina and spread in waves through the medium of Indian war. Patterned in almost incidental ways on native forms of slaving and slaveholding, it actually had no regional indigenous counterparts, precisely because it integrated with the expanding colonial, maritime system of chattels and trade.[4] The highly important question of how Indian slave raiders and traders understood their practices in the period remains relatively unexplored and poorly understood, but doubtless the scale and purposes of slave raiding and exchange had no precedent before the advent of Carolinian settlers with strong links to the emerging slave societies of the Caribbean.[5]

Once established, forced labor generated the conditions under which the colonial quest for great wealth often became a quest mainly for land and the servants to work it, and for more land and more servants, conditions and patterns that reached their apotheosis in the antebellum South but that existed in the eighteenth century. Slavery became a phenomenon of the frontiers. Establishing black slavery in places like early Virginia had involved the quest among late seventeenth-century English men for western homesteads and personal, male, independence.[6] This depended greatly on having dependent women and slaves, and it took the colonizers a great deal of energy to generate a suitable, for them, social order.[7] Establishing African slavery in early South Carolina involved enslaving Indians for the purposes not only of labor, but of trade, export, and, especially, alliance.[8]

As slavery threatened some Indians and provided access to European goods for others, Indians exchanged stories of the menace that stalked the frontiers, leg irons at the ready. Brutal, violent, and exploitative, the menace had to do not only with land and labor, but also intimately with sex. To comprehend the experience of the frontiers, it helps to come to terms with these rumors. Profoundly destabilizing, slavery and slave raiding spread genuine alarm and forced Indians to analyze the intentions of their neighbors.

Virginia

At the start of colonization, Europeans meant less to dispossess Indians than to extend imperial dominion over Indian leaders and lands, putting the lower

orders to work. From the initial garrison colony at Roanoke through the settlement at Jamestown in the early seventeenth century, English colonists expected Indians to serve as allied tributaries and, ultimately, as subordinates, not as refugees driven farther westward. In 1586 the English captain and Irish veteran Ralph Lane tried and failed to turn Roanoke Indians into a submissive population willing to feed English lords. John Smith, a generation later at Jamestown, similarly admired the Spanish practice of forcing the Indians "to doe all manner of drudgery worke and slave for them, themselves living like Souldiers upon the fruits of their labours." In both places, colonists insisted that Indians feed them, and in both places, Indians rejected the terms.[9]

As the demand for land increased with the colonial populations in the late seventeenth century, the demand for slaves to work the land increased with it. In Virginia, wars against Indians from the Opechancanough War of 1622 through Bacon's Rebellion of 1676 brought both land and slaves into the colony. Virginians treated captives taken in these wars as slaves for life and extended slavery to their posterity. Governor William Berkeley expected in 1666 that wars against Indians might pay for themselves since the government could sell the captives as slaves. His rivals in the so-called Bacon's Assembly of June 1676 likewise sanctioned the enslavement of enemy Indian captives. Even allied Indians fell prey. In the wake of the rebellion, Virginia's new assembly passed a law confirming the ownership of any Indian slaves captured by Virginia's "loyal" soldiers in the immediate wake of the rebellion.[10]

The drive to control Indian labor fed Indian rumor. As the colony attempted to recruit Indian students for the College of William and Mary, which had received a large donation for that purpose, Indians resisted and cited their potential enslavement as a cause. During the Tuscarora War (1711), the Virginia colony demanded that those Tuscarora villages that remained at peace send Virginia "two Children of the great men of each town to remain as Hostages, and to be educated at our College." If that effort at student-as-hostage recruitment were not example enough, the colony resorted to purchasing Indian slaves from distant nations to fill the school's ranks. When the college attempted to recruit free Indian students in its early decades, the targeted students' parents and fellow villagers reasonably objected with a story: they had in a previous generation sent students to Virginia, but the colony instead seized and "transported" the youths "to other Countrys . . . as Slaves."[11] The colonial practice of Indian slavery fundamentally undermined weak

colonial efforts to Anglicize Indians, for it suggested what status Indians might expect under a new, colonial regime.

New England

In New England, the Pequot War (1636–1637) and King Philip's War (1675–1676) both resulted in Indian enslavement and expanded indentured servitude. Following the annihilation of Mystic, the Pequot's main village in 1637, colonist Israel Stoughton and 120 soldiers attacked a body of the enemy Indians and captured 28 men and at least 50 women and children. Summarily executing the men, Stoughton delivered some women and children to his allied Narragansetts; most of the rest, close to 50, he transported to the Connecticut government. They crowded into a pinnace named, oddly, *Giggles*. Stoughton expressed his "desire" to keep for a servant "the fairest and largest that I saw amongst them, to whome I have given a coate to cloath her." He indicated two other captives, each a "little squa," one desired by a colonist and the other by an allied Indian. He also pointed to "a tall one," whom a colonial lieutenant wished to possess: she "hath 3 stroakes upon her stummach, thus—|||+."[12]

Forty years later, the southern New England colonies sold hundreds of Indians into slavery and servitude in the wake of King Philip's War. Most went overseas. The deportations, indeed, the export, of these persons to "any of his said Majesties Dominions or the Dominions of any other Christian Prince," marked yet another milestone on the road toward the racialization of Indians in New England.[13] As the vicious fighting spread to Maine, colonists forced women and children into servitude, and the bondage of Indians formed an element of war. In 1677 a former justice of the peace maintained that the Maine Indians had taken up arms because of "the treacherous dealings of some of the Inhabitants of Boston, who trading with the same Indians, Invited them on board and there detaynd them and brought them to Fayal [Faial, an island of the Azores], where they sold them for slaves to the Portuguese."[14] In 1682 Richard Waldern faced serious charges for, in part, reigniting King Philip's War in Maine through an act of enslavement. "About the year 1677," read the charge against him, "after the peace concluded with the Indians, [Waldern] did invite the Indians that lived in the said province [Maine] to settle near his house, professed great kindness towards them, built them a fort, and entertained them about fourteen Days with Victuals and Strong Drink, in the meantime he gott about

200 Indians, and seized them all, where of seven of the principall were hanged, and about 200 Sold for Slaves, whereof many had never been in Arms to the great Scandall of the Christian Religion, which was the occasion of many English being killed."[15] Short of hereditary slavery, for generations following the war, indentured servitude and debt peonage became characteristics of southern New England Indian life.[16]

Carolina

The decade that began in 1670, which saw Indians frequently enslaved in both Virginia and New England, opened a far vaster trade in Indian slaves, centered in Charleston, South Carolina. South Carolina traders, in close league with the local colonial government, if not with the Proprietors in England, embarked on an extensive, lucrative, and profoundly destabilizing slave trade in the Southeast. To defend their actions before the distant Proprietors, the Carolinians circulated rumor and misinformation. So, at least, the Proprietors believed as they charged Carolinians with lies.

The Proprietors, for example, had a report in 1683 that privately scheming Carolinian slavers had spread a "false alarum" among the neighboring Shawnees of an impending Westo Indian assault. The Proprietors heard that the Carolinians had promised the Shawnees arms and had encouraged them to raid another group, the Waniahs (or Winyahs), for slaves. The Shawnees would exchange these with the Carolinians for more weaponry, preparing them for the Westo attack. The Proprietors laid the charge before the colonial slavers: "By buying [Waniah] Indians of the" Shawnees, "you induce them through Covetousness of your guns powder and shot and other European Commodities to make war upon their neighbors to ravish the wife from the Husband[,] kill the father to get the child[,] and burne and destroy the habitations." What is more, the Carolinian slavers had misrepresented reality, for they had justified the attacks on the Waniahs with a lie, calling it the punishment for murder. The slavers had accused the Waniahs with killing a party of Indian slaves, but that party, the Proprietors understood, had actually already embarked for and had "arrived safe in Antigua." The Proprietors believed, in short, that the colony, at the behest of slavers, had attacked the Waniahs "without ever inquiring into the truth of the thing or even sending to the Waniahs to let them know the Information had been given to the government that such murder was committed by some of their people." The Proprietors observed that the Waniahs had welcomed the

early colonists and had allied with Carolina; now the Carolinians deployed false rumor, raising Shawnee proxies to destroy them.[17]

La Florida

Farther south, Indians experienced servitude in the Spanish colony of La Florida, which in the late sixteenth and especially seventeenth centuries subjected the mission Indian villages to the *repartimiento de indios*. A royally sanctioned forced levy, it put Indians to work on public projects—roads, transport, docks, churches, and most notably the massive construction of the citadel of San Marcos, St. Augustine. Begun in 1672 after the establishment of South Carolina, San Marcos would absorb frequent pounding by British artillery, but it still stands. The Spanish system, rationalized as labor in exchange for Christianity, followed pre-colonial native tributary patterns, though it intensified them. In practice, the *repartimiento* also put mission Indians to work as field laborers, domestic servants, and burdeners (carriers of heavy packs). Outright slavery, hereditary and permanent, fell not upon mission Indians, but upon heathen captives brought into the colony from afar, a practice that long survived the Spanish Crown's sixteenth-century interdiction of Indian slavery. As in the English colonies to the north, such Indian slavery would eventually become overwhelmed in La Florida by African slavery, but over the course of Spain's hundreds of years in the region, slavery and servitude joined with Catholic conversion as common colonial experiences.[18]

Realities of forced Indian labor shaped Indian knowledge about Europeans, and rumors about Spanish intentions flourished. The rumors made their way into the colonial record, and they bore, sometimes powerfully, on the events that mark La Florida's history. As early as 1656, subjugated Timucua Indians—rumoring Spain's intentions to export them to the islands—rose in rebellion. The rumors had some specific foundation: the governor, Diego de Rebolledo, anticipated an English attack, and he ordered the conscription of Timucuas to defend St. Augustine. His orders, however, ignored the interior Timucua leadership, and the villagers violently resisted. Lucas Ménéndez, a Timucua leader at the mission settlement of San Martín, organized others from nine villages. With less effect, the rumor made its way to the neighboring Apalachees. The Indian rebels killed seven, deliberately sparing all priests (a fact that soon gave rise to Spanish rumors that the priests had organized the rebellion).[19] Spain managed to restore authority over the

Timucuas, but at the cost, in part, of recalling the hated governor. Timucuas might be tributaries, but they would not be chattel slaves—not yet.

New France and Louisiana

By the middle of the eighteenth century, British colonists and policymakers considered their French counterparts to be particularly adept at winning Indians as allies, and the idea of some Gallic affinity with Indians became part of early American mythology. But both French-Indian alliances and the French colonies featured Indian slaves. By the middle of the eighteenth century, slaves formed perhaps a third of the inhabitants of French Illinois Country. Both Africans and Native Americans worked the fields.[20] At Detroit, slaves made up 7 percent of the population in 1750.[21] Even in the St. Lawrence heartland of New France, Indian slaves tended crops or served elite households. These individuals had lost their freedom, usually at the hands of Indian enemies, in places as distant as the Arctic or the southern Plains. More typically, they belonged to western Great Lakes peoples, particularly the Fox (Mesquakie) Indians, or to those of the Prairie West, particularly the Siouan speakers. Eventually, over time, a few thousand Indians would suffer slavery among the *habitants* of New France, a feeble echo of the tens of thousands who passed through English Carolina alone, but still a large enough number to have associated the French, even far to the north of Louisiana, with Indian slave trading and agricultural slavery. Slaves labored in French fields, they worked in French households, they guided French expeditions into the interior, they became merchandise, and they also served as binding gifts among allies in a turbulent and often violent colonial world.[22] As a result of this reality, the Indian allies of the French, far from seduced by brandy and the Mass, rationally rumored malevolent French intentions to rob them of their freedom and humanity.

At the dawning of this interior trade in the mid-1680s, for example, Ottawas even as far north as Michilimackinac, at the top of Michigan's mitten, rumored that the French, in requesting an Ottawa military alliance, actually meant "to make us their slaves." After Ottawas destroyed their mutual enemy, some rumored, the French "will do with us what they do with their cattle, which they put to the plow and make them cultivate the land. Let us leave them to act alone."[23] The Ottawas did shore up their alliance with France, but the rumors clearly manifested both their distrust and their determination to remain autonomous.

French officials understood the power of such rumors and tried to turn them against the British. As they attempted to make peace with Chickasaws, perhaps the greatest slave-raiders in alliance with Great Britain, officers ventured in 1702 that "the ultimate plan of the Englishmen, after weakening you by means of war, is to come and seize you in your villages and then send you to be sold somewhere else, in faraway countries from which you can never return as the English have treated others, you know." Indians also deployed the rumors diplomatically. To the west, Osages, who had almost certainly experienced occasional Chickasaw slave raiding by 1719, sought to defeat French plans to trade with the rival Taovayas by rumoring that French diplomats actually planned that people's enslavement.[24] Extensive French alliances in the interior were real, but they took constant work, and rumors reveal that even allies held the French at arm's length.

The World the Slave-Raiders Made

The reality of Indian slavery gave its rumors power. Slave raiding by South Carolina's Indian allies tore tens of thousands of people from their bleeding and mourning kinsmen. The raiders especially prized women and children, following both customary practices of captivity and the practicalities of the forced march over long distances. Most of those who reached the colonies ended their harrowing journeys only later, after disembarking from vessels in the West Indies or in more northern colonies. Others labored near the Atlantic. In South Carolina by 1709, 500 Indian men, 600 women, and 300 children worked as slaves beside 1,800 "negro" men, 1,100 women, and about 1,000 children. Their combined numbers swamped those of the unfree white servant population of 60 men and 60 women. Free persons, mostly white, were also outnumbered: 1,300 men, 900 women, and not quite 2,000 children. Most of the Indian slaves, the colony claimed, had arrived in the past five years "by reason of our late conquest over the French and Spaniards and the success of our forces against the" Apalachees and other Indians.[25] In those years, scores of South Carolinians and thousands of Yamasees, Creeks, and others had descended upon the Roman Catholic Timucuan and Apalachee villages of Spanish Florida. Some Apalachees had managed to join the Creeks or Carolinians as allies, but several thousand had wound up, like most Timucuan captives, as slaves. Roman Catholic communities that had existed for lifetimes lay utterly destroyed.[26]

Not all slave raiding, however, accompanied English imperial rivalry with France and Spain. More complicated patterns blistered across the southeastern landscape as South Carolina allied with one group, encouraged its slave raiding, and eventually turned against it for slaves obtained through a new ally. Thus Westoe allies of the English fell upon, enslaved, and sold enemy Kussos Indians to Carolina, only later to become enemies of Carolina's new Shawnee allies, who forced Westoes into the leg irons that had only recently bound the Kussos.[27]

The expanding violence provided ideal conditions for epidemics that blazed forth from the trading and raiding paths. A "Great Smallpox Epidemic" (1696–1700) raced out of English Virginia and Carolina, following the Tuscarora and Creek trading paths through the Piedmont, the Smoky Mountains, and the great river valleys of the South, decimating peoples as far away as the entire Lower Mississippi Valley. Villages emptied before the raiders, or they dissolved in plagues. Survivors coalesced with others into larger, defensible groups, the most successful of which would ultimately form the Indian Nations that survive to this day. Other groups succumbed to social extinction. The larger societies retained and intensified old methods of incorporating outsiders: slaves, adoptees, fictive kinfolk. The more directly affected southeastern peoples, such as the Catawba, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Seminole Nations, may provide the best examples of rapidly evolving polities. Even the English, French, and Spanish southern colonies followed the pattern to some degree; they, too, accepted villages into their orbit as military allies and trading partners. Virginians and Carolinians called them "settlement Indians"; Louisianans termed them "petite nations." Surviving groups joined and sometimes briefly flourished in the trade by becoming raiders themselves. British markets exchanged somewhere between 24,000 and 51,000 Indian people between the establishment of South Carolina and 1715. At the low estimate, this is more people than the so-called city of Charleston would have at any time before 1800; at the high estimate, more than the city would house until well after the Civil War.[28]

Rumor and the Yamasee War, 1715

As natives feared that they might degenerate from raiders into raided, many agreed to turn their guns on South Carolina, the entrepôt of the slave trade. In April 1715 Yamasees, Ochese Creeks, and others launched a series of attacks

so effective that they killed an estimated 7 percent of white Carolinians.[29] Rumor flew alongside the war's hot ball and cold, steel-tipped arrows; Creeks and Yamasees held that Carolinians had conspired to enslave them. For decades, Carolinian traders and officials had shifted their alliances from one native group to the next, turning former allies into catchments for slaves. Such ambiguity bred no loyalty, but it provided a rich medium for rumor.

The Ochese people, Muskogee-speakers who had once lived along the Apalachicola River, particularly worried about the Carolinians in 1715. These people, long enemies of Spanish Florida and its Apalachee and Timucua allies, had moved to and settled along the Ochese Creek tributary to the Ocmulgee River. They and their allied towns earned the English name Creeks. They captured, retained, and adopted numbers of the Apalachees in brutal joint raids with Carolinian forces against Spanish Florida in the first decade of the eighteenth century. In the wake of those raids, however, the Ochese Creeks and their Yamasee allies found growing cause for alarm about their alliance with South Carolina.[30] Indebted to English traders, who established themselves almost in the fashion of warlords in Indian villages, they could not keep pace with the traders' demands for hides or slaves, and their debts mounted. Within a decade of their crushing of the Catholic missions, they foresaw their own debasement. Traders demanded that the Yamasees pay their debts by surrendering their Apalachee captives, some now living as beloved adopted kin.[31]

Rumor alone, then, did not cause the Yamasee War. Yamasees had clear and comprehensible reasons to fight Carolinians: debts, traders' threats and abuses, all piled on top of a declining ability to hunt for skins among collapsing deer populations or for slaves among increasingly well-armed Indian enemies. The advent of South Carolinian rice cultivation increased the pressure on the Yamasees' land.[32] These factors formed real and related preconditions for the war.

Yamasees who fought for land, however, also defended their standing against utter degradation in a Southeast characterized in 1715 by slave raiding. Ochese Creeks had somewhat less than Yamasees to fear immediately when it came to land. But they agreed with the Yamasees that Carolinians needed correction. And whatever the rational preconditions for the conflict, a rumor of enslavement, rational at its core, sounded the war's opening. Strong evidence exists for the rumor. Scholars have long discussed it, based on reports distant from the events.[33] In a 1747 document, for example, the Lower Creek leader Malatchi recalled to an Englishman that his people and

the Carolinians had "lived as brothers for some time till the traders began to use [us] very ill and wanted to enslave us which occasioned . . . [the Yamasee] war."[34] In a report far more proximate in time, but written at a considerable distance to the north, New York's governor heard in July 1715 the familiar tune that the southern Indians fought against threats to their lands, but also that Carolina had, on promising to educate Indian children, instead "transported" them "to other plantations" and "sold" them as "slaves."[35] Floridian Spanish records from the same month reveal Yamasee fears that the English meant to enslave their people.[36]

Historian William L. Ramsey has pinned these distant echoes (New York, Florida, mid-century) to the event. He notes that "Carolina lore" long held that Yamasees had written to the colonial governor stating the Indians' reasons for going to war. He then discloses the actual existence of the note itself in the Admiralty Papers of the British National Archives. Colonists under Governor Craven found the note in a dead Indian's bag following a battle. The Yamasee "Huspew King" had dictated the message to a captive English boy. He addressed it to the governor. The government enclosed the message in a letter sent that July to Whitehall. The note put the rumor in the mouth of the trader John Wright. "Mr. Wright," it claimed, had announced that the "white men" had plans to invade in the night, round up all the Yamasees, "hang four of the head men" until dead, "and take all the rest of them for Slaves, and that he would send them all off the Country." For good measure, the message added that Wright had, in words and obscene gestures, insulted the Yamasees: "the men of the Yamasees were like Women, and shew'd his hands one to the other, and what he said vex'd the Great Warriors, and this made them begin the war."[37]

Along with rumors of enslavement, the Yamasee War exposed deeply affecting concerns about gender, sexuality, power, and violence. A leading Virginian, William Byrd II, accompanied the trader David Crawley to London to explain the war and perhaps to defend Virginian trading interests. Crawley saw the war's origins in many things, from Carolinians' errant hogs destroying Indian crops to beatings and threats by Carolinian traders. These traders, Crawley said, forced Indian men to carry enormous burdens of 70 to 100 pounds over 300 to 500 miles—with little compensation. But centrally, Crawley testified, Yamasees feared what would happen to women in their villages once the men had gone, and for good reason. Crawley had heard British traders "brag to each other of Debauching their wives sometimes forced them," indeed, he said he had "once seen it myself in the Day time." Crawley

had made the charges to Byrd in writing and, in much the same language, before the Board of Trade at Whitehall.[38] Yamasees, intimately involved in the emerging slave economy of South Carolina, knew well that slavery could mean degradation right down to their sexual lives.

The previous two decades had seen an enormous traffic in Indian slaves, and that traffic meant mainly a trade in women. During the war, when South Carolina pleaded with Virginia for troops and assistance, Virginia made the remarkable offer to supply one soldier in exchange for each black woman South Carolina could supply in return. The proposition failed, as the stunned Carolinians depended at that critical juncture on every man in the colony, including enslaved black men married to those very women. Virginia's astonishing proposal, to loan white soldiers in exchange for the permanent surrender of reproductive black women, exemplifies the importance of the traffic in women to those who would gain from and defend the emerging colonial slave societies.[39]

Highly plausible rumors that the Carolinians meant to enslave their erstwhile allies ran through the Southeast as some Creek and Chickasaw villages, most regional Shawnees, almost all Yamasees, and other local groups took up arms against South Carolina. Some Cherokees joined in the initial attacks on local traders, generating fear in Carolina that the war would present a united, hostile Indian front. As the Carolinian Colonel George Chicken approached the Cherokee highlands to prevent such an outcome in December and January 1715–1716, he heard a rumor of enslavement that lay behind the Cherokee attacks on the traders. Cherokees further told Chicken that an English trader, Alexander Long, had entered the Nation and "told these people that the English was going to make wars with them and that they did design to kill all their head warriors." Cherokees rumored even further that visiting Creeks, not Cherokees, had actually killed the English traders, an ungrounded story that nonetheless eased a renewed Anglo-Cherokee alliance. Cherokees cemented the union by slaughtering an unfortunate Creek delegation. Drawing Creek blood served both to atone for the traders' deaths and to declare war on Creeks, whom Cherokees would raid for slaves to sell to Carolina in exchange for advanced weaponry.[40] The Cherokee alliance helped to rescue South Carolina, but at the time, some English thought the price so high that the Cherokees had become their lords: "we may properly say, We are become their Tributaries, We buy their Friendship at too dear a rate . . . to defend Ourselves, and pay this annual Tribute is a Tax this Country cannot long bear."[41]

By 1717, Cusita and Coweta Creeks complained bitterly to the Spanish about the Cherokees' alliance with South Carolina. The Cowetas and Cusitas now wished to "join forces with the [Spanish] provinces of Apalachicola, to destroy the said Cherokees because they have killed their sons and sold them to the English, and by making an end of the Cherokee nation they will have avenged themselves on the English."[42] This Spanish alliance did not materialize. Far from eliminating the Cherokees, Creeks instead came to terms with the English. As for the Yamasees, they moved southward and clustered in several villages around Spanish St. Augustine. By 1718, the Yamasees, once raiders for slaves among the Christian Indian satellite communities of that Spanish colonial center, themselves inhabited new satellite communities in Spanish Florida. They became allied with similar communities of free blacks in the Spanish service, some of whom had broken Carolinian shackles.[43] The Yamasee War did not end the enslavement of Indians, but it did mark the end of the social and economic dominance of slave raiding in the Southeast. No longer would slaving principally spread regional Indian war.[44]

Enduring Fears to Mid-Century

But the history left its mark, and Indians continued to fear the prospect of transportation overseas, as slaves. In the 1730s, when Moravian missionaries joined the early colony of Georgia and evangelized to the Creeks, many Creeks saw it as another step toward their own enslavement. That missionaries portended slavery became a recurring rumor in native communities throughout the North American East.[45] Creek parties told Spanish authorities in 1745 that the British aimed to have the Indians so weaken themselves in wars that the traders would easily "enslave their women and children."[46] Rumors about British plans to enslave Cherokees and Creeks flared in 1756, as the English set about completing Fort Loudoun, deep in Cherokee Country. According to British traders among the Creeks, the rising anti-British militant, the Mortar, visited the French at Fort Toulouse (Alabama) and claimed to speak for the Cherokees when he denounced the British fort. He reportedly told both French officers and his fellow Creeks that "the English has now a Mind to make Slaves of them all for [they] have already filled their [Cherokee] nation with English Forts and great Guns, Negroes and Cattle." South Carolinian Indian agent Daniel Pepper observed that the Creeks saw "the Words Fort and Slavery as synonymous Terms," but a Creek leader told him that they would tolerate a small garrison, especially if it housed women

and children, alleviating "their Fears greatly of being Made Slaves." Pepper attributed the "malicious Insinuations" about English intentions to French "spies." He said the French rumored among dissident Creeks that pro-British Creek leaders had "sold" their people to the British, who "were then upon the March with an Army of five thousand Men, to take Possession of their Lands and to build Forts to subject them to Slavery." These "lying Reports" had generated "such a Blaze . . . that the Head Men could [scarcely] extinguish [it] upon their Arrival; nay the Remains lurk latent in the Breasts of a great many."[47]

Creeks and Cherokees indeed worried about the increased militarization of South Carolina as Great Britain and France engaged in frequent wars. Captain Raymond Demeré of the South Carolina Independents wrote from his outpost, Fort Prince George on the edge of the Cherokee lower towns, that "The large Quantity of Iron that is come from Charles Town . . . has struck a great Terror amongst many of the Indians[,] they imagine they are brought up on Purpose to put them in Irons and make them Prisoners and the same News was sent to the Creeks and to the French."[48] Cherokees had enjoyed for several decades an often-fruitful relationship with the colony of South Carolina, yet doubt riddled the alliance.

Rumors of colonial intentions to enslave Native Americans continued to surface long after the Seven Years' War. But before pursuing such eastern North American rumors through the revolutionary era, the operation of rumors bears closer examination. The alliance between the Cherokees and the British colonists, which solidified in the Yamasee War, provides a fine case study. Both parties feared its disintegration in 1751, and renewed Cherokee fears of their impending enslavement raced through their communities. By the decade's end, the alliance had collapsed, and some of the Cherokees' worst fears about the English had become realities. Those realities may have featured rough pioneers bent on forming quiet freeholds in the shade of the woodlands and the shadow of the Smoky Mountains. But they also included imperial troops, slaveholders, and abusers of Cherokee women.

4. Panic: Rumors Deployed, 1751

Looking backward, slavery and freedom constitute the most famous paradox of early American history.[1] In yet another paradox, natives and settlers often needed one another, in part because of slavery. Cherokees, to take a major example, formed a strategic alliance with South Carolina, the colony that distilled slavery into its most potent North American form. Seeking arms, ammunition, and goods, Cherokees frequented the chambers of the governor's council. Seeking profits and military support, South Carolinian Britons lived among Cherokees, married Cherokee women, and raised Cherokee families. Cherokees traveled to England, inking a treaty in 1730 and posing for painter Joshua Reynolds in 1762. They patrolled the colony's borders, protected its flanks, and generally returned its fugitive slaves. But even during periods of relative peace, and even among such long-term and mutually needful allies, the colonial world produced panic. Such panic gripped Cherokees and Carolinians alike in 1751.

From early spring through the fall of that year, Cherokees spoke of impending Carolinian invasions. Carolinians, for their part, reported British deaths in the Cherokee hills, Cherokee intrigues with France, and Cherokee banditries in the colonial backcountry. The "bad talks" inspired defensive actions: Cherokees abandoned hamlets near the border; Carolinians erected stockades.[2] Panic seized the frontiers as peoples from Charleston to the Tennessee River braced for an unrealized war. That fearful year generated scores of documents as Charleston investigated a vague but very real crisis: a crisis about rumor.[3] Like many other such episodes up and down the colonial seaboard and through the centuries, the crisis involved rumors of war, violence, and malevolent intentions. Also as in other such crises, many Indians and settlers struggled for peace, this time with success, and their peace held, for a time.

South Carolina's colonial government produced or collated most of the sources documenting the panicky year. As was typical for a British North American colony before London established formal, imperial Indian superintendencies in 1756, South Carolina's governor and his executive council acted as the colony's de facto Office of Indian Affairs. They managed diplomacy; they gathered affidavits and letters, mostly from traders, backcountry merchants, or, less frequently in 1751 than in later years, soldiers. The council also served as the upper house during sessions of the assembly. When matters called for new regulations or expenditures, the lower house (or commons house) also became involved. Busy in 1751, often scratching under their powdered wigs, government men documented the panic of 1751.[4]

They confronted openly the problem of rumor. As the crisis erupted, the council investigated the origins of frontier agitation. It gathered, for example, an affidavit from the backcountry storekeeper Herman Geiger, who spoke only of hearsay: he had reliable accounts, from unnamed others. He described the recent visit to the Cherokees of William Broadway, a deerskin trader and employee of one of Geiger's competitors. As Broadway entered the Cherokee towns, "the Indians asked him[,] as they generally do, what News below?" Responding, Broadway unleashed a dangerous rumor: "The white Men were raising an Army to cut the Indians all to Pieces." At a time when Cherokees sought "News" from the colony, Broadway had circulated an outrageous rumor. Or so his rival Geiger had heard, from someone.[5] Was Broadway the villain behind the panic? Could Geiger be trusted, and could his vague sources?

Cherokees and Carolinians had to assess many such poorly founded stories. Out of some eighty years of experience, and almost half of those spent in close alliance, Cherokees and Carolinians had fashioned dangerous notions about one another. These circulated as rumor, not only among but also between the peoples, along the fraying networks that bound them together. By 1751, the Cherokees and the British in South Carolina had been at formal peace for some thirty-five years and had adhered to a treaty of alliance for more than two decades. Cherokees found in the colony a rich source of goods, while the colony found in the Cherokees a powerful buffer against the ambitions of slaves for freedom or those of imperial rivals for expansion. So important was the Cherokee "bulwark" that Governor James Glen called it the "key of Carolina."[6]

The "key" turned on a fiction. The Cherokees' alliance with the British colonies could never be a simple "government to government" affair. Cherokee towns were generally independent, and even the Cherokee language

exhibited strong regional dialects. The Cherokee Nation was no state; each town and each of the four major Cherokee regions possessed its own experiences and concerns. South Carolina had, since the second decade of the century, overtaken Virginia in Cherokee diplomacy; from South Carolina more than from Virginia, too, British traders had entered and begun to mesh with the undulating economic, and sometimes the familial, fabric of the Cherokee people.[7] In 1751 Carolinians and Cherokees feared the paths of negotiation were closing; the panic manifested that fear.

Rumors and Panic

The panic began with rumors. Some spread among the Lower and Middle Settlement Cherokees that a Carolinian army stood poised to destroy or to enslave them. At about the same time, higher in the Cherokees' mountain towns, resident British traders exchanged word of a Cherokee plot to kill them all, and Cherokee women warned traders of impending violence. Most traders who could flee did so, carrying false news to the colony. They left behind goods, livelihoods, bewildered Indian partners, and, in some cases, families, who wondered if the traders had learned of hostile colonial plans and prudently escaped before the invasion came. Peace, and peace of mind, required more information, generating more rumor in its absence.[8]

To the South Carolina backcountry, frightened traders brought false news that Cherokees had already killed four Britons and stood poised to assault the settlements. Backcountry Carolinians, many only recently arrived from Europe or Africa and already worried about Indian attacks, took the traders' word seriously.[9] Older Carolinians could recall the dreadful Yamasee War.[10] Newer settlers soon realized that they had inadvertently planted themselves in a complicated zone where Indian fought Indian. Lower Creeks from beyond Georgia and "Norward Indians" from beyond Virginia skirmished with Catawbas in the Piedmont or the "Settlement Indians" who maintained villages on the Upper Savannah River.

These "Norward Indians," active in 1751, passed armed through the thickening European settlements, expecting and forcibly extracting food and small material items from poor immigrant households. A gang of intruders murdered four German colonists near Saxe Gotha; one woman, severely wounded and left for dead, survived to swear an affecting affidavit before a justice of the peace. Now, as alarmed traders fled to South Carolina, its settlers spread rumors that Cherokees had joined the northern Indian

commandoes. "We have much reason to apprehend," wrote commons house speaker Andrew Rutledge, that "the Cherokee Indians will fall upon the Settlers in the Frontiers."[11]

Several fantasies and realities bloomed that spring: a Cherokee-imagined South Carolinian invasion, an actual flight of the traders; a Carolinian-imagined Cherokee invasion of South Carolina, an actual plundering intrusion into the Carolina backcountry of "Norward Indians" out to strike the Catawbas. In addition, the South Carolina council darkly underscored another reality: on March 13 Indians had fatally shot Jeremiah Swiney, a colonial trader. He died to the southwest, in the borderlands between Georgia and the Creeks. Lower Cherokees and Lower Creeks (the easternmost groups among these emerging Nations) were then in open war. A mixed party of "Norward Indians" and Lower Cherokees had pursued a mixed party of Lower Creeks and Chickasaws south toward Creek Country. The two bands met bloodily on that March day at a trading house on the Oconee River, and they wounded several British subjects in the crossfire; Swiney died of his wounds. More alarming, the council had learned, through hearsay evidence, that Swiney's suspected killer, Andrew White, known to the English as the "half-Breed fellow," had "laughed heartily" with others as they mocked the groans of the fallen traders: "O, Lord! O, Lord! have Mercy upon us!"[12] Swiney's death stands as the only well-documented Cherokee killing of a British subject in 1751.[13] A later incident aggravated the anxieties: trader Hugh Murphey took a bullet in the arm while riding toward the Cherokees at a place called Coronico, northwest of the trading place at Ninety Six, named for its distance in miles from the nearest Lower Cherokee settlement. Glen pressed this issue, confusing Hugh Murphey with another trader, Daniel Murphy, until he grew uncertain that a Cherokee had pulled the trigger. But Swiney's killing at the Oconee remained a grave issue throughout 1751.[14]

Only months before Swiney's death, another Indian killing of a colonial inhabitant, the slave "Hector," had caused no alarm. Colonial militia and a "gang of Indians" had fired on runaway slaves who had hidden in a Stono River swamp. An utterly routine operation, the event only made it into the record because the allied Indians had mistakenly killed Hector, a bystander who had "always behaved himself as a slave ought to do." The man who had enslaved Hector petitioned the government for compensation. No war had threatened.[15]

To the fantasies and facts we can also add this: a party of Carolinians stole 330 deerskins belonging to the Lower Cherokee town of Tugaloo. The

thieves, who knew Indian ways, had attempted to throw Cherokees off their track by strewing the path with what they considered to be Indian signs. The red herrings failed, and Cherokees tracked the thieves into South Carolina. The government in Charleston acknowledged this theft and went so far as to recommend proceedings against two traders implicated in it.[16]

Understandably nervous about the news from the mountains, backcountry Carolinians gathered that spring and early summer into strong houses and worked their fields under arms.[17] Slaveholding legislators extended assembly sessions and debated with Glen over the proper course of action. The legislative houses formed a joint committee, pointedly named "Committee to take into consideration the present State of the province on the present melancholy prospect of an Indian War, and the discontinuance now approaching of several salutary Laws heretofore made for its Security."[18] Meeting at Gordon's Inn on May 9, the committee pored over the reports of backcountry disturbances, and it recommended both the reinforcement of Forts More and Congaree and the raising of patrols, including local "Settlement Indians," for the frontiers.[19]

Rumors and Colonial Officials

As alarm spread in the backcountry, the government's divisions widened. Glen had long advocated uniting South Carolina with its Indian neighbors into a league against the French. In 1747 he had attempted to win over an anti-French faction of the predominantly French-allied Choctaws by supplying them with trade goods. When he assigned the potentially lucrative Choctaw-trade monopoly to a company in which his family had interests, he infuriated rival merchants. Further, when that company failed to deliver a Carolinian supply of arms and ammunition to the Choctaws in time to prevent the collapse of the anti-French faction, Glen faced intense criticism. Many Carolinians doubted the wisdom of uniting Indians who might turn their fighting skills against settlers. By 1750, as Glen's failure among the Choctaws became clear, he was sharply at odds with the commons house over Indian policy.[20] Even so, in 1751 the government did take steps to restore order, and it did so under Glen's leadership, for despite the opposition of the lower house, Glen had a critical advantage. Glen and the council effectively controlled the sources of information about Indians. They, not the lower assemblymen, discussed the military and mercantile documents sent by officers and traders to the governor. They interviewed traders, Cherokees,

and subjects. This gave them the power to guide, though they could not command, the Carolinian response to the crisis.[21]

First, Glen and his council, still pursuing the policy of allied-Indian unity, asked the lower house to help mediate a peace between Catawbas and the Six Nations Iroquois, whose hostilities had brought "Norward Indian" fighters—along with depredations and panic—to the backcountry. The lower house reluctantly agreed on May 17 to defray expenses for a joint Catawba-South Carolinian mission to meet with the Six Nations and the government of New York. Though the mission would not stop other northerners or even, as it turned out, check all Iroquois, it succeeded in reducing the presence of northern warriors in the Carolina backcountry.[22] Second, and less effectively, in an effort to forestall Cherokee aggression, Glen and the upper house proposed as early as May 13 to gather one thousand armed men to march with intimidating display toward the Cherokee hills. The force would not wage war; it would instead "bring these People to make a proper acknowledgement and satisfaction for the murders and insults" and it would establish among the Cherokees at least one British fort to "be an awe or check" on "the turbulent and outrageous part of that People." The lower house—conscious of costs and skeptical of the need—refused to support these proposals, instead funding only a defensive posture based on local militia, backcountry forts, and temporary patrols. Third, the lower house proposed to bring Indians to terms by placing an embargo on all Cherokee trade. Glen initially opposed this measure as contrary to justice in that it punished innocent Cherokees along with those guilty of disturbing the peace. But as panic spread in early June, he endorsed an embargo until Cherokees delivered the "guilty" to colonial justice. This measure satisfied the government's need for strong action, but it further aggravated Carolinian-Cherokee relations.[23]

To enforce the embargo, the governor on June 8 called all remaining traders out of the Cherokee Nation. Though some traders defied the summons, as the embargo settled in it threatened the fall hunting season, before which traders customarily supplied hunters on credit. As early as July 30, Overhills leaders called it "a great Trouble . . . to see the white People's Houses empty in this Nation, that used to be full of goods."[24]

Cherokee Alarms

The embargo ignited a firestorm of Cherokee rumor. Because the Cherokees were forced to acknowledge dependence on British goods, their anxiety about

colonial intentions soared. As the crisis began in April, Lower Cherokees had sacked several trading houses, preparing for a hard defense. Following the adoption of the embargo in June, Cherokees abandoned two borderland villages, harvesting first their mid-summer crops, fattening their animals on food intended for themselves, and seeking safety in the deeper recesses of their homeland. For a second time in months, a flock of rumor flew through the Smoky Mountain valleys that South Carolina, with enemy Creeks, would soon march upland.[25] Leaders of the Overhills Cherokee towns of Chota and Tanassee reported that an unnamed Shawnee runner had brought from the colony's "Settlement Indians" this word: one thousand Indians friendly to Carolina and a party of Carolinian gunmen stood poised to invade, "burning and destroying everywhere they went." As the rumor infected Cherokees, it alarmed the few British traders who defied the embargo; they fled the mountains.[26]

Another rumor, of practically continental scope, compounded matters. It held that South Carolina had written to New York to encourage a massive Six Nations Iroquois attack on the Cherokees. It echoed reports circulating throughout eastern North America: a large French-allied Indian expedition, departing from near Montreal, had begun its march against unspecified southern Indians. Even the governor-general of New France, Jacques-Pierre de Taffenel, Marquis de La Jonquière, sent word to his superiors that a "great party" of Six Nations Iroquois planned to attack the British-allied Cherokees. Far from the Carolinas, La Jonquière appears to have mistaken Catawbas for Cherokees. In South Carolina, Glen may have intensified Cherokee fears when, on August 6, he sent warnings of this forecasted French raid to all the allied southern Indians on his borders—*except* the Cherokees. None of Glen's information excluded the Cherokees as targets, yet Glen did not warn them.[27]

South Carolina's Antagonists

South Carolinians also exchanged speculations that foreign and domestic antagonists provoked Cherokee enmity. Throughout the crisis, the French operated somewhere in the background—or so some in South Carolina suspected. Neither Carolina nor Britain was then at open war with France, but a mere three years had passed since the last war, and few expected peace to last. Overhills Cherokees had in fact worked for peace with French-allied Great Lakes peoples, leading trader James Adair to write that Cherokee

Country had become the "rendezvous of the red pupils of the black Jesuits."[28] Other Carolinians suspected that the rising Cherokee statesman Attakullakulla, known to the British as the Little Carpenter, acted for France, noting his six years of captivity among the French-allied Ottawas. Backcountry settlers rumored that French agitators had the Cherokees "in continual Motion, holding councils of war every Morning setting up the War-Hoop, and every Night the Death Song."[29] They exaggerated, but with cause; one Cherokee admitted, toward the end of the crisis in November, that "the French have sent Messengers to us with bad Talks." When Glen pressed him on this point, he and others quickly altered the statement to mean that the French had been in contact with the Cherokees' enemies.[30]

On the domestic front, curiously, when Carolinians during this panicky year bruited about the possibility of free Indian-slave collusion, the rumors had sharp limits, and they may not have even implicated Cherokees. A backcountry Georgian, Edmund Gray, reported that three of his slaves told him that "the Half Breed Fellow" had incited them and three others to escape, but the first three changed their minds and returned. A Carolinian trader then claimed that three of those six had exhorted the Lower Cherokees to invade the lowcountry, where South Carolina's black majority would join them. Further, the Old Warrior of Keowee alerted a Carolinian trader that "some Negroes had applied to him, and told him that there was in all Plantations many more Negroes than white people, and that for the Sake of Liberty they would join the" Cherokees in an anticolonial war. Gray had described the "Half Breed Fellow" as a "subtle fellow" who "may have influence on many slaves," and who needed to be stopped "as an incendiary and disturber of public safety." But counterevidence within the two reports dampened potential colonial fears: this otherwise frightening news came directly from slaves and from Cherokees. It came from slaves to the man who claimed them, and it came from Cherokee leaders to their local trader in a bid for ammunition. The Old Warrior of Keowee resumed his friendship with traders once they assured him a supply.[31] That, in many ways, captured relations neatly: if Cherokees could depend on armaments from South Carolina, so necessary in the war-torn eighteenth century, South Carolina need not fear that slaves seeking freedom would find much hospitality among the Cherokees. And fear, generally, they did not. The panic conjured the bogeys of oppression and subversion: oppression if France gained ascendancy in North America, subversion if Indians and slaves united in rebellion. Of the two, the former loomed large.

Fears of free Indians conspiring with slaves enter the colonial record but rarely; fears of Indian conspiracies with enemy Europeans fill volumes.

The real events and the imagined non-events of 1751 might have precipitated a war nobody wanted. Maintaining peace meant, for both Cherokees and Carolinians, getting the rumors under control. This entailed not only leashing them in, but also investigating their origins, repudiating their content, and demanding their repudiation by others. These efforts to stop the rumors' spread and to discover their sources, vigorous throughout the summer and early fall, arrested the slide toward war, but otherwise provided few reliable answers.

Investigation and Control

Cherokees and Carolinians alike responded to rumors with more than desperate preparations for war; they put work into preserving peace. While South Carolina took steps to keep out the "Norward Indians," arm its frontier, and discipline the Cherokees with an embargo, the governor—hoping ultimately to unite his Indian neighbors against French Louisiana and its allies—still encouraged negotiation. Cherokee headmen, on their side, struggled to calm passions and to discover Carolinian intentions. From the Warrior of Keowee in the Lower Towns to the Raven of Hiwassee in the Valley Towns to Ammouiscossitte of the Overhills town of Tellico, the leading Cherokee peacemakers had strong political connections to the colony, their main source of European goods. Though they could not discount out of hand the rumors of an imminent Carolinian attack, they protected traders who had not fled the Nation. Several unnamed women warned traders of dangers and also sheltered them from harm. Goods plundered out of the abandoned traders' stores dispersed rapidly, but several leading men had enough authority to gather up much of the booty and restore it to the owners, with apologies, assurances of peace, and pledges to shun towns found guilty of abuse. Cherokee headmen sent to Charleston messages that contradicted Carolinian rumors of Cherokee hostility and directed blame for the panic to outsiders: to the traders themselves, to "Norward Indians," to Shawnees, to Chickasaws, to fugitive slaves, as well as to insiders, particularly in the Lower Towns. One message, summing up the widespread desire to preserve the alliance, declared that every Cherokee "remembers the great King's talk and keeps it in his Breast, and has not vamated it up."[32]

The Raven of the Hiwassee particularly impressed Carolinians with his desire for reconciliation.[33] This elder stood among the Cherokee men and women who had protected the traders in late April and early May. At the outbreak of the crisis, he sent his son to demand that the Lower Towns restore goods plundered from the traders. No stranger to Charleston, he had cooperated with the colony for more than a decade; his good relations with Carolina had bolstered his authority in the Valley Towns. He had the support of Ammouiscossitte, his close political associate in Tellico, who had been dubiously dubbed the Cherokee "Emperor" by the British. The Raven procured the services of the elderly, experienced trader Robert Bunning, a reliable interpreter who had been among the Cherokees since 1714. As other traders spilled from the hills with rumors of war, Bunning hurried to Charleston with the Raven's peace talks. As an interpreter who enjoyed the governor's and the Raven's trust, Bunning kept negotiations alive.

The Raven explored the rumors, and he did so in Cherokee fashion. Taking the report that South Carolina stood poised to strike, he concluded that an obscure Carolinian trader had been misunderstood by the Cherokees of the Lower Towns, whom the Raven thought to be particularly turbulent.[34] This the British would easily understand: the Carolinian had dangerously speculated in the Lower Towns that Glen might send an armed expedition into the Cherokee Nation to kill any visiting "Norwards," and Lower Town's people had misinterpreted the speculation to mean that a general invasion was afoot. To punish the guilty, the Raven recommended an embargo on the Lower Towns alone, "till they acknowledge their Faults." In Cherokee fashion, he could point to guilty persons, but he could not, according to Cherokee norms, seek their individual punishment, nor could he hand them over to the Carolinians. The Carolinian trader's responsibility was a matter for the colony to resolve, but Cherokees held bodies of their own people (towns and clans) accountable for the misdeeds of their members.[35]

Although South Carolina never investigated the trader, perhaps because the Raven emphasized that the man had been misunderstood, the colonists, unlike Cherokees, actively sought to discover—and punish—the guilty individuals. For example, Governor Glen, a trained lawyer, insisted on the surrender to South Carolina of those Cherokees who were personally guilty of manslaughter, robbery, and rumoring. He had reluctantly burdened the whole Nation with an embargo, but that he saw as leverage, not penalty.[36]

Like the Raven, Glen thought Carolinians played a role in the rumoring. He did not see it in sociological terms. No social anxieties generated collec-

tive speculation. Instead, self-seeking individuals had hatched the flying reports.[37] Glen's search for the conspiratorial source aligned with eighteenth-century British ideas of historical causation, which stressed the actions of powerful or well-situated individuals.[38] Factions might also drive events, but they were merely aggregates of the self-interested. This British view provided a stark contrast to the Cherokee notion of corporate (village or clan) accountability for wrongdoing. Britons would find and punish the guilty persons, setting an example for others to prevent the recurrence of the misdeed. Cherokees would identify the accountable and demand restitution to restore good relations.

Glen's suspicions naturally turned to traders, though he never finally identified any guilty individuals. He had long complained of the "low Indian Traders and Pack horsemen" who imposed "on this Government by lying letters and false Reports."[39] He later wrote that "Some very false Accounts were sent to Town . . . which alarmed a great many[,] and the Authors or inventors certainly deserved death for they might have brought on an Indian war." During the panic, with corrupt traders in mind, Glen drew up a "Scheme for Regulating the Indian Trade" for the assembly's consideration. He suggested that since many traders were "Persons of neither Sense or Substance, nor Character, it has been greatly detrimental to the Province in general." The upper house pleaded with the lower house in late August to pass new measures regulating the traders' behavior, lest they be "left at large to follow their own wicked designs."[40]

Chief among Glen's suspects was James Adair, a trader with experience among the Cherokees (1736–1744) and the Chickasaws (1744–1749). The two men were already at odds over the failed effort to supply and win over the anti-French Choctaw faction. Adair, who would later publish a valuable if odd history of the southern Indians, strongly angered Glen in February and April 1750, by criticizing him in two satirical newspaper advertisements for mock pamphlets, one scathingly titled "A TREATISE Upon the Importance of the Chactaws, and Means of Securing the Chactaw Nation . . . Concluding with *Some* Scenes of a FARCE." Adair had visited the Cherokees just before the outbreak of the panic in 1751. He was, in fact, among the first traders to warn the colony of an impending Cherokee war. Rival traders Herman Geiger, David Dowey, and Richard Smith linked Adair to an alleged conspiracy that included William Broadway and storekeeper and justice of the peace James Francis. The government considered bringing Adair and the others to Charleston for examination, but the evidence against them was

hearsay, much of it reportedly originating with non-Christian Indians, whose testimony would not be taken against a European in a Carolina court and who would not likely cooperate with the court system in any case. The government dropped this line of inquiry.[41]

Print and Panic

Though suspicions against traders did not lead to indictments, they gradually hardened into policy. In December 1751 an ordinance forbade traders to "presume to talk to any Indian or Indians, of Matters relating to the State or Government without Leave."[42] More generally, the government urgently tried to control the flow of information. It stopped the *South Carolina Gazette* from printing reports on Cherokee matters or on the backcountry panic. While the records of 1751 hold no direct order restraining the paper, such censorship was habitual in the southern colonies and can be inferred from the *Gazette*'s pages.[43] These efforts—defense, embargo, and the suppression of rumors—proved impossible to accomplish simultaneously, for while the government could restrict public discussion, its very meetings, defensive mobilizations, and harsh policies caused alarm among its ill-informed subjects and their Cherokee neighbors.

Published weekly in 1751 by Peter Timothy, the *Gazette* said nothing directly about the panic until October, though Timothy was aware of the disturbance as early as April 23, when the assembly, with which he was closely connected, became directly involved.[44] Throughout the year, Timothy commented only vaguely on the colony's Indian affairs.[45] In August he printed Glen's proclamation calling the assembly into special session to consider "affairs of great consequence," but the item did not mention, and Timothy did not add, that the backcountry panic was the sole reason for the session, as the executive records of South Carolina make clear.[46] Not until September 2, after the assembly's adjournment, did Timothy advert to the Cherokee crisis, when at the council's request he reported that the assembly had passed rules for Indian affairs and noted a Cherokee rumor about Carolinian plans to invade the mountain villages. But nowhere did he cover the backcountry panic, the embargo, or the actual or imagined killings of whites. Colonial-era newspapers rarely gave prominence to local and regional affairs; still, Timothy's snubbing of the panic demands explanation, particularly since he willingly devoted space to such local events as the hurricanes that flattened parts of Charleston in 1752.[47]

Timothy's *Gazette* was no independent newspaper; it "enjoyed public subsidies" and served as "the voice of the local political establishment." Timothy himself joined the government, winning election to the assembly in November 1751.[48] His alliance with the commons house brought him, on one occasion during the panic, to blows with Glen. The episode had roots in Virginia, in Cherokee diplomacy, and in censorship itself. Glen suppressed printed news of the panic and the rumors that sparked it—but with untoward consequences. Newspapers borrowed freely from one another, but here there was nothing for papers to the north to borrow. Without reports in the *South Carolina Gazette*, there were none in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* or the *Virginia Gazette*. Without these, and with no direct communication from Glen, the Virginia council could claim, when faced with the sudden appearance of a Cherokee delegation, complete ignorance of the panic, the embargo, and the "Outrages these Indians had committed" in South Carolina. The Virginians feted the embargoed visitors, much to Glen's embarrassment.[49]

Timothy was no friend of Glen. He particularly opposed, as he later put it, the governor's "wretched Management of Indian Affairs."[50] On September 11 Timothy notified Glen that he intended to reprint an item from an August issue of the *Virginia Gazette*. The piece simply described the Cherokee embassy to Williamsburg. As a criticism of Glen, it spoke for itself. Shut out of Carolina by the embargo, Cherokees outflanked Charleston. Timothy invited Glen to attach a comment. Instead, Glen quashed the piece.[51]

Timothy responded on October 3 in an issue that discomforted the public and the governor. Timothy did not disguise his anger at Glen's decision: "Many of our readers, having inquired the reason, why some extraordinary intelligence, not long since received, was not inserted in our Gazette? We hope it may be permitted us to answer, *we were not permitted* to do it." Juxtaposed with this admission, under the same dateline, was a story of Indian violence: "there hath happened a skirmish with some Indians, not many miles from this metropolis; of which we have not yet any particular accounts given us."[52] It was his first such report, and it lacked all the important details. The issue also featured an announcement by the council that a Cherokee ambassador had arrived for negotiations concerning peace and trade with South Carolina. This item never said that the negotiations dealt with violence, but Timothy's readers could well have inferred as much from the question of "peace," and from the rest of the quietly provocative issue.[53] In line with lower house opinion, the issue more than hinted that trouble bedeviled Glen's Indian policy, escalating the anxieties that lofted rumors. What is more, in

five other issues Timothy printed items that described Indian attacks on colonists. In these, the scene of British suffering was not backcountry South Carolina, but Nova Scotia. While Timothy printed virtually nothing of the nearby foothills, he published detailed pieces on Nova Scotian outrages, with lurid accounts of scalping and "mangling."[54] The Nova Scotian items bore rumors of a coming French war. Unprinted rumors of the backcountry panic and printed news of Nova Scotian horrors steeped a heady brew among a people who feared an Indian league with France.

South Carolina's conflicted efforts to suppress the rumors could not end the panic. The government, divided over Indian affairs and uncertain of the status of the Cherokee alliance, mixed information control with defensive measures. The actions only intensified the uncertainties on which the rumors thrived. No one could silence the rumors of war until extensive peace negotiations rendered them implausible in November. Nor did Carolina's leaders ever come firmly to identify what or who was to blame for the panic of 1751. Governor Glen's declaration, which came after seven months of baffling intelligence, summed up the widespread exasperation: "Sometimes Traders write Letters which we do not know how to believe."[55]

The Significance of Rumors

Tamotsu Shibutani emphasized long ago the importance of ambiguity, of a lack of reliable information, to the life of rumors.[56] We have already seen, for example, the Carolinian rumor that Cherokee young men had hidden themselves among "Norward Indian" raiders in the backcountry. This report fed on the escape of the traders from the Cherokee Nation and the desultory attacks on settlers and settlers' property by northern Indians whose main military target was the Catawba Nation.[57] As a backcountry interpretation of these events, the Carolinian rumor pessimistically appraised the colony's alliance with the Cherokees or, for that matter, with any Indians. Cherokee rumors of a Creek-Carolinian conspiracy against them fed similarly, first, on the war with the Creeks and, second, on the Carolinian-imposed embargo. Both Cherokees and Carolinians considered, in rumor, the deterioration of their alliance. Each constructed rumors out of groundless information, forming, within the rumors, skeptical interpretations of the alliance.

While the rumors implicated their allies, they may have contributed to the consolidation of Cherokee and white Carolinian identities. By rumoring imminent attack, rumorers conceived of themselves more fully as part of

the threatened group. Simultaneously frightening and exciting, the rumors intensified one's associations.[58] On one level, the rumors strengthened the Cherokee-Carolinian alliance by elevating individuals who came to be trusted on both sides. But more deeply, the rumors exposed huge, irreparable tears in the fabric of the relationship, and these would continue to grow.

While Cherokees and Carolinians investigated the sources of rumor, the rumors assumed investigative functions. Rumors, spoken directly by Cherokees to Carolinians, invited reactions. The rumors that one's partner in alliance had plans to turn hostile did more than create fear and alarm. They demanded denial and reassurance.[59] It is even possible that by exposing anxieties, they lengthened the peace by almost a decade. In late spring and early summer, Governor Glen conducted an encouraging exchange of messages with powerful Cherokee leaders, including Ammouiscossitte of Tellico and the Outacite of Euphassee (this is probably Ostenaco, a rising Cherokee leader and close associate of both the Raven of Hiwassee and Ammouiscossitte). Delays ensued, which the men attempted to explain after their delegation finally entered Charleston in October. Their explanations reveal not only worries about the state of the alliance but also the potential interpretive and investigative characteristics of rumor.

One reason for the Cherokees' delay was that they feared Charleston's notoriously unhealthful summers. The assembly, which Glen called into special session to deal with the crisis late in August, did not conceal its displeasure at having to risk illnesses such as malaria. Yellow fever struck only during summer and only in the Charleston area. Seven times in the eighteenth century the virus reaped lives in the port, including recent epidemics in 1745 and 1748. In 1749 summertime Cherokee delegates to Charleston became gravely ill and had to be carried partway home in wagons, after which smallpox broke out in the nation. Carolinians should have been able to understand the Cherokees' desire to have the meeting on higher ground, away from the lowcountry. Robert Bunning, the trader and interpreter who continued to relay messages, understood the Cherokee explanation that way, interpreting several leaders' remarks with the idea that they feared the "unhealthy" air everywhere below the Congaree River.[60]

Knowing nothing of microbes, neither Cherokees nor Carolinians employed modern medical explanations for Charleston's disease environment. The notion of "unhealthy" air, reported to Glen by Bunning, was a traditional European explanation for such mosquito-borne febrile infections as malaria. Cherokees may have accepted that explanation for imported illnesses,

Outacite, also known as Ostenaco, helped negotiate an end to the panic of 1751. Outacite, Chief of the Cherokees. Ostenaco (fl. 1741–1777). 1762. Engraving on paper. Sir Joshua Reynolds. National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution / Art Resource, NY.

but they generally saw disease differently. For them, as for their Indian neighbors, powerful forces—either slighted benevolent powers or inherently malevolent ones—caused most disease.[61] The Cherokee view bore on Cherokee-Carolinian relations because Cherokees could and did associate illness, retaliation, and malevolence with colonists. By 1751, Cherokees faced catastrophic population collapse; their numbers bottomed out around 1760. Bunning noted later in 1751 that "the Nation in our Time has been greater than at Present. We remember since there were six thousand stout Men in it. They are now not Half." Cherokees remained acutely aware of encounters with disease as their towns shrank.[62] In practical terms, inviting Cherokees to the port during the summer did expose them to illness. Well might Cherokees might hold colonists responsible for epidemics, adding ambivalence to the alliance.

Another Cherokee justification for delaying the journey to Charleston illuminates the investigative functions of these borderland rumors. The rumor that one thousand enemy Indians joined Carolinians to march against the Cherokee Nation had already stopped Cherokee negotiators on their way to Charleston. This rumor, part of the second wave of 1751 rumoring, followed the imposition of the embargo. Later reporting this rumor to Glen, the Cherokee speakers underscored the fact that recent colonial actions—from the flight of many traders to the embargo—had left relations with Charleston so unclear that Cherokees had to take seriously the report. In the face of the collapse of friendly trade with the colony, reasonable leaders could not reject the possibility of a colonial attack. Doubling the suspicion was South Carolina's continued trade with neighboring Indians, especially enemy Creeks. Cherokees explained all this in messages to Glen throughout the summer, seeking his rebuttal.[63]

The Overhills Cherokees went further, and sent a delegation to Williamsburg, Virginia, to seek trade; it was this episode that led Glen to silence the *Gazette* in September. Headed by Attakullakulla, the Cherokee embassy charged the governor of South Carolina with failing to live up to his agreements with the Cherokees. He argued that South Carolina favored the Creeks to the Cherokees' great disadvantage. He highlighted the embargo on trade: if South Carolina would not trade with Cherokees, perhaps Virginia would. Attakullakulla saw the embargo as a Carolinian gift to his Creek enemies, who would press their attacks on his people. He explained that these circumstances had made stories of a Carolinian-Creek invasion more credible. Virginians, surprised by the whole affair, circumspectly waited for more information from South Carolina. The council gave the Cherokees presents but did not promise trade.[64]

Cherokee leaders who dangerously delayed negotiations with South Carolina had reason. By September and November, key leaders admitted that the rumors had mostly been false. The so-called Cherokee Emperor, Tellico's Ammouiscossitte, acknowledged that reports of an armed invasion of the Cherokee towns were "all Lies"; Ostenaco promised to tell his people that "there never were any grounds for the lying Reports they heard spread of the sending up an army to destroy them"; and a leading Cherokee from Hiwassee publicly stated in the council at Charleston that he "did not believe" the rumors of invasion. Still, the talk of invasion had been sensible. Not only did living memory provide examples of South Carolina turning on such erstwhile allies as the Westoes, Savannahs, Tuscaroras, and Yamasees,

but the colony had, in fact, considered raising a "Sufficient Force against them to puni[sh] the Guilty." Even the colony's more limited steps meant an armed frontier, as Charleston sent one hundred muskets, with powder and ammunition, to backcountry folk.[65]

The most critical point about Cherokee efforts to master the rumors is this: though the Cherokees delayed their negotiators, they sent news of the rumors to South Carolina, seeking information and demanding denial. Individuals in both societies deliberately deployed rumors as probes, but also as levers. When Cherokees let out that the French had indeed sent messages to them, knowing full well that the most powerful of all Carolinian fears was a Cherokee-French alliance, they forcefully reminded the colony of their strategic importance as its defensive barrier.[66] Similarly, Cherokees who notified Carolinians of rumors of war did not thereby associate themselves with the dangerous news. The rumors allowed them obliquely, even diplomatically, to charge South Carolina with belligerence, under conditions of alarm that forced the colony to attend to complaints. Cherokees generally argued that, while they were valuable defenders of the colony, they were not being treated as well as their neighbors. Ammouiscossitte complained that some traders, even when allowed among them, used false weights and measures, cheating them of a fair price for their deerskins.[67] The alarms lent urgency to South Carolinian deliberations on Cherokee matters. Although the drive for action raised dangers, it also aired grievances. The instrumentality of rumoring hardly outweighed its social characteristics. But in this instance, the functional possibilities meant that rumors shaped events. If spreading rumors served the purposes of negotiators, so did repudiating them.

The Panic Subsides, with Consequences

That fall, as Charleston's "unhealthy" air dissipated, so did the panic. Ostenaco visited in September and returned safely with presents from the governor and the council. In October and November Cherokees descended in large, armed parties into the colony, but they announced their peaceful intent; they only carried weapons for defense against Creeks.[68] By the fall, South Carolinians understood that rumors had grossly exaggerated Cherokee hostility and violence. Glen backhandedly recognized the error in a speech to the Indians on November 20. He listed the Cherokee misdeeds and allegations of Cherokee outrages, but among them the only Cherokee killing of a Briton of which he was certain was that of Jeremiah Swiney, caught in the

crossfire at the Oconee River.[69] In the course of the meetings, the Cherokees had to deal most seriously with that shooting. As they had prepared for the trip to Charleston, Cherokees and traders had circulated a rumor that falsely promised to resolve this central issue. A trader reported in September that Andrew White, Swiney's alleged killer and probably the same man implicated in encouraging the escape of six slaves, had been "killed and two more that was in the Company when the Mischief was done, they are killed at War with the Creeks."[70] But the government did not swallow the story and continued to insist that White be surrendered. When it became clear that White still lived, Cherokees sought a pardon from Glen, emphasizing the circumstance that mitigated the crime: the killing took place in the context of a Cherokee-Creek war. They pointed out, moreover, that White was so remorseful that he had gone again to war with the Creeks, returning with a scalp. The implication, in Cherokee justice, was that White might use the scalp as a gift to satisfy the aggrieved colonists, uniting Carolinians and Cherokees against the Creeks. Cherokees insisted that if the Carolinians truly cared about this episode, they should at least stop supplying the Creeks with arms. If the colonists had any sense, Cherokees argued, they would support their good Cherokee friends in the war, because the Creeks had combined with the French, allowing them to build Fort Toulouse in Creek Country. As one Cherokee put it, "I have heard that the French encourage their Indians to kill white people, and also those of our Nation." This notion that the Creeks constituted a common enemy accompanied proclamations of fidelity to the alliance. "I love the white people," said Sachetche of Tucalogia, while the Raven of Toxoway recalled the famous talk of George II to a visiting Cherokee delegation in 1730: "he and his People were the same as our People."[71]

Glen insisted that White be surrendered, and the Cherokees, anxious both to avoid war and to restore the trade, promised to bring him in. This they never did, and the colony allowed the affair to lapse in the run-up to the Seven Years' War. Perhaps South Carolina was embarrassed that the long list of suspected Cherokee atrocities and plots had dwindled, by late 1751, to the slaying of Swiney, the woundings of one "Jenks" and Hugh Murphey (who may have been shot by "Norwards"), and the robbing of a few traders, whom the Cherokees had already partially reimbursed.[72]

The panic of 1751 encouraged Glen to intervene diplomatically in the Cherokee-Creek war. Cherokee rumors of Carolinian Creek plans to invade the mountains now presented him with an opportunity to further the ambitious project of a southern Indian alliance, much as, earlier in the year, the

settlers' rumors of Cherokee-"Norward Indian" plans to invade the colony had helped him to argue for colonial mediation in the Catawba-Iroquois war. The settlers' rumors had drawn further attention to the intrusion of northern Indians into the backcountry as the warriors raided South Carolina's Catawba allies. The Cherokee rumors demonstrated that the Cherokee-Creek war destabilized South Carolina's Indian alliances. In both cases, the panic gave Glen strong arguments to persuade South Carolina legislators to grant funds for his diplomatic efforts. In the wake of the panic, as further Creek-Cherokee violence unsettled Carolinian-Cherokee relations, he intensified his efforts for a southern Indian union against France, and he helped mediate a Creek-Cherokee truce by the end of 1752.[73]

The panic of 1751 saw a flurry of rumors as frightening and credible for the Carolinians as for the Cherokees. To be sure, true stories—stories too well supported at most tellings to be construed at any point as rumors—played a role. But the importance of rumors in the panic is no interpretive invention. Both sides were conscious enough of the part that rumors played to agree, during the Charles Town conferences, to the following treaty article: "the Indians promise that they will not listen or give Ear to any bad Talks . . . but will seize and detain the Person bringing them . . . unless they have a Paper from the Governor with the Seal appended and then believe what he says. And the Governor promises that he will not give absolute Credit to the Letters that may be wrote to him or Others concerning the Behavior of the Indians till such Time as he has sent to them to enquire the Truth."[74]

The determination that rumors had largely caused the crisis was, in the end, a diplomatic stroke. Without prosecutions, without repairing genuine tears in the alliance, Cherokees and Carolinians agreed to blame the panic of 1751 on groundless rumors. Rumors, generated by collective anxieties, came in the course of the negotiations not only to express the worries but also to divert attention from some of the fundamental sources of strain. While both parties made serious efforts to end the Cherokee-Creek war, and while they continued their discussions about the mechanics of the trade, never did they address such basic problems as the Cherokee dependence on trade goods, expanding British settlements, recurring imperial conflict, and declining Cherokee numbers. Instead, in an expedient that helped to save the alliance, they made rumors take the blame for tensions grounded in deep social, demographic, economic, and imperial realities.[75]

Cherokees and Carolinians cooperated to dispel the panic of 1751. The disturbance might be seen psychoanalytically as an immense parapraxis, a

Freudian slip across the landscape, but for all the anxiety that contributed to it, it is not best understood in terms of collective pathology. The rumors that spread fear were born of Cherokees' and Carolinians' reasonable uncertainties and ambivalences. They provoked diplomatic responses that, paradoxically, helped both to end the panic and to reduce temporarily the ambiguity in the relationship. The Cherokee-Carolinian alliance survived the crisis, an outcome that very materially advanced British interests. But powerful corrosive forces continued to undermine a friendship that was to last, in Glen's early version of the cliché, "while the Sun gives Light and while the Rivers Run."[76]

5. Father: Rumors Unmanaged, 1757

The young colonel, wary of false alarms, heard the ring of truth in the reports. Some two thousand enemy French and Indians had rendezvoused at Fort Duquesne on the Ohio River, and they now marched his way. The powerful expedition had already crossed the Monongahela River, passing the site of General Edward Braddock's infamous 1755 defeat, which the colonel remembered all too well. A veteran of that disaster, he could imagine French men and horses straining at heavy artillery as they lumbered, flanked by Indians, across the many, parallel, forbidding ridges of the Alleghenies. Such a force would make quick work of Fort Cumberland, a weak outpost on the Maryland frontier. All signs indicated that the enemy thousands would next hit his own station, Fort Loudoun at Winchester, Virginia. The enemy, wrote the colonel, "are bringing howitzers with them for the easier reduction of the place." The cunning foe, advancing in thousands, threatened destruction to the unfathomably, unconscionably, weak colonies. Looking on his current "intelligence" as "of utmost importance," the young George Washington forwarded copies to the governor, and he called a council of war.

He had precise details. A party of six British-allied Cherokees had gone toward French Fort Duquesne (now Pittsburgh), along with fourteen other Indians and ten colonials under the Virginia Regiment's Captain Robert Spotswood. The six Cherokee men had boldly spied ahead toward Duquesne, the bustling regional hub of enemy military operations. In extreme danger, the stealthy six saw the enemy preparing the carriage of mortars so large, as they were later said to have put it, that a fawn could sleep in each weapon's gaping mouth. Before returning to their outpost, Fort Cumberland, they came under attack. Three took bullets, but all lived to breathe the bad news to British forces.

Washington understood that the six had returned directly to Cumberland, which meant that Spotswood and the others still patrolled the high country; if so, he feared that "they are all cut off" by the enemy's thousands. He carefully examined the intelligence at his disposal, appealed for assistance, and took action.[1] His foes would crush Fort Cumberland, but he might defend Fort Loudoun at Winchester with the help of neighboring counties. He sounded the alarm to the county militia lieutenants at Fairfax, Prince William, and Culpeper, adding that "the truth of the report is, I believe, unquestionable."[2]

"I believe," he said, taking faith in the reports. But faith often admits doubt, and young Washington left that door ajar with the word "if." "If the enemy are coming down," he wrote, and, notably, "if the Indian intelligence may be relied on."[3] A responsible officer, Washington informed his superiors of contradictory evidence: a French prisoner taken by a different Cherokee party near Duquesne weeks earlier had insisted, under interrogation, that Fort Duquesne possessed no heavy artillery capable of carriage across the Allegheny Mountains. Washington knew the enemy would not attack if the prisoner's "intelligence is to be literally credited," but, he believed, "surely it is not."[4]

Putting doubt aside, Washington instructed Major Andrew Lewis on the South Branch to "give all the country people warning of the danger with which they were threatened," a danger he likely increased.[5] He had little information, and he made what historian Matthew Ward has aptly characterized as "a terrible decision," ordering the consolidation of forces and the abandonment of several frontier outposts, stimulating a further evacuation of the outlying settlements.[6] From the Alleghenies eastward to the Blue Ridge, terror swept the valleys of Virginia.

The situation in 1757 demanded fear, but not because an enemy force of thousands came howling with great guns to level Virginia's fortifications. For one thing, Indian raiders had for two years terrorized and devastated the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania backcountry. For another, in the colonel's news lay a kernel of truth: a French and intertribal party led by Lieutenant Pierre-Louis Boucher de Ninerville, sieur de Montizambert, had actually sallied out from Fort Duquesne with designs on Fort Cumberland; the force had even crested the Appalachians. The Cherokee reports anticipating this were, in that sense, pinpoint accurate even as they reached Washington in Winchester. But, just as the French prisoner had insisted, the invading force had no artillery. What is more (or less), the entire invading force had only

two hundred—not two thousand—men. It had no design on Winchester. As it happened, Montizambert fell seriously ill before reaching Cumberland; he and the French gunmen returned to Duquesne. Their allies, in scores, not thousands, broke up into smaller parties, which brought devastation to scattered settlements on the South Branch of the Potomac. Fort Cumberland saw no assault; Loudoun had never been in danger.[7] But the phantom force wreaked havoc, as backcountry settlers saw local garrisons withdrawn to protect forts against it and as smaller forces stepped up their raids on farmsteads. A genuinely dangerous place, Virginia's wartime frontier amplified news and rumor. There uncertainty flourished; there people needed more accurate information than they had; there they needed "to 'make sense' of events which otherwise would seem merely accidental or calamitous." Washington's frontier vainly cried out for intelligence.[8]

Two hundred armed and dangerous men marched out of Fort Duquesne. From the house of rumor screamed their unreal allies by the thousands. Phantom French soldiers drove nonexistent draft animals that dragged weightless howitzers over the broad ranges of the Alleghenies, and phantom Shawnees, Ottawas, and Delawares protected the army's flanks. Unreal French-Indian plots threatened Washington's own post. Real and increasingly routine terrors, uncertainties, and dangers accompanied these nonentities.

The Winchester alarm of 1757 sprang from many human sources, none of which could Washington verify. Six *unnamed* Cherokee allies, having scouted near French Fort Duquesne, brought the most critical news. They had returned to Fort Cumberland with wounds, enemy scalps, and information. But they did not speak clear English, and no one at Fort Cumberland understood much Cherokee. The Cherokee men later denied to Washington, apparently through a better interpreter, "having given such an account." Instead, they had accurately told the Cumberland officers that "many large scouting parties were sent hitherwards," that is, into the colonies. Washington added that those parties were then "exercising their cruelties in Pennsylvania." Washington later concluded that the commander of Fort Cumberland, Maryland's Captain John Dagworthy, had distorted the original Cherokee-language (or broken-English) report of French and Indian commando raids into an imminent French Indian invasion, complete with howitzers. When Washington realized the error, he noted that "The storm which threatened us . . . is, in a manner, blown over. It arose in a great measure from a misunderstanding (in Captn. Dagworthy) of the Indians, for want of a proper interpreter."

Washington disliked Dagworthy, and the feeling was mutual. The men had in 1756 weathered a dispute over the chain of command, a dispute Washington had taken all the way to the British headquarters in Boston, where he had succeeded in having his rank over Dagworthy recognized. Once the alarm of 1757 had passed, the older and far more seasoned Dagworthy had another explanation for the rumor. The experienced captain informed the upstart 25-year-old colonel that the Cherokee scouts, "young Warriors and much Frightened," had simply exaggerated, and a more experienced Cherokee party later corrected them.[9] Frightened young warriors: he may well have intended to sting the Virginian.

Both Washington and Dagworthy agreed, however, that bad information produced the rumor. Dagworthy blamed unreliable Cherokee perception; Washington blamed an error in translation. As Dagworthy understood it: if the Cherokees had only made an accurate report, no alarm would have sounded; as Washington saw it: if a proper interpreter had only been available, no panic would have spread. Both explanations—"faulty perception" and "distortion in serial transmission"—have had advocates among those who would explain rumor. The rumor, when not a deliberate hoax, forms from a series of individual errors, flaws in initial perception, and sequential failures of understanding.[10] But how the rumor assumes its shape, how it retains sense, requires more attention to historical, social, and cultural aspects of the "medium" that carries the hearsay. Errors in perception or transmission do not alone make rumor: people do not bruit about gobbledygook. Whatever a rumor's inception, it needs communities of people to form and spread. Revisiting Tamotsu Shibutani's views might help us understand Washington's predicament. Shibutani posits rumormongering as the common work of people intelligently seeking information under ambiguous circumstances. Rumor, in this generous sociological tradition, results from a group effort to understand unexplained events.[11]

Dagworthy and Washington alike attributed the false news to the report of the Cherokee party at Cumberland, but the rumor had other tributaries. Washington, after all, did not meet the Cherokee men themselves until the rumor had already abated—he had it from Dagworthy and the men who carried his letter. Nor did Washington's false news reach him from Dagworthy's report alone; other frightening tidings had hopped aboard Dagworthy's message as it sped from Cumberland to Winchester. An unnamed soldier, dispatched from Cumberland, arrived in Winchester with his own observation that the "woods appear to be quite alive with enemy Indians, who shew

themselves openly in the day." Washington passed this datum on to his superiors, adding his own detail: "This is unusual for them to do, unless they are strong."[12] The common soldier had seen figures in the woods; the colonel authorized those figures as harbingers of enemy arms, and he spread the news. The rumor reached Annapolis, where unnamed British subjects, recently escaped out of Indian captivity, further shaped it, confirming it to the satisfaction of Horatio Sharpe, the governor of Maryland, at least for a time. The frontiers became, in Sharpe's words, "very much alarmed." Spiraling aloft on such conversations, the rumor cast its widening shadow over the vast Chesapeake watershed.[13]

Historian Marc Bloch long ago recognized meaning in such mistakes as that made by the Cherokee interpreters, the Cumberland captain, the unnamed soldier, and his colonel. The "interpretive work" that goes into the making and sustaining of rumor, Bloch wrote, reshapes whatever original observations instigated the rumor. If a distortion in transmission (by Fort Cumberland's incompetents, in Washington's scenario), or an original misperception (by Cherokee incompetents, in Dagworthy's scenario), initiated the misinformation, neither error explains how the report gained its particulars and became resonant rumor. A rumor must accord with the understanding of those misinterpreting the information and those discussing it. Rumoring, again, is group work.[14]

The rumored investment of Winchester grew on and in multiple tongues and it rendered multiple judgments on current affairs. Cherokee allies, British commanders and governors, ordinary soldiers, and common civilians all voiced their concerns by sounding the alarm. They deplored British and provincial military preparedness; they expressed awe at Indian and French abilities; some vilified Native Americans by lumping all under the collective noun "Indians," erasing their bold Cherokee allies. The Virginia backcountry provided excellent acoustics for the rumor's amplification. As Washington contemplated the news of the grand invasion that was really *petite guerre*—horrifying, truly, to those who suffered it—it is possible that he reflected on earlier alarms that had buffeted Winchester and the surrounding regions.

For Washington had resisted rumors before. As he had moved through Winchester in 1755 with General Braddock on his way to the disaster on the Monongahela, Washington wrote: "The Inhabitants of this place abound in News, but as I apprehend it is founded upon as much truth as some I heard in my way down, I think it advisable to forego the recital till a little better authority confirms the report." Four months later, while down in the tide-

water counties in the shadow of defeat, Washington received accounts of horrific attacks in the Virginia backcountry, yet the government had not responded.[15] In such a setting, with authorities helpless, rumors flourished alongside news of real violence, and it became impossible to separate the real from the imagined.

Washington in 1755 again hurried westward to Winchester. In mid-October he found that panic severely compromised his efforts to coordinate a response to the crisis. Rangers, supposed experts at irregular war, huddled in "small Fortresses," Washington wrote, "more encompassed by Fear than by the Enemy." He admitted into his new quarters a messenger, "spent with fatigue and fear," who sounded this alarm: "a party of Indians were seen at the Plantation of one Isaac Julian ab't 12 Miles off and that the Inhabitants were flying in the most promiscuous manner from their dwelling[s]." The next morning he received "a Second Express, ten times more terrified than the former, with information that the Indians had got within four Miles of the Town, and were killing and destroying all before them, for that he himself had heard constant Firing, and the Shrieks of the unhappy Murder'd!"

Unable to ignore such ear-witness accounts, Washington gathered what forces he could and marched "directly to the place where these horrid Murders were said [by the second express] to be committed." Instead of a smoking charnel house, he found a jolly party: "three Drunken Soldiers of the Light Horse, carousing, firing their Pistols, and uttering the most unheard-of Imprecations." He then learned that the deadly invaders reported by the first messenger consisted in reality of two resident African Virginian cowherds bringing in livestock. Their yodeling cattle calls became Algonquian war whoops. The first messenger's own son had seen the pair, mistaken them for hostile Indians, and alerted "the Neighborhood." Washington despaired that "a panick prevails among the People . . . they are alarmed at the most usual and customary Crys."[16]

Washington had come to Winchester to defend it against a powerful enemy who had as recently as July routed and humiliated a well-armed British invasion and now attacked the more exposed parts of the colony. Once in town, he found himself fighting not native warriors but Virginian fears. His arsenal included ridicule, encouragement, and reassurance.[17] He posted an advertisement in October meant to humiliate men who abandoned their farms. "Whereas divers timorous persons run through the Country and alarm its Inhabitants by False Reports, of the Indians having attacked and destroyed the Country," Washington assured readers that "the Indians who

committed the late Cruelties (though no lower than the South Branch) are returned Home." He promised that "in a short time the Frontiers will be so well Guarded, that no mischief can be done, either to them or their Plantations, which must of course be destroyed, if they desert them in so shameful a manner."[18] Fear, compounded by falsehood, was the trouble. Bravery, backed by truth, was the cure. Accurate reports would scatter rumor's dark flocks.

Washington's 1755 efforts resemble the more systematic and technologically sophisticated efforts by American governments (federal to municipal) to circulate counter-information during the Second World War and the late 1960s. But these efforts to combat "rumor" with "authorized" news—a technique Washington deployed in his advertisement of 1755—suffer when rumors feed on the mistrust of authority.[19] Even Washington's advertisement carried a whiff of doubt about the government's power to protect, for he did not promise a well-guarded frontier immediately, but "in a short time." Like later authorities, Washington found rumor management extremely difficult. His own youthful authority weak in an age that respected age, his government apparently weak in the face of the enemy, Washington's effort to ridicule those who would rumor accomplished little. Washington's frontier was a place where authorities had failed. No one trusted authorized news, which was in any case rare, and rumor echoed from the Piedmont to the Appalachians.[20] Authorities proved as susceptible to rumor as any. Winchester, a boom town during the war, a key center in the grain-producing region of Virginia, located strategically along wagon roads that joined the frontier to the Piedmont and the backcountries of Virginia to those of Maryland and Pennsylvania, formed a point of exchange, not only for goods, but also for talk.[21] Washington, near the figurative front lines, could not help but join his men and the locals in their efforts to find truth in vague intelligence. The longer he remained at Winchester, the more he fell prey to rumor.

Another panic followed in 1756, when "a report prevailed in town" that the French and numerous Indian allies planned to assault Cumberland in the fall. Washington traced as best he could the transmission of the story to its supposed source. It was "said to come from a man, who had it from a person[,] who was at [Pennsylvania] Governor [Robert Hunter] Morris's treaty with the Indians [at Easton, Pennsylvania]." The groundless news presented a dilemma. On the one hand, Washington thought that Morris would have corroborated such a serious report, if true. Surely no governor would keep such critical news from a neighboring British colony. Moreover, "Reports of this kind often take rise without good foundation." On the other hand,

Washington's determination to discredit potentially mischievous news weakened in the deep ambiguity of war; his resolve dissolved in the solvent of frontier violence. After all, this "is an affair of great importance, the slightest intelligence ought not to be discountenanced," and he considered this detail: two (unnamed) men had deserted British ranks and reached Fort Duquesne. Before their desertion, they had been overheard speaking "in high terms . . . of the [French] reward that would be got for communicating the weakness of the works and garrison at fort Cumberland."[22] As Washington and his peers discussed the various pieces of information, they, like the country people fleeing false alarms, shaped, amended, and passed along false news.

By 1757, when Cherokee scouts attempted, without a proper interpreter, to provide information to the garrison at Cumberland, its soldiers and officers, along with others posted from Cumberland to Winchester, had for years lived under threat of war and in a state of inquisitive alarm. Straining for meaning in the alien words of six exhausted Cherokees, they interpreted not only an unfamiliar language, but also their precarious world and the odds of their victory, even their survival. When a soldier near Winchester soon mistook shadowy figures in the woods for proof of a French invasion, he commented on the sad course of the war. When Washington and others at Winchester, struggling to make sense of the Cherokees' relayed reports, folded in other news from messengers and locals, they engaged in the interpretive work that fuels rumor. Hearsay proved too strong for Washington and his countrymen in the panic of 1757. To return to Marc Bloch's metaphor, the rumor phenomenon becomes "a mirror in which the collective consciousness surveys its own features."[23] Amid the uncertainties of 1757, a horrible year for British arms, Washington and his peers gazed unhappily into the glass.

Desire and Distrust

By 1755, Indians had for decades, even generations, done little to harm the colony of Virginia; suddenly that year colonists suffered real violence as Native Americans from the nearby Ohio Valley to the faraway Upper Great Lakes raided the backcountry, killing or capturing over the next several years thousands in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The raids continued, and the colonies failed to repel them. Indian success shocked the colonists; well could the people of Winchester imagine that a skillful, deadly, merciless enemy gathered in strength just beyond their detection. The amplification of

real Indian assaults into far-flung panics of the kind that serially rocked Winchester reveals more than fear. The proliferation of non-events—of imagined Indian assaults and phantom enemy hoards advancing over the near ridges—unveils the broad and terrified respect for Indian military power that had spread across the colonial landscape. It underscores, too, the colonial reality that North America remained mostly Indian Country, a fact colonists knew better than generations of their historians.

Washington shared the colonial sensibility. British officers, colonial soldiers, and frontier farmers identified in generic "Indians" awesome and mysterious power. In the consciousness of the imperial gentry that claimed to lead war-torn America, Indian fighters possessed potential that virtually no other men, save perhaps others raised as Indians, could match. Correspondents widely bruited the Indians' superiority in the woods, and amid the frequent denigration of Indians in officers' writings, there appears not only a grudging admiration but even a bewildered longing for the Native Americans' desperately needed military skills. When his Cherokee allies brought in intelligence, Washington cherished it.

On May 20, 1757, shortly before the panic erupted, the Virginia Regiment's Lieutenant James Baker and the Cherokee Nation's Swallow Warrior led five Regimentals and fifteen Cherokee men from Fort Cumberland toward Fort Duquesne. On a 19-day patrol, at the headwaters of Turtle Creek within 20 miles of Fort Duquesne, they caught up with a party of 10 French soldiers under 3 ensigns. In the ensuing firefight, the Anglo-Cherokee force suffered two serious casualties, but it overwhelmed the French, killed and scalped five, including two of the officers, and took the third ensign prisoner. Swallow Warrior lay among the dead.

Washington reported the facts to his superiors, but they interested him less than the intelligence the patrol had gathered. The small French party had recently separated from a much larger party of fifty Shawnee Indians that assaulted the backcountry. The captured Ensign "Velistre" (probably François-Marie Picoté de Belestre) revealed that a knight of the Order of St. Louis, one "Delignery" (François Marchand de Ligneris [Lignery]), commanded six hundred French and two hundred Indians at Duquesne. The dead ensigns were "Lasosais and St. Oure" ("La Saussaye" and "St. Ours," both had served in the colonial troops of Quebec). When the French governor later narrated the incident, his details were surprisingly close, though he added one more French death. Washington praised Swallow Warrior, and he acknowledged all the Cherokees' skills, endurance, and loyalty: "one other

Indian was wounded, and brought in on a bier, near 100 miles by the party, who had nothing to live upon for the four last days but wild onions."[24] No doubt the colonel dramatized Cherokee difference here, but he wrote with martial respect, if not envy. The French captive, Belestre, was the very man who, interviewed by Washington at the height of the Winchester alarm of 1757, would accurately deny Fort Duquesne's capacity to mount the heavily armed, phantom attack. Washington would understandably choose not to credit his enemy, and he would believe instead the second-hand reports of what allied Cherokees had said at remote Cumberland.

Washington could not foresee the prowess he would achieve as a leader of millions, but he knew in 1757 both that he preferred European to American forms of combat and that he was no woodsman.[25] Yet a veteran of Indian warfare, he believed British success to depend in good measure on Britain's Indian allies. Only native warriors could bring intelligence of enemy movements and spread alarm through enemy ranks. Above all, he wrote, only they could oppose other Indians.[26] No Virginians, indeed no Britons, yet rose to the task, as the Indians' "cunning and craft are not to be equaled, neither their activity and indefatigable sufferings."[27] Washington noted—more than once—that "I think these scalping partys of Indians we send out will more effectually harass the Enemy by keeping them under continual alarms than any partys of white people can do."[28] He praised Indians, but spiced his praise with loathing: he called the parties "we send out" not scouts, rangers, or patrols, but "scalping partys." He considered Indian military abilities to be great, enviable, and repugnant. It boded ill for the Cherokee-British alliance that for Washington and other British subjects, dependence on Indians was real—and hateful.

Colonists had long resisted the idea of becoming too American, too Indian.[29] In the decades that preceded the Revolution, as transatlantic networks of all kinds intensified, colonists tended to develop greater British—even more English—habits and identities. George Washington was among them. His experiences in the first years of the war tempered rather than melted his admiration for the British military and European arms.[30] If the war gave colonists respect for Indian prowess, it did not inspire a desire to go native. Broadly speaking, the Seven Years' War instead intensified racial vilification and Indian hating.[31] Colonists widely understood that Indians, more than anything else, tipped the war's early balance sheet in France's favor. As France and its Indian allies, some of whom had once allied with Britain, trounced British expeditions and invaded the backcountry, already established

convictions of Indian savage treachery and long-held fears of an enemy within found their expression in rumor.[32]

Twentieth-century sociologist Shibutani, who knew from hard experience the wartime power of suspicion, noted that in such times groups often describe the enemy in terms that reveal fears about their own internal divisions.[33] Put another way, rumors of treason accompany war. In 1756, when Washington and Virginia's governor Robert Dinwiddie attended to a rumor of treason, neither saw "any Foundation for the Report" of "Cabals of people in the Neighborhood of Winchester . . . forming themselves in Parties to capitulate to the Enemy."[34] Yet as the war broke out, Dinwiddie thought of Maryland's Catholics as natural traitors. He estimated them to comprise fully a third of that colony's population, and he said that "they would be glad of any Conquest that would establish their religion." Pennsylvania's Germans added to Dinwiddie's suspicions, for they "live all in a Body together, as if in a Principality in Germany, may they not in Time throw off their Obedience and Submission to the B. Crown?" He also worried about Quakers, a sizeable population not only in Pennsylvania but also in parts of the Shenandoah Valley; their behavior struck him as "intolerable" in 1754.[35] The possibility of slave insurrections further fed fears of the enemy within: the Board of Trade worried that the "Negro Slaves" would "doubtless be glad to purchase their Freedom."[36]

Irish Catholics fell under unsurprising suspicion. At Maryland's Fort Cumberland, troops arrested two deserters and quickly hanged the "Irish papist" as a spy for the French. "Justly," Washington thought.[37] Rumors in England identified the impious but well-connected Pennsylvania Indian trader George Croghan as a Catholic priest. They pinned Croghan's name to several bizarre letters written under the pseudonym Filius Gallicae. These letters, probably hoaxes, attempted to pass as a Pennsylvania turncoat's intercepted proposal to France for massive treason in the backcountry. The high-ranking British politician Henry Fox called Croghan an "Intriguing Disaffected Person," and wondered "upon what Foundation He is thought to be a Popish Priest." Croghan's Irish surname and accent merely inflected the suspicions; his capacity to work in an Indian world drew serious metropolitan attention. The letters, written by someone claiming knowledge of both French and Indian languages yet who curiously wrote in English and spelled the name of His Most Christian Majesty "L-E-W-I-S," promised Cherokee and Catholic assistance in the subversion of any British expedition against Fort Duquesne. Lord Halifax (George Montagu-Dunk, Second Earl

of Halifax) conceded they might amount to "nothing," as they contained ideas that seemed "vague, visionary, and absurd," but he simultaneously worried they "May be a matter of the highest consequence to the Welfare of America." The suspicions against Croghan evaporated, but the letters intensified Pennsylvanian opposition to the displaced Acadians.[38] What's more, the letters named Cherokees as willing allies of France.

Fantasies of treason often fingered Indian traders, who frequented Indian Country and who often embraced aspects of Indian life. A few years before the Filius Gallicae affair, South Carolinian suspicions fell upon the Cherokee trader Anthony Dean. Murmurs spread that Dean was a Catholic who had hired an assistant "from the Havannah . . . who speakes French as well as Spanish." Investigating the report, the South Carolina council demanded of another trader whether or not Dean was a Jesuit priest. The reply came in the ambiguous language of rumor: "They say he is a very learned man."[39] Dean traded with the Cherokees, Great Britain's best prospect for alliance in the first years of the war with France.

Washington paid considerable attention to the quest for Cherokee support, and he was not alone. During the dangerous winter of 1755–1756, he appealed to his government for Indian scouting parties: "A small number, just to point out the wiles and tracks of the enemy, is better than none."[40] Hopeful as the ensuing fall approached that four hundred Cherokees accompanied Andrew Lewis toward Winchester, he noted his "unhappy disappointment" when only ten arrived.[41] By 1757, as he joined in Winchester's alarm, he worked with more Cherokees, including Ostenaco, a leading figure in the Cherokee-British alliance, an alliance the colonel saw as "well worth cultivating. For my own part, I think they are indispensably necessary in our present circumstances."[42] In April 1758 he still saw these Indians as "our steady friends and valuable allies."[43] Washington had good company. As late as May, General John Forbes notified William Pitt, now directing the overall British war effort, that "our greatest dependence is upon" southern Indians, including Cherokees.[44] Also that month, Maryland's Governor Sharpe reported that Cherokee scouts had revealed Fort Duquesne's strength to have fallen to fewer than five hundred men, many of them preparing to retreat westward.[45] In his Whitehall chambers, Pitt read of the Cherokees' importance.

At this very time, though, Washington worried. Cherokees, he noted, indeed delivered intelligence. Some thirty Cherokees under Attakullakulla and six Virginians under Christopher Gist had left the South Branch of the Potomac to spy on Fort Duquesne. The Virginians never made it. Gist fell and

injured his leg, and the rest stayed with him until he could travel on foot. The Cherokees pressed on; some procured a bark canoe and managed to reach the neighborhood of Duquesne itself, returning with the valuable news that the French were weak. Nonetheless, they presented Washington with a major problem. Having performed important services, they intended to go home. Officers could not command them to wait, in undersupplied and unhealthy camps, for the march against Duquesne. Without them, the expedition remained blind. Washington struggled to retain them, as he thought their departure would entail "the most fatal consequences to this part of the continent."[46] Months later, when, finally, the march began, Washington pleaded with the commander to send Indians to the front as its eyes and ears: "If Indians ever can be of use to us, it must be now, in the front, for intelligence."[47]

The colonial senses of Indian power and ability, the equation of Indians with stealth, speed, and intimate violence, worked their way into American legend. We sense them in the Apache, Chinook, and Black Hawk helicopters that have hovered over the Middle East and Central Asia; we see them in the precision-guided Tomahawk cruise missiles that have sped to their targets; and we see them in our marketing strategists' Chevy Thunderbirds, Jeep Grand Cherokees, and Dodge Dakotas. The attribution of dangerous power worked both for and against real Cherokees and the real Cherokee-British alliance in the Seven Years' War. That Cherokees endured hardship better than Britons was a backhanded compliment. The mystical abilities of Indian allies to subsist on wild onions, though admired, identified them with "the Indians": the enemy. The Cherokees' martial skills and service failed to win them true partnership. Not in a context of war, where authorities feared African slaves, Irish Catholics, German immigrants, English Quakers, and British traders as potential domestic enemies. In spite of the important alliance, rumors regarding enemy stealth resonated with rumors alleging Cherokee treachery. British colonists and Cherokees again surveyed their unsteady relationship in groundless talk.

Rumors of Misalliance

In the years immediately preceding the Seven Years' War and in the war's early years, many Cherokees distrusted the British, despite the alliance. The two Carolinas, Virginia, and even Georgia threatened Cherokee lands to the east. French and French-allied Indian emissaries visited the Nation and argued for a united front against the British. The Cherokee Overhills town

of Tellico became particularly interested in opening an outlet to the French, and even the emerging center of the Cherokee-British alliance, the town of Chota, entertained enemy emissaries who came to discuss peace or even union against the British.[48] Because British traders resided in many Cherokee towns and hamlets, news of such meetings reached British colonial capitals that could tolerate no ambiguity in the alliance and that anticipated Indian treachery.

During the frontier panic of 1751, entire Cherokee towns had pulled up stakes and fled into the mountains; Carolinian farmsteads had consolidated into rude garrisons. Cherokees had rumored that Carolinians would soon invade, that colonial doctors prepared to unleash diseases, that the planter elite plotted a massive land grab and would enslave its erstwhile allies, and that the Carolina government favored the Cherokees' frequent enemies, the neighboring Creeks. Many on both sides had looked to their arms. Importantly, however, they had also looked on the value of their alliance; diplomacy ensued, messages revealed webs of rumor, and the crisis faded with very little actual violence. More reports than people died in the panic, but their themes soon resurfaced. This is the way of a form of rumor. Noticing such recurrence in eighteenth-century France, historian Arlette Farge calls it too structured to happen "by chance." Even after 1751, Cherokees and Britons recirculated details from stories they had told during earlier crises.[49]

In the spring of 1752 leading Cherokees Attakullakulla and Ammouiscossitte had gone to Virginia both to tighten the British alliance and to free the Cherokees from sole dependence on South Carolina traders.[50] Amid a renewed war with Creeks, the Cherokees needed arms and ammunition. South Carolina's traders routinely shortchanged them, Attakullakulla informed Williamsburg, and the British alliance failed to provide for Cherokee security, much less prosperity. Virginians had wealth: by opening their markets they could expand Cherokee options while keeping them loyal to Great Britain. In South Carolina, meanwhile, disloyalty became the word, as rumors spread that Attakullakulla had defected, not only to British Virginia—but to enemy France: "Little Carpenter with several Warriours . . . set off to the Northward . . . to sue for a Trade from thence it is said he goes always to the French." The following year, Attakullakulla met in conference with South Carolina Governor James Glen, who informed him that "in his absence some of his Enemies gave out, that he was gone to the French."[51]

The 1752 embassy of Attakullakulla and Ammouiscossitte had produced a trio of revealing rumors about their fate, doings, and whereabouts. These

circulated widely in Indian Country and they penetrated the colonies. Laden with falsehoods, the stories reveal extreme anxiety, even among British allied Indians, about everything from French and Indian power, to British slaveholding, to British territorial expansion. First, in Virginia, Dinwiddie heard that "French Indians" had attacked, killed, and scalped Ammouiscossitte, taking his wife, his son, and some of his men "Prisoners to Canada." Dinwiddie reported his source as Pennsylvania's Indian agent Andrew Montour, who in turn had heard it from leaders of the Six Nations Iroquois.[52] Second, Governor Glen, in Charleston, heard differently from Cherokee Country that Ammouiscossitte had been "barbarously beat by some [Virginians] who tied him like a Slave, he afterwards out of revenge burnt the fine Cloathes and other Presents" Williamsburg had provided.[53] Rumoring that a leading Cherokee suffered a colonial beating while tied to a tree, Cherokees repeated their suspicions that colonists might enslave them, along with their more general discomfort with British assertions of superiority.[54] A third intriguing rumor had it that Ammouiscossitte, when in Williamsburg, had sold vast territories to Virginia without proper Cherokee authorization. Ludovick Grant encountered the rumor in the Cherokee town of Chota, increasingly the most important town in the Overhills section. Grant reported to Glen that Ammouiscossitte "has sold to the Government of Virginia a large quantity of Land, which they say was their Northward hunting Ground," adding that Ammouiscossitte "had no power of himself to dispose of Land."[55] Enemy power, British hierarchy, enslaved Indians, and landed dispossession—Cherokees and Britons expressed these concerns through the medium of rumor on the eve of the Seven Years' War. Buffeted by false news that revealed British doubts about Cherokee fidelity and Cherokee doubts about British intentions, the alliance had persisted.

As war erupted in the summer of 1754, Cherokees and Creeks imagined total national destruction. Rumor had it that the British-allied Chickasaw Nation would break apart under enemy Indian assault: "There is a flying Report," wrote a leading Muskogee trader, "that the Remains of the Brave Chickasaw Nation Propose to Evacuate their Countrey. One part of them to take Shelter amongst the Creeks and the other part amongst the Cherokees." The British trader to the Creeks marked the story as rumor: "This wants Confirma. and I hope not true."[56]

Carolinians approached the Seven Years' War amid waves of hearsay of their own making. Their rumors held Cherokees responsible for isolated depredations on backcountry settlements. Late in 1752 Ostenaco deflected the

origins of these "lying reports" to mutual enemies, Shawnees, "a people of no settlement but rambling from place to place with nothing but lies." Governor James Glen doubted Cherokee hostility, insisting instead that distant warriors from the North committed the crimes. Many other Carolinians disagreed, and as their dependence on Cherokees intensified with the outbreak of war, rumors of Indian treachery proliferated.[57]

George Washington's failed invasion of Fort Duquesne in the early summer of 1754 inaugurated the war. John Shaw, an Irish "cadet" who had fought beside the Virginian at Great Meadows, provided the fullest report that the South Carolina council received of Washington's defeat. Shaw's affidavit notes exactly the kind of treachery that British colonists expected of Indians: "Some of the Indians who were in our Interest some days before the Engagement under Pretense of making some Discovery went Towards the French Fort and Meeting a French party, were told that if they would not fight against the English, they would Scalp them. Upon which they all turned to the French." Shaw provided no details about his sources. Although he accused no Cherokees, the theme of Indian betrayal would not long overlook them.[58]

About a month after considering Shaw's report, the council received more alarming news. At Buffalo Creek, a frontier settlement in the Carolina Piedmont, some twenty-one colonists had assembled to celebrate a marriage. The bride and bridegroom had gone off to the nearest justice of the peace, some 40 miles away, and the gathering awaited the couple's return. It hosted instead a war party, which killed sixteen and carried away the rest. The newlyweds returned to find the dead scattered over the fields, most of them killed with arrows and hatchets. Some bodies lay covered in piles of animal carcasses. The council learned that sixty, "some say more," Indians had attacked "these unhappy People." Other sources put the number of dead at seventeen and the number captured at eight. At the first news of this attack, the council, suspecting false rumor, had laid it aside, "as the Information in the above Letter was not properly Authentick." But the councilors soon realized that something terrible had happened at Buffalo Creek, as frontier families fled eastward, militia musters nervously inspected their inadequate arms, and colonists cried out for more protection from Charleston.[59]

The council received similar calls for protection from the Cherokee and Catawba Nations. Reports of enemy attacks on the Cherokees peppered the very council meetings in which the news broke of the Buffalo Creek killings. Yet accounts also came down from the mountains that spoke not only of Cherokee dissatisfaction with the alliance, but even of Cherokee discussions

with enemy representatives. By early 1755, many South Carolinians saw the Cherokees as enemies. They had once attributed the Buffalo Creek killings to "Northward Indians or French Indians," but now they pointed to their "insidious friends," the Cherokees.[60]

South Carolina's commons house of the assembly accepted the rumor of Cherokee hostility, resolving to abandon all reliance on Cherokee or Catawba allies and to depend instead on additional colonial forces. Moreover, it would reward colonists, slaves, and members of the small communities of Indians living within the colony's settlements with a 30-pound bounty for "the Scalps of all such Indians as shall be certainly known to be enemies." Of these measures, the governor favored only the idea of additional forces. He especially opposed the scalp bounty, which opened the door to the indiscriminate slaughter of Indians. He also demanded to know "the Grounds of this suspicion" that Cherokees had a hand in Buffalo Creek; for his part, he had "not the least reason to imagine" that Cherokees had attacked colonists.[61] Glen feared that "if they knew that this Government had such an opinion of them, and branded them with such Names, they should soon show us, that they were neither insidious nor friends, by joining the [enemy Indians] in a War against this Province."[62]

The lower house did not represent frontier opinion; new settlements had no representation. Engaged in a continuing struggle for authority with Glen, the house found in Indian affairs a useful cudgel. On the defensive, Glen spoke of Cherokee power and loyalty: "The Cherrockees are . . . far more numerous, than all the Six Nations together . . . And while other Indians on this Continent, who are thought to be friends to the English, have either deserted our Interest or are at best doubtfully inclined, not one of our Nations has left us, not a Single Town in any of them is suspected."[63] Glen's vigorous defense notwithstanding, many from Virginia southward joined the lower house in suspecting the Cherokee friendship. Even as the Cherokee Nation committed to assisting Great Britain in the war, even as it sent hundreds of men into Virginia and Pennsylvania to assist against enemy parties coming out of Ohio Country, North Carolinians and Virginians rumored Cherokee "outrages." Dinwiddie wrote to Washington in the summer of 1756 of "horrid murders" committed in the neighborhood of Augusta, Virginia; in the language of rumor, Washington replied that "By the latest Advices from Augusta, it is thought, that *these* outrages were committed by the Cherokees." Dinwiddie, squaring his unreliable news with Washington's, responded that "I did hear of one Cherokee's being with the other Indians,"

but he understood that the party was a multi-tribal party of "Allegheny Indians," a polyglot group with no real links to the Cherokee Nation. The enemy was real: on June 25, 1756, it took Vass's Fort (Virginia), in which many settlers had sought refuge, leading others to flee the region.[64] In 1756 Washington and Dinwiddie already speculated about Cherokee betrayal.

From Iroquois Country, British officers heard the rumor that, in early 1757, a party of ten Cherokees had entered into discussions with the French at Fort Duquesne. The Seneca Silver Heels had returned to the Mohawk Valley from Genesee Seneca Country, bringing this news, which he had heard from an unnamed Indian who had gathered it at Fort Duquesne.[65] Britons knew that a Cherokee delegation had the previous year visited French Fort Toulouse (in what is now Alabama), Mobile, and New Orleans. That delegation, representing a dissident faction from the town of Great Tellico, had failed, however, to establish a satisfactory relationship with France. Promises aside, the emissaries learned that the Gulf region's French could barely supply themselves. Even the delegation's leading figure, the Mankiller of Tellico, abandoned the French and joined British allies in Virginia, where colonial rumor followed him, announcing that he meant only plunder. Andrew Lewis of Virginia thought that there was "some scheme on foot between [the Cherokees] and the French to Distress us, and that they are greater Friends to the French than to the English." Lewis tossed in accusations against both Attakullakulla and an otherwise unnamed "Cherokee Wench that speaks the Shawanee tongue." The common epithet "wench" itself speaks to the instability of the alliance.[66]

Cherokees felt icy colonial sentiments as they covered the roughly 500 miles between their towns and their rendezvous with colonial forces at Winchester. While traveling, even as they performed remarkable and dangerous service for the British from 1756 through 1758, Cherokees and colonists repeatedly came to real blows. Cherokee war parties expected and relied on hospitality from allied settlements along the road, and when denied, frequently enough, hungry warriors took what they needed. In 1756 offended Cherokees badly beat a settler; others plundered livestock and property in the North Carolina backcountry. Panic swept the South Carolina districts of Amelia and Great Saluda as farmers contemplated fleeing their homes in anticipation of war.[67] In one incident, a Cherokee party, heading homeward, captured a colonial woman. Rumors later held that this indentured servant had guided them in their efforts to carry "off some horses saddles and Plunder from those back settlers as they passed through the province, who I suppose

would not supply them with provisions."[68] A British-allied Catawba patrol under Catawba "King" Hagler stopped the party and seized the woman.

Hagler delivered her to North Carolina authorities, requesting that she not suffer execution for her part in the raids: "I think she was compelled by the Cherokees to do what she did." The local justice of the peace promised to return her to her "master." Hagler expressed his satisfaction, and elaborated: "The loss of one Woman may be the loss of many lives, because one woman may be the mother of many children. At which the audience smiling, he added, I believe I have spoke nothing but the truth." We cannot know exactly what lay behind the grins; perhaps discussing procreation in formal council with British settlers was ticklish. No joke for Hagler, reproduction mattered a great deal: the Catawba Nation knew all about dramatic depopulation.[69] Grins aside, North Carolina authorities saw in the frontier troubles evidence of the Cherokees' "Friendly Disposition towards the French."[70]

Beginning in 1757, British colonists and Cherokees killed one another in episodes that authorities on both sides struggled to contain as isolated criminal incidents.[71] Their success in such containment, for more than two years, shows that revenge alone moved neither people to all-out warfare; negotiation and settlement remained desirable to many leaders. But the new governor of South Carolina, William Henry Lyttelton, sought more to rule than to negotiate, and he adopted uncompromising positions that he had no power to enforce. When a Cherokee peace delegation came to Charleston in the fall of 1759 to settle a recent spate of killings, Lyttelton took it hostage, marched at the head of an army to the border of the Cherokee Nation, and demanded that the Nation unilaterally surrender those who had murdered colonists. "Lyttelton's folly," as Carolinians soon called it, brought on a new war.[72] Military historian John Oliphant observes that Lyttelton's actual "folly was to accept uncritically intelligence which portrayed the Cherokees as bloodthirsty, disloyal and even treacherous."[73] Oliphant is onto something, for "intelligence," true and false, had become a key issue in the Cherokee-British relationship. From the dire British need for Cherokee allies capable of gathering intelligence about French maneuvers in Ohio Country, to the alarming and often false news about Cherokee intentions, the need for information had set imaginations to work.

After several years of struggling to bring the Nation together into a firm and prosperous alliance with Great Britain, even those Cherokees most committed to the alliance in the late 1750s exchanged news about the behavior and intentions of their powerful ally, news as dangerous as that racing

through the British lowcountry. Themes of disease, invasion, land theft, enslavement, and mass killing hotly pepper the stories Cherokees told one another as relations with Great Britain deteriorated. George Turner, a Virginian recruiting warriors in the Cherokee Nation in the spring of 1758, had arranged to conduct a large party to Winchester, where they would rendezvous for the final British push against French Fort Duquesne. British officers still had high hopes for intelligence work provided by Cherokees. But by the day before the summer solstice, when the Cherokees had agreed to meet him, Turner learned from "the Great Warrior and his brother" that his allies might withdraw: it "all depended upon the Conjurers," as the British called Cherokee religious leaders. On the appointed day, Attakullakulla asked Turner to wait another day, saying, "one day woud break no Squares," and he then brought Turner to the central house at Chota to meet all the "Warriors and Conjurors and Some Beloved Men."[74]

"And there," Turner wrote, "they told me that Several Bad Omens had appeared in their Conjurations and they were threatened with Sickness and Death to many and Vast Fatigue to the Whole if they went" to Virginia in the summer, and "positively refused to go till the fall, and wanted me to wait till then." The conjurors "repeated that the first two Moons they would be very well, but afterwards there would be a Pestilential Destemper got among their young Men, that they would lose a great many, and the rest would be so harassed with fatigue and Sickness that they would get in very late if at all." Turner could not change their minds, even after promising to skirt towns and tidewater. To the north, among the Mohawks in 1757 and among the Indians of the more western Great Lakes in 1758, smallpox indeed raged. Turner further observed Cherokee anger, especially in the Middle Settlements, at "some of their People being cut off by the Out Settlers of Virginia and both the Carolinas, who were rob'd and some murdered as we are told by the Indians returning from Virginia and the whites had pursued and killed 8 or 10 out of . . . several gangs and we hear of more Mischief of this Nature every day."[75]

Interpreting this news as clear evidence of Cherokee stalling—colonial authorities simply dismissed the influence of conjurors—governments from South Carolina to Virginia accused Attakullakulla of having "play'd false." But Attakullakulla stuck to the story when he met with the Virginia council the following January, and well he might have done.[76] Disease and depopulation starkly confronted southeastern Indians in these years; the association of colonists with disease had deep roots. As recently as 1756, Cherokees

had rumored that "The Carolina people had conjurors amongst them, that could send up different Bundles of Sickness to their Nation, which they scatter amongst their towns from which proceeds the Decrease of their People."[77]

The rumors that Cherokees and British colonists circulated about one another during the Seven Years' War exposed animosities that outweighed the benefits of alliance. The rumors, sped by enormous uncertainties and a pressing need for knowledge, circulated easily along lines familiar to all who spoke them. Virginia, South Carolina, and Chota were not innocents in the wars that befell them between 1754 and 1762, but war cares little for justice, and among both colonists and Cherokees were innocents who paid with their lives. For those colonists and Native Americans living on frontiers that had become war fronts, fears and uncertainties generated rumors that did everything from condemn governments to betray allies. George Washington and other colonists had desired Cherokee allies to meet a menacing enemy that seemed too powerful otherwise to overcome. Colonial authorities believed that Cherokees might best gain intelligence of the enemy and bring certainty to a chaotic world. At the same time, they, and other colonists, increasingly despised Cherokees for being Indians. "Indians" had suddenly emerged as a powerful force, native to lands that empires meant to occupy, administrators meant to exploit, and settlers meant to farm. Colonial rumors of Cherokee treachery, like colonial rumors of "Indian" power, revealed and shaped mentalities.

The colonists' sentiments disturbed Cherokees, whose leaders had struggled to coexist with the British-dominated slave societies of the Upper and Lower South for the better part of a century. These Cherokee leaders' policies faced opposition at home, however, and the opposition rode upon Cherokee rumors of British intentions to dispossess, enslave, and utterly destroy the mountain Nation. During the Seven Years' War, rumors strained the Anglo-Cherokee bonds that the colonial need for Indian intelligence had helped to sustain. Upon the wings of Fama, Great Britain's deepest and most promising alliance with a Native American people spun downward into the dark valleys.

6. Bonds: Sexual Assault and Slavery

The Reverend William Richardson, a Presbyterian Virginian, heard the rumor when he visited the Cherokee Overhills town of Chota in 1758. If Cherokee men departed northward for the British expedition against French Fort Duquesne, Carolinians and Virginians would attack in their absence and enslave their women and children. In "general disaffected," the minister wrote, Cherokees "fear we sh'd take their wives and children for slaves w'n they are gone."[1] The rumor, new wine in an old skin, revived the heady Yamasee stories of 1715. Like them, it evoked the slave raiding and abuse of women that had wracked the Southeast from 1670 to 1720, a history, neither dead nor distant, which the Cherokees intimately recalled.[2]

Cherokees knew that "Lower Creek" Muskogees had once traded heavily in slaves for the Carolina market, and in 1758 they widely rumored an impending British-Creek invasion of their mountainous country. In the summer, the commander of Fort Loudoun, high in the Cherokee Nation, caught wind of that Cherokee rumor. A similar flying report again buzzed the Nation the following February. By June 1759, British traders among the Creeks learned that the Cherokees anticipated that a Creek-British attack would "Cut them off Root and Branch." Young "Runnagado [renegade] fellows" carried the news "from Town to Town." As Edmund Atkin, the overstretched and inexperienced British Indian superintendent for the southern colonies, prepared to meet with the Creeks, Cherokee rumoring of the anticipated invasion escalated.[3] Fears of slavery did not alone cause the Great Cherokee War that erupted late in 1759, but the war was, like the Yamasee War before it, tangled up in bondage.

This chapter treats Indian rumors about slavery and sexual violence. The stories flew over eastern North America from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes and from the mid-eighteenth century into the revolutionary era. The

chapter pivots on the Great Cherokee War (1759–1762), which left an especially stark record. The realities of the age rendered the rumors highly plausible, and often true. Indian stories about colonial sexual predation pierced a shroud of colonial silence and promoted Indian resistance to enslavement. The two concerns, slavery and sexual abuse, formed flipsides of the colonial coin: both involved the total control of the person and the loss of social protection. Both meant individual and familial debasement and disgrace.

For enslaved Indian women as for their increasingly numerous African counterparts, the threat of sexual abuse presented a fact of colonial life, exacerbated by the colonial practice of matrilineal slave descent, which increased women's value by enslaving their children.[4] Free Indian women in independent Indian Nations had much less to fear, most of the time. Their communities protected against rape. But in the mid-eighteenth century, Indians of those communities also rumored that colonists threatened their sexual integrity and personhood.

Of course, consensual sexual relations, desired by women and men, spanned the many barriers that rose and fell in the colonial world. But the British southern colonies barely tolerated them. Exceptional men, George Galphin, for example, or Lachlan McGillivray, retained high colonial status despite knowledge of their partnerships with, and in the case of McGillivray, marriage to, Indian women. These instances of prominent British subjects breaching the hardening conventions of racial (and gendered) preference, while important, were uncommon in the Lower South and even rarer in eighteenth-century Virginia. Governor Spotswood probably did not look hard, but he claimed as early as 1717 that "I cannot find one Englishman that has an Indian wife, or an Indian marryed to a white woman."[5] Many less prominent men, traders who spent most of their time in Indian Country, did live with Indian women, but other colonists throughout the century spoke in demeaning tones of such arrangements, barely distinguishing an Indian wife from a "mistress," as Thomas Nairne put it in the early eighteenth century, or from a slave.[6] When the South Carolina council referred in 1748 to such a trader's wife as "a half Breed wench call'd Peggy belonging to Mr. Harvey," the writer classed her as a "wench," identifying her not only with the supposedly promiscuous lower orders among the English, but with the colony's African-descended women. And she "belonged" to Harvey, if only rhetorically. Remarkably, Peggy carried the ugly title "wench" in a document that praised her assistance to Carolinians in the Cherokee Nation: she had alerted traders to rumors of an attack.[7]

Unsurprisingly, Indian men also expressed discomfort with traders who formed relationships with Indian women. In 1753, for example, the Wolf King of the Upper Creek town of Muccolossus mixed innuendo with a complaint about the terms of trade. He embarrassed his hosts in the very chambers of the South Carolina council. He reasoned that British traders charged high prices for their goods because "they give away such quantities to their Wives" and, he added, to the "Women which they keep." Sharing his anger, "several of the warriors and young men left the room, without taking any of the presents with them, and making some noise as they went out."[8] Wolf King distinguished traders' wives from traders' kept women, but he criticized both. A dozen years later, to the west of the Creeks, Choctaws spoke of abusive behavior as they came to terms with the new British colony of West Florida. An important leader of the Choctaw "Sixtowns" region, Tomatly Mingo, urged the British to "Caution and restrain" their traders. The Alibamon Mingo, an octogenarian highly regarded throughout the Choctaw Nation, spoke directly of "the Behaviour of the traders towards our Women." He had heard from the Creeks and Cherokees that British traders "cause disturbances." The rumor had it that when British traders requested food, and a "Generous Indian sent his own wife," as she presented the meal, "instead of taking the Bread out of the Basket they put their hand upon the Breast of their Wifes which was not to be admitted," and indeed was a "disgrace."[9]

Rape and the Cherokee War

Many combustibles that had little to do directly with slavery, sexually charged conflict, or sexual abuse detonated in the Cherokee War. Large issues included the landed expansion of South Carolina, Cherokee disappointment with the meager fruits of the British alliance, British and colonial resentment over Cherokee demands, poor trade terms, and the violent instability of the southern colonial frontier. Episodes of 1757 and 1758 sparked explosives, as Cherokee men, having just served British troops, found themselves under assault in Virginia, and several met their deaths. In May 1759 Cherokee warriors from Settico, a Lower Town in the eastern valleys closer to the colonial settlements, retaliated for the Virginia killings, murdering settlers on the Catawba and Yadkin Rivers. Such attacks and counterattacks, such material differences, might well have been mediated, and a settlement reached. But it would have taken a spirit of conciliation on both sides, a spirit that had fled the body of the alliance by 1759. Inept and arrogant leadership in

South Carolina had something to do with it. But so did sexual conflict and bondage, an unstable admixture that proved beyond containment as the violence escalated. Rarely in eastern North America does the violent intimacy of the frontiers enter the record as it did in the course of this war. The events of the war itself tore the veil off anxieties about slavery and bondage, about manhood, and about the fate of women.

The Lower Towns of Cherokees dealt regularly with officers and soldiers at nearby Fort Prince George, situated in the vicinity of the Cherokee town of Keowee. According to the later writings of James Adair, the post's disorderly officers eyed Cherokee women and "forcibly violated" them "in the most shameless manner, at their own houses, while their husbands were away making their winter hunt." This would have been before the May raids issuing out of neighboring Settico. Rumor had it that the Carolinian rapists later "madly repeated" the crime, further aggravating it by "insulting and abusing" the local people when they "paid a friendly visit to the garrison." South Carolina council minutes confirm Adair's recollection, recording the Cherokee Lower Towns leader Tistoa's complaint before the body: he "had found something bad" about the garrison at Fort Prince George. When "the officer gets drunk, he goes to our Houses and draws our women from us, he paints himself and says he is a warrior, but we are no warriors, and had to do with our women at his own pleasure." Upon Tistoa's concluding his remarks, the other Indians present in the council chamber said that "they all agree to what has been said." There are few clearer charges of sexual assault in the history of the British seaboard colonies.[10] But some come with the Great Cherokee War.

It began with a hostage crisis that evoked slavery for the Cherokees. In October 1759 the main body of leading Cherokees, eager to repair damaged relations and arrest the slide toward war, risked an embassy to Charleston consisting of fifty-five men and women. Oconostota, also known as the Great Warrior of Chota, a long-time ally of Great Britain, led the way. The South Carolina governor, William Lyttelton, accepted the delegates' gifts, but he spurned their proposals for peace.[11] He instead seized and confined the leading men, and he then marched them, with an undisciplined army of more than one thousand men, toward Fort Prince George at the edge of the Cherokee Lower Towns. Lyttleton transformed Cherokee ambassadors seeking peace into hostages to Carolinian demands: the Cherokees must surrender for execution twenty-four men as retribution for the Carolinian dead. Lyttelton's violent response confirmed the most dangerous Cherokee rumors about

long-range British goals. Trader James Adair later reported that the taking of the hostages "conveyed the idea of slaves."[12]

When smallpox soon surfaced both among the Carolina troops and the Cherokee Lower Towns, Lyttelton's army bled away through desertion and amid recrimination, but the hostages remained confined in Fort Prince George, under the command of Richard Coytmore. Even as tensions soared, some Cherokees continued to hope for a resolution. They delivered two of the raiders, and Lyttelton reciprocated by releasing two hostages. That left twenty-two hostages in the garrison—an exact equivalent, the governor felt, for the number of men that Cherokees must deliver for Carolinian execution. As Oconostota stood among the released Cherokees, he surveyed the shards of his shattered trust in the colony, and he prepared for bitter war. Not long after Lyttelton returned to Charleston, Oconostota summoned Coytmore for talks. Coytmore had a reputation in the Lower Towns as one of the fort's sexual predators. Lured out by his former ally and former captive, he walked into the deadly aim of Cherokee muskets, which fired and then turned on the post. The garrison, in response, murdered every Cherokee hostage.[13]

Outraged, grieving, and at war, the Cherokees in the Lower Towns, led by Round O (father of two of the murdered hostages) and the Young Warrior, or Scaroroski, of the town of Estatoe, began slaughtering Carolinian traders and other "white people" in the Nation. Some of the murdered men had spent years among the Cherokees and had remained in the Nation during the crisis, trusting that their close-knit relations with women and families would protect them, perhaps assuming that leaders would resolve this crisis, as they had others. Another trader, Aaron Price, had much better luck: out of the Nation at the time, he retained contact with his Cherokee intimates. One of these, a Cherokee woman, brought the news of the traders' killings to Price at the colonial borderland settlement known as Ninety Six (its distance in miles from the nearest Cherokee town). She had more news for Price: five to six hundred Cherokees would soon invest that settlement. To this she added a truly significant detail: Cherokees had, following their capture of five Carolinian men, "whipt them and then made slaves of them." Cherokees had earlier practiced ritual torture and even physical punishment, including beating with sticks, but they knew whipping as a European specialty, a form that flourished in the Carolinian lowcountry. The spectacular insult, turning slaveholder into slave, could not have been lost on the South Carolina council, which soon had the news from Price.[14]

It had been forty years since Native American slaves formed a rich share of South Carolina's exports. The chaos of the Yamasee War, the soaring transatlantic African slave trade, the collapsing Indian populations, and the profitable turn toward rice had long ago discouraged the purchasing of Native American slaves from neighboring tribes. The Cherokee War briefly sparked renewed colonial interest in Indian slavery. British Colonel Archibald Montgomery, organizing His Majesty's troops for an invasion of the Cherokee Nation, observed that settlers spoke wildly of "putting all the Cherokees to Death, or making slaves of them," even as they did little to assist the expedition.[15] North Carolina passed an act that year promising that each Indian captive "is hereby declared to be a Slave and the Absolute Right and Property of who shall be the Captor of such Indian."[16] South Carolina added to its scalp bounties a similar clause, and it considered a proposal for the export of Cherokee prisoners as slaves to the West Indies.[17] The way seemed open for the revival of the Indian slave trade. This did not happen, at least not on any observable scale. But the record lends credibility to earlier Cherokee fears that the colonists meant, in the end, to enslave them. Credibility fed rumor, and rumor spread among the Creeks, to the Cherokees' south, that they would be next.[18]

Two events in August 1760 expose the place of slavery and the roles of women in this messy and brutal war. The first took place three years to the date after the unrelated attack on the surrendered British troops at Fort William Henry, far to the north. Cherokees of the Overhills—so called because they lived remote from the colonies, west of the height of the Great Smoky Mountains and along the headwaters of Tennessee River—had long hosted a strongly pro-British faction. In August 1760 they captured British Fort Loudoun, a well-engineered garrison nestled, with their permission, in their valleys. Unlike the officers at Fort Prince George, on the edge of the Cherokee Lower Towns closer to the Carolinians, Fort Loudoun's commander, Paul Demeré, had enjoyed relatively good company among the people of the Overhills. Some Overhills women had established affective relationships with men in the garrison, so much so that they smuggled food to the soldiers during the siege. But love did not triumph. Running low on supplies and hopeless of relief from the seaboard, Demeré surrendered on August 7. Promised protection, his men, the garrison's colonial women, and some traders began a march, armed and under Cherokee escort, out of the country. But the escort dissolved by August 9, and on August 10, near Cane Creek, Cherokee gunmen opened fire on the weary and famished colonials.

Demeré, twenty-six soldiers and officers, and three women died in the firefight. Legend has it that as he died, his attackers stuffed Demeré's mouth with earth, saying, "since you are so hungry for land." This symbolic act, too powerful a story to ignore, likely never happened. It stems from remote, unreliable hearsay—a rumor among the French. Overhills Cherokees did not fight primarily to defend their land in 1760: that fight awaited a later time. Status, not land, was at stake. In a more appropriate symbolic act, Cherokees enslaved many of the fort's 120 survivors, and they forced some to perform their subordination, in dance. They executed one, by torture.[19]

The second event to unite concerns about bondage to those about women, an event also taking place in August 1760, accompanied the return of Colonel Archibald Montgomery's expedition. Montgomery had invaded the Cherokee Nation with some 1,600 British Highlanders and Carolinian Rangers. Cherokees eventually blocked the advance of the imperial force, but only after it had provisioned Fort Prince George, destroyed vast food supplies, and burned several Lower Towns and several Middle Towns. Montgomery also took prisoners. These did not generally become chattel slaves. Plans to export the captive Indians as merchandise to the West Indies appear to have collapsed over the course of the year because more than one hundred British subjects languished in Cherokee captivity. The safety of these captured colonists concerned the colonial government; Montgomery's prisoners became security for the colonial captives' safety and return. So rarely did British and colonial troops hold Indians as prisoners of war—as opposed to as slaves or captives to be interrogated then summarily executed—that the colonists did not know quite what to do with them. Two were men; thirty-two were women and children. South Carolina's council quickly decided that since the king's troops had captured them, the Crown, not the colony, must lodge and feed them.[20] Montgomery soon departed the colony with most of the British Regulars, but a small body of Scots Royal remained, along with the South Carolina Independents, comrades of those who had garrisoned Fort Loudoun. The prisoners fell under the mastery of the Scots Royal.

That fall, Oconostota proposed that the English send up to the Nation reasonable terms of peace, along with all the Cherokee prisoners, on which, he promised, he would have "all the English prisoners at Keowee ready to be delivered up." The council received it as an insult, instead demanding that the Cherokees deliver all their English prisoners before it released any imprisoned Indians.[21] Anticipating a positive Cherokee response, the council marched the Cherokee prisoners toward the frontier, to no avail. By

mid-November 1760, the Scots Royal received orders to return with the suffering prisoners to Charleston.[22]

Two men and thirty-two women and children (we do not know how many of each) had come down to Charleston with Montgomery's army that August and had been placed under the care of the British Regulars. By January 1761, Colonel James Grant informed the South Carolina council that the soldiers "daily committed" what he termed "great abuses . . . upon the Cherokee women, prisoners in part of the said Guardhouse." Grant requested that the council order the women moved out of the main guard and transferred to colonial, not royal, confinement. The council agreed, and ordered the women to the armory.[23] One cannot know that the transfer improved the already traumatized victims' lot. We do know that they lacked adequate winter clothing; that some succumbed to a subsequent Yellow Fever epidemic; and that some would briefly escape, only to encounter a Creek patrol that returned them to prison.[24]

Such a record of sexual abuse rarely stains the official correspondence of the period. Why Grant, a British officer, thought the South Carolina councilors might provide more protection to Cherokee women than British troops remains a question, given all we know about the power slavery gave male masters over enslaved women and given the presence of slave prostitution in Charleston itself.[25] Grant's own later successful and destructive expedition to the Cherokees left behind some record that provincial troops had pursued and made "free" with Cherokee women. And when Lieutenant Governor William Bull II considered the prospect of more women prisoners returning to the colony with Grant's force, he worried about their mistreatment—though he preserved his colony's honor: he said that sailors, currently numerous in the port, posed the danger—not Charleston's citizens.[26] But the colonial government, as Grant likely understood, had to consider the fate of Carolinians held in captivity among the Cherokees; the treatment of Cherokee prisoners in the lowlands might well weigh on the treatment of settlers and soldiers held in the mountains.

The Cherokee War strikingly confirmed the Cherokees' worst fears: imperial and colonial forces took Cherokee women for sex slaves. At the war's end, a full year after the report of the rapes, Cherokees objected strenuously to a plan, as "exceptionable and disagreeable to them," to have the British army escort the surviving prisoners back to the Nation.[27] As the Cherokee War had approached, and as it ended, Cherokees rumored evil British colo-

nial intentions against Cherokee women. Decades after the Indian slave trade had ceased as a main feature of colonial life, it remained a great and highly plausible fear, sharply evocative of sexual violence.

Cherokee rumors in the late 1750s that British colonists meant to shackle them in irons and send them overseas bore kernels of understanding if not precise truth. Imperial officers and colonial settlers would moot the massive enslavement of Indians; royal troops would make sex slaves of captive Cherokee women. Colonial economies, only forty years past, had put slave raiding at the center of a vast trading system that included Cherokee towns. The frequently invoked fear that colonists meant to take land was, in the emerging South, overlaid with the equally reasonable fear that they meant to sell men overseas and to bind and abuse women. The fears extended beyond the Cherokees, beyond the Southeast, and beyond the early eighteenth century. Amid similar apprehensions, Indians would soon rumor enslavement as yet another war darkened lands north of the Chesapeake Bay and Ohio River.

Rumors to the North and Northwest

"Britons are our oppressors: I speak it with shame—I speak it with indignation—we are slaves." The 1774 words belong not to a plantation slave in the South or a Cherokee militant in the mountains but to a descendant of early English Puritans, the "Son of Liberty" Josiah Quincy of Boston. In the 1760s and especially after 1774, the colonial seaboard resounded with talk of British ministerial plots to reduce the colonists to slavery. The sense, that year, among British colonists that their dearly purchased liberty faced peril had American Indian counterparts. Even Indians in the northern regions, somewhat less familiar with chattel slavery than those to the south, spoke in the era surrounding the American Revolution of plots to enslave them. As in the South, the northern rumors bound slavery to manhood, womanhood, and sex. The northern rumors frequently targeted Protestant missionaries, who arrived only later in the South. Like the rhetoric of the American revolutionaries, this groundless talk, however extreme, was not hyperbole; it made sense. Like the revolutionaries' rumors, these statements were not mere flourishes; they were believed as dead-on accurate. Indians who feared slavery's total debasement couched their fears in sexed and gendered terms.[28]

Three valleys provided particularly fertile ground for reports of colonial plans to enslave the local Indians: the Susquehanna, the Detroit, and the

Ohio. The three supported colonial slavery. The Susquehanna River has its origins in what is now New York, and it is most associated with Pennsylvania, but it drains into the Chesapeake, into the social world of Maryland and Virginia. Colonial settlements everywhere along the Susquehanna supported slavery at least on a modest scale. In the small French settlements of Illinois Country at the lower end of the Ohio Valley, the proportions of the enslaved persons to free resembled those in Virginia. French-allied Indians of the Lower Ohio had historically been targets of English-allied Chickasaw and Cherokee slave raids, just as they had themselves been dealers in *panis*, the generic North American French term for Indian slaves. Detroit had fewer slaves, but slaves did labor there, and Detroit, as a military and economic center, saw the exchange of captives.[29]

By mid-century, some inhabitants of the Susquehanna Valley must have retained memories of the violent era of Carolinian slave raiding. Shawnee communities of the Susquehanna might have had links with those of Carolina and Creek Country. Certainly the Tutelos, Conoys, and Nanticokes (formerly of the Chesapeake) and, especially, the Tuscaroras (formerly of the North Carolina coastal plains) had considerable experience before 1720 with slavery and slave raiding. Tuscaroras had moved north from eastern North Carolina in the wake of the Tuscarora War (1711–1713), at the end of which hundreds of Tuscarora women and children had become slaves, bound, quite literally, for South Carolinian markets. Surviving Tuscaroras had accepted protection from the Iroquois Five Nations of what is now New York, and in several migrations beginning in the second decade of the century they had quit the Carolinas for the Upper Susquehanna Valley, claimed by the Iroquois League, becoming the Sixth Nation.

Such past experience fed the anti-British rumors that circulated at mid-century. Delawares, Mahicans, and Susquehannocks—as well as the peoples just mentioned—jostled together along the Wyoming section of the valley (now greater Wilkes Barre). During the 1740s and 1750s, anticolonial religious movements swept these communities. In the same period, waves of colonial revivals known as the Great Awakening encouraged Christian evangelism. The valley's Indians confronted the evangelists with the charge that they meant less to convert than to dispossess and enslave. The Presbyterian John Brainerd gathered in 1751 "that the white people were contriving a method to deprive them of their country . . . and to make slaves of them and their children as they did of the negroes; that I was sent on purpose to accomplish that design."[30]

Such accusations color another charge soon levied in the Ohio Valley by the Seneca "Half King," Tanaghrisson, a "Mingo" Iroquois affiliated with the Six Nations. Following the 1754 debacle at Fort Necessity and the eruption of the Seven Years' War in America, Tanaghrisson called the 22-year-old George Washington "a good natured Man, but [with] no Experience; he took [it] upon him to command the *Indians* as his Slaves, and would have them every Day upon the Scout, and to attack the Enemy by themselves, but would by no Means take Advice from the *Indians*."[31] Similar concerns that colonizers held Indians in the same contempt in which they held their slaves contributed to the outbreak of Pontiac's War in the Detroit and Ohio Valleys (and throughout the Upper Great Lakes) in 1763.[32]

In 1761, when two Mingo Senecas—Kiashuta and Tahaiadoris—promoted anti-British activity in the Detroit region, they declared that the new British commander "intends to Attempt enslaving them."[33] They did not raise a following that year, but they did strike a chord. The abandonment of Canada by France between 1760 and 1763 and the claims of Great Britain to former French posts left many Indians wondering where they might stand. In April 1763 Detroit's commander, Captain Henry Gladwin, caught wind of the widespread Indian impression that the British Empire planned "to make slaves of them, by taking so many posts in their country, and that they had better do something now, to recover their liberty."[34]

Recent scholarship has emphasized the presence of actual Indian slavery in Detroit, the Great Lakes, and Canada. We know that some of the region's Ottawas, Hurons, Ojibwes, and Potawatomis at times engaged in the dangerous slave trade that had transformed many Mesquakies from the Upper Great Lakes—but even far distant Apaches from the southern Plains—into *panis*. Scattered among the *habitants* of New France, and especially concentrated in Illinois Country at the mouth of the Ohio River, *panis* often faced hard labor, sometimes alongside Africans brought up from Louisiana. As the British in 1760 began to garrison formerly French posts surrounded by ethnic French communities, the practice of Indian slavery continued.

When, near Detroit in 1762, for instance, two *panis*, a man and a woman, murdered their new master, the Bostonian John Clapham, the killing did not meet with local approval among the Indians. Instead of honoring the killers as self-liberators, regional Indians captured the *panis* and delivered them to Fort Detroit. Still, it is to be wondered that the man—not a native to the region—somehow escaped. The woman, on the other hand, remained in the garrison's jail, until the arrogant commander, Henry Gladwin, subjected

her to public execution by hanging. Carried out in "the most Exemplary and publick manner, that thereby Others may be Deterred from Committing such Cruelties for the Future," she, nameless in the record, died in late April 1763. Intended as an object lesson in British rule, Gladwin's deadly performance instead convinced many Indians in the Detroit region that the new British order endangered their own liberty. After all, Gladwin stated that free Indians, like enslaved Indians, needed this example. Detroit's free Indians rejected the example, and they made their resentment clear. The event helped trigger the eruption of Pontiac's War in the following month. Gladwin's public demonstration turned the killing of a slave, which the region's Indians might have generally accepted, into a threat to their autonomy. His subsequent actions contributed to widespread Indian fears that the British meant nothing less than total native subordination.[35] If we trust the 1767 memory of a Dutch American trader, captured by Ojibwes at the opening of the war and enslaved by the Potawatomis to the west of the St. Joseph River region, Potawatomis joined Pontiac because "the English intend to deprive them of their Country and enslave them."[36]

In the central Ohio Valley lay the fields and villages of the Shawnees, who had, for the most part, allied with the French in the Seven Years' War and who had remained at odds with Great Britain over the issue of captivity. As the war broke out in Detroit, Shawnees still held scores of colonial prisoners: most were children whom they had captured in frontier raids during the Seven Years' War and had forcibly adopted into Shawnee families. British demands that Indians return these children to the colonies met stern resistance. So did rumored British plots to enslave Shawnees. That December, 1763, French officers still holding Fort de Chartres, along the Mississippi in the southern Illinois region, listened to Shawnee explanations for their war against the British: the British called them "brothers" but treated them like "dogs" and "slaves."[37]

Pontiac, an Ottawa, repeated the anti-British charge twice when he visited the post, still in French hands in 1764. Like the Shawnees, Pontiac asserted that his followers "would rather die with the Tomihauks in their hands than live in Slavery with which the English menace them." The English claimed, he said, that Detroit's Indians would "die Slaves or at the feet of the Trees," that is, hanged.[38] Before a gathering of Indians and French in New Orleans early the following year, Charlot Kaské, who had descended the Mississippi River from Ohio Country, agreed that the British wished only to enslave his people and take their lands.[39]

The British by the mid-1760s assigned a French origin to such "villainous stories." Effectively, the British rumored about a rumor, but they got some of their misinformation from their Indian opponents.[40] Kiashuta, who by May 1765 had made peace with the British, reported that the French commander in Illinois had "approved much of their resolution to defend themselves from Slavery."[41] That spring, as Kickapoos and Mascoutens of Illinois Country maneuvered toward peace with George Croghan, they went further, and pinned the rumor on the French, who had warned them, they said, of a British conspiracy to "bring the Cherokees there to settle and to Enslave" them. In July Pontiac repeated that tale.[42] As the British rumored among themselves of French deception, Indians so rumored to the British.

During the Seven Years' War, French officers had indeed warned that a British victory meant the Indians' slavery. French individuals in 1763 possibly made the same claim—after all, a few actually did join Pontiac's forces. But Native Americans had no more need of European expertise on the subject than they had need of European commanders in war. Indigenous experience provided ample loft for the rumor that British intentions included shackles and whips. The colonial British rumors that put France behind Pontiac's War fit a different pattern that held a European state accountable for Indian action. Britons struggled to make sense of the terrific early Indian effectiveness in Pontiac's War. A multi-tribal coalition had rapidly reduced post after post in the Ohio and Great Lakes regions and had renewed devastating assaults on the middle colonial settlements, Maryland, and Virginia. English-speakers quickly blamed their old imperial enemy. This pattern of thought had a history that went back to the late seventeenth century, and it would endure, as we will see, throughout the American Revolution, when U.S. settlers, suffering Indian attacks, would turn the finger toward the British Crown. While colonists at times grasped Indian motivations for war, and while they clearly appreciated native skills in combat, they nonetheless regularly attributed Indian war to enemy European origins.

By 1766, Pontiac's War had sputtered to an inconclusive end, without putting to rest the rumors of British plans to enslave Indians of the Ohio Valley. As in the Susquehanna Valley of the 1750s, the rumors attached themselves to Christian missionaries. United Brethren, or Moravian, missionaries moved into the region with their primarily Lenape and Mahican congregations in the late 1760s, and Indian militants hit them with the charge. The energetic Pietist David Zeisberger found himself repeatedly accused of planning to enslave and sell his converts overseas.[43] The militant Lenape

prophet Wangomend rumored that the Moravians like Zeisberger plotted to have the Indians "transported as slaves, where they would be harnessed to the plough, and whipped to work."[44] "It is an old story," the missionary wrote, "that the baptized Indians are taken to an island across the sea to be sold as slaves."[45] An evangelist of a different stripe, the Baptist David Jones, visited Shawnees in Ohio Country in 1772–1773, and he faced the same recurring rumor. Unlike Zeisberger, Jones was employed partly by colonial speculators, and he keenly assessed the agricultural potential of Shawnee territory.[46] Militants correctly saw a threat to their independence in Jones's mission, and they may have fairly identified such a threat in Zeisberger's. But that Baptist or Moravian missionaries contemplated Indian slavery was legend.

Long after the American Revolution, militant Shawnees would continue to rumor that the efforts of colonizers to transform their ways of life entailed Indian enslavement. The early federal administrations from Washington through Madison all supported Indian missions of various kinds, challenging pan-Indian militant efforts. At perhaps the highest peak of militant efforts, in the early 1790s, when a shifting alliance of Indians defeated one invading American army after the next, the Shawnee Painted Pole issued the old rumor in new form. Indians had captured American papers, he claimed, that outlined plans to force Indian men into agricultural servitude: "to make them labour like their beasts, their oxen, and their packhorses." No doubt his choice of oxen—castrated males—was deliberate, for Shawnee men generally did not work the fields. Painted Pole and his allies meant to remain men.[47] As the federal project worked its way into Indian Country, it stimulated continuing Indian rumoring that the government ultimately intended to enslave Indians and unman the men. The Shawnee Prophet, Tenskwatawa, brother to Tecumseh and a pan-Indian leader, denounced a federally appointed missionary as the president's intended "Master" over the Indians. The federal agent would make "women of the Indians—but when the Indians was all united they would be respected by the President as men." Tenskwatawa asserted that he had gathered into his possession "all the speeches that the different chiefs" who cooperated with the federal government "had delivered to the President." These, he said, revealed that the leaders would not only surrender Indian lands, they would have the president "appoint masters over them to make them work, which the President had Done."[48]

William Bartram, Booger

In the course of diplomacy, southeastern Indian men had long taunted their allies and enemies alike with sexually charged language, sometimes collapsing slavery, women's work, and sexual abuse into a single insult. When Cherokees, having made peace with the colonies in 1761, exhorted their Anglo-American allies to fight their Creek enemies, they claimed that the Creeks ridiculed Anglo-American manhood. In 1764 the Cherokee speaker Saluy reported that Creeks insulted Carolinians, saying, "they are all Women; and that they [the Creeks] would make use of the [Carolinian] Men as Women."[49] Twenty-eight years later, Creeks similarly insulted Americans at the home of James Carey, the U.S. interpreter to the Cherokees. They egged Carey on, daring his country to fight. Feigning exasperation, they declared that, having attacked Americans, taken prisoners, and made them "slaves like negroes," and having even "debauched their [American] women," they could not provoke the unmanly Americans to defend their honor. "Shall we," the Creeks reportedly demanded, "take some man and *bouger* him, and send him back to tell his people," to rouse the Americans to war?[50]

The Creeks (or Carey) chose a remarkable word, for while "bouger" meant male-on-male rape, it has thicker possibilities, too. In the mid-1930s, working out of the community of Big Cove, North Carolina, the eastern Cherokee translator and mask-maker Will West Long collaborated with the ethnographer Frank Speck and the sociologist Leonard Broom to document the dances of the eastern Cherokees, North Carolinian Indians whose ancestors had escaped the general Cherokee removal of the 1830s. Among the dances was the so-called Booger, or Mask, Dance, which has attracted considerable scholarship. Most scholars treating the dance, from Long, Speck, and Broom forward, see the word "Booger" as deriving from the ghostly English terms relating to bogey or bogeyman, but the 1792 usage and spelling, "bouger," suggests that the word could just as easily stem from the English expletive "bugger," a term that also applied to the dance in the twentieth century.[51] In its early twentieth-century form, the dance evokes, among other things, the dangers that foreigners and their insatiable lusts posed to Cherokees throughout history. Ethnographer and curator Jason Baird Jackson summarizes the elements of this practice. "Cherokee communities would gather each winter in the homes of individual families who sponsored all-night social dances." During the dance, "a group of four to ten men, masked as Boogers

and disguised by ragged clothes," might burst into the room and "disrupt the otherwise peaceful assembly." The Boogers did not speak Cherokee, and they demanded either to fight or to receive "Girls!" Eventually, Cherokees would persuade them to dance peaceably.

The Boogers of the early twentieth century carried distinctly rude or alien names, such as Northerner, Chinaman, German, Black Buttocks, and Sooty Anus. The masks they wore bore the marks of age and decrepitude. Some extant masks appear to represent European, African, or Asian men, but most represent other Native Americans. Nonetheless, the Boogers were clearly outsiders to the community; they declared no clan affiliation; they "invaded." Each performed an absurd dance to entertain the gathering. Then, as female partners decorously joined them, they together danced either the Bear or Eagle Dance, the women dancing with "composure," and the Boogers baudily showcasing their provocative, lustful desires. Satisfied by the symbolic performance, the Boogers departed, and the social dance continued.[52]

There are several ethnological interpretations of this dance, which featured aged outsiders named Boogers demanding sex and violence. The dance had many purposes, from simple entertainment to the establishing of proper behavior within eastern Cherokee communities. It had deep roots; scholars have explored its early colonial antecedents, and its profound, structural relationship with other Iroquoian and other southeastern rites and cosmologies. It would be as ham-fisted to reduce the dance solely to a comment on nominal colonialism as it would be to reduce Christian communion to a reflection on cannibalism. Yet colonial invasion—with all its complexities—became an aspect of the dance. By the 1920s, eastern Cherokees had encountered enemy Georgians, Carolinians, and Yankees (all three groups in black and white). Slave raiding and colonial warfare had also frequently pitted Native American against Native American. Many eastern Cherokee men and women by this time worked off the reservation, often at a great distance. That outsiders posed dangers and might need to be sacredly accommodated and controlled would be an unsurprising conclusion to draw from an eastern Cherokee reflection on the past. Considering Cherokee history, the dance itself arguably recalled and warned against violent colonial assaults on the Nation and on its "Girls!"[53]

Understanding this longer context, we might reread the most famous passage from the naturalist William Bartram, a widely quoted passage that gained vast exposure in the late twentieth-century novel by Charles Frazier, *Cold Mountain*, later a major motion picture. In the spring of 1775, as war

The naturalist William Bartram had nothing on Cherokee dancers, whose performances bore historical truths. This Cherokee Booger Mask, White Man Form, displays a phallic nose and pubic facial hair. Courtesy of Penn Museum, image #46-6-2.

broke out between the colonies and Great Britain, Bartram, the young naturalist, busily documented the flora of the southeastern interior. The famous, erotic passage from his published journal constitutes no evidence that Bartram sexually abused anybody. But his literally juicy story—a narrative of pursuit, flight, defense, and, not conquest, but trade—makes sport of Cherokee women. At first unnoticed by any Cherokees, Bartram imaginatively writes, he and his American companions, all young men, came upon "companies of young, innocent Cherokee virgins, busily gathering their rich fragrant fruit," while "others" relaxed beneath foliage that the author spells out in a long list of botanical names, for the amusement of his readers. The Cherokees disclosed "their beauties to the fluttering breeze," and bathed "their limbs in the cool fleeting streams." Still others ran about in play, "staining" one another's "lips and cheeks with the rich fruit." So he claims. He and his

"hearty young men" could not "long continue idle spectators," so they advanced, only to stumble into "envious matrons who lay in ambush." Undeterred, the colonials "pursued and gained ground" on several young women at "a greater distance from their guardians." The passage ends in suggestive commercial, not sexual, intercourse, as the "discovered" women "decently" trade their baskets of berries with Bartram's party of explorers.[54] As in the Booger Dance, not too much is left to the imagination. Had early twentieth-century Booger Dancers time-traveled from the eastern Cherokee Nation and encountered Bartram in their eighteenth-century homeland, they would have understood him well: he was, after all, a Booger himself, dancing under the mask of science.

The year after Bartram's fanciful encounters, the revolutionary governments of the Carolinas and Virginia sent armies into the Cherokee mountains, and the old rumors of slavery recurred. As far away as London, rumor had it that the "Rebel Government" in South Carolina had not only adopted a scalp bounty on enemy Indians but had declared Cherokee "Children of a certain Age, which may be taken Prisoners, the Slaves of their Captors." British officials relayed the report from England back to British Southern Indian Superintendent John Stuart for verification in America.[55] The rumor garbled the truth. South Carolina's Indian committee had indeed proposed bounty on scalps taken from Indian men. It placed other, higher, bounties on captives taken alive (and higher for men than for women and children). As for slavery, while the new state's leaders considered the matter, they refused to permit the enslavement of the prisoners: "on the contrary, . . . publick declarations should be made to prevent such expectations." As the committee understood, "subjecting prisoners of war to a state of slavery, independent of any considerations of the illegality of such a measure, would involve this State in many difficulties, obstruct and impede a future peace, give the *Indians* a precedent that may be fatal to those of our own people who may unfortunately fall into their hands, and prevent a mutual exchange of prisoners." Contrary to rumor, prudence had again defeated a renewed Indian slave trade in revolutionary South Carolina.[56] Still, the rumor died hard. In 1777, as the main body of Cherokees made peace with, and ceded lands to, the state, the leader Old Tassel again raised the specter of slavery. Objecting to American promises to educate Cherokee children in American schools, he invoked the Great Spirit, who, he asserted, "has given you many advantages, but he has not created us to be your slaves."[57]

Into the late 1790s among the Creeks, tensions with the United States suggested slavery, including sex slavery. Creeks learned of the Pinckney Treaty (the Treaty of San Lorenzo, 1795), and its settling of the Florida boundary between the Spanish Empire and the United States. The boundary ignored Creek claims and bisected Creek lands. Rumor spread among Creeks that the two arrogant powers had agreed to subject the men to plantation slavery, taking away their women and children: "the men would be made slaves of, to work in the ground, . . . and their women and children would be kept and taken care of, and . . . their land would be taken from them." For women and children to be "kept" implies their enslavement, and the term carried sexual freight: not only because of the usage, in the English language, of the phrase "kept woman," but also because of the experience of slaves in the American South.[58]

Rumors of slavery throughout Indian Country reveal that deep and justified anxieties about physical exploitation accompanied American colonization. Mid-century Indians did speak of sovereignty, nationhood, and independence, at least in approximate terms; but those lofty abstractions reflected a more earthy determination not just to defend land, but also to defend personhood, to defend childhood, womanhood, and manhood. From early in the colonial period, Indian slavery—a feature of the early Virginia colony and an economic mainstay of South Carolina until about 1720—portended the abuse of women and men. During the Cherokee War, men of the Scots Royal used imprisoned Cherokee women as sex slaves. A similar assault on women, as we will see in the final chapter, further scars the Jacksonian record of Cherokee removal. Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century and into the period of removal, colonial and federal efforts to "civilize" Indians encountered, throughout Indian Country, rapidly flying reports that the United States intended both to overthrow Indian manhood and to enslave Indians. Such rumors reveal, and for very good reason, that Indians understood U.S. slavery to threaten their sexual integrity and gender conventions as much as it threatened extreme labor and suffering. Indians had excellent cause, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf Coast, to fear the loss of their land. But land itself was never the only issue. They also knew, and they knew from experience, that colonization meant far greater degradations than dispossession.

7. Solidarity: Fugitive Rumor, Modern Legend

If rumors reveal social anxieties, what might the absence of a rumor reveal? Eighteenth-century British colonists surprisingly rarely rumored, indeed, they only occasionally imagined, hostile conspiracies of their slaves with neighboring Indian powers. They certainly imagined slaves poisoning their cups or slitting their throats. They imagined the fire arrow in their shingles and the scalping knife at their foreheads. They feared Spanish, French, and Catholic agitation of slave and Indian violence. But they could scarcely imagine that the slaves laboring in their fields and the strong independent Indian Nations beyond their borders might act in concert, unless, as conventional colonial thinking had it, conducted by enemy Europeans. Colonists recklessly rumored slave uprisings, inter-tribal Indian conspiracies, Spanish toying with Indians and slaves, and French and Jesuitical seductions of powerful interior warriors. Colonists even rumored of servile white alliances with black slaves and white renegade activity among the native peoples.[1] But they rarely shivered beneath flying reports that the slaves whom they would so brutally exploit dangerously corresponded with the Indians whom they would so readily dispossess.

We might expect that colonists feared such a union: a coordinated rebellion in their homes and an invasion from their flanks, organized by, as the eighteenth century would have it, some uniquely gifted leader, or propelled by, as we moderns might have it, the mutual recognition of the colonizing enemy. To prevent such unity, we might imagine, and historians have argued, colonists carefully placed and fiercely hammered the wedge of divide and rule. To prevent mutually beneficial alliances among the peoples of color who often formed the majorities in their midst, the colonists shrewdly, consciously, and effectively deployed the strategy, or so we scholars have said.[2] It is an idea more obvious to us than to most in pre-revolutionary America. Before 1800 few imagined that free Indians identified enough with

enslaved Africans to attempt an anticolonial union. The rumor of this form of revolt is practically missing from the colonial record in the pre-revolutionary period.

Some would disagree, having found "divide and rule" in specific colonial policies. After all, colonists armed slaves against Indian enemies and armed Indians against fugitive slaves. Settler governments enacted statutes meant to limit the presence of black people, and especially black slaves, in Indian Country: all true, but to simpler ends than "divide and rule." They armed black slaves as a last-ditch defense in the course of emergencies that threatened all of a colony's people, including its most oppressed. They armed Indians against fugitive slaves not to drive a wedge, but to recapture the slaves. They legally restricted the African American presence in Indian Country not for fear of black-native solidarity, but to deny blacks economic opportunity and to entrench racial hierarchy, in keeping with much other legislation. Keeping free blacks and slaves out of the Indian trade squared with prohibiting literacy, skilled-trade work, and marriage to whites. As historian Ira Berlin has put it, the colonists meant "to shrink the slaves' world and isolate them from all but the masters' dominion."[3] This racist policy did not have at heart "divide and rule." The colonizers saw nothing to divide, and they were not blind.

Although Indians spread fearful rumors about colonial intentions to enslave them, they mounted no broad opposition to slavery. To prevent their own enslavement, they needed strength. The widespread slaving and slave trading that bedeviled the Southeast before 1720, while disastrous to southeastern Indians in general, had provided some rising, independent Indian Nations with power: with access to arms and ammunition, with labor, and with fearsome status in a colonial world. Slave raiding early on, slave patrolling throughout the era, and chattel slavery at the century's end continually distinguished the South's Indians—decisively by mid-century—from Africans and creoles of African descent. A common ground between, a common identity of, free Indians and enslaved peoples did not emerge in the social landscape.

To be sure, enslaved Indians often cast their lot with their black brethren, and fugitives from colonial slavery did occasionally find refuge among powerful interior peoples. Powerful ideologies of race did not much configure Indian action until the middle to late decades of the eighteenth century, and even then with considerable regional variation. Tributary Indians in the Chesapeake, for example, in general terms often welcomed African-descended

slaves into their communities, while those in South Carolina more often profited by returning escapees to the colony.[4] But nowhere in the period did the fear of an anticolonial alliance of slaves and free Indians rise above the British seaboard colonies in a nightmarish flock of rumor.

If colonists had deeply feared free Indian conspiracies with African slaves, they would have frequently said so. Instead, they had little to fear, and they wrote precious little. They feared greatly not collaboration by race rebels in solidarity against an emerging racial hierarchy, but the conspiracy of enemy European powers with independent Indian peoples or slaves: the archives groan with those rumors. When colonists rumored that an enemy empire sought allies among both their slaves and their Indian neighbors, the rumored relationship formed not a triangle, but an inverted V, with European puppeteers at the point and the portended allies at each stem. Independent of an imperial conspirator, colonists saw little potential for such alliances.

Until the American Revolution violently divided the colonists and generated risky opportunities for the uprising of slaves, planters had little reason to fear hostile conspiracies among the enslaved peoples of the lowlands and the powerful, free Indian peoples of the nearby interior. But after a century of British colonization in the Lower South and the interior, as the new Republic of the United States emerged as a power on the continent, American citizens began to voice fears of the potential, and the reality, of black slave alliances with free Native American peoples. Such fears centered on the Seminoles in Florida, with ripples farther west along the Gulf of Mexico toward Mobile Bay; chapter 10 of this book will examine them. This chapter focuses on a century of relative silence where historians have expected urgent talk.

This relative absence of colonial-era rumoring, this lack of dread of slave-free Indian alliances, provides a clue about British North American colonial perceptions of social transaction. Not even in South Carolina did settlers much rumor about free-Indian conspiracies with slaves; not even in the one North American colony where colonists maintained precarious dominance over a discontented, enslaved majority of mostly African but also Indian people, not even in the colony that faced perhaps the most powerful Indian peoples on its colonial flanks. Rumors only gain speed, they can only take flight, in a medium of plausibility. Rumors cannot be senseless. In colonial South Carolina, such conspiracies would seem social nonsense.

Native Americans and Africans shared no ideal of a heroic resistance by people of color in solidarity against colonialism. Such thoughts, even such words, needed later centuries. As conscious categories that shaped action,

identity, or collective expression, anticolonialism and people of color did not yet exist, not even in the late colonial and early revolutionary eras, when racist thought—among colonists and Indians—had considerably hardened. But if an ideology of broad race-conscious resistance awaited later times, it was more for a lack of gunpowder than for a lack of imagination. When slaves contemplated rebellion, and when Indians contemplated war, they had to look to their arms. Gunpowder, in particular, came mostly from Europe throughout the colonial era. Difficult to make, spent in hunting, essential in warfare, gunpowder kept the need for European trading partners and allies in play. Slaves seeking to escape therefore looked more to Spain in Florida, and later to Redcoats under King George III, than to Indians in the nearby Piedmont. For the same reason, independent Indian peoples forged alliances with one another and with European powers, not with the unarmed and enslaved people of the Atlantic seaboard.

Europeans divided against one another more consciously than they divided free Indians from black slaves. When British colonists faced off against Spanish Florida, French Louisiana, or—during the American Revolution—one another, Native Americans and African Americans might find themselves as comrades in arms, but they did so in alliance with some Europeans against others. The pre-revolutionary East, no world of racial wedge imperialism, no world of solidarities among the victims of colonialism, at times opened a quite different if dangerous prospect to discrete groups of free Indians and enslaved blacks: find the European divisions and gain power.

A Conspiracy of Independent Indian Peoples with Colonial Slaves?

South Carolina's governor James Glen took rumors so seriously as threats to the tranquility of his province that he waged war against them. Well before the panic of 1751, in early 1748 he described the colonial populace as "annually alarmed with accounts of intended Invasions, and even in time of profound Peace" rumors spread "that the Spaniards had prepared Embarkation for that purpose at St. Augustine and Havana, or that the French were Marching by land from Louisiana with more Men than ever were in that Country." To these rumors of imperial invasion he added rumors of slave insurrection or pan-Indian war: "the Negroes were to Rise and cut their Masters' Throats"; or "the Indians were confederating to destroy us." Glen believed that "Artful and designing Men" regularly "hatched" such flying reports to advance

their interests, and he steadily endeavored to "trace these stories to the Fountain Head."[5] Glen joined most of his European contemporaries in seeing in rumor the cunning of conspirators, a far cry from our more contemporary view of rumor as a social phenomenon. The commonplace eighteenth-century British idea that masterminds would manipulate the simple public mirrored the colonists' understanding of African or Indian violence: it threatened the most danger when masterful enemy Europeans, armed to the teeth, worked its levers.

Glen's South Carolina—closer to Spanish St. Augustine than it was to Virginia, intruding into the relatively densely settled Indian world of the North American Southeast—grew wealthy over the course of the early eighteenth century by exploiting its growing black majority. Given its proximity and wealth, the colony could well have feared deeply a triple threat: Spanish, African, and Indian. By the time Glen wrote, recent history recommended militant vigilance. During the devastating Yamasee War (1715–1716), Yamasees had sought refuge among the Spanish in the environs of St. Augustine in La Florida; organized parties of slave rebels had attempted to follow them as early as 1720. The same had been tried by slaves in the Stono Rebellion of 1739. Throughout the period before 1763, Spanish Florida provided to those enslaved Africans who succeeded in escaping southward an alternative to Carolinian or Georgian slavery. Considering the experience of colonial blacks, historian Jane Landers accurately terms Spanish Florida a "sanctuary."[6] Governor Glen might then have forgiven his people for imagining Spanish incursions, Indian dangers, and African uprisings; after all, they happened. Well might colonists see a perilous, Spanish, Indian, and African web.

But when colonists, Glen included, imagined such a web, its spectral cords were loose and asymmetrical. The Spanish, Indian, and African dangers loomed as separate and unequal; they would not work in concert. Glen wrote on the heels of a panic that shook his colony in 1746. Colonists that year had urgently shared fantasies about invading French armies and well-armed Indian assailants, but had spoken rarely of slaves during that crisis. When they rumored conspiracies, they did not pass along stories about free Indian people conspiring with enslaved people yearning to shake the colonial yoke. Instead, they had spoken of French conspirators, unruly Indians, and alarmed settlers. The 1746 panic shook Glen enough that he had raised patrols, outfitted Indian allies, and called his assembly into special session.[7] During the more serious panic in 1751, when colonists did hear talk of enslaved black proposals for collusion with Cherokees, the talk came not from

panicky colonists, but from Cherokees—who said they had spurned it—and it generated little discussion.

In 1759, as South Carolina plunged headlong toward a calamitous, needless, and real war with the Cherokees, colonists passed about some news that might squint toward Indian-slave conspiracy. A prophetic "free Mulatto" visionary named Philip John (or Johns, his name has several slight variations) had gained renown among Charleston's slaves and purportedly those in the surrounding lowcountry and Piedmont. The rumor spread that Johns "had seen a vision in which it was revealed to him that in the month of September the white people would be" wiped "from the face of the earth." Come the harvest, according to the story, slaves would alert the Indians, "and they would come and assist in killing all the Buckraas," a black coinage for whites, especially poor ones.[8] Here appears seemingly clear evidence for a deep colonial fear of black-Indian counter-power, a war for justice launched by race rebels.

But even in 1759—in the context of impending war with the Cherokees, as Lyttelton sent arms, ammunition, cattle, and hundreds of troops into the Cherokee Nation to garrison British posts, as he reported the killing and scalping of dozens of Carolinians—the governor did not link the Johns affair to the Indian threat. Instead, Lyttelton charged a white Christian minister possessed of an "overheated imagination" with having inspired Johns. The white rector of a Charleston parish had "asserted that the World wou'd very soon be at an end"; his millennial talk triggered Johns's visions. Lyttelton may have been dismissive, but he took the episode seriously, and violently. He saw it as a dangerous if immature "cabal" among Carolinians of African descent. Because Johns allegedly continued his efforts that summer even after a whipping, Lyttelton ordered him arrested along with another "free Mulatto his accomplice." That man escaped; Johns faced a brief trial, and Lyttelton had him executed. Lyttelton's description of the events survives in a letter to the Board of Trade. In that very letter, he also discusses the Cherokee affair. But he never ties Johns, not at all, to Indians. What is more, by October, as the assembly passed resolutions supporting military action against the Cherokees, it agreed to enlist black men (at low pay) in the colonial effort.[9]

As the Cherokee War erupted that year, the former governor James Glen, then in Philadelphia, jotted down his concerns. He did not fear, as the Johns story might imply, that lowcountry slaves would summon Indians. He feared the reverse: that the slaves "would undoubtedly be invited by the Indians to

join them and will be incited to it by the hopes of Liberty."[10] Here, indeed, we have a rare note on the fear that has been much expected by historians but that few inscribed on the voluminous pages written by colonists as that war approached. But Glen was speculating about a possibility, not rumoring about an uncertain event.

The following spring, in the heat of the Cherokee War, British Lieutenant Colonel James Grant, preparing with Colonel Archibald Montgomery for a British invasion of the Cherokee Nation, observed that "The planters in the country are alarmed on Account of their Negroes." Unfortunately, Grant did not record what alarmed them. Did they fear insurrection, or did they fear a loss of property in Indian attacks? Either would have been cause for planter alarm.[11] Of these three instances from 1759—the Johns affair, Glen's speculations, and Grant's report—only the Johns affair involves something like a rumor of black plan to ally with free Indians. The free colonists reporting that rumor did not give it credence: they put the rumor among slaves, they did not rumor it themselves. They did not rumor, even as hostilities with neighboring Indians approached, that Indians had joined the discussion. Not one of these instances points to a British Carolinian rumor that slaves and Indians actively conspired to attack the colonial power.

In a colony facing imperial enemies France and Spain, fighting a powerful Indian neighbor, brutally exploiting its slaves, rumors about slave conspiracies with Indians on the frontiers might well have abounded. In South Carolina, above all places, where the slaves formed the majority, where slaves included persons of Native American descent, where the Cherokee Nation included among its leaders a man, known to the colonists as Caesar, who had once been a Carolinian slave, the rumors of slaves' plotting with independent Indian Nations might have flourished. They did not. Instead, men like Caesar, far from seeking solidarity with slaves, became an important negotiator with South Carolina, a trafficker in slaves in his own right, and a ranger patrolling for runaways. In reward for his services the colony removed his status as a fugitive by paying off the slaveholder who had once claimed him as property.[12]

A rumor did circulate in western Virginia during Pontiac's War that enemy "Indians are saving and Carressing all the Negroes they take," at least according to the surgeon William Fleming, who feared that any resulting slave rebellion would produce "the most serious Consequences." Fleming, writing from Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley, responded to attacks almost 100 miles away in Hampshire County, now West Virginia, where slavery was

relatively thin. This rumor did not take off—the governor did not take it seriously enough to take any special action, and it is not reported elsewhere.[13]

French Louisiana may have had a different pattern in the 1720s. "Divide and rule" appears to surface here. Daniel H. Usner Jr. has identified several instances of Africans advocating Natchez Indian resistance to the French, or, conversely, Natchez Indians promising freedom to a few African allies who had been slaves of the French. In November 1729, for example, Natchez Indians recruited African and Indian slaves before launching joint attacks on French settlements, killing and capturing hundreds. But even this event, in which Choctaw Indians and black slaves armed by the French joined the colonizers in crushing the Natchez, demonstrated the failure of free Indian collaboration with slaves in an anticolonial undertaking. No doubt French officers worried that too heavy a French reliance on armed black slaves might incline the empowered blacks "to revolt after the example of those who joined the Natchez." And officers even mooted the entire destruction of the small, neighboring Indian "nations which are of no use to us, and which might on the contrary cause our negroes to revolt." But when the French turned three of the captured rebellious slaves over to the Choctaws for execution by fire, a priest observed that the act generated in the colony's black slaves "a new horror of the Savages, which will have a beneficial effect in securing the safety of the colony." Although the Natchez's effort ended disastrously, it had agitated the colony, which endured in its aftermath several flying tales of similar conspiracies. By 1730, Usner writes, "the prospects of joint African and Indian resistance provoked official efforts to guard bridges between colonial society and its Indian neighbors more vigilantly." But after the 1730s, Louisiana's pattern more closely resembles that of the British colonies. Colonial Louisianans continued to fear Indian-African conspiracies, but rumors concerned African and Indian slaves, not independent Indian peoples.[14]

The colonized landscape, as most Indians, colonists, and slaves experienced and imagined it, did not offer much room for ideological solidarity among slaves and free Indians. In general terms, black slaves had by the 1750s as much to fear from Indian wars as did their colonial oppressors. While some African slaves had gained freedom by escaping toward Spanish St. Augustine, others who traveled in that direction or toward the Gulf of Mexico did so as captives, torn from a British South Carolinian slave society by Spanish-allied Yamasee or French-allied Creek warriors, and resold into a slave society in such places as Spanish Florida and French Louisiana or Illinois.[15]

In the Yamasee War's wake, a social chasm increasingly yawned between free Indians and enslaved Africans. After most other peoples had stopped fighting, small parties of Yamasees continued to harass the settlements in a manner that extended no solidarity to the colony's slaves. Examples of episodes that initially suggest such solidarity quickly dissolve on further inspection. In early September 1723, for example, two canoes of Indian men—personal enemies of a settler named Booth—approached his plantation on Parris Island. As they beached their sleek dugouts, they met an enslaved woman, whom they called on to join them. If these free Indians promised an alliance, she refused. Indeed, it must have been she who alarmed the surrounding planters. They pursued and apprehended two of the boatmen. The report of the incident adds this gruesome detail: a member of the same Indian party had received "three hats full of money from the Spaniards for three Scalps brought to St. Augustine." The Spanish, the account continued, paid for the scalps of any Carolinian, slave or free.[16] Rumors of these patterns reflected the distrust of Indians among the South's slaves. Decades later, during a colonial panic that Indians would soon attack, the Carolinian planter and keen observer Elise Lucas Pinckney noted the "great confusion about the Indians"; she found that her own "Negroes were in such dread of them I could not make them mind their work."[17]

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the relationship between African descent and slavery, never absolute even in South Carolina, had become well enough established in the colonial world that the Chickasaws of the interior firmly grasped it. Raiding a French convoy on the Mississippi River in 1741, Chickasaws captured a French boy and two black people; they killed the boy, and they drove the others toward British colonial markets. A generation later, when a party of dissident Cherokees under Toogalousco attacked and plundered a party of ten colonial hunters at the juncture of the Ohio and the Mississippi in 1772, they killed seven whites and two blacks, according to the one escapee—a black man who fled to the nearby Chickasaw Nation, allied with the British. These Cherokee attackers harbored no inklings of solidarity with African Americans. They carried the scalps of their black and white victims to the Cherokee towns, where most Cherokees, still favoring peace with the colonies, rejected them.[18]

Colonists more easily imagined native assistance in managing slavery than they feared Indian-slave conspiracy. The "Deputies of the Cherokee Nation" who visited England and treated with the Crown in 1730 formally agreed to capture and return any fugitive slaves who might seek refuge out-

side the colonial settlements. Cherokees rekindled that commitment in 1751. By then, the colony and its new neighbor, Georgia, had made similar arrangements with the Creeks. South Carolina, facing war with Spain in the late 1730s, petitioned the Cherokee Nation for warriors to supplement its own slave patrols, understanding that the Indians would "be an Awe to the Negroes." Colonists and independent Indian peoples colluded in slavery far more than free Indians joined enslaved Africans in solidarity and resistance. In the immediate aftermath of the smashed Stono Rebellion (1739), the most serious slave uprising seen by the colony before the American Revolution, the colony renewed its rewards to Chickasaws and Catawbas who might return fugitive slaves. When slaves in the Piedmont organized an effort to escape into the forest in 1765, they found the woods filled with Catawbas, who tracked them down, captured them, and returned them to the colony.[19]

Some black fugitives did find refuge in Indian Country. Some lived freely in Creek and Cherokee Countries on the eve of the Revolution. But such examples, like those of free blacks in South Carolina, do not obscure the stronger patterns, which show little mutual interest between slaves and free Indians in the pre-revolutionary American East. Escaped slave Simon Felix Argular certainly had no reason to trust the Creeks who had killed his father, captured the 7-year-old boy, sold him into Carolinian slavery, and then recaptured him after his escape to Spanish forces 20 years later. British colonists relied on such intricate patterns of mistrust, but they hardly controlled them. When the Cherokee War came in 1759, Carolinians may have harbored some anxieties about Indian-slave collusion, but they more deeply worried that too violent a British victory would harm the colony by driving the Cherokees across the Mississippi and into the interest of the French, creating vast opportunities for slaves to escape, not into the Cherokee villages where they would face recapture, but into an abandoned no-man's land, perfect for maroons: a "place of Rendezvous and settlement for all the Runaway Negroes from this and the Neighboring Provinces."[20] If the Cherokees' mountain homeland became a true wilderness, it would gravely imperil Carolinian slavery. The colony depended on powerful Indian neighbors to maintain and manage slavery. Before the Revolution, Indians checked more than encouraged black hopes for liberty.

The eve of the Revolution saw a brief blossoming of maroon hideaways in the Georgia and Carolina region. Applying the phrase "maroon communities" very loosely to include small, unsustainable, fugitive bands of determined escapees from slavery, historians identify them throughout the colonial

period on the edges of colonial society.[21] Far from resembling Brazil's, Jamaica's, or Surinam's seemingly robust, intergenerational, and independent communities, these southeastern camps of escapees generally found themselves crushed within months or years, often by Indian power. Rarely, they might last a decade. An extant scholarship identifies such defiant black refuges dotting the wetlands and interior hill country throughout the colonial era. But Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Catawbas generally did not tolerate them, had the power to eradicate them, and found it in their interests to do so.[22] These settlements, as Glen intimated, existed in inverse proportion to Indian power; they depended more on Indian weakness than strength. The West simply did not signify freedom.[23] "Go west" meant recapture.

Yet in the late 1760s and early 1770s colonists saw a spike in the maroon phenomenon, or something approaching it. Florida no longer provided a sanctuary since Great Britain had claimed it from Spain at the treaty tables in 1763. East and West Florida had begun to emerge as British slave societies. Blacks seeking freedom had nowhere to go but into fairly local wetlands unsuited to mounted pursuit. They did not get much Indian support. Colonists and their Indian allies continued to suppress these bands and camps.

In 1766, for example, the South Carolina assembly approved funds to pay Catawbas for the recapture of more than one hundred enslaved people who had fled to the lowcountry swamps during an insurrectionary scare in the province. Even though a large number of African Americans had escaped, slave trader Henry Laurens belittled his fellow colonists' fears as having "Little or no cause." In the same month, when eleven blacks actually freed themselves by joining with Creek Indians, Georgia's authorities did not moot a vast Indian-slave conspiracy. They sought to fix the business with a simple expedient: they offered a keg of rum to each Indian who delivered one of the fugitives to a local trader.[24] In late 1771 the Georgia council engaged Indian patrols and a company of militia to find the "Camps of the Negroes" who, in "a great number," had "Committed many Robberies and insults between this town and Ebenezer." Importantly, Ebenezer stood only some 5 miles away from Savannah; it was hardly on the Creek frontier. Another, or perhaps it was the same, "number of fugitive slaves" by mid-1772 had "assembled themselves on or near the borders of the River Savannah and are frequently committing Depredations on the Inhabitants of that Neighbourhood." To be more precise, they had raided at Black Creek and at a place called Augustin's Creek. These two locations, within 30 miles of Savannah itself, do not suggest any effort to ally with independent Indians;

indeed, these fugitives steered clear of the Creek frontiers.[25] In a colonial world in which alliance meant survival, escaped slaves had little of value, beyond their own strength and knowledge, with which to negotiate, and any Native Americans harboring them had a great deal to lose.

Although the colonies discouraged it, British traders often brought enslaved people to Indian Country. They made friendships and formed intimate alliances of all kinds with Cherokee individuals and families, but when violent lines were drawn in this period, the slaves tended to stand with the colonies, where they likely had close family members. During the panic of 1751, black men joined their white enslavers as they secretly fled Cherokee Country for the lowcountry. Slaves did not remain in the highlands with expectations of freedom. During the Cherokee War, one Abraham (known also as "Black Abraham"), slave to a trader among the Cherokees, gained the admiration of the colony. Known in Charleston as a "resolute Negro," he several times brought news from the most distant parts of Cherokee Country to Charleston. This would have been difficult, to say the least, without some Indian complicity; perhaps Abraham's status gave him a measure—it could not have been absolute—of protection as he carried messages from British Fort Loudoun, in what is now Tennessee, to Charleston. In any case, he informed the colony of the fort's fate: its garrison killed or enslaved. Abraham secured his freedom, not by joining the Cherokees, but by a rare expression of colonial gratitude for a slave's service.[26]

He was not alone. The British army employed South Carolina's slaves in the war. Black "Pioneeers" served under James Grant, "making pens for Cattle," and "throwing up Entrenchments" as Grant's forces moved "through the mountains" to scorch and burn Cherokee Country in 1761. This was short of what slaves did for the colony during the Yamasee War, when "two hundred stout Negro Men" fought against the Yamasees and Creeks, and when a white and black force marched under arms into Cherokee Country on a successful mission to induce the Cherokees to join South Carolina.[27] South Carolina did not in the 1760s arm its enslaved black forces, but it did deploy them militarily.

A sad episode to the north suggests a more general lack of identification between independent Indian people and enslaved Africans. It comes from the aftermath of Dunmore's War (1774). Virginia commissioners demanded the return of all captives, including black slaves, taken by Shawnees during the war and in the decades preceding it. Shawnees did not yield easily, flatly refusing to surrender any children they considered their own. They expressly

meant to keep two children born of a woman, called horribly in the record "the Negro Wench," who had escaped western Virginia slavery into Shawnee Country. As Shawnee diplomats explained, the black woman may have fled slavery, but her two infants had been "Bagat by our People." The Shawnees treasured the children as Shawnees; notably, the Shawnees did not racialize these youths. They knew the children would become slaves in Virginia, and they absolutely refused to deliver them. They did, however, surrender their desperate mother.[28]

Shawnees distinguished this black woman from her children, who had a Shawnee father. Perhaps she had not been formally adopted into a kin network, remaining a nonperson, a slave among Shawnees. Her experience hints at sexual victimization at Shawnee hands; her losses are hard to fathom. Native Americans of the Eastern Woodlands resisted the fate of slaves in the pre-revolutionary era, but while many among them, particularly among Shawnees, began to see that they shared across their many Nations a struggle against the millions of colonists to the east, they did not equate their struggles with those of the colonial slaves.

We have imagined that fears of Indian-slave collusion disturbed the settlers' sleep. If so, settlers' kept their dreams mostly to themselves. Slavery in North America between the 1670s and the American Revolution featured independent Indians as slavers, slave traders, slave catchers, slave patrollers, and slave owners. By the second third of the eighteenth century, the colonies saw fewer Indian slaves in both absolute terms and in proportion to black slaves. The southeastern Indian slave trade had virtually closed down by 1720. Colonial rumors about Indian attacks and slave uprisings do not form patterns suggesting colonial fears of solidarity among people of color, among anticolonial resisters, or among any such political unions that we, in a nominally postcolonial age, might expect. Instead, colonial rumors about Indian attacks and slave uprisings shout loudly about something far more important to the colonists: imperial wars. If colonists imagined little solidarity among those whose descendants might today identify as people of color, nor did so-called whites live in a world of white supremacist brotherly love.

A Great Fear: European Alliances with Indians and Slaves

It is not that the woodlands heard no European American voices rumoring in one breath African slave revolt and Native American war. But when such

rumors lofted, they included the colonists' European enemies. Such rumors described free Indians conspiring not with African-descended slaves but with European enemies: Spain, France, and after 1775 the mother country herself. Imperial foes, rumor often had it, held and worked the strings that moved slave rebellion and Indian war. The U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776) follows the pattern. In the same sentence, in the final of the seventeen charges lodged against King George III, it reads: "He has excited domestic insurrections . . . , and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages." The Declaration does not charge, however, that Indians and slaves collaborated: it targets the actions of the Crown.

The rumors pointed to the king and his ministers after 1775, and to the wily Catholics of France or Spain in earlier times. The pattern reached back to the two great wars that opened the final quarter of the seventeenth century: King Philip's War in New England (1675–1676) and the Indian war associated with Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia (1676). Neither conflict had any significant French inspiration, but the English colonists rumored nonetheless of French provocateurs. Even before King Philip's War, Metacom, or King Philip, had been grilled by colonists suspecting him of connections with the French.[29] During the wars, concurrent rumors circulated that France had stimulated Indian hostilities in both Virginia and New England. The British Board of Trade received a grossly exaggerated statement of Indian successes against the Virginians; it said that colonists regularly and "confidently reported" that the Indians received "all manner of artillery from France." In November 1676 the board heard from New York that, in New England, "the French from Canada are assisting the Indians with Ammunition," that Frenchmen in Indian clothing had been captured, that "a Jesuit is one of their ringleaders, and that they have stirred up the Indians both there and at Virginia also." From the 1670s on, to the south in the new colony of Carolina, colonial fingers often pointed to Spain to explain conflicts with Indians. Carolinians cynically rumored that Spain had conspired with the Kussos, a people conveniently targeted for enslavement by the Carolinians as early as 1671. The same form of rumor rationalized a Carolinian war against the Westo Indians in 1680.[30]

During the Yamasee War, facing genuine annihilation and reeling from seemingly coordinated Indian assaults, Carolinians feared that most of the native peoples who lived between them and Spanish La Florida had become enemies. The colonists passed around stories, said to be from New England, that even Canadian Indians had plotted to "assist Our Indian Enemies."

The Indian war, they feared, would soon "be General" in North America.[31] Rumors circulated that the Spanish in St. Augustine had hatched the plot leading to the war. The deputy governor of South Carolina described "complaints and information given unto me" to that effect: "the Spanish Government at St. Augustine did Intise, Stir up and Incourage the Yamasees and other Nations of Indians to make continual Depredations." Major James Cochrane, a slaveholder, had traveled to St. Augustine during the early part of the war, and he came back with stories of Spanish involvement. Cochrane asserted that the "Yamasees had a constant supply of ammunition from the Spanish government." Port Royal shipwright George Duckett claimed to have met with Yamasees, who "assured him that the Spaniards Supplied them with as much Gunpowder and Ball as they Demanded and that the Spaniards Bought all such Goods of them the Said Indians which they plundered or Robbed from his Majesties Subjects." Among the stolen Carolinian assets, Duckett said, were slaves, some of whom he knew from Port Royal; Cochrane claimed to have identified his own slaves in the Spanish citadel, slaves who begged, he claimed, to rejoin him in South Carolina. Carolinians worried not only about enemy Europeans, but also about neighboring British colonists. They protested to the Board of Trade in Whitehall that self-interested traders from Virginia, remaining at peace with the Indians, sold arms and ammunition to South Carolina's enemies.[32] The fears that the imperial French, the imperial Spanish, and the avaricious neighboring English colluded with enemy Indians constituted a far more widespread worry than the rare rumor of conspiracies between slaves and free Indians.

Enmity with Spain fed fabulous rumors. In the late winter of 1718 a South Carolina assembly committee discussed the report that a "white Man" had delivered to Charleston from La Vera Cruz (now Mexico). The unidentified man disclosed that "several of our enemy Indians" had landed at that port, and from there Spanish agents brought them to Mexico City, "in order to show them their Grandeur, that they may despise us." He said the Indian ambassadors had also visited La Havana, and in all places the Spanish treated them "at a very high rate." Meanwhile, worrying about the role of the French along the Gulf, the committee considered the silence of their remaining Indian allies, the Cherokees and the Catawbas. Fears circulated "that the whole Body of Indians all round us are plotted against us encouraged by the French and Spaniards, which," they concluded in the ambiguous language of rumor, "we have good reason to believe."[33] Instead, by the end of the year,

most Yamasees had fled to the environs of St. Augustine, and other regional Indians had stopped fighting.

Like Yamasees, black Carolinian rebels looked to La Florida. On May 20, 1720, Andrew, a slave, alerted authorities of a plot by a dozen or so slaves to attack plantations, gain force, and turn on Charleston. The betrayed conspirators, or rumored conspirators, fled, perhaps seeking Indian support—at least enough to guide them to St. Augustine. They found nothing of the sort. Mixed patrols of Britons, Africans, and Indians pursued and captured some of them. The patrols executed several. One man, Primus, died horribly, hanged in chains above Charleston's streets.[34] The event, evidence that some Africans hoped for collaboration with Indians, did little to generate colonial fears of Indian-slave conspiracies; if anything, it rendered them less plausible.

To be sure, slave rebellion, like Indian war, remained a prospect deeply feared by whites. The year 1720 saw considerable anxiety and political instability in the colony. South Carolinians had recently overthrown their proprietary government, seeking instead a governor appointed by the king. When colonial insurgents, careful to petition the home government, listed all chief dangers to the colony, they put prominently the "danger of being massacred by their own Slaves, who are too numerous in proportion to the White Men." They also listed Indian invasion and European attack. But they did not discuss slave conspiracies with free Indians. When they rumored slaves to conspire with outsiders, those outsiders were Europeans.[35] A 1721 description of South Carolina reckoned that for every three whites, there were then in the colony four blacks. The document explained the relative dearth of white Carolinians as the result of European intrigue with Yamasees and other Indians: "the frequent Massacres committed of late years by the Neighbouring Indians at the Instigation of the French and Spaniards, has diminished the white Men." The rapidly rising importation of slaves, the author admitted, also played a role. Amid all the dangers, the colony had but barely averted a "New Revolution" by its black majority.[36] Rumored French and Spanish intrigue with Indians sat dangerously alongside the explosive possibility of insurrection. Colonists charged Spain with abetting slave rebellions. But they did not expect free Indians and slaves to unite in common cause.

Spanish Florida viewed the new British settlement of Georgia in 1736 as an act of war. Alarmed as well at the growing prosperity of South Carolina, Spain took aim at its most valuable asset. Since the late 1680s, Spanish governors

had offered some protection to Carolinian runaways, and royal edicts of 1693 and 1733 had promised freedom (after four years in Crown service) to slaves who had fled South Carolina. By 1738, some such former slaves of the British lived close to the Spanish in an odd kind of freedom. Conscripted into military units intended to augment St. Augustine's defense; they garrisoned the semi-autonomous buffer town of Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose (Mose). But others the Spanish enslaved. And still others spent time in Spanish slavery before gaining their freedom after successful appeals under the edicts. South Carolina regularly protested Spain's proceedings, but with little success.[37]

The garrison town at Mose partakes mildly, but not wholly, of the character of an independent maroon colony, an example of the defiant Caribbean phenomenon of marronage. But neither the British nor the Spanish saw it in those terms. "Maroons" implies an independent community; Britons and Spaniards regarded the villagers as dependents of Spain. Although the villagers lived in the manner of maroons, producing their own food, for example, Spain claimed and armed them. Their semi-autonomy did not last long: destroyed by the British within two years of its settlement, Mose would rise again in 1752, only to come under British authority with the rest of Florida in a little more than a decade, at which point, many of its inhabitants evacuated along with the other Spanish subjects—apparently never to return. During its two brief lives, Mose, or rather the Spanish actions that supported it, provided much grist for the rumor mills, black and white, in South Carolina and Georgia.[38] These rumors spoke of Spanish intrigue.

In 1737, for example, *The Drake*, a royal naval vessel, sailed from Jamaica into Charleston harbor with false news of Spanish plans to incite Georgia's slaves to rebel. South Carolina's Lieutenant Governor Thomas Broughton passed the rumor on to British authorities across the Atlantic. Not only did Spanish officers meddle with slaves, Broughton wrote, they wooed the Creek Indians. A trader added that Spain had invited Creek leaders "to St. Augustine with a view, I presume, to draw them to the Spanish Interest." Rumor further placed five hundred imperial reinforcements in the Spanish citadel at that place. British colonial slaveholders grew understandably wary. South Carolina's "Negroes are very numerous," wrote the governor, and "more dreadful to our Safety than any Spanish Invasion." As the threat rose, South Carolina renewed its ties with the Cherokees and Catawbas, and as tensions with Spain increased further in 1739, the assembly considered placing a bounty on the scalps of runaway slaves, men, women, or children, caught

beyond the Savannah River. The proposal contained the macabre detail that the ears should remain attached to the scalps, presumably to prevent the entrepreneurial subdivision of scalps for multiple rewards. The proposal failed.[39]

News of the actual declaration of war with Spain came in September, and within forty-eight hours the colony experienced its largest slave revolt, the Stono Rebellion. According to the highly involved Colonel William Bull, "a great Number of Negroes arose in Rebellion, broke open a store where they got Arms, killed twenty one white Persons, and were Marching the Next Morning in a Daring manner out of the Province," apparently toward the recently established Mose and St. Augustine. Not without reason, Bull pinned the rebellion on the Spanish "Proclamation," but he also reported the entirely groundless rumor that "great Preparations" for the uprising had been "made some time ago at the Havana." By October 5, 1739, Bull could report that the rebellion had been put down, with forty of the rebels either killed in battle or executed. He credited South Carolina's Indian allies, especially Chickasaws and Catawbas, with inhibiting slave desertions. But he worried that separate French intrigues would undermine his colony's Cherokee alliance and weaken the British-allied Chickasaws' strength.

Bull passed on news that a vast French and Indian army had marched from Montreal through the Great Lakes and Ohio Country against the Chickasaws, "a small but brave people," stout allies of his colony and great enemies of French New Orleans. This was, in fact, the ill-fated Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville expedition of 1739–1740, which convened detachments from Montreal, Michilimackinac (Michigan), New Orleans, and Illinois Country along with many Indian allies, in a failed effort to conquer the Chickasaws. Bull imagined that the French planned to place a fort in Cherokee Country, and he rumored elaborately about a peculiar episode involving a German mystic, Christian Priber, who indeed lived among the Cherokees. Bull rumored that Priber had gained Cherokee protection and stirred up "ill principles." In particular, Priber had reportedly "gone with ten of the Cherokees to the French in Order to make a peace with them," a peace that Bull feared would weaken Carolina's influence. In March 1740, as Bienville's Chickasaw expedition actually faced collapse, Bull worried that its success would compel the Cherokees "to forsake the British Interest and join the French."[40] Bull, in short, wrote of Spain's role in fomenting a genuine slave rebellion while simultaneously rumoring that French officials (and a German mystic) intrigued with Indians against British allies. But remarkably—amid

serious uncertainties about the colony's Indian neighbors—the Stono Rebellion produced no recorded fears of free Indian-slave collusion. South Carolinians saw little danger in slaves conspiring with Indians, even while they saw great dangers in the intrigues of each with a major European power.

The pattern surfaced well beyond South Carolina. Rumors of slave conspiracies with Europeans raced through Prince George's County, Maryland, during the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War (1739–1748). Such rumors of Catholic-slave conspiracies would shake Maryland even more during the Seven Years' War (1754–1763). Again, the rumors did not suggest that slaves cooperated with the enemy Indians, independent of a European power. Farther to the north, the so-called New York slave conspiracy of 1741 did not raise the region's Indians in anyone's mind. Instead, the rumors had Catholics, especially Catholic slaves from the Spanish Caribbean, stoking the fires of rebellion. Reports described one of the accused, "Lowe's Wan" (Juan), as "yellow" and as "Indian." Not a native to the Hudson Valley, he had recently disembarked as a prize slave, a "Spanish" slave. He likely had origins somewhere from La Florida to the islands. Another Indian, a recently freed slave named John, also surfaces in the record of the New York episode. But during the politicized panic that accompanied the trials and executions of the accused, no one mentioned a conspiracy among the city's slaves and free communities of northeastern Indians: Lenapes, Munsees, Mahicans, Mohawks, or River Indians. Catholic connections to slave discontent remained paramount in the minds of the prosecutors.[41]

Colonists' fears of slave conspiracies, rationally held, never subsided, but fears of European conspiracies with slaves waned after mid-century, until the American Revolution rekindled them. In the 1750s France loomed more than Spain as a threat to the colonies, and the British colonists rumored more about French intrigues with Indians than they did about anyone's intrigues with slaves. Spain seemed threatening as late as 1748, when Henry Laurens could write, almost with a yawn, that the spring brought with it "the Annual menaces of an Indian War and some Little grumbling of a Spanish Invasion, which I hope will vanish according to Custom," but on the subject of French alliances he saw "reason to fear" Indian attacks, for there had been "several Insults offer'd to our Traders, by the Indians in Amity with us," Indians who had, moreover, allowed "French Indians to come down and take" two Carolinians captive.[42]

Rumors circulate in a medium of plausibility, a medium that reveals much about beliefs and expectations. Colonists imagined with ease and frequency

that Spain or France might tamper with Indians and slaves. They did not much fear alliances, absent European intervention, between independent Indian peoples and the enslaved within the colonies, at least not before the American Revolution. That we might expect such alliances says more about our world than it does about theirs. For much of the eighteenth century British North American colonists most feared Indians and slaves who had leagued with a European enemy. As colonists divided against one another during the American Revolution, the prospects for Indian-imperial alliances soared, bearing upon their windy currents the most frightening and violent rumors, a set of flying reports that long scarred early American culture.

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8. Scalps: Charged Revolutionary Rumor

The rumor first rose along the road between Lexington and Concord. The guns that had fired at Concord's north bridge now fired to the east, and the battle still grew. Having accomplished much of their objective, several companies of British light infantry hustled in a disciplined retreat toward Boston; panic had not yet set in. They met, along the way, the dying man. From his badly mangled head the rumor multiplied and took flight: the suddenly savage country people scalped the king's soldiers; they scalped the wounded along with the dead; they had already brutally tortured a fallen grenadier.[1] Airborne, spiraling, noisy, and shape-shifting, the flock of rumor commanded the attention of British and insurgent leaders.

British officers quickly printed a version for distribution. They testified before imperial officials. One of the first to speak, Lieutenant William Sutherland, said that while fighting at Concord, he had taken a bullet, "a little above my right breast which turned me half around." He had left two comrades "dead on the Spot, one of which I am told they afterwards Scalped."[2] *I am told*: it is the language of rumor. Lord Percy, who did not fight at Concord but who had reinforced the retreating Regulars as they regrouped at Lexington, picked up the tale. He deplored the "cruelty and barbarity of the rebels, who scalped & cut off the ears of some of the wounded men who fell into their hands."[3] Years later, as the war drew to an end, a British ensign recalled that the story had excited the 10th regiment. If we can trust his memory, the news had grown by the time it spread to his company: four troops had been "Killd who was afterwards scalp'd their Eyes goug'd their Noses and Ears cut of, such barbarity exercis'd upon the Corps could scarcely be paralleld by the most uncivilized Savages."[4]

General Thomas Gage, the imperial governor of Massachusetts, rushed into print his own version of the disastrous events at Lexington and Concord, including the story that several British companies returning from the north

bridge had "observed three Soldiers on the Ground one of them scalped, his Head much mangled, and his Ears cut off, tho' not quite dead; a Sight which struck the Soldiers with Horror." Here Gage scaled back the numbers scalped from "some" or "four" to only "one," but he left the act of scalping—alive—intact.[5] In our own time, historian David Hackett Fischer says of the scalping and its news that "It instantly changed the tone of the engagement . . . The thin veneer of 18th century civility was shattered by this one atrocity at the North Bridge."[6] Rumor smashed civility, became legend, and lives.

Actual eyewitnesses said nothing of scalping, at least not exactly. Five British soldiers later testified under oath that they "saw a Man belonging to the Light Company of the 4th Regiment with the Skin over His Eyes Cut and also the Top part of His Ears cut off."[7] This describes mangling of some kind, but it does not fairly describe a scalping. Still, the story has drawn the attention of historians loath to ignore the charge that simple New England farmers in this most heroic moment of their history had scalped a Regular at famed Concord. Long ago, after carefully examining the evidence, historian Allen French reached a reasonable judgment: he held the minutemen not guilty, at least not beyond doubt.[8]

That said, someone murderously mangled the soldier, who, in the casual disregard of eighteenth-century armies for common men, remains nameless. Local Concord legend concurs with the British accusation that the dying man suffered a vicious and inhumane torment. But the British charge had it, precisely, as a *scalping*, and the idea that good country people of John Adams's Massachusetts had taken up such ritual American Indian forms of violence ignited a controversy that has forever obscured the victim's actual fate.[9] The English press charged the Americans with a "savageness unknown to Europeans," citing as evidence the scalping and, further, the eye gouging at Lexington and Concord: "Two soldiers who lay wounded on the field, and had been scalped by the savage Provincials, were still breathing . . . Near these unfortunate men, . . . a soldier . . . appeared with his eyes torn out of their sockets, by the barbarous mode of GOAGING, a word and practice peculiar to the Americans."[10] The nature of American "humanity," wrote another, "is written in indelible characters with the blood of the soldiers scalped and googed [gouged] at Lexington."[11]

The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts could hardly ignore the claims and it issued an official rebuttal. Without explaining what actually happened to the soldier, the insurgent government printed eyewitness testimony that denied the scalping and ear cropping. What is more, the provincials ac-

cused Gage of printing the story "in order to dishonour the Massachusetts people, and to make them appear to be savage and barbarous."[12] The dishonor fell, then, on a lying Gage. The insurgent press quickly joined in, attacking His Majesty's officers as deliberate purveyors of falsehoods.[13]

The scalping at Concord is groundless rumor become legend. True or false, the story itself remains a fact tied up with America. Suppose, counterfactually, that the Regulars had marched against a movement in, say, the village of Wolverly, England; no one would have spoken of scalping. But the actual guns were fired not in imaginary Old England but in actual New England, so imaginary hair was torn in indigenous style from a British head (or heads). That the poorly grounded story rang true to the imperiled imperial Regulars on that April day makes eighteenth-century American sense. Taken by devastating surprise at the strength of the Massachusetts insurgency, the smart soldiers and their officers began talking of Indians, of scalps, and of savagery. They spoke in echoes of the Monongahela and Fort William Henry.

The rumor that colonial insurgents had taken to scalping their foes flew not only across the Atlantic to England, but across the Allegheny Mountains to Indian Country. As British soldiers had mooted Patriot scalping, Shawnees spread similar news: that insurgent Virginians had scalped Shawnees. Aware that strife among colonizers often ricocheted into the interior, Shawnees of the Ohio Valley pondered the news of Lexington and Concord and anxiously discussed stories of the violent "rupture between England and America."[14] Shawnee militants, after years of actively seeking intertribal support against colonial expansion, had recently suffered a serious setback in Dunmore's War. Now, but a year later, Virginia warred with itself, with Dunmore on the defensive. This might have caused Shawnee celebration; instead, it spread alarm. For the humiliating treaty of Fort Charlotte that had ended Dunmore's War had also made hostages of several Shawnee leaders, taken to Virginia. Their lives, held in the darkening heart of the unstable colony, deeply concerned their friends and families in the Ohio Country.

The Shawnee unease surfaced in the record of James Wood, a representative of Virginia's Provincial Congress, who traveled to the Scioto Valley (in what is now Ohio) in an effort to prevent Virginia's Revolutionary War from becoming an Indian war. Along the way, Wood confronted unfounded stories, reportedly spread by an escaped Shawnee hostage, Chenusaw. These rumors had it that the Virginians, after considering the several hostages' enslavement, had decided instead to kill them. The stories went on: two of

the Shawnee men, Cuttemwha and Newau, already lay dead. Chenusaw had not personally witnessed the killings, but he had heard gunshots as he broke for freedom. He had also heard that the Virginians had flaunted "many Indian scalps," including those belonging to relatives of the hostages. Wood, in Shawnee Country, called Chenusaw's story a lie. Colonial papers spread news of his efforts.[15]

The Revolutionary War had just begun, and already scalping formed a subject for widespread rumor, misinformation, and denial—a pattern that would continue through the making of the Treaty of Paris. Britons and Shawnees had, through these particular stories, each imagined American insurgents as barbarous and treacherous. If they also anticipated that scalping would scar the war to come, they had the company of their insurgent enemies. American Patriots, far more than the British, the Loyalists, or the Indians, would fall prey to, embellish, and deliberately manufacture rumors of scalping. The American stories would unsurprisingly hold, as a fundamental truth, the savagery of Indians. More remarkably, just as these early rumors targeted the American rebels, the American stories of scalping aimed more at Britons than at Indians.

An extensive literature treats the practice of scalping as committed by both Native Americans and European colonists, its role in polemical representations, and its peculiar manifestation in colonial scalp bounties.[16] This chapter deals less with real than with rumored scalping (some of which was real). Scalping, even fake scalping, even lies about scalping, even rumors of scalping, attained historical force. In the American Revolution, stories of scalping contributed far more energy to the conflict than did the allure of provincial scalp bounties. The mouth, in this case, mattered more than the money. The Revolutionary War enveloped most peoples of eastern North America, and it remains among the most lethal and brutal in the history of the United States. In such a climate, information became a battlefield, misinformation became a weapon of choice, and rumor thrived. Stories of scalping, some false, others true or plausible, have become legendary. Speaking of scalping, founding American citizens spoke meaningfully, making sense of their world, joining Indian barbarity to imperial cruelty.

That corrupt Britons would deploy Indians against their own countrymen in America made utter if shocking sense to American insurgents. Colonists had long rumored the foreign imperial manipulation of natives. The general outlines of the formulaic tale had held steady since the late seventeenth century: the ministers and agents of corrupt tyranny, supporting tyranny's

designs, stimulate Indians to murder and scalp innocent farmers and their families. Once serving Spain or France, by 1775 tyranny's toadies abetted the British Crown. The general charge, made in the Declaration of Independence, provided great grounds for false and falsified news. The Declaration itself fell under the shadow of a hoax.

The Unfounded Founding

Months before Congress declared independence in July 1776, insurgent settlers in Watauga (in what is now far eastern Tennessee) resorted to forgery. An illegal settlement according to British imperial policy, Watauga already irritated imperial Indian superintendent John Stuart. That spring, two of his subordinates, working among the Cherokees, had inadvertently provided the raw material for the Wataugan fraud. These two, Henry Stuart and Alexander Cameron, knew that they could not command the disunited Cherokees, especially as one Cherokee faction threatened violence against the Wataugan settlers who had come primarily from Virginia and the Carolinas. To uphold policy, to prevent bloodshed, and perhaps to distinguish friend from foe, the two British officials encouraged the Wataugan settlers to abandon the region. They sent Watauga a letter, dated May 7, 1776, promising to provide good lands in West Florida and safety from a "merciless, cruel, enraged enemy," who expected the settlers to get packing within twenty days.

That officers of the Crown intimated that they could prevent an Indian attack for twenty days would alone have sufficiently outraged the settlers, had they received that warning. But they heard a quite different, falsified message. As Henry Stuart learned all too quickly, enterprising Wataugans read the actual letter, forged a far more inflammatory version of it, and circulated their forgery among their neighbors and beyond. A copy reached a revolutionary committee in Fincastle County, Virginia, and further copies sped to the revolutionary conventions of Virginia and North Carolina. In the very months that the Second Continental Congress debated independence and mooted language condemning the Crown for Indian attacks, the Virginia convention discussed an "attested copy of a Letter from *Henry Stuart*, Deputy Superintendent of *Indian* Affairs, directed to the inhabitants of the frontiers, informing that five hundred Indian Warriors from each Nation were to fall on the said frontiers, while other forces were to make a diversion on the sea-coast." The accusation resonates in the Declaration of

Independence: the king "brought down . . . the merciless savage" upon "the inhabitants of our frontiers." This "attested copy," of course, was the Wataugan hoax. Where the original letter had offered a compensated if hasty deportation in the face of an impending Indian assault, the falsified letter threatened a joint British, Loyalist, Creek, Chickasaw, and Cherokee attack on rebel settlers. It added that the Indians would kill every member of a Patriot family, while Loyalists might escape, as in the biblical book of Exodus, by offering a sign of their support for the Crown.[17]

Taken seriously, the hoax found its way into colonial papers just as the Second Continental Congress made its most weighty decision. Three letters by Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry suggest its place. Richard Henry Lee introduced his famous measure for independence on June 10. On July 2 Congress declared independence. In between, on June 18, Gerry noted "an intercepted Letter sent to Congress by the Convention of Virginia, whereby it appears that the Design of the Enemy is to land some Regulars at Florida and join the Cherokees etc. wth which they intend to attack the western Frontiers of Virginia, and the other Southern Colonies." Gerry refers to the forgeries. Obscure to us now, they had an impact in 1776, and Patriots even late in the war continued to invoke them.[18] Stuart and Cameron disclaimed the false letter in a statement distributed on May 23, and they urgently reiterated their proposal that settlers abandon the Cherokee mountain valleys for farms in West Florida. Otherwise, the Indians would most certainly fall upon "the Inhabitants in general without any regard to their Political Principles."[19] But the Wataugan hoax remained highly plausible. It fed on a year's worth of rumor and news that the Crown and its agents plotted with Indians and slaves against defenders of liberty.[20] Once the Cherokee War began the following month, the British Indian Department could not reverse the damage. While Stuart and Cameron maintained that they had warned illegal squatters of impending danger, insurgents asserted that corrupt agents of British tyranny had inspired a Cherokee assault on honest frontier folk.

Deployed on the American frontiers from the arsenal of war and diplomacy, false news that characterized Indians mainly as His Majesty's savage minions closely joined scalping rumors. General John Burgoyne, invading New York from Canada in 1777, marching partly in the footsteps of Montcalm twenty years past, added strong credibility to the idea that ruling Britons conspired with Indians to kill and to scalp Americans. In a proclamation to the people on June 20, Burgoyne promised safety to those who supported

the Crown, but vowed "devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror" to those who opposed his forces. In a particularly unfortunate choice of words, he claimed to control his allied Indians, many from the Six Nations Iroquois League: "I have but to give stretch to the Indian Forces under my direction, and they amount to Thousands, to overtake the harden'd Enemies of Great Britain and America (I consider them the same), wherever they may lurk."[21] Without need to forge an augmented version, Patriot papers angrily reprinted the proclamation up and down the seaboard. Many soon circulated a parody, worthy of Benjamin Franklin but written by a "New Jersey Man," William Livingston, that state's revolutionary governor.[22]

I will let loose the dogs of Hell,
Ten thousand Indians, who shall yell,
And foam and tear, and grin and roar,
And drench their maukesins in gore;
To these I'll give full scope and play
From *Ticondroge* to *Florida*;
They'll scalp your heads, and kick your shins,
And rip your guts, and flay your skins,
And of your ears be *nimble croppers*,
And make your thumbs, tobacco-stoppers.[23]

Livingston's grim comedy played in an increasingly violent theater. In coastal New Jersey, where civil war raged, Livingston sought no laughs. Nor did merriment typify life in the corridors of violence that lay along the Mohawk River or between Lake Champlain and the Hudson. Credible reports of butchery and scalpings peppered American papers in August. From Saratoga, news came that sixty men, women, and children (slave and free) had been killed and scalped; from Fort Stanwix: two girls, killed and scalped while gathering raspberries. From Albany: the most notorious murder and scalping of the Revolution, that of Jane McCrea. Pro-independence writers quickly exploited the emptiness of Burgoyne's promises to protect Loyalists as several died at Indian hands, young McCrea among them.[24]

McCrea's actual murder and scalping became later enshrined in the creative arts. We have the famous 1804 painting by John Vanderlyn. Hilliard d'Auberteuil would in 1784 publish a novella about the incident; in 1782, a bloody year in the trans-Appalachian regions, he sent a draft to Franklin, hoping that he would find it "agreeable." Poems by Philip Freneau and Joel

Barlow; histories by Mercy Warren, William Cullen Bryan, and Washington Irving; and emerging popular writings by George Lippard would keep the murder, and especially the scalping, of the comely and innocent young McCrea alive among nineteenth-century readers.[25]

During the Revolution, by contrast, writers did less to fictionalize real events than they did to greatly exaggerate atrocities or to invent them out of whole cloth. The American insurgents also killed noncombatants, especially among Indians; they also scalped the enemy, especially Indians but sometimes Loyalist partisans in Indian company; they also gained Indian allies, who were especially important in the 1777 campaign. They did not simply imagine the very real terrors of frontier warfare, but they also participated in those terrors. It was necessary, then, to augment the atrocities of their enemy. One story had it that a regional Tory leader, Philip Skene, former governor of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, had "ornamented" his home at Skeneborough "with scalps." A more general rumor had British officers rewarding Indian warriors with fixed bounties for rebel scalps. A Boston paper printed a letter from Albany denouncing a rumored British bounty of 20£ for each scalp. An American, taken prisoner during the campaign, would later testify that British sergeants had told him that Barry St. Leger, one of Burgoyne's subordinates, offered a fixed sum for every American scalp. British soldiers during Burgoyne's campaign, according to the public allegations of Continental Army General Horatio Gates, paid $10 for each scalp, no matter what the victim's age or sex. Since the bounty threatened "Europeans, and the descendants of Europeans," Gates declared, it marked a shocking departure from previous provincial scalp bounties, which had targeted Indians alone. To pay the bounties "for each scalp so barbarously taken, is more than will be believed in Europe." Burgoyne vigorously denied the charge, and revolutionary papers began in mid-August to report that he had "discontinued" the rumored practice, not out of humanity, but because it had led to Loyalist deaths. In contrast to all this condemnation, the pro-independence press, even in long-established coastal cities, accepted the insurgent scalping of Indians. The practice provoked little comment, yet was widely reported. As Burgoyne's campaign got under way, for example, a New Haven paper noted with satisfaction that an American ranging party, while suffering casualties, had killed an Indian warrior "of some note," and then had taken his scalp.[26] One could not get too much farther from the western frontiers than the shores of Long Island Sound and still stand in the young United States.

Bounty, Brutality, and the War, 1777–1780

At a considerable distance from Burgoyne's invasion, in the trans-Allegheny reaches of Pennsylvania, Colonel Archibald Lochry of the Westmoreland County militia sent five scalps to the president of the state's Supreme Executive Council, Thomas Wharton Jr. The militia had torn the scalps from Indians, said to be enemies. Lochry urged that the state reward the scalpers "for the Encouragement of other Partys." Lochry's immediate suggestion went unheeded. But over the course of the following two years, events in the Middle Atlantic states and the information that circulated about those events took such a turn that the bounty on enemy *Indian* scalps became acceptable in Franklin's enlightened state, much as such a bounty had once become acceptable in the formerly Quaker province.[27]

Two of these events carry the names of valleys: the Wyoming and the Cherry. The Wyoming Valley lies along a curving stretch of the Susquehanna River in northeast-central Pennsylvania. Throughout the colonial period, Susquehannocks, the Iroquois League, Delawares, Mahicans, Shawnees, and many others had contested it. Late in the colonial era, British subjects entered the contest, not only against Indians, but also against one another. In the early nineteenth century, the valley would gain fame for its beauty, a force that has faced (but survived) heavy industrialism, crowded interstates, and subsequent sprawl. In the early nineteenth century, beauty aside, its violence also gave it fame. Indeed, in that period, Americans less likely attached the word "Valley" to Wyoming than they attached another word, "Massacre."

On July 3, 1778, an expedition of close to 500 Senecas and Cayugas and more than 100 allied Loyalist Rangers descended from the north into the valley under Major John Butler. They approached a Patriot garrison known as Forty-Fort, manned by more than 400 men, almost all of them local militia under Colonel Zebulon Butler. Earlier in the war, the Loyalist Butler had supplied Indian raiders who had already, by his own estimate, taken 170 scalps on the northern frontiers. But with 600 men, his party meant to do more than terrorize; it would prevent the valley's farmers from providing grain to American forces. Many Senecas who would later rise to prominence traveled with it, including Blacksnake, Cornplanter, Red Jacket, and Handsome Lake. The Loyalist Butler, who had already persuaded smaller forces of Americans to surrender at the nearby blockhouses Wintermoot and Jenkins, offered similar terms to the Patriot Butler, but the revolutionary officer

chose instead to fight. That Butler fought Butler was mere but fitting coincidence; the two men were unrelated, but the valley saw fratricidal war.

By the end of the month, newspapers across Pennsylvania and New England ran an account of the "general massacre of the inhabitants" of the Wyoming settlements. The news hit Connecticut particularly hard, since Connecticut speculators had interests and Connecticut settlers had homes in the valley. Papers did not report that the Loyalist Butler's Rangers included many "Pennamites," that is, Pennsylvania colonists contesting the region with these New Englanders.[28] Such analysis of the complex intercolonial roots of conflict eluded the revolutionary press, which greatly exaggerated the truly atrocious events of that early July.

The insurgent Butler's forces, having refused terms, sallied out of the fort and into history and legend. The Loyalists who overwhelmed them, Pennamite and Iroquois, quickly turned a battle into a rout. Refusing quarter, they killed and scalped most of those who fell into their hands. Official reports estimate American casualties at 301 to 367 dead. According to the Loyalist Butler, his forces and took 5 prisoners and a terrifying 227 scalps.[29] The attackers had initially offered quarter, the defenders instead attacked, the Loyalists and Indians killed and disfigured them, all combatants. Ghastly in fact, the "Wyoming Massacre" grew monstrously in rumor.

Readers learned falsely that following the battle, the Loyalist and Indian forces expanded their atrocities elsewhere, approaching small posts with overwhelming numbers, sending in fresh rebel scalps to increase the terror, offering no quarter, and butchering all persons taken from Fort Kingston and "Wilkesbury." The assailants, the false news had it, shut their prisoners up "in the houses"; the Indians "set fire to them"; and men, women, and children were "all consumed together." Readers followed close descriptions of various tortures inflicted on the settler-victims. Even livestock fell prey, as the tormenters cut out the tongues of cattle, leaving them to starve miserably to death. Such tales appeared and reappeared in the press into the 1780s.[30] Rumor had it that the rising Mohawk leader Joseph Brant inflicted all manner of rumored vengeance on his victims, yet Brant actually took no part in the expedition. Rumors also placed Catherine (some said her sister Esther) Montour—a woman of French-Indian descent—at the scene, where she personally bludgeoned and scalped, while singing, fifteen prisoners in a systematic, ritualized manner. In fact, like Brant, the Montours did not participate.[31] Three months after Wyoming, a Pennsylvania paper included an

extract from a report by Fort Augusta commander Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Hartley, who had led a military expedition into the valley to survey the wreckage. He found the "settlement . . . totally destroyed," with many of its women and children "murdered or carried into captivity."[32]

Propaganda did not need, and it does not explain, the exaggerations. If papers knew what actually happened, they could have reported it in gruesome yet accurate detail and still condemned the enemy. But rumor's power lies not in the cleverness of its original inventor, as if a liar lies behind every rumor, but rather in the medium of the public. Nothing feeds rumor more than a desperate public state in which "more information is demanded than is available."[33] The insurgents of 1778 lived in that state. Transcendent Indian martial power, already legendary, came with heartless violence, also legendary. The rumors of Wyoming slipped into and amplified that American legend.

None other than Michel-Guillaume Jean de Crèvecoeur, famous first author of the question "what then is the American, this new man?," sketched an interpretation of the atrocity. He hoped to include it in his "Susquehanna," a narrative of several trips to the Wyoming Valley, one of the visits made in the immediate wake of the battle. Crèvecoeur, for all his famous optimism about the United States, soon fled the new country. He saw in the slaughter strong evidence for the capacity of the American wilderness to reclaim the European to savagery, as Loyalist allies of the Indians literally went native and joined in the slaughter of European families. He knew of the dispute between the Pennsylvanians and the Yankees, and he knew that the dispute had bled into the Revolution, but he cared less for the causes of event than for the hideous capacity of America to strip men of civility. "Susquehanna" a minor work, went unpublished until long after his death.[34] But it reveals, if nothing else, that even one as thoughtful about America as Crèvecoeur fell prey to the greatly exaggerated stories that flocked out of the valley.

In the following generation, the shadow of the massacre cast its exaggerated length across the English-speaking world, thanks in part to the Glaswegian Thomas Campbell, a Scot who never saw the Susquehanna. His "Gertrude of Wyoming" was widely admired, especially after it appeared in an American edition introduced by Washington Irving. The lovely Gertrude, killed with her father in the presence of her young lover by an "Indian crew" lusting for "murd'rous deeds," became common fare for antebellum American youngsters. The poet Oliver Wendell Holmes would recall Campbell's

lines as he visited the valley in the late nineteenth century.[35] Crèvecoeur, Campbell, Irving, and Holmes: rumors had become not only legend, but also literature, and fiction at that.

In the actual aftermath of their very real massacre of the insurgent Butler and his men, Rangers and Iroquois approached the area's remaining forts and offered quarter, which was wisely accepted. The American insurgents had to surrender all arms, permit the demolishing of the garrisons, deliver up military stores, and restore confiscated possessions and lands to any Loyalists, among other provisions. The inhabitants had to swear to shun arms in the Patriot service for the remainder of the conflict. The Loyalist Butler vowed to spare all properties of those who surrendered. With this particular promise, his allies refused to comply. According to his own report, they destroyed one thousand dwellings and secured abundant plunder, including one thousand head of livestock. Contrary to rumor, the inhabitants' lives were, at least mostly, spared: "not a single person has been hurt of the Inhabitants, but such as were in arms, to those indeed the Indians gave no quarter."[36]

The slaughter of pro-independence forces that had sallied out to fight and whose leader had earlier refused quarter, thus grew in rumor to far more gruesome violence. The rumors of British, Loyalist, and Indian atrocities undoubtedly fed on the genuine grieving and fury at the needless slaughter of routed militiamen, as well as on the general despondency that accompanied a massive retreat and the devastating loss of animals, homes, fields, and other property. The mourning population spilled out of the valley, effectively abandoning everything north of Sudbury, Pennsylvania, where Fort Augusta held. One settler, Robert Covenhoven, described his people fleeing downstream in "Boats, canoes, hog-trough's, rafts hastily made of dry sticks, every sort of floating article." The improvised craft, "crowded with women and children," burdened with rescued belongings, frequently ran aground, and "the women would leap out into the water and put their shoulders to the boat or raft, and launch it again into the deep water." The men, meanwhile, marched down the banks, "to guard the women and children."[37] The inhabitants of the West Branch of the Susquehanna River also fled, in what became known as the "Great Runaway."[38] Such tumult intensified the hatred of Indians and of the British, too. In that sense rumor spread the Revolution; if it could mobilize families to flee, it could send men to arms.[39]

The Wyoming warfare joined a larger regional fighting season that saw a series of severe reprisals and counter-raids destroy Euro-American settlements and Iroquois communities. Large American parties struck the multi-

ethnic Native American towns of Tioga, Unandila, and Oquaga, while Indian and Loyalist raiders leveled Cobleskill, Springfield, and Andrustown, even hitting Minisink in New Jersey on the Delaware River. Historian Colin G. Calloway has noted of the October 1778 American strike on the Iroquois town of Oquaga that, although the town served as a base of operations for British-allied Iroquois forces, its inhabitants remained deeply conflicted about the war. Many had leaned toward the Americans—at least until the attack, which generated its own gruesome tales of violence. Samuel Preston, twenty years later, encountered an American veteran who bragged that he had skewered several children with his bayonet. Such stories, plausible but unverifiable, are themselves harsh facts. Told much later, they mark the violent depths into which Americans would imaginatively descend when killing Indians, celebrating violence as a dark passage through which the new country would pass.[40]

In this atmosphere of escalating violence and soaring rumor, British Regulars, Loyalist Rangers, and Seneca and Mohawk Indians, more than five hundred strong, struck the village of Cherry Valley one November morning in 1778. The last major action of that theater's 1778 season of war, it spread outrage among Americans. Yet another Butler commanded the some two hundred British Regulars and Rangers: Captain Walter Butler. The emerging Seneca leader Cornplanter and the Mohawk Joseph Brant also participated, with hundreds of their men. The insurgent Colonel Ichabod Alden commanded some two hundred greatly outnumbered and badly deployed men, whose fortification was but a palisaded church. Officers slept in homes that lay outside the walls, as did almost all civilians. Food supplies in the garrison and the surrounding town ran low.

The attackers made short work of the village. They killed many of the Patriot officers, including Allen, with their civilian hosts early in the fighting. Iroquois leaders and Ranger officers reportedly attempted to arrest the mayhem, but by the time they restored order, 16 soldiers and 32 inhabitants—most of them women and children—lay dead and dying. Indian forces seized more than 70 captives, 40 of whom they soon released, but they also killed a woman among the captives. The raiders plundered and torched the town, and they commandeered or destroyed its livestock.[41] Historians view Cherry Valley as marking a turning point along the northern frontier of this war, a point at which civilians became slated for destruction. But few observers at the time saw a shift in the fortunes of noncombatants. Indians, by long association with colonists, expected that war meant outbreaks of colonial slaughter.

For more than a decade, the Susquehanna, Delaware, Ohio, and Shenandoah Valleys had become well known for settler killings of Indians, killings with little regard for the age, sex, religion, or alliances of the Indian victims. Outside New Jersey, northern colonial courts had punished no such killers, something that the Iroquois, at least, knew well. They may also have known that the governor responsible for the sole punishments of Indian killers in recent memory was New Jersey's William Franklin—the Loyalist son of Benjamin Franklin.[42] Neither could the killing of noncombatants have much surprised settlers on the frontiers by 1778, given the charge in the Declaration of Independence, given the fictive slaughter at Wyoming, and given real, smaller-scale slaughters elsewhere. Everyone anticipated the worst.

News of Cherry Valley contrasted sharply with that of Wyoming in one critical respect: it was accurate. The *Continental Journal*, published out of Boston in December, correctly reported that "32 inhabitants, chiefly women and children, also Col. Alden, and . . . [10 members] of his regiment" had been killed. It observed truthfully that the fort had survived. But the stories of both massacres, the true and the false, circulated widely in many papers; they stabilized for years, with all their facts and falsehoods. They made sense to readers facing great unknowns in a revolutionary war; they helped readers make sense of the war and a world turning upside down.[43] It suggests something about the settlers' expectations that the very real killing at Wyoming of several hundred soldiers, many of them fleeing and most of them scalped, failed to satisfy Americans seeking to understand the war, while the killing of thirty-two noncombatants met their craving for information.[44] By the standards of eighteenth-century American warfare, the violence in both valleys was all too understandable. It made too much sense that a force of Indian and Loyalist partisans might grant no quarter, and not simply because quarter had been earlier refused—a European standard of war. Indians might also give no quarter, settlers knew, because they could expect none. The killing of Indian prisoners of war elicited little colonial comment.

In the aftermath of Wyoming and Cherry Valley, the state of Pennsylvania revived bounties on enemy Indian scalps. The former colony had posted such bounties during both the Seven Years' War and Pontiac's War. In 1779 Archibald Lochry renewed his 1777 call for a "reward for scalps," that is, for Indian scalps. Governor Joseph Reed urged George Washington to support the bounty, as an inducement to the active participation of militia in the campaign of 1779: a two-pronged Continental Army assault on the Seneca

Nation, intended to destroy its war-making capacity and avenge the Susquehanna losses. "I fear," Reed wrote in a postscript, that "we shall be forced into it whether we like it or not."[45]

The Revolution's enlightened impulses, however, were also strongly felt in Pennsylvania, at least in some influential sectors. Washington avoided the topic of the bounty when he replied to Reed. Reed explained to Daniel Brodhead, who would lead the western prong of the assault, that both Congress and Washington shared an evident "Reluctance on the Subject, and an Apprehension that it may be improved by our Enemies to a national Reproach." Even in the throes of war, revolutionary and humanitarian currents, along with a deep concern about the opinions of Europe, troubled some minds. Nonetheless, Reed heard the calls for the bounty coming from the likes of Lochry, and he and his council left it to Brodhead to issue rewards for scalps as his "judgment and discretion . . . shall direct."[46]

From Pittsburgh, forces under Brodhead marched into the southwestern settlements of the Seneca Nation, while from Wyoming John Sullivan and American Continentals marched up the Susquehanna Valley, around the largest of the Finger Lakes, and westward as far as the Genesee River. These invasions of the Senecas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Mohawks left many hamlets, towns, and fields destroyed, but they failed to achieve their fundamental goal: to eliminate the martial power of British allies among the Six Nations. Instead, the 1779 attacks intensified hostility toward the United States. A British-Indian campaign the following year, organized among the very peoples injured by Sullivan and Brodhead, would scour and devastate settlements in New York. The closest student of the 1780 assaults concludes that "the total damage inflicted on the Americans included three hundred thirty killed or prisoners—fourteen of whom were officers—six forts and several mills destroyed, over seven hundred houses and barns burned and nearly seven hundred head of cattle driven off. The grain destroyed was immense. Also to be considered was the terror instilled into the frontier inhabitants and their enforced flight from once flourishing settlements."[47]

The failure of the Brodhead-Sullivan expeditions to stanch raiding in the Middle Atlantic states encouraged more desperate measures. Governor Reed and the newly formed, conservative, Pennsylvania council informed Samuel Hunter, the Northumberland County lieutenant, that they would authorize "the following Premiums for every male Prisoner whether white or Indian if the former is acting with the latter 1500 dollars and 1000 for every Indian scalp." Targeting Indians alone, the authorization left undistinguished the

condition, age, and sex of the scalped victim. A state-funded bounty for Northampton County soon followed. By the end of April, Reed had issued an official proclamation awarding $3,000 Continental for every "Indian Prisoner, or Tory acting in Arms with them," and $2,000 Continental "for every Indian scalp." Regular soldiers in provincial pay could not collect the reward. The fiscally minded had insisted on that restriction, but they need not have worried. Over the remainder of the war, only a handful of men claimed the bounty, and the state paid for only six scalps, a fraction of those taken by Pennsylvanians.[48]

If few Patriots collected the bounties, a much greater number wielded knives. Such men did not think much about Continental dollars, and they did not much seek Pennsylvania's reward. Bounties did little that hate did not do better. What is more, the revolutionary press frequently reported Patriot scalpings of Indians. Always provided that the victims were combatants, the writers' tones ranged from gleeful to calm. The scalping of enemy Indian men provoked no outrage. Some such stories indulged in macabre amusement, as did one tale of a hand-to-hand fight between a Cherokee and a South Carolinian "cracker" during Williamson's 1776 raid. The two, having broken their firearms, wrestled hand to hand. American gouging began. The "cracker quickly had his thumbs in the fellow's eyes, who roard out carnally nacuah, in English, friend enough. 'D——you,' says my countryman, 'you never can have enough while you are alive'"; the Carolinian then "scalped him alive . . . and knocked his brains out." The writer added that he wished the settler had not killed his foe, but "sent him off without his nightcap, to tell his countrymen how he had been treated."[49] Purportedly written in Charleston, South Carolina, but read in Newburyport, Massachusetts, the story partakes of "sanguinary oral traditions that exalted the strong and deprecated the weak." It blended "realism and fantasy," revealing the dreadful violence Americans faced in the Age of Revolution, revealing, too, the rage of revolution.[50]

More commonly, the reports delighted less in gore, as when the already "famous" Daniel Boone defeated a Shawnee party and "brought in one scalp," or when Sullivan's forces took at least eight scalps in the one true engagement of the entire 1779 invasion.[51] A widely reprinted story from southwest Pennsylvania in April 1779 moderately described the murdering and scalping of a wounded Indian who had begged for "mercy." The anonymous correspondent from Fort Pitt placed the atrocity—he did not call it such—alongside descriptions of numerous Indian scalpings of settlers: men

and women.[52] Revolutionary Americans accepted the merciless torture and slaughter of captive Indian men by hardened backcountry woodsmen. They exchanged such stories as facts. When it came to scalping Loyalists of European descent, the insurgents only approved when the scalps were notional and when the knives were in allied Indian hands, as in the hope that Oneida allies would "make the tories fear for their scalps."[53]

The humanitarian concerns of the Enlightenment, and the need for Americans to stand honorably before Europe, softened some official attitudes even during the war. The scalp bounties placed on Indians generally fetched a lower reward than the delivery of enemy Indian prisoners. South Carolina's act, for example, had placed bounties of 75£ for an Indian scalp, 100£ for an Indian prisoner, and 80£ for every captured Loyalist, black or white.[54]

As scalp bounties appeared on the books in South Carolina and Pennsylvania, and as stories of scalping appeared increasingly in the papers, British officers faced a hailstorm of charges that they purchased settlers' scalps. General Henry Hamilton, the former British lieutenant governor at Detroit, particularly faced the allegations. Hamilton had taken Vincennes in 1778 and still wintered there when he surrendered the post to George Rogers Clark in February 1779. Clark sent him to Virginia as prisoner, where the government treated him as a criminal. Historian Bernard Sheehan describes the charge against "Hair-Buyer" Hamilton as "rumor and hearsay." Historian John D. Barnhart imagined long ago that a "lawyer for the defense would have little trouble in discrediting the evidence which has been accepted as supporting this charge." John Dodge, deposed before a committee of Virginian Patriots, alleged not only the cruel treatment of American prisoners, but that Hamilton "gave standing rewards for scalps, but none offered for prisoners," and that he paid for "a number of women and children's scalps." Although he presented a "plainly fraudulent" image of the British commander, his narrative spread in published form. Others, from Kentucky to western Pennsylvania, repeated the story: Hamilton had offered, variously, 10£ and 50£ per scalp. Virginia Governor Thomas Jefferson at first admitted these allegations, but eventually, as the evidence for an actual British scalp bounty crumbled, he dropped that charge against his prisoner.[55] A half century ago, Jack Sosin concluded that "the evidence against the British officer was hearsay and circumstantial and that we must presume that he did not pay Indians for *white* scalps" (emphasis added).[56]

The allegations against Hamilton stood on hearsay and rumor. Though false, they bore truths. Refuting Sosin, Sheehan assembled a "fragmentary

but suggestive record of the number of scalps received" from Indian fighters visiting Hamilton after raids on the frontier: "at one time 129, at another 81, and yet others 15 and 9." These are large numbers. Hamilton clearly accepted, as a fact of frontier warfare, the scalping of enemy Americans, if not through a direct "bounty" or "fixed reward," at least through the presentation of gifts when his allies proved that they had raided their American foes.[57] Hamilton also employed scalps in conformity with native diplomatic protocol. When visiting Delawares presented him with two scalps, he sent one to Ojibwas and the other to Miamis as evidence of the Delawares' alliance.[58] The Americans who captured Hamilton and who dealt brutally with him and his fellows did not have access to any direct evidence of Hamilton's actions, but they understood the nature of the war.

The complicated realities fell out of the attenuated American reports that raced up the Piedmont from Cherokee Country to Virginia and made it into print from Pennsylvania to New Hampshire. Rumor favored the simpler idea that British officers offered Indians "a stipulated quantity of goods for every scalp."[59] Such rumors of British scalp bounties reinforced the widespread conviction that Great Britain manipulated Indian warriors, that the Indians lacked true virtue, that monarchy and savagery had united against good citizens:

> To Take our lives and scalps away,
> The savage Indians keeps in pay,
> And Tories, worse by half than they.[60]

Groundless in their details, the rumors regarding Hamilton and Great Britain reflected facts. Britain supported with arms many Native American fighters; men among these had scalped a great many citizens, including unknown numbers of women and children. Those facts, bad enough, do not fully explain American outrage, which focused on the fictional bounty on American scalps, that is, on Euro-American scalps. The lifting of enemy Indian scalps by rough frontier settlers suited American Patriots, who shared a tradition with their British opponents that sanctioned the slaughter of captured American Indian warriors. Rooted in ancient Western conventions that permitted the slaughter or enslavement of enemy barbarians, heathens, or infidels—rooted too in developing notions of race that both sanctioned and required brutal force and cruelty—European and Euro-American practices had long allowed for the murder or enslavement of captured Indian prisoners.[61]

American revolutionaries accepted scalping as a fact of the frontiers. George Rogers Clark's forces denounced Hamilton for purchasing white scalps, but they ruthlessly scalped their Indian enemies. A member of Clark's 1780 expedition against the Shawnees casually reported the expedition's taking of seventy-three Indian scalps, a very high number by any standard, and the taking of no Indian prisoners.[62] In February 1779, while besieging British Fort Vincennes, Clark's revolutionaries publicly staged intimate physical violence. They had just intercepted a northern Indian war party returning to Vincennes from raids in Kentucky. The Americans had killed and scalped two men in the action, and they captured and spared two of the party who turned out to be of French descent. But they publicly executed, by bludgeoning and scalping, in full view of the besieged garrison, four captive Indians. One they named: an Ottawa, Macutté Mong. A fifth Indian they spared because, according to Hamilton, an American officer intervened, declaring that he owed his life to the captive's father. As several historians have recently emphasized, Clark approved of these murders, and he calmly reported the acts in his journal, though with considerably less detail than that provided by his opponents.[63]

Another atrocity caused Clark more rhetorical difficulty, however. Clark's men captured and scalped alive Francis Maisonville, a British subject and partisan of French American birth. British sources accused Clark himself of commanding the torturous punishment. Henry Hamilton testified that Clark "ordered one of his people to take off his scalp, the man hesitating, he was threatened with violent imprecation, and had proceeded so far as to take off a small part when the Colonel thought proper to stop him." Clark's own letters blame the scalping on two of his subordinates. As for Maisonville, he survived the ordeal, for a time, and went to Virginia as a prisoner. There, according to Hamilton, he "snatched" a razor from a servant and committed suicide. Denying responsibility for Maisonville's torment, Clark had no trouble accepting responsibility for the murder of four captured Indians.[64]

This hard racism was not merely a frontier phenomenon, a harsh but transitory reality of life in the "West." Clark dressed in a hunting shirt, but the outfit did not lead him to torture and murder captives. Coastal citizens also took satisfaction in stories that American forces scalped Indians. A Providence paper reported a "great affair" of 1779 in which General Edward Hand surrounded Onondaga, destroyed it and its crops, killed twenty-one people, captured families, and returned with a "great number of scalps."[65] The

scalping of Indian victims provoked little outrage among citizens. If whites suffered scalpings, hackles raised on both sides of the Atlantic. When white men wielded the knives, coastal citizens might consider it colorful in Kentucky against Indians but atrocious in Massachusetts against grenadiers. The insurgent rumors that British officers traded in white Americans' scalps flew on the winds of unsurprising racism, and they flew across the ocean. Among many other places, they landed in the able mind of Benjamin Franklin, who knew a thing or two about the uses of information.

9. Hoax: Franklin's Forgery

The French village of Passy, a close suburb of Paris, lay on the north bank of the River Seine. Much later, but not long before the Eiffel Tower rose on the far bank, the metropolis would absorb Passy, leaving streets and parks behind as place-names. But in 1777, two springs after Lexington and Concord, Benjamin Franklin resided in Passy, and it was there that he read a letter that bore especially grisly news from America. The news came via London, where the letter's author, Samuel Wharton, recorded it for his partner in patriotism and speculative schemes. Wharton neither verified nor affirmed the news, and Franklin left no direct record of his impressions. But the letter's ghastly information had power; at the very least it reinforced what Franklin already held true, or true enough for his purposes. And for Franklin, a diplomat at war, truth meant less than plausibility, for deception was a legitimate weapon. When the time came, he would use whatever means were at his disposal, and the terrifying letter was suggestive.

Wharton wrote that Cherokee and Creek Indians—"at the Instigation" of both East Florida's Loyalist governor Patrick Tonyn and British superintendent of Indian affairs John Stuart—had "in One Day taken Seven hundred Scalps from the inoffensive, frontier Families of the Carolinas and Georgia." They then paraded these "bleeding Trophys" at St. Augustine, shocking Tonyn so thoroughly that he "dispatched Expresses to stop the farther Massacre." Wharton blamed the king as "the *Primary* Author of this Tragedy." British "Bribes and wicked misrepresentations" had provoked this unprecedented cruelty.[1]

The letter is pure misrepresentation. Tonyn and Stuart would never see southern Indians parading seven hundred scalps, nor did Creeks and Cherokees ever scalp seven hundred victims in one day.[2] Evidence did not matter, however, as British-instigated scalping on a massive scale became a signal

rumor of the American war. When Wharton penned the letter in January 1777, Great Britain had yet to organize and arm powerful Indian peoples against the revolted colonies. As one scholar long ago insisted, "Despite all the rumor and negotiations throughout 1776, the British had only used a few Indians defensively in East Florida and Canada."[3] In the Lower South, where wide swaths of Loyalists often lived in settlements that approached Indian Country and where a good many traders favored the Crown, British agents feared that Indians would fail to distinguish royal friends from disloyal foes. Among the peoples collectively called Creeks, moreover, many had doubts about Great Britain, and the vast majority, throughout 1776, remained uncommitted and neutral. A faction of Cherokees had indeed pushed for the war that erupted in 1776 against southern settlers, but settler casualties in that war are unknown, perhaps unknowable. As for scalps, it is entirely conceivable that American provincial forces attacking Cherokee towns that year took a greater number than Cherokee forces attacking settlers. One historian, pointing out that settlers were prepared for the attacks, states that "warriors destroyed buildings but caused little loss of life because the majority of settlers had taken refuge in the stockades."[4] Andrew Williamson's South Carolina expedition against the Cherokees, by contrast, returned to the colony, according to a highly unreliable letter, with seventy-five scalps.[5] Whatever the death rates, by the end of 1776, Cherokees had suffered punishing American raids, and most desired peace; others, more militant, moved farther to the west.[6] The history of the 1776 Cherokee War underscores Wharton's 1777 fallacy: seven-hundred scalps taken in one day? Not possible.

Wharton enclosed in the letter a report that similarly evoked awesome Indian power. This "Authentic account" described an Indian hoard descending on the southern backcountry, destroying the American "General Lee's Army" and killing "*nine thousand* . . . not giving any quarter." The numbers again fail before all evidence: in no battle of the Revolution did any force kill nine thousand; in America such grisly battle figures awaited the Civil War. But in feeling the awesome power of Indian violence—even false violence—Wharton had vast company.[7]

Weeks before Wharton wrote his report, Franklin himself had written without much originality of the "uncommon Cruelty" of the British in "exciting Slaves to rise against their Masters, and Savages to assassinate and massacre . . . inoffensive Husbandmen."[8] And many years before that, he had deplored an evil imperial power, France, for encouraging its Indian allies to scalp innocent colonists. For Franklin and many others, imperial

manipulation and imperial complicity in scalping provided a familiar pair of trusty rhetorical weapons, a brace of arms that might influence diplomacy by shaping public opinion at home and abroad. In England toward the end of the Seven Years' War, Franklin had urged Great Britain to demand Canada in the forthcoming treaty with France. Rebutting those Britons who asserted that a French Canada would ensure American dependence on Great Britain, Franklin stated in bloody parody: "We should restore [Canada to France], that the French may, by means of their Indians, carry on (as they have done for these 100 years past even in times of peace between the two crowns) a constant scalping war against our colonies, and thereby stint their growth; for, otherwise, the children might in time be as tall as their mother."[9] Throughout the Revolution, Franklin would sound very much the same note in concert with American revolutionaries.

Deception

Benjamin Franklin, in France in 1777, had filed away Samuel Wharton's letter falsely reporting the massive exhibition of scalps before British officers on the southern frontier. Still in France five years later, Franklin would put a similar story to remarkable use in his efforts to secure the best treaty for the United States. He understood that Indians went to war for their own purposes. He had already, in the pre-revolutionary age, passionately attacked killers of Indian innocents. But in the throes of war, all was fair, and he knew opportunities when he saw them.

Franklin was no woodsman, no frequenter of Indian Country. But Indians were nonetheless a part of his world. In his printing days, he had published thirteen Indian treaties—a quarter of all such treaties published in the colonies. He helped promote and found the American Philosophical Society, to this day a center for American Indian studies. He participated in conferences with Indians at Carlisle in 1753, and, more famously, at Albany the following year.[10] Indians appear in the pages of his autobiography. During the Seven Years' War, he built forts in the valleys of eastern Pennsylvania to protect settlers from enemy Indians, and in 1764 he stood, backed by armed militia and British regulars, between an armed crowd and the Indians it despised. Shortly thereafter, he wielded his pen against Pennsylvanian Indian killers. When seeking French support for the revolutionary cause, he altered his identity, donned a fur cap, and portrayed himself as a natural, philosophical savage.

Memories of King Philip's War still colored the New England of Franklin's youth. He edited the *Pennsylvania Gazette* from 1729 to 1748. His first series of articles involving Indians, gory and stretching over several editions, include a long account of Shawnees slowly torturing a Catawba captive, "burning him by slow degrees up to his Privities, where they took much Pains."[11] In his twenty years of printing Franklin included some sixty reports on Indians, hardly a high figure, but colonial papers did not dwell much on American affairs. The number and kinds of Indian pieces he printed in the *Gazette* included two governor's proclamations against sales of rum to Indians; six reports of Indian crimes; five advertisements for runaway servants of Indian descent; twenty notices concerning colonial negotiations with Indians; nineteen accounts of battles or other episodes involving Indians during the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War; six reports of Indian raids in neighboring colonies; one report discounting rumors of Indian raids in Pennsylvania; and one advertisement for a pamphlet on "a species of Milk white Indians described and accounted for."[12] Forty-two of these reports come from the period of King George's War, 1740–1748, Franklin's last years on the paper. Overwhelmingly, the pieces smack of violence. Franklin may have occasionally deployed images of Indians to contrast their famous generosity with that of his fellows, as when he praised a group of West Indian "cannibals" for saving shipwrecked sailors, but "cannibals" the natives remained. As an "Ode" had it, published for his "Associators" in his last year on the paper, "Some dread the butch'ring Indians most, and some the Spaniards on the Coast."[13] He inclined, as one scholar concludes, "to assert the civility of colonial society by juxtaposing it with what he perceived as the savagery of the Indians."[14]

Late in the Revolutionary War, in Passy, France, Franklin lifted his pen in a most extraordinary effort at what today's intelligence community would call "disinformation." He sought to encourage support for the American position in the treaty negotiations. Between April 18 and April 22, 1782, he printed a broadsheet, a phony "Supplement" to the Boston *Independent Chronicle*, complete with advertisements, and he provided for its circulation around Europe, partly by enclosing the broadsheet with his correspondence. The "Supplement's" main "item" was a purportedly intercepted message, sent, the item alleged, by an agent among the Seneca Indians and intended for the British governor of Canada. This message and the strange freight that accompanied it had been captured by a New England captain while

raiding the Indians, or so Franklin fabricated the events. A portion of the message read:

> At the request of the Senneka Chiefs, I send herewith to your Excellency, under the care of James Boyd, eight packs of Scalps, cured, dried, hooped and painted . . .
>
> 1. Containing 43 Scalps of Congress soldiers, killed in different skirmishes; these are Stretched on black Hoops, 4 inches diameter; the inside of the Skins painted red with a small black spot to note their being killed with Bullets. Also 62 of Farmers killed in their Houses; the Hoops red, the Skin painted brown and marked with a hoe; a black Circle all around to denote their being surprised in the Night, and a black Hatchet in the Middle, signifying their being killed with that weapon.

Franklin conjured up another 88 scalps torn from women, 193 from boys, 211 from girls, and 29 from infants "ripped out of their mothers' bellies." In his monumental biography of Franklin, Carl Van Doren long ago called the hoax "gruesome propaganda." No doubt, as Franklin explained to John Adams, Indian men had been known to scalp noncombatants, even children. Each of these particular hairpieces, however, was beyond false: all of them were nonexistent.

This is old news. Scholars have known of Franklin's hoax at least since the appearance in 1844 of Jared Sparks's *The Works of Franklin*, and in 1914 Luther S. Livingston treated it as a piece of print history in his *Franklin and his Press at Passy*.[15] The editors of the Yale University Press, in volume 37 of *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, include an excellent discussion. Attributing the ruse to Franklin's "rage at the cruelties of the war," they describe the product as "nearly perfect, from the newspaper's number . . . down to the convincingly worded notices of land for sale in [Medford] and of a missing horse in Salem." The font, they find, while close to that of the genuine *Independent Chronicle*, was "French rather than English."[16]

It is hard to know whether Franklin's disinformation ever became a pure rumor, circulating widely, rapidly, and by word of mouth without attribution to a reliable source. The rumors and legends of his childhood and the tall tales of mass scalpings that had already crossed the Atlantic gave shape to his diplomatic deception, a deliberate and carefully planned lie. Modern scholars tend to define rumors as having sprung from the collective conscience rather than from a single author; some insist that a lack of known

authorship is a key ingredient to a rumor; a few refuse to admit deliberate lies and falsifications into the category. But such a definition of rumor is too confined. A powerful example of governmental disinformation becoming potent rumor is the famous anti-Semitic forgery, the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, likely concocted by Russia's secret police around 1900. Like Franklin's own forgery, the *Protocols*, according to a recent scholar, "incorporates many of the most vicious myths" that circulated along well-established lines. Although forged, it "crystallized the qualitatively different opponents" of the regime "into a single enemy responsible" for all manner of "ills." The *Protocols* capitalized on rumor, becoming rumor in turn.[17] Studying a radically different context, psychologist Gary Alan Fine and sociologist Patricia Turner have argued that the "motivated lie" can become a "truth claim" that may "operate much like rumor." In a sentence that could well apply to Franklin, they write, "If one sees oneself as being in the midst of a revolutionary struggle, the use of disinformation may be justified for the cause, despite the dangerous ends." The manipulation of information and the spreading of rumor, they note, is a common way to advance "political agendas or achieve personal gain"; indeed, "governments often find themselves in the business of creating rumors to undermine the confidence of an enemy."[18] In this case, Franklin passed on no rumor, but he hoped to make one.

Franklin endeavored to persuade those to whom he sent copies of the bogus "Supplement" that he had chanced upon the news sheets. He feigned suspicion of the text itself, though he expressed confidence in its general truth. He raised questions about its authorship, adding force to its character as unfounded rumor. He understood that, as one rumor scholar has put it, "when state representatives spawn rumors, they cannot officially claim to be their source. This is because rumors qua rumors are impervious to verification, for once verified, rumors cease to be so."[19] There at the founding, Franklin knew the workings of unfounded news.

The hoax certainly is not the kind of "improvised news" that characterizes collective rumoring, in which people caught in worrisome circumstances seek understanding—accepting, refining, and passing on ambiguously grounded information as they struggle for the knowledge they desperately need. It is not a fine example of groups, bereft of information, seeking solutions during emergencies. Franklin sought to capitalize on such circumstances, and he built on such desires, but he did not rumor. He lied. And it was war. Likewise, several understandably skeptical Britons saw no rumor in the "Supplement" but a clear American deception; the British politico Horace Walpole,

in fact, saw straight through the forgery to its author, whom he identified as Franklin. For Walpole (partly for Franklin, too, one is tempted to suspect) the "Supplement" was not just deception, it was parody.[20]

But the hoax, rumor-like, did spread. In its entirety or in healthy extract, it appeared at least twice in England and more frequently in America, and it circulated as if true from mid-1782 to early 1783. One could read it in London, Philadelphia, Hartford, Providence, New York, Worcester, Burlington (New Jersey), and even Boston. In the last place, interestingly, one did not read it in the *Independent Chronicle*, where the printers certainly and immediately knew it for the fraud it was. But those Bostonians very familiar with the *Chronicle* must have been more than suspicious when they encountered the forgery in another periodical, the *Continental Journal*.[21] An American story, it stood easily next to others of more ambiguous authorship. An item radiating out of Philadelphia in the fall had it from "a whig gentleman of good information" that Great Britain had not only spent more than 200,000£ for presents to the Indians but kept 6 craftsmen busy in Birmingham, England, "wholly in the making of tomahawks, scalping knives and a sort of short muskets for the use of the same copper-coloured gentry."[22]

Franklin's hoax gained new life in the run-up to and during the War of 1812, where it appeared in some twenty-seven papers, as truth.[23] With such frequent printings, the hoax obviously rang true to many, and with good reason, for it resonated strongly with American interpretations of their wartime experiences. In spite of at least more than 160 years of writings marking the piece as his, Franklin's hoax spreads as truth in our own time, and it stands poised to infect history in the future. The late Allan W. Eckert's widely available "narrative biography," *A Sorrow in Our Heart: The Life of Tecumseh*, nominated for a Pulitzer Prize, takes the document at face value. Eckert, whose popular writings on Ohio Valley and Great Lakes frontier history have stirred a love of history in many a young Ohioan's breast, has a British agent, sitting comfortably at a desk, an oil lamp warming the night, penning a letter to Governor Frederick Haldimand of Canada. The agent had just finished placing marks on large packages, wrapped in oilskin. They are stacked about him, and they contain 1,062 scalps. Eckert not only swallows the hoax, hook, line, and sinker, but dangles it out to young readers, as fact.[24]

The hoax now has an e-life that would have delighted its author, for it appears in the magnificent digitized collection, *America's Historical Newspapers*, listed in chronological order under its fraudulent date and title, alongside genuine installments of the *Independent Chronicle* (Boston) as if it were



Numb. 705.

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE BOSTON

INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE.

BOSTON, March 12.

Extract of a Letter from Capt. Gerrish, *of the* New-England *Militia, dated* Albany, March 7.

"THE Peltry taken in the Expedition [*See the Account of the Expedition to* Oswegatchie *on the River St.* Laurence, *in our Paper of the 5th Instant.*] will as you see amount to a good deal of Money. The Poſſeſſion of this Booty at laſt gave us Pleaſure; but we were ſtruck with Horror to find among the Packages, 2 large ones containing SCALPS of our unhappy Country-folks, taken in the three laſt Years by the Senneka Indians from the Inhabitants of the Frontiers of New-York, New-Jerſey, Pennſylvania, and Virginia, and ſent by them as a Preſent to Col. Haldimand, Governor of Canada, in order to be by him tranſmitted to England. They were accompanied by the following curious Letter to that Gentleman.

May it pleaſe your Excellency, *Teoga, Jan. 3d, 1782.*

"At the Requeſt of the Senneka Chiefs I ſend herewith to your Excellency, under the Care of James Boyd, eight Packs of Scalps, cured, dried, hooped and painted, with all the Indian triumphal Marks, of which the following is Invoice and Explanation.

No. 1. Containing 43 Scalps of Congreſs Soldiers killed in different Skirmiſhes; theſe are ſtretched on black Hoops, 4 Inches diameter; the inſide of the Skin painted red, with a ſmall black Spot to note their being killed with Bullets. Alſo 62 of Farmers, killed in their Houſes; the Hoops red; the Skin painted brown, and marked with a Hoe; a black Circle all round, to denote their being ſurpriſed in the Night; and a black Hatchet in the Middle, ſignifying their being killed with that Weapon.

No. 2. Containing 98 of Farmers killed in their Houſes; Hoops red; Figure of a Hoe, to mark their Profeſſion; great white Circle and Sun, to ſhew they were ſurpriſed in the Day-time; a little red Foot, to ſhew they ſtood upon their Defence, and died fighting for their Lives and Families.

No. 3. Containing 97 of Farmers; Hoops green, to ſhew they were killed in their Fields; a large white Circle with a little round Mark on it for the Sun, to ſhew that it was in the Day-time; black Bullet-mark on ſome, Hatchet on others.

No. 4. Containing 102 of Farmers, mixed of the ſeveral Marks above; only 18 marked with a little yellow Flame, to denote their being of Priſoners burnt alive, after being ſcalped, their Nails pulled out by the Roots, and other Torments: one of theſe latter ſuppoſed to be of a rebel Clergyman, his Band being fixed to the Hoop of his Scalp. Moſt of the Farmers appear by the Hair to have been young or middle-aged Men; there being but 67 very grey Heads among them all; which makes the Service more eſſential.

No. 5. Containing 88 Scalps of Women; Hair long, braided in the Indian Faſhion, to ſhew they were Mothers; Hoops blue; Skin yellow Ground, with little red Tadpoles to repreſent, by way of Triumph, the Tears or Grief occaſioned to their Relations; a black ſcalping Knife or Hatchet at the Bottom, to mark their being killed with thoſe Inſtruments; 17 others, Hair very grey; black Hoops; plain brown Colour; no Mark but the ſhort Club or Caſſetete, to ſhew they were knocked down dead, or had their Brains beat out.

No. 6. Containing 193 Boys' Scalps, of various Ages; ſmall green Hoops; whitiſh Ground on the Skin, with red Tears in the Middle, and black Bullet-marks, Knife, Hatchet, or Club, as their Deaths happened.

No. 7. 211 Girls' Scalps, big and little; ſmall yellow Hoops; white Ground; Tears; Hatchet, Club, ſcalping Knife, &c.

No. 8. This Package is a Mixture of all the Varieties above-mention'd, to the Number of 122; with a Box of Birch Bark, containing 29 little Infants' Scalps of various Sizes; ſmall white Hoops; white Ground; no Tears; and only a little black Knife in the Middle, to ſhew they were ript out of their Mothers' Bellies.

With theſe Packs, the Chiefs ſend to your Excellency the following Speech, delivered by Conejogatchie in Council, interpreted by the elder Moore, the Trader, and taken down by me in Writing.

Father,

We ſend you herewith many Scalps, that you may ſee we are not idle Friends. *A blue Belt.*

Father,

We wiſh you to ſend theſe Scalps over the Water to the great King, that he may regard them and be refreſhed; and that he may ſee our faithfulneſs in deſtroying his Enemies, and be convinced that his Preſents have not been made to ungrateful People.

A blue and white Belt with red Taſſels.

Father,

Attend to what I am now going to ſay: it is a Matter of much Weight. The great King's Enemies are many, and they grow faſt in Number. They were formerly like young Panthers: they could neither bite nor ſcratch: we could play with them ſafely; we feared nothing they could do to us. But now their Bodies are become big as the Elk, and ſtrong as the Buffalo: they have alſo got great and ſharp Claws. They have driven us out of our Country for taking Part in your Quarrel. We expect the great King will give us another Country, that our Children may live after us, and be his Friends and Children, as we are. Say this for us to the great King. To enforce it we give this Belt.

A great white Belt with blue Taſſels.

Father,

We have only to ſay farther that your Traders exact more than ever for their Goods: and our Hunting is leſſened by the War, ſo that we have fewer Skins to give for them. This ruins us. Think of ſome Remedy. We are poor: and you have Plenty of every Thing. We know you will ſend us Powder and Guns, and Knives and Hatchets: but we alſo want Shirts and Blankets.

A little white Belt.

I do not doubt but that your Excellency will think it proper to give ſome farther Encouragement to thoſe honeſt People. The high Prices they complain of, are the neceſſary Effect of the War. Whatever Preſents may be ſent for them through my Hands, ſhall be diſtributed with Prudence and Fidelity. I have the Honour of being

Your Excellency's moſt obedient
And moſt humble Servant,
JAMES CRAUFURD."

It was at firſt propoſed to bury theſe Scalps: but Lieutenant Fitzgerald, who you know has got Leave of Abſence to go for Ireland on his private Affairs, ſaid he thought it better they ſhould proceed to their Deſtination; and if they were given to him, he would undertake to carry them to England, and hang them all up in ſome dark Night on the Trees in St. James's Park, where they could be ſeen from the King and Queen's Palaces in the Morning; for that the Sight of them might perhaps ſtrike Muley Iſhmael (as he called him) with ſome Compunction of Conſcience. They were accordingly delivered to Fitz, and he has brought them ſafe hither. To-morrow they go with his Baggage in a Waggon for Boſton, and will probably be there in a few Days after this Letter.

I am, &c.
SAMUEL GERRISH.

BOSTON, March 20.

Monday laſt arrived here Lieutenant Fitzgerald abovementioned, and Yeſterday the Waggon with the Scalps. Thouſands of People are flocking to ſee them this Morning, and all Mouths are full of Execrations. Fixing them to the Trees is not approved. It is now propoſed to make them up in decent little Packets, ſeal and direct them; one to the King, containing a Sample of every Sort for his Muſeum; one to the Queen, with ſome of Women and little Children: the Reſt to be diſtributed among both Houſes of Parliament; a double Quantity to the Biſhops.

TO BE SOLD,

A convenient Tan-Yard, lying in Medfield, on the Poſt Road, Half a Mile from the Meeting-Houſe, with a good Dwelling-Houſe and Barn, and about 20 Acres of Land, conſiſting of Mowing, Plowing, and Paſturing, and an excellent Orchard. For further Particulars enquire of Adam Peters, on the Premiſes.

TO BE SOLD,

A large Tract of LAND, lying partly in Oxford, and partly in Charlton, in the County of Worceſter. It is ſituated on a great Country Road, about Half a Mile from Charlton Meeting-Houſe, and is capable of making a Number of fine Settlements. For further Particulars enquire of Joſeph Blaney, of Salem, or Doctor Samuel Danforth, of Boſton.

All Perſons indebted to, or that have any Demands on, the Eſtate of Richard Greenleaf, late of Newbury-Port, Eſq; deceaſed, are requeſted to bring in their Accounts to Moſes Frazier and Mary Greenleaf, Executors to the laſt Will and Teſtament of the deceaſed, for an immediate Settlement.

TO BE SOLD,

A ſmall new Brick HOUSE, two Rooms on a Floor, at the South Part of the Town.—Enquire of the Printer.

Strayed or ſtolen from the Subſcriber, living in Salem, a Bay Horſe, about ſeven Years old, a ſtocky well ſet Horſe, marked I. C. on his off Thigh, trots all. Whoever ſhall take up ſaid Horſe and return him to the Owner, ſhall be handſomely rewarded.
HENRY WHITE.

Benjamin Franklin put apparent effort into producing his bogus "Supplement" to the *Independent Chronicle*, approximating the proper number and typeface, and including false advertisements. Courtesy, American Antiquarian Society.

a genuine supplement. This digital project, I hasten to add, is one of the most important recent developments in the field, and this very book relies on it.[25]

Franklin had grown accustomed to printing false news, and even in his lifetime it nipped at his reputation. An unfriendly assessment of Franklin's use of the press comes from Loyalist historian Peter Oliver: "black as the Art was before, he made it blacker, by forcing the Press to speak the Thing that was not." John Adams said of him, his "moral character can neither be applauded nor condemned."[26] For Franklin, however, it was war. He put considerable effort into the fabrication, and he had no qualms when it came to distressing Great Britain to the advantage of his country though elaborate lies about Indian savagery and British cruelty.

Franklin enclosed a copy to Adams on April 22, distancing himself from it while rationalizing its justice: "I send enclosed a Paper, of the Veracity of which I have some doubt, as to the Form, but none as to the Substance, for I believe the Number of People actually scalp'd in this murdering War by the Indians to exceed what is mention'd in the Invoice."[27] Substantially, as Franklin says, it is more than probable that Indians had scalped more than five hundred American citizens in the course of the Revolutionary War. We know of mass scalping during the rout at Wyoming. British officers at Detroit also received large numbers of scalps from Indians, as when Captain Pipe of the Delawares delivered fourteen in November 1781; Captain Buckagihitas delivered sixteen a month later, and there were many other scalpings.[28] But that women and children suffered the majority is implausible, and Franklin had no evidence. Indeed, we have no such figures today.

Howard Peckham led a team that compiled the best figures on American casualties in the Revolution.[29] The resulting book, a remarkable compilation of American military casualties, limits itself to the engagements of U.S. American soldiers, including informal partisan units. It excludes civilian dead, a figure we do not know. Similarly, we do not know the full number of casualties inflicted by American citizens. Peckham, who took Indians more seriously than most professional historians of his day, attended to the frontier war. But he limited his task to the calculating of U.S. American casualties; he noted British, Loyalist, or Indian casualties as additional information; he did not pretend to systematically gather or analyze such data. He expressly excluded one set of *American* casualties: deaths suffered by American civilians, including those of men who may well have been members of state militia killed in the small raids of the woodlands. Peckham acknowledges the shortfall, explaining that the frontiers "posed a special problem." Native

American hostilities, he asserts, "would have occurred at this time, war or no war," and settlers would have struck back. Such "actions bear no relation to the American Revolution." Whatever one makes of the argument, the fact remains that the war's civilian casualties, particularly those in or near Indian Country, remain yet uncounted.[30]

We need not agree with the polemical arguments of Americans from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Franklin that held the British entirely responsible for Indian raiding to notice that each raid did take place within the context of a revolutionary war that spread violence over the eastern half of the continent, sweeping up both settlers and Indians. The counterfactual assumption that some Indian attacks would have occurred without the Revolution is reasonable, but the war escalated North American violence to unprecedented levels, as Peckham's volume demonstrates conclusively. That violent world inevitably shaped settler-Indian warfare.

Franklin employed his pen and press to advance his nation's position at treaty tables where ending that violence was a major goal. Franklin hoped for a European, especially British, outcry against Britain's alliance with Native Americans. As leverage in the negotiations, he proposed that the settlement include British reparations to the United States for both Britain's abuses of prisoners and its deployment of Indians against the settlers: the "Burning of Towns scalpings by Savages &c. &c." In the same days that he produced, like a hobbyist in his basement, two printed versions of the phony "Supplement," and through the same spring that he circulated them, Franklin promoted this idea of British reparations. On April 19, seven years to the day after Lexington and Concord, Franklin "wished England would think of offering something to relieve those who had suffer'd by its scalping and Burning Parties." That "something," he strongly implied, meant Canada. Throughout the spring and into the early summer, as he met with British diplomats and corresponded with British friends, he sometimes referenced his crooked story. British diplomat Richard Oswald met Franklin in early July, and Franklin "again mentioned Canada, and said, there would be no solid Peace while it remained an English Colony."[31]

Denial

Only after he had printed and begun to circulate the mass scalping lie did Franklin learn of an atrocity of similar dimensions, except that this atrocity was no hoax, no fantasy. Worse, the guilt fell not on royal officials and not on

murderous Indians, but on militia from Pennsylvania, his own state. Still too poorly known today by Americans, the outrage likely rivals or trumps any known crime committed against noncombatants of the brutal Revolutionary War. The setting was the Muskingum Valley of Ohio in early March 1782, a year that the region's inhabitants would long remember as "The Bloody Year." Several communities of Christian Indians, largely Mahican and Delaware, converts to the Moravian Church, had sought to avoid open conflict throughout the war, even as their Euro-American missionaries had quietly provided information to the Americans at Pittsburgh. In late 1781 suspicious British officers and British-allied Wyandot forces had forcibly removed the missionaries and their congregants to the Sandusky Valley and Detroit region near western Lake Erie. Late in the winter, in the early months of 1782, many of these "Moravian Indians," suffering famine, returned to their Ohio Country villages, hoping to find stored corn.

American militia under Colonel David Williamson met most of them at the villages of Salem and Gnadenhutten. The Americans killed one and concentrated more than ninety prisoners, with no resistance, at Gnadenhutten. After a discussion, and after a chilling vote on March 7, the Americans agreed to kill every person, man, woman, and child. On March 8 they separated the women and the children from the men into two buildings, serially bludgeoned the men to death, some with a cooper's mallet (for these people made barrels) found in the abandoned village, and scalped their broken heads. The killers did not collect, apparently they did not seek, their state's bounty. The women and children they murdered, again serially, with tomahawks. One boy somehow slipped away; another, in the men's slaughterhouse, named Thomas, survived the murderous blow and the scalping but was left for dead. Thomas later returned to mission life, and remained with the Moravians for his remaining four years, suffering frequent convulsions, the last of which apparently caught him while canoeing—once a good swimmer, he drowned at a young age.[32]

Franklin, who eighteen years earlier had expressed outrage at the cold-blooded killing of peaceable Indians in the Paxton Massacre at Conestoga and Lancaster, treated Gnadenhutten very differently. The news, as Franklin received it in early July, came in a late April copy, probably handwritten, of an item from a Loyalist paper, *The New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury*. It did not cover all the details, but the news nonetheless sounded alarms. The item described the public sale at Pittsburgh of horses, blankets, and other plunder "carried off as booty" by 160 mounted militia from the Monongahela

Valley after their slaughter of "innocent Indians." The victims, the paper related, were captured one day and killed and scalped the following. Franklin believed it.

Franklin had received the copy from a British correspondent, the prominent British Moravian Christian James Hutton, who had connections in the Shelburne administration. To Hutton, Franklin expressed his "Pain and Vexation," but he only barely directed his anger at the "cruel" killers of "little Children." By now an unflinching American nationalist, Franklin pegged his countrymen's mass murder of Christian Indians on the "single Man in England, who happens to love blood . . . It is he who has furnished the savages with the Hatchets and Scalping knives, and engages them to fall upon our defenseless Farmers," and so on, according to the old boilerplate: "so that even these horrid Murders of our poor Moravians may be laid to his Charge." In further defense of America, Franklin enclosed two items. One was a piece from the *Pennsylvania Evening Post* (April 16, 1782), which rationalized the attack as retaliation for the murder of settlers. Other pro-independence newspapers reprinted that explanation, falsely describing the Pennsylvania militia as having burst upon the Indians in their cabins at night, completely surprising them, frantically killing and scalping "upwards of ninety," excising, therefore, the calculated and deliberate nature of the mass execution. The second piece Franklin enclosed to this correspondent, whose co-religionists had just suffered mass murder, was nothing other than the phony "Supplement" to the *Independent Chronicle*.[33] Franklin's hoax has often been treated as satire or humor, but it was war.

Responding two weeks later, a furious and undeceived Hutton urged upon Franklin the irrelevance of the king to the Pennsylvanians' atrocity. The blame, according to this foe of combat, fell on war—"especially civil war." Reaching out to a friend with whom he was at war, he wondered if any man might murder: whether German, French, British, or colonial American. He did speculate about Indians. As for the "Supplement," he denounced it as fraud: "Bales of Scalps!!! Neither the K. nor his old ministers nor Haldimand are capable of such atrocities. Nor his new ministers."[34]

As propaganda, the hoax was more offensive than defensive: an arrow from Franklin's quiver, it flew to the Mississippi River. When Franklin prepared the hoax in mid-April 1782, he sensed strong French and Spanish sentiment for containing the United States to the eastern seaboard. In the quiet negotiating rooms, Spain and France soon raised, against the wishes of their allied American commissioners, the idea of an Indian barrier to

American expansion. Spain moved first. In the late summer of 1782 Spain claimed vast lands east of the Mississippi, claims that were no more extraordinary than the American claims to those lands. The idea of an Indian buffer state emerged in Spanish and French circles as a possible compromise between Spain and the United States. Joseph Mathias Gerard de Rayneval, secretary to French minister Charles Gravier de Vergennes, included Indians in a memo to American envoy John Jay. Britain, in Rayneval's scheme, would receive the territory north of the Ohio, of which Americans controlled very little. To the south, Spain would assume a protectorate over Indians in an area that is now western Kentucky, western Tennessee, western Georgia, and all of Alabama and Mississippi, vast spaces inhabited or held by few Americans. The United States would make its own arrangements with Indians to the east of the line, but its territory would be barely trans-Appalachian.[35]

Franklin, though ill and not directly a part of these negotiations, agreed with John Jay that Congress must stand firm at the Mississippi. And the Americans would, in fact, achieve most of their aims in the treaty, largely by abandoning their Spanish and French allies and negotiating separately with Great Britain. Franklin wrote Foreign Secretary Robert Livingston on August 12 that continental Europeans attempted to "coop us up within the Allegheny Mountains." He insisted on the Mississippi as a "Boundary," and on "the free Navigation of the River." His very next lines, revealingly, concerned the manner in which the Gnadenhutten Massacre was being "represented in Europe." Franklin monitored European public opinion, which he knew could influence events.[36]

Franklin's hoax is an egregious example of the kind of false information that surrounds diplomacy. He devised it while serving as an American commissioner during the Treaty of Paris negotiations, and he meant it to have an impact. The resulting Treaty of Paris (1783) between Great Britain and the United States may well be the most important treaty in the treaty-strewn history of Native Americans whose peoples have long inhabited what is now the United States. But the treaty itself does not mention Indians. It gave the United States a claim, in European eyes, to lands it had not conquered or purchased. Americans would strenuously push those claims.

The treaty bore down hard on Indians. Not only did the treaty give the United States putative sovereignty over most of the rich lands east of the Mississippi without Indian consent, it also threatened both to deprive Indians of access to British traders and to stop the flow of "presents" from British posts. Never having conceded British possession and largely victorious

in arms, the Indians received news of the cessation of arms, the treaty deliberations, the preliminary treaty, and the treaty itself with shock. Frederick Haldimand did not receive bales of scalps from his Iroquois allies, but he knew, even before the preliminary treaty, that the Iroquois and many others were "thunderstruck at the appearance of an accommodation so far short of their expectation." To the emerging details, uncertainties were added. Alluding to Gnadenhutten, Haldimand reported that Indians dreaded "the idea of being forsaken by us and becoming a sacrifice to a vengeance which has already in many instances been wreaked upon them."[37]

The "idea" of American murder provided fertile ground for rumor. From Niagara, a British officer reported unease among the Senecas and other Six Nations Iroquois. They rumored that General Philip Schuyler had startled his Oneida allies with this declaration: the Americans were "resolved to destroy the Six Nations, together with the Delawares, Hurons, and Shawanese, and also all the white people that served with the Indians, particularly Sir John Johnson and Colonel [John] Butler." The British officer refused to credit the story, but it resonated with the region's Indians.[38] Far to the south, an Upper Creek "Head Warrior" from the town of Euphalies relayed similarly dark rumors to the British at St. Augustine. The Treaty of Paris, he had heard, provided for the enslavement of Indians who had allied with the Crown: it gave "to the Virginians and Spaniards as a present all the Indian warriors, their families, friends and lands to be divided between them." He hoped it "was a Virginia Lie." To avoid such degradation, some Indians seriously considered boarding British vessels and leaving the continent, "having made all the world their Enemies, by their attachment to" Great Britain.[39] Desultory raids and counter-raids accelerated between American settlements and Indians, despite the declared cessation of arms in 1782. By 1786, violence was endemic along the Ohio and growing in the Southeast; the violence would become war, and the war would outlive Benjamin Franklin.

Scalping was real. During the American Revolution, men on all sides, which is far from saying all men, scalped their victims; they sometimes inflicted the terrible, usually lethal, wound on living persons. But when scalping was unreal, when its reality was unfounded, and when it made war as misinformation, it invites more than condemnation. Despite the indulgence of American revolutionaries in the practice—indeed, sometimes, as at Gnadenhutten, exactly because of the Americans' use of scalping—this once-Indian military form achieved a rare power in both rhetoric and in

rumor to shape the story of the American Revolution from Lexington, through Saratoga, to the Treaty of Paris.

The war began with Americans standing accused of embracing a "savage" practice, but no Yankee scalped a Redcoat at Concord. The war's grueling years wore down the charges against Americans, who won the rhetorical contest that made British officers shoulder the blame for scalping. When an American force committed perhaps the greatest atrocity of the war at Gnadenhutten, when settlers actually killed and scalped scores of unarmed, captive noncombatant men and murdered many women and children, the main story, constantly repeated, remained one of a British conspiracy to scalp Americans, with subordinate stories of Wyoming, Cherry Valley, "hair buyer" generals, bales of scalps, and merciless Indians. That is the story that long dominated the American representations, in scholarly and popular media, of British frontier forces and, far more, of Native Americans.

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10. Slavery: South to Freedom

The four cardinal directions, North, South, East, and West, carry popular symbolic associations in antebellum American history. East implies port cities and development; North, free labor and industry; West, freedom and frontier; South, slavery and staple agriculture. None of this would have made any sense to North Americans before the revolutionary era, especially not to slaves in the Lower South seeking to escape bondage in the British colonies. The compass points might for them instead represent the following: East, the formidable sea; North, slavery for one thousand miles; West, powerful Indian Nations; South, possible liberties in Spanish Florida's sanctuary (until its cession to Britain in 1763). The turbulent events of the 1760s and 1770s altered the directional fields, threw this eighteenth-century compass out of whack, and sent the dial spinning.

As the dial spun, American revolutionaries circulated familiar rumors, borne aloft by powerful ideologies, that accused Great Britain and its allies of manipulating Indians and slaves in a diabolical effort to destroy American rights. The insurgents' heirs voiced that rhetoric beyond the War of 1812. Following the retrocession of all of Florida to Spain by 1783, that nation resumed its old rumored role as imperial agitator, now alongside Great Britain. But to these familiar, recurring rumors, a new and highly specific concern also circulated in poorly grounded reports as the United States expanded toward the Gulf of Mexico. The Republic's citizens increasingly rumored, with reason, about a new and dangerous sanctuary for slaves, among the Seminole Indians of Florida to the south. From the 1760s to the 1830s, the geography of slavery and freedom reoriented. Perhaps only beginning in the 1830s, as the abolitionist movement rose in the North and as the fury of the Second Seminole War limited slaves' possibilities to the South, would the compass set with modest and regular accuracy to points familiar in a

popular sense to early national American history, where North might mean freedom. Until then, other points also beckoned. This chapter looks eastward and southward, to explore the rumored relationships of blacks seeking freedom with independent Indian peoples in the early American Republic.

East from Slavery

Throughout most of the eighteenth century, the North did not call to the Lower South's slaves seeking escape. Cramped between the Atlantic to the east and generally unsympathetic Indian Nations to the west, facing slaveholding societies that stretched expansively to the north, slaves escaping from South Carolina and sparsely settled Georgia best headed toward Spanish Florida until Spain yielded the colony to Great Britain in 1763. With the Revolutionary War's outbreak in 1775, a prospect opened, figuratively, to the east, where captive black men might ride the Atlantic in British transports, exchanging military service for prospective freedom.

In the late winter of 1776 some two hundred black men, women, and children paddled from mainland South Carolina across the mouth of the Savannah River to Tybee Island, hoping to resist attacks and align with the British. Carolinians responded with a plan to have Creeks wipe them out, conscious both of the historic role of interior Indians in maintaining slavery and of the good that might come from reinforcing "an aversion between Indians and Negroes." Here, clearly articulated, was a rarely stated idea of divide and rule, arising in the Revolution. It was unnecessary. The escapees had not thought to find Creek allies; they had not headed into Creek country. They had paddled southeastward, away from colonists and Creeks. Similarly, a second group of freedom-seeking black Carolinians crossed eastward over water, sought out enlistment in British forces, and camped on Sullivan's Island, where pro-independence Rangers attacked them. The Rangers reportedly disguised themselves as Indians, perhaps again to maintain an "aversion," or perhaps to increase terror. In neither case had the bold escapees headed toward Indian Country. Instead, they had sought their liberty on the inlets of the Atlantic and with the empire.[1]

Above this altered field, where East briefly hailed, flew old colonial rumors in a new form. Defenders of colonial American rights spoke of British-inspired Indian and slave depredations. John Stuart, the slaveholder and British Indian superintendent for the South, remained staunchly loyal to the Crown as most of the North American colonies lurched toward revolu-

tion. Tipped off that a revolutionary committee sought his arrest, Stuart fled Charleston to Savannah, and then fled farther south to St. Augustine, by then the capital of British East Florida. Arriving there in the summer of 1775, he explained his flight to the Earl of Dartmouth. A thick cloud of rumors about Stuart and the British had drawn attention in Charleston and Savannah. Some said that the British ministry colluded with both potential Indian enemies and Carolinian slaves. Stuart's opponents bruited that he already had tampered with Cherokees and Catawbas. Simultaneously, "it was given out that the Negroes were immediately to be set free by the Government and that Arms were to be given them to fall upon their Masters." In a now much quoted passage, Stuart claimed to Dartmouth, "As nothing can be more alarming to the Carolinas than the Idea of an attack from Indians and Negroes, the Leaders of the disaffected Parties easily carried into execution their plan of arming the People."[2] "Indians" *and* "Negroes," Stuart had said, as he reported on the entrenched and powerful colonial fear of imperial manipulation of Indians and Africans. Sadly for Stuart, rumors identified him, individually, as the corrupt ministerial agent. Where colonists once accused Spain or France of pulling the strings, they now accused the British ministry, entangling Stuart.

The new royal governor of South Carolina similarly fell into the web of stories. Lord William Campbell, a glittering slaveholder familiar with the province, had married into a prominent South Carolina family, and he arrived to lead the colony in 1775, stepping into a revolution. He marveled at the power of rumor, finding "the most notorious falsehoods propagated to work up the people . . . to that pitch of madness and fury to which they have arrived." Much as his colonial opposition pinned slave and Indian discontent on British ministers, Campbell traced the origin of these rumors to members of the Sons of Liberty and the Provincial Congress, whom he called "the leaders of the faction" that plotted "the most diabolical system." He heard that Arthur Lee had sent false news to the insurgent Provincial Congress that the British ministry plotted with slaves and Indians to shed provincial blood. Colonial rumor even had it that the very ship (aptly named *Scorpion*) from which Campbell had recently disembarked concealed within its dark hold "14,000 stand of arms" intended for the impending slaughter. Rumor (partly true) further circulated that British General Thomas Gage had from Boston commanded Stuart to prepare the Indians for war against colonists. Finally, rumor pointed to—and led to the execution of—a more remarkable conspirator with slaves. His name was Thomas Jeremiah.[3]

Jeremiah, a free black man, well-known, busily employed, and improbably successful against the odds around the Charleston harbor, had manned his several fishing and pilot craft with his own slaves. But his remarkable career ended in 1775, once he stood accused of plotting an uprising of slaves in cooperation with the evil British ministry, whose men-of-war he might pilot into the harbor. None other than Patriot Henry Laurens advocated for Jeremiah's death by hanging, which meant not a quick break of the neck, but slow, painful strangulation. The new governor denounced Jeremiah's conviction and execution as so outrageous that he called it murder, adding, "I can call it nothing else."[4] As Sons of Liberty in 1775 tortured and killed Thomas Jeremiah for his rumored role in promoting an uprising of slaves, they hinted at British ministerial involvement. They did not claim that he worked with Indians. The man they condemned belonged to the British and black Atlantic, not to the Cherokee hills.

A third party, the manipulative British ministry, importantly, formed the rumored lynchpin between the coastal pilot Jeremiah and the Indian agent John Stuart. For Laurens and the Sons of Liberty, the British ministry would stop at nothing to gain absolute power over all its colonial subjects. The South Carolina Association, formed in May 1775, justified the taking up of arms against, and note the adjective, "Instigated Insurrections."[5] The rumors gained some grounding; during the war to come, bodies of combined British, black, and Indian forces would arise. After the Patriots of Augusta, Georgia, had tarred and feathered Loyalist trader and Indian agent Thomas Brown, he emerged as a leading partisan. His force, which included blacks, whites, and Indians, boldly represented one of the liberating possibilities raised in reaction to the Revolution.[6] Activities of men like Brown greatly encouraged the circulation of familiar rumors that the British instigated Indians and slaves to fight.

Rumors to similar effect rocked coastal North Carolina in the same period: King George III pledged not only to emancipate slaves, but also to give "every Negro that would murder his Master and family . . . his Master's plantation." Janet Schaw, a visiting Loyalist Scot who found herself entwined in the false news of the summer of 1775, observed that "the Negroes have got it amongst them and believe it to be true."[7] If the rumors raised uncertain hopes among black North Carolinians and horrendous fears among white planters, they deeply worried Crown officials. North Carolina's royal governor, Josiah Martin, reminded the Earl of Dartmouth that rumors undermined British authority. These "false reports," he urged, "operate most

fatally upon the people here." He urged Whitehall to adopt immediate and direct measures to refute the flying reports, otherwise North Carolinian subjects "will be gained over universally by falsehood, to the congenial Standard of Revolution." But other than the quick refutation of each falsehood with "the truth," Martin did not provide much of a remedy. And by the time he wrote, he floated off shore, putatively governing the broad colony from a gunboat in the Cape Fear River. Beyond range of its cannon, he had lost power.[8]

Farther north, the rumors gained verification in November 1775, when Virginia's royal governor, James Murray, the Fourth Earl of Dunmore, issued his famous proclamation promising to free and arm enslaved and indentured men, black and white, whose labor belonged to the opponents of the British ministry. He drew hundreds of black men to his ranks. Hardly a humanitarian abolitionist, Dunmore desperately urged Great Britain to deploy a sufficient force of armed Regulars to inspire Virginia's lower orders, black and white, to flock to the Crown. Dunmore, lord, slaveholder, and exponent of colonial expansion, sought less slave and servant emancipation than he did an aristocratically led royal army that would rouse the black and white poor against Virginia's landed gentry.[9]

Twenty days after Dunmore issued his proclamation, the Reverend Jonathan Boucher, seen in some quarters as the intellectual powerhouse of Loyalism, took a different tack. He respectfully questioned the prudence of recruiting black slaves or Indian allies. He understood the British urge to darken the Patriots' dreams of liberty with the terror of uprising: "to keep their Fears perpetually awake, either by apprehensions of having their Slaves armed against them, or their Savage Neighbours let loose on their Frontiers." But he opposed, strategically, any effort to raise such forces. "They resemble," he argued, "the Elephants in the Armies of old: they may, it is true, exceedingly annoy your Enemy, but you have no Security that, even in the moment of Victory, They will not turn on Yourselves." He certainly saw no simple union of people of color. For one thing, he spoke in terms of "either" and "or." But for another, he added that indentured servants—overwhelmingly European and even British—were, for the insurgents, potentially the most dangerous "enemies in their bowels." He urged their recruitment to the Loyalist cause.[10] Like Dunmore, he envisioned black and white servants, led by Crown forces, overthrowing Maryland's insurgent gentry and restoring proper government, but this Loyalist worried more than Dunmore about the fidelity of blacks to the king.

Like their enemy Boucher, Sons of Liberty and their allies similarly added highly suspect strands of white colonists to the mix of His Majesty's potential minions. Insurgent colonial papers printed a story that the king had prepared "seventy-eight thousand guns and bayonets, to be sent to America, to put into the hands of negroes, the Roman Catholics, the Canadians; and all the wicked means on earth used to subdue the Colonies." Two Catholics in Charleston soon fell victim, as a mob set upon James Dealy and Laughlin Martin, doused them with boiling tar, and humiliated them with a coat of feathers. They suffered deeply scarring torture. Notably, they did not face the far worse fate of Thomas Jeremiah.[11]

News of Lord Dunmore's actual proclamation infuriated Provincial Congresses up and down the seaboard and escalated the intensity of the revolutionary movement. Forces like Dunmore's and Brown's likely aided the insurrectionary Patriots' efforts to recruit followers among white settlers. Most of Virginia's indentured servants ignored the offer contained in Dunmore's proclamation. But it gave hope to thousands of slaves from Virginia southward. For more than a decade, since at least 1763 when Florida had come under British rule and had ceased to provide Spanish sanctuary, those men and women who fled slavery had virtually no place to hide but in badlands too proximate to the colonies for comfort. The shifting politics that made Dunmore's proclamation possible opened up opportunities for freedom, all laden with risk, among the British on the Atlantic and far to the south.

The American Revolution put the largely Loyalist British colonies of East and West Florida, for example, at odds with the Patriot bodies of Georgia and South Carolina. With a very low population of British subjects, the East Florida government placed firearms in black men's hands. The Loyalist Governor Patrick Tonyn, sensing the vulnerability of his colony to attack from the north, wrote as early as August 1776 that he hoped to raise four companies of black troops. Free blacks enlisted in the colony's armed forces, feeding the already flourishing rumors among Carolinians and Georgians that the British inspired slaves to rebel. As the Revolution advanced in those American states, the colonies of East and West Florida swelled modestly with Loyalist refugees, and with the more than eight thousand slaves who outnumbered them. Taking shape as British slave colonies, the Floridas both posed risks for those who would escape from slavery in the United States and raised hopes that enlistment with the British might bring freedom.[12]

Slavery expanded in East Florida. Some British planters prospered and managed, even during the war, to purchase and import "New Negroes"

from overseas. The free militia drilled not only to oppose invasion, but also to "keep in awe the Negroes who multiply amazingly."[13] Slaves who served in the British troops in some cases liberated themselves, having escaped from the revolutionary states, but in other cases they had no choice; planters, demonstrating their loyalty, donated slaves to the cause. Nor did Floridian Loyalists envision Florida's Indians as permanent, independent allies, for the loyal planters expected Indian land. Within a year of Dunmore's proclamation in Virginia, Tonyn sought Crown permission to obtain such cessions. The Loyalist refugees pouring into the province had flooded him with petitions for plantations, and he approvingly forwarded those to London.[14] Both slavery and British settlement expanded, in spite of the war and in the face of rumors that Britain backed Indians and slaves.

Expansion during the period did not entirely suit the people who began to enter the record as "Seminoles." Strongly independent, they held the Loyalist forces at arm's length. Patrick Tonyn initially thought he could command allied Seminoles: he would "fix" them "at proper stations" against an anticipated Georgia invasion (that never materialized). He had good reason to at least hope for Seminole cooperation, having received reports that they favored the British. As it turned out, Seminoles did not act in unison, much less did they obey Tonyn's command.[15] They never contributed substantially to the British alliance during the Revolutionary War. But they did offer a potential asylum to slaves.

South from Slavery

Toward the end of the summer of 1775, a Spanish force appeared in British St. Augustine's harbor, and it unleashed a devastating bombardment. That false rumor passed among Creeks skeptical of British power. The governor of West Florida found the report alarming enough to send copies on to London.[16] The rumor anticipated a reality: Spain would actually ally with the United States in 1779; the West Florida towns of Mobile and Pensacola would fall to Spanish forces in 1780 and 1781; and though Spain did not invade East Florida, it actually restored its claim to all Florida in the European deals that brought the American Revolution to a formal close in 1783. Once again, points south beckoned to enslaved Georgians.

To be sure, most people of African descent in Spanish Florida remained slaves after the Revolution. But East Florida in particular sheltered a significant free black population, which included slaveholding men and women,

armed militia, and even a commissioned general. From 1784 to 1790, East Florida revived the old Spanish edicts providing sanctuary, upon the condition of conversion to Catholicism, to fugitives from slavery in primarily Protestant Georgia and South Carolina. This indeed drew both black immigrants from the states and the ire of the leadership of the new Republic. U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson negotiated a Spanish end to that policy in 1790, but U.S. slaveholders continued to see dangers to American slavery in the Spanish colonies of Florida, and new dangers arose among the Seminoles. As the Spanish resettled the region, they courted peace with the Seminoles, dispensing gifts to their villages, including their largely black villages, whose residents the Spanish began to refer to, with some accuracy, as *cimarrones*, or maroons.[17]

The name "Seminole" had begun to surface in colonial writings on the very eve of the Revolutionary War. Primarily Muskogean in speech, like most of the peoples of the eastern Gulf, the Seminoles gained fame, or notoriety, for their special relationships with people of African descent. Like other southeastern societies, though with more regularity, Seminoles conferred full status and kinship on some individuals of African ancestry: those, for instance, born to a Seminole woman or those formally adopted. Like other southeastern Indian societies, too, Seminoles personally enslaved outsiders, increasingly black outsiders, who suffered a non-kin status of subordination. A more distinctive third pattern, reflecting more ancient native traditions in the Southeast, found groups of people of African ancestry living in tributary villages among the Seminoles, yielding resources and military service to their Seminole chiefs.[18] Mainly escapees from slavery to the north, these villagers did not live in equality or liberty in any liberal sense. Still, among peoples who recognized all human relationships as characterized by kinship, obligations, and responsibilities, their relative autonomy beat chattel slavery. And in the face-to-face and yet rapidly changing world that the Seminoles made in the late eighteenth century, men and women of African descent might marry Seminoles. They brought skills with pastoral agriculture, especially in work with cattle, and European languages, crafts, and warfare that gained some black individuals positions of considerable respect.

It was, however, a highly complicated and politically turbulent world. A Loyalist turned adventurer, William Augustus Bowles, gained support from British authorities in the Bahamas and established a "state" in the 1790s at the Seminole town of Mikusuki, with influence in some related Seminole towns. Blacks, Indians, and the few whites at Mikusuki raided and plundered

plantations in both the American state of Georgia and Spanish Florida, yet few slaves rushed to join Bowles. Some whom his forces captured actually struggled against him. Seminoles themselves tolerated Bowles only as long as he had access to British authorities and trade, but that access collapsed. Many Seminoles opposed Bowles, and he met a bad end. Creek Indians captured him in 1803 and presented him to Spanish authorities. He perished in a Cuban prison in 1805.[19] Bowles or no Bowles, Americans feared that the rising Seminoles and the two colonies of Florida, throughout their second Spanish period, gravely endangered the system of slavery.

Racial Anxieties and the Wars of 1812

At the other end of the American Gulf of Mexico, a slave uprising in Louisiana, known as the Deslondes or German Coast Rebellion, intensified the fears in 1811. In January close to two hundred (perhaps many more) slaves seized arms and, led by Charles Deslondes, marched southward toward New Orleans, about 40 miles downriver along the Mississippi. The territory's Governor William C. C. Claiborne sent federal troops and militia under Wade Hampton in pursuit of the poorly armed rebels, who retreated into the grasp of a better armed, mounted force of territorial militia. Territorial tribunals, composed of white planters, ordered twenty-one rebel leaders executed. Mobs killed many others, sometimes under brutal torture. The territorial fathers of Louisiana paraded black heads through the muddy streets.[20] Obscure to Americans today, the revolt electrified the press. Importantly, U.S. citizens did not rumor any Indian collaboration with the rebels, in spite of the growing national worries about the Seminoles to the east or the pan-Indian movement organized by Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet, Tenskwatawa, to the north. Instead, echoing earlier thinking that had enemy Europeans encouraging disorder among slaves, South Carolinian Wade Hampton pointed a finger at the territory's Spanish planters. Others speculated that various ethnic French inhabitants—privateers, smugglers, or discontented Franco-Americans—encouraged slaves to violence. Unreliable news also circulated that the outside black agitators hailed not from France, Spain, or Britain, but from the islands, including Saint-Domingue, for Haiti deeply impressed Louisianan minds. After the United States declared war on Great Britain in June 1812, false rumors spread in the northern states that the Lower Mississippi faced yet another massive slave uprising, with "negroes . . . killing all before them" and sending U.S. citizen families to the

safety of gunboats. A Federalist denounced the Republican administration for "studying the law of nations" while "the Indians are united against us"—an understandable exaggeration—and while "the negroes are murdering their masters on the Mississippi"—a falsehood in that year.[21] In October new rumors of an impending Louisiana "mutiny" led to the executions of more black men, before they hatched their plot, if any plot ever existed. These reported conspiracies and rebellions reveal a growing sense that a powerful black uprising might not require a European power, that Louisiana would experience race war.[22] To the east, in the zone between Georgia and Florida, American slavery faced equally great peril, joined now to the fear of Indian war.

Spanish East Florida, just south of the St. Mary's River from the state of Georgia, both irked American slaveholders with its armed black militia and attracted them with its lands. With approval from slaveholder and president of the United States James Madison, a team of filibusterers and East Floridian insurgents calling themselves "Patriots" secured the assistance of the U.S. Navy and Marines and invaded East Florida in March 1812. They meant to seize the colony for the United States and to end its alleged threat to U.S. slavery. They claimed that Spanish officials had both incited American-held slaves to escape and failed to restrain Seminole depredations. They pointed to the presence of black troops in Florida. Grossly overestimating republican sentiments among the colonists of East Florida and grossly underestimating the resistance they would face, the largely Georgian expedition seized Amelia Island and laid siege to St. Augustine, destroying plantations along the way. John Houston McIntosh, an Anglo-American planter who had previously moved to Spanish East Florida, warned American officials that Florida's "slaves are excited to rebel, and we have an army of negroes raked up in this country." He saw Florida as a budding "refuge of fugitive slaves; from thence emissaries . . . will be detached to bring about the revolt of the black population of the United States." According to historian Jane Landers, rumors that accompanied this "Patriot War" directly stirred fears of a race war on the order of the Haitian Revolution. John Cusick, the leading historian of the conflict, provides abundant evidence of the American "frustration with [Spanish] East Florida as a sanctuary for runaway slaves and a haven for armed maroons and blacks."[23] As far away as Alexandria, Virginia, readers learned that spring that Spanish leaders in East Florida had incited "certain tribes of Indians . . . together with the people of color and slaves . . . to assist in exterminating" all pro-American Floridians, "offering

them . . . property and plunder as a reward."[24] And East Florida did successfully resist the American invasion with its small companies of armed black militia, larger forces of Cuban black troops, and, though their support had to be won, Seminoles under the leaders Bowlegs and Payne, whose slaves, black allies, and black countrymen strongly opposed the filibusterers and their aims.[25]

Blacks, Indians, and pro-Spanish colonists fought off the American occupation. Seminoles with strong black support and black militia in the Spanish service played major roles in the major American defeat at Twelve Mile Swamp in September 1812. A Seminole-dominated force with heavy black participation defeated Americans again later that month, halting the "Patriots'" effort to eliminate Seminole towns in the Alachua region. Such battles established black military prowess among the Seminoles, with important consequences for the future. Unlike their colonial forebears, U.S. citizens in the early Republic came to recognize the potential for enslaved black-free Indian coordination without an essential European or European American director. A report circulated, for example, that runaway slaves from Georgia, having once joined the Spanish troops in East Florida, now defected to the Seminole Indians, the better to fight the pro-U.S. Patriots. The writer, an East Florida "Patriot," begged for compassion: "What is to become of us, God knows."[26] When Americans again invaded the Alachua Seminole villages in February 1813, they had extreme orders: "to punish those Indians who had taken the warpath, burn all their property which could not be transported, execute without mercy Negroes captured under arms, and take all other Negroes as prisoners."[27] The murderous directive came from Brigadier General Thomas Flournoy, who essentially repeated it months later, as the United States entered into a more devastating war: the Creek Civil War, also known as the Red Stick War. Flournoy ordered American troops to kill "all negroes, horses, cattle, corn and other property that cannot be conveniently brought in" from the enemy.[28]

Remember Fort Mims

By mid-summer 1813, scattered rumors had enemy Indians colluding with enslaved blacks not only in the Spanish Florida colonies but elsewhere in the U.S. South: in Georgia, Tennessee, and especially the Mississippi Territory. In May 1812 press reports announced that militia had crushed a budding slave rebellion in Humphrey's County, Tennessee. The conspirators had

planned to "escape with plunder to the Indians," many of whom, the reports made clear, desired war with the United States.[29] The reports apparently referred to the Red Stick Creeks, the name given to the militant, anti-American and antigovernment Creek party in the Creek Civil War. The Red Stick insurgent religious movement, loosely allied with that of Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa far to the north, violently opposed the consolidating Creek National Council and its increasing embrace of Anglo-American influence. The United States, with a clear interest in eliminating Red Stick strength, intervened powerfully in that Indian civil war.

Before the American entry in the summer of 1813, Red Sticks seeking arms had actually visited Spanish posts in West Florida, and rumor had them colluding with British traders and officers. With East Florida already convulsed in the previous years' Patriot War and showing some real signs of black-Seminole alliances, events in and near West Florida raised alarm among U.S. citizens. Already, in the previous summer and fall, false rumor announced that British commanders had landed at Spanish Pensacola with 250 crack British West Indian troops of African descent. This force, this mirage, seized the colony for Britain and raised Indians against the Republic and its settlers. The phantom Redcoats distributed imaginary arms to the unreal Creeks, who would attack, as only Indians could, "this moon." Far up the Mississippi Valley an American officer feared that if Spanish Pensacola had actually fallen into the "possession of the arms of Great Britain, defended by black troops, the southern states have an enemy within their bosoms worse than the Creeks." Yet another rumor had Canadian British officers authorizing, in writing, Spanish governors in West Florida to arm and support the Red Sticks.[30] Amid such rumors, by 1813, the Creek Civil War generated further shocking stories that rationalized a brutal American intervention. Fort Mims, an obscure stockade in the Tensaw region north of Mobile Bay, became a focal point for those tales.

The fort, which joined almost twenty other stockades in the Mississippi Territory, had been improvised around the home of the Creek Indian cotton planter Samuel Mims, as the Creek Civil War and the War of 1812 erupted. The local free white and Indian residents intended this small palisade and blockhouse to protect the slaveholding Mobile hinterland. Several of the area's Creek families had invested heavily in the expanding cotton economy. Some of them openly welcomed similarly ambitious white settlers. These entrepreneurial Creeks, often English-speakers with European ancestry and connections, provided the new settlers with services, such as ferrying,

and they became the objects of Red Stick Creek hostility. Local militia headed by both white and Creek Indian leaders hoped to defend the community that gathered within and around the fort. Mississippi territorial militia, another 120 men, supported them. Importantly, the local Tensaw militia had already attacked Red Sticks at a place north of Pensacola called Burnt Corn Creek on July 27, 1813. Importantly, too, several Red Stick leaders hailed from the Tensaw region, some of these also had European ancestry, and they knew, very personally, many of those individuals who would seek protection that August within Fort Mims.[31] Fort Mims, sucked in 1813 into the Creek Civil War, blew out rumor. The Red Sticks' bloody assault on Fort Mims gave rise to rumors that settlers' slaves had not only plotted but had actually collaborated with enemy Indians.

Upwards of 700 Red Sticks attacked Fort Mims on August 30. The fort sheltered under 400 people, most of them noncombatants. By the end of the day, the battle had taken as many as 400 lives; there are no accurate counts. For their part, the Red Stick assailants lost as many as 100 men. Despite an enormous Red Stick advantage in numbers and despite their serious losses, writers have subsequently speculated, as rumor soon had it, that the fort fell because of an enemy within, that Indians and African Americans within the stockade somehow colluded with the attackers. Perhaps, it is alleged, slaves piled up the sand that is said to have kept the gate from closing. Perhaps slaves removed pickets from the stockade, allowing the attackers to overwhelm the garrison. Perhaps the slaves who withdrew with the Red Sticks after their victory did so voluntarily, escaping the Kingdom of Cotton for a more bearable life with less market-driven Creeks. One remarkable Red Stick letter that mentions the attack speaks nothing of black liberation but of an exaggerated "243 negroes taken prisoner." Among the dead defenders lay John Randon, a slaveholding Creek. According to one story, two of Randon's enslaved boys, at work well outside the fort, had noticed Red Sticks in the area and had raised the alarm shortly before the attack. If true, these youngsters clearly had no wish for Red Stick success. The story concludes with their reward: the commanding major, Daniel Beasley, accused them of spreading a false alarm and ordered one of them severely whipped. Whatever the reality behind all the uncertainties, the attack on Fort Mims almost immediately morphed in rumor and rhetoric into revealing but false stories that alarmed the southern citizens of the United States.[32]

According to the Washington, D.C., paper *National Intelligencer*, Red Stick fanatics, "headed, as some have imagined, by Spanish or British officers,"

attacked an American settlement and massacred whites in astonishing numbers that soared in print to as high as six hundred. The multi-ethnic Tensaw defenders, many of them Creek, paled to a uniform white under the power of rumor. Fort Mims became a racial event, marked by British or Spanish racial treachery, at which "every soul of the whites perished."[33] Other rumors put slaves in cahoots with the attackers. Benjamin Hawkins, the federal Indian agent to the Creeks, reported a rumor that three slaves, including a man named "Jo," had guided the Red Sticks to Mims. Hawkins vaguely stated that the three had first been captured by the Red Sticks; he leaves us guessing about their motivations or even their will. In any case, several of the Red Sticks who assaulted Fort Mims knew the region thoroughly and had no need for guides. Hawkins also had an earlier allegation from Coweta Creeks allied with the United States that a Fort Mims slave, "Siras," had assisted the Red Stick assault by cutting down the pickets. But in the same report, the Cowetas noted, the Red Sticks followed their triumph by hunting for escaped blacks. And the conflicting information in both reports came from yet another "negro," whom the federal agent and others increasingly trusted, though they kept him under guard.[34]

Other poorly grounded news had it that Fort Mims's African American men not only willingly accompanied the Red Sticks as captives, but also took up arms for them. Using the passive language of rumor, Governor William C. C. Claiborne alerted his militia colonels that "It is confidently reported that many slaves have escaped their Masters and joined the Indians."[35] This remains a plausible story to the degree that it appears that black men did, particularly at the later Battle of Econochaca, or Holy Ground, fight for the Red Sticks. But many of the black gunmen at Econochaca, far from being escaped slave rebels from the U.S. settlements, belonged as slaves to Red Stick leaders, particularly the large slaveholder William Weatherford. The U.S. forces had Indian allies at Econochaca, Choctaws who reportedly scalped both Red Sticks and African Americans, but who discarded the blacks' scalps in an act of contempt.[36] Amid such multiple racial signals, unfounded rumors like Claiborne's, right or wrong, mark a turn in U.S. American thinking: even considering that rumors of this war often had mooted British or Spanish instigation, these rumors of Indian-black collaboration in the Creek War bear something of the prospect of race war, with blacks joining Indians against white settlers. In 1813 and 1814 reports began to fly that the Red Sticks, even more than Seminoles before them, incited slave revolt.

Fort Mims did not occasion American involvement in the Creek Civil War; it was more symptom than cause of that intervention. But in its wake, the United States, with Creek, Cherokee, and other Indian allies, devastated Red Stick strongholds, kept the scattered militants on the move, and at the Battle of Tohopeka, or Horseshoe Bend, in March 1814, dealt the most severe battle defeat, measured in probable casualties, that any Indian people would see in all of U.S. history. Red Sticks likely lost more than eight hundred dead, with hundreds more women and children captured. Andrew Jackson led the American forces in this battle that effectively ended the war. Those Red Sticks who nonetheless wished to continue the fight made their way toward a refuge near and among the Seminoles, in West Florida.[37]

Fort Mims, hardly a "white" community, had supported a polyglot people with European, Creek, Natchez, African, and other ancestries. Take the remarkable case of Susannah Stiggins, a once prosperous resident who lost her husband and much property, including slaves, during the Fort Mims attack. Five years later, Andrew Jackson, having soundly defeated the Red Sticks in 1814, returned one of these captured slaves, a woman named Eliza, to Stiggins. Stiggins was a Creek of Natchez descent—her mother was Natchez and her father was Anglo-American. Her brother, George Stiggins, identified as both Creek and Christian: he later wrote an important narrative of the war.[38] Fort Mims, from which exploded powerful rumors of enslaved black collusion with free Indians against white settlers, presents the complicating factor that its slaveholders prominently included Creek Indians. At Mims, too, as scholars Gregory A. Waselkov and Claudio Saunt separately observe, Red Sticks killed blacks, deepening the ambiguities we should remember when we remember Fort Mims. Slaves sought every opportunity to escape slavery, but throughout the Creek Civil War, most saw little real hope among the Red Sticks, at least not until British troops actually arrived in 1814, by which time the Red Sticks had been largely annihilated. The British landing, not the Creek Civil War, precipitated a significant Indian-allied martial movement for black independence in West Florida.[39]

The First and Second Seminole Wars

In the messy way of war, the "Patriot" and Creek Civil Wars merged into the War of 1812 (itself really a series of wars), before bleeding in turn into the First Seminole War (conventionally dated 1817–1818). The First Seminole War bore the accents of European intervention from the Anglo-American War of

1812, and it carried the marks of Indian division from the Creek Civil War. But more than either, it raised the prospect and fear of independent black-Indian collaboration against the United States.

Following the Red Sticks' devastating defeat at Tohopeka in March 1814, militant Creeks took refuge in the Florida region. British forces arrived in Spanish West Florida that spring, and in May and June they began a brief but meaningful collaboration with Indians and former slaves at both Pensacola and Prospect Bluff on the Apalachicola River. Already during raids on coastal Georgia British officers had distributed copies of an April 2, 1814, proclamation that encouraged slaves and their families to escape to British arms. Now, British forces that included West Indian black troops encouraged the gathering of more people who freed themselves, as it turns out, mostly from the Creeks and the Pensacola colonists, though some did continue to escape from the southern states.[40]

To combat this threat to American slavery, Andrew Jackson captured Pensacola with only minor Spanish and British resistance in November, and he held it for a matter of days. He forced the British, Red Sticks, and black allies to withdraw from the immediate environs, and he left the town in Spanish hands before departing for his more famous victory at New Orleans the following January. The British continued to encourage slave resistance to the United States, and with Indian and African support they seized American Fort Bowyer on Mobile Bay in February 1815, just in time for news to reach them that the Anglo-American War of 1812 had formally ended. Before they withdrew from the Gulf, British forces had trained and armed hundreds of newly freed black men, who continued to drill in the absence of British officers. These men and their families consolidated under arms at the fort on Prospect Bluff, which became known in the United States as the Negro Fort. For some fifteen months Prospect Bluff hosted an independent maroon community that traded and allied with militant Creeks and Seminoles. It became intolerable not only to the United States, but to many proslavery Creeks, who raided its environs. Again violating Spanish territory, but without much offense to its alienated slaveholders, Americans with Creek allies attacked and destroyed the Prospect Bluff community and its fort in July 1816. By 1817, after survivors of that attack had fled to the Seminoles, American reports estimated that blacks among the Seminoles numbered about six hundred.[41]

The First Seminole War smoldered against this thick background of British participation, black independence, and Seminole and Red Stick alliance.

Americans sensed British intrigue as Andrew Jackson again invaded Florida, still under Spanish rule, in 1818. Jackson captured and executed a prominent British trader and a former British marine, whom he accused of inciting blacks, Seminoles and Creeks. He also hanged two Red Stick leaders, Josiah Francis and Homathlemico. His troops penetrated the Florida interior, attacked remaining Red Sticks, killed scores, and destroyed a main body of Seminole villages on the Suwannee River. Most of the black and Indian inhabitants of these Seminole communities, however, had withdrawn, and as Jackson left Florida, they harassed him. Jackson largely failed in one of his objectives, to capture fugitive slaves among the Seminoles.[42]

If rumors of Native American efforts against American slavery ever soared over the Atlantic seaboard, they did so on the eve and through the early years of the Second Seminole War (1835–1842). The federal policy of removal, the Jacksonian determination to move all Indian peoples to the central and southern plains, formed the fundamental and igniting issue of the war, with its familiar ingredients: fraudulent treaties, legalistic whitewash, and force. But the presence among the Seminoles of people of African descent, who in most cases lived far more freely than they would among neighboring Nations, strongly configured events. Conflict over land, over labor, and over race—a formidable trio—brought on the Seminole War.

The United States acquired Florida from Spain in the Adams-Onís Treaty, which the Senate ratified in 1821 and which opened the prospect for settlement by the slaveholding Republic. The treaty greatly reduced American concerns about European intervention in the Southeast. Congress quickly organized the Florida Territory in 1822. As U.S. settlement expanded, territorial concern deepened that Seminoles profoundly weakened American slavery. By early in the following decade, reports circulated that Seminoles gave refuge to more than one thousand persons, legally American slaves. News from Alachua County, Florida Territory, had it that these blacks, now emboldened and turbulent, freely traversed "the County night and day." Local citizens petitioned the president in 1832 to deploy troops "to protect the Citizens of said County from aggressions by the Indians or attempt of an insurrection among the slaves." East Floridian citizens petitioned again in early 1834; this time they demanded Seminole removal to the faraway Indian Territory. The Indians' current proximity, they argued, meant that "the owners of slaves in our Territory, and even in the states contiguous, cannot, for a moment, in anything like security, enjoy the possessions of this description of property." Historian Matthew Clavin has analyzed these petitions


Massacre of the Whites by the Indians and Blacks in Florida.
The above is intended to represent the horrid Massacre of the Whites in Florida, in January, February and March, 1836, when near Four Hundred (including women and children) fell victims to the barbarity of the Negroes and Indians.
AN
AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE
OF THE
SEMINOLE WAR;
ITS CAUSE, RISE AND PROGRESS,
AND A MINUTE DETAIL OF THE
HORRID MASSACRES
Of the Whites, by the Indians and Negroes, in Florida,
in the months of December, January and February.
Communicated for the press by a gentleman who has
spent eleven weeks in Florida, near the scene of the In-
dian depredations, and in a situation to collect every im-
portant fact relating thereto.
PROVIDENCE:
Printed for D. F. Blanchard, and others, Publishers.
1836.

Massacres of Whites by Indians and Blacks, 1836. Artist unknown. By the Second Seminole War, U.S. citizens admitted to the realities of black and Indian collaboration, but even in this tableau, the actions are distinguishable. Indians burn captives and homes, take babies, and scalp, while blacks attack men and one black insurgent, to the far right, listens as a woman pleads for her children's lives. Foldout frontispiece, D. F. Blanchard (pub.), *An Authentic Narrative of the Seminole War* (Providence, 1836). William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

as part of the panicky and bloody sequel to Nat Turner's 1831 slave rebellion in Southampton, Virginia. That crushed uprising, like the 1811 Deslondes Rebellion, had stirred fears of a North American Haiti.[43] The petitions also represent a real turn from the colonial era, when governors saw in powerful Indian Nations a foil to escapees and maroons.

As Floridians now speculated on the union of black and Indian efforts, they increasingly conceived of Seminoles and escaped slaves as sharing goals and identities. The authors of the 1834 petition ruminated awkwardly, but with clarity, that the Seminoles and fugitive slaves shared "sympathy," a "parity of interest," and a "similarity of condition." Such sentiments, interests, and circumstances, the petitioners asserted, made the Seminoles attractive friends to any "negro" who would "become tired of the service of his owner." On a national level in the most important publication on American Indians to that date, in 1836 Thomas L. McKenney and James Hall called the protection Seminoles gave escapees from slavery "galling."[44]

The Seminoles' growing identification with Africans and African Americans was a new, uncommon, and unfinished social phenomenon.[45] Blacks and Indians in Florida had collaborated to some degree for decades, even for a century, though generally with some imperial involvement. Although individual blacks made rich and unfettered lives among largely independent Indian peoples throughout the continent, often achieving important positions of authority as informed mediators, their experience does not express a broad social pattern. The period of the Seminole Wars raised novel possibilities: a free Indian Nation had strong leaders who identified their cause and interests with the black people among them. The Second Seminole War, as it turned out, would also demonstrate that the identification had limits. But until then, American citizens rumored afresh.

In Florida and along the Gulf, U.S. citizens in the 1830s imagined black Indian collaboration without European intervention. Their forebears had few such anxieties, but these Americans knew that "negroes" had a strong hand in Seminole opposition to the United States. Americans speculated widely about the nature of this new unity. While Seminoles no doubt determined as their first priorities the retention of their independence and their homeland, American officials reached for other explanations for Seminole resistance to removal, the most violent the Republic would ever see.

American agents knew that Seminoles opposed the leadership of the Creek Nation, fearing that removal entailed, among more serious losses, a forced "reunion with the Creeks." Slavery played a critical role in this legitimate

concern. The Creek elite had adopted the model of racist chattel slavery. Seminoles foresaw that, after removal, Creeks would both enslave the free black Seminoles and abscond with the Seminoles' own black slaves and tributaries. Seminoles had good reason for the concern. Creeks already complained to American agents that they, like U.S. citizens, had lost slaves to the Seminoles. Creek hopes either to recover slaves or to gain compensation for the losses indeed threatened the social fabric of the Seminole Nation. American officials saw that this Creek-Seminole friction over the issue of slavery reinforced a unity of interest among blacks and Seminoles generally. Americans also argued in more conventional and less sophisticated terms, rumoring that an underground network of black liquor smugglers exercised a corrupting influence over Seminole leaders. Americans further rumored that a particular gang of slaves, Indians, and former Spaniards had formed a motley crew on an island in Charlotte's Harbor, where they engaged in an extensive illegal trade with Spanish Cuba. Territorial Floridians charged Seminole leaders with a hand in that corruption. Most incongruously, Americans asserted that "The slaves belonging to the Indians have a controlling interest over their masters, and are utterly opposed to any change of residence."[46]

As Americans rumored that Seminoles colluded with slaves, they reported that Seminoles and fugitive slaves raided and plundered the livestock and goods of U.S. citizens in Florida. In turn, territorial citizens raided the Seminoles, seeking purported fugitive slaves from the states and federal territories. The Apalachicola Seminole leader Econchattamico gained the assistance of U.S. agents to recover slaves he had lost to such raids, but Americans also used the incident to try to persuade him that his true safety and security lay in removal westward, to Indian Territory at a greater distance from lawless Americans.[47]

The fears stoked by Seminole collaboration with fugitive slaves advanced the politics of Indian removal. American citizens sloughed the old assumption that slave alliances with independent Indian Nations depended entirely on British, Spanish, or French intrigue. Saint Domingue's defeat of France, the 1811 German Coast slave rebellion, Nat Turner's recent insurgency, and, above all, the experience of the recent Florida wars demanded expanded vigilance among planters. Southern citizens—in the run-up to the Second Seminole War and as its violence expanded—rumored expansively about the Seminoles' collusion with former and current slaves, without much reference to outsiders, with one striking exception.

A new seemingly alien opponent had recently emerged beyond slavery's fortress. As they had in the aftermath of Nat Turner's rebellion, a few southern citizens pointed to the abolitionists, a new enemy quickly shedding its civility in the northeastern states and Great Lakes Country, a small but vocal and influential group of conspirators. U.S. Brigadier General Joseph Hernandez, a native of Spanish St. Augustine who embraced the United States and had served as a territorial delegate to Congress, denounced the northern agitators. Hernandez would gain some notoriety as the officer who captured Osceola in 1837. In 1835, as war loomed, he called on the territorial governor to raise the troops, to hasten Seminole removal, and to protect the U.S. citizens. He pointed to the latest cause for alarm: "there are a large number of Negroes amongst the Indians, who may be under the influence of the Abolitionists of the North, whose machinations, are now endangering our safety."[48]

The most prominent of the abolitionists at the time, William Lloyd Garrison had already printed a rejoinder to this kind of accusation. In his December 1831 issue of *The Liberator*, Garrison asserted that slaves needed no agitators when the sounds of their world—from the cries of the Haitian Revolution, to the speeches of the pleasant Independence Day celebrations—resounded with freedom: "The slaves need no incentives at our hands. They will find them in their stripes—in their emaciated bodies—in their ceaseless toil—in their ignorant minds—in every field, in every valley, on every hilltop and mountain, wherever you and your father have fought for liberty—in your speeches, your conversations, your celebrations, your pamphlets, your newspapers—voices in the air, sounds from across the ocean, invitations to resistance, above, below, around them!"[49] In Florida and throughout the slaveholding states and territories, such "Voices in the air" grew louder with the British Emancipation Act (1833), promising an end to slavery in places as close as the Bahamas.

Sounding violently discordant to most U.S. citizens, the voices conjured Haiti as they spoke of black men waging war in Florida. Although national reporting generally maintained the Seminoles as a noble and worthy American Indian enemy, when correspondents turned to those among the Seminoles who were of African descent, stories of unrestrained savagery raised their heads.[50] A crucial moment came early in the war, on December 28, 1835, when Seminoles surprised and killed more than one hundred American troops in the so-called Dade Massacre. Press reports drew a stark line between Seminole fighters and black horsemen, who allegedly slaughtered the

wounded. The reports further mutated, elaborated, and spread with groundless exaggeration as they made it into the national press. The embellishment came far more at the expense of blacks than of Indians.[51]

Major General Thomas S. Jesup, commanding U.S. forces from the end of 1836 through early 1838, embarked on the clearest, perhaps the only, explicit federal strategy of divide and rule that had black-Indian alliances in mind. Understanding American chattel slavery lay at the heart of black resistance to Indian removal, the Virginian famously declared this "a negro, not an Indian war" that threatened slavery across the South.[52] With fits and starts, Jesup worked a wedge into the alliance of blacks and Seminoles, promising to protect black Seminoles from abduction and sale by Creek Indians or U.S. citizens. Jesup promised black belligerents who came to terms that they could expect to go safely to the West, and he promised Seminoles who owned slaves that they could expect to carry their property there as well. By early 1838, Jesup had succeeded in drawing both most blacks and a good many Native Americans from the fighting and away from those Seminoles who continued to resist. As for Jesup's promises, not all blacks would escape seizure by U.S. citizens or Creeks who claimed them as property.[53]

The climactic, unusual, and even exceptional Second Seminole War followed centuries of African American slavery in the North American Southeast. From the establishment of the Carolinas through the American Revolution, British colonists and early U.S. citizens had feared the collaboration of free Indian peoples with enslaved Africans and African Americans, but most often that fear featured an imperial enemy. That Spain, France, or corrupt British ministers might mobilize Indians and blacks against inoffensive settlers made far more rhetorical sense to colonists than did the rarely expressed idea that free Indian Nations would league with enslaved Africans against a colonial oppressor. After the American and Haitian Revolutions, however, and particularly with the emergence of the Seminole Nation, evidence of black cooperation with Native Americans in Florida and the Gulf of Mexico penetrated and altered the consciousness of settlers. Federal, state, and territorial governments wondered about such cooperation in the Creek War and took action against it in the two Seminole Wars. During the Second Seminole War, the army worked deliberately to remove blacks from the action. Curiously, even as the Second Seminole War erupted, some U.S. citizens revived the old idea that a corrupt white elite, in this case the new abolitionists, worked the strings of black-Indian resistance. The needle of

freedom spun away from the South, pointing toward to the North and the North alone for decades.

American slavery shaped the American frontiers, those legendary western nurseries of American freedom. Both slavery and the frontiers distinguished the colonial world from the Old World at the dawn of globalization. Native Americans, colonizers, and enslaved Africans formed on these frontiers new societies with novel social structures based on slavery and race that would have startled their ancestors, and they spoke of them in rumor and legend, telling stories of slavery, violence, and disease. The following chapter chases powerful reports about smallpox that swept through Indian Country in the age of the Seminole Wars and Indian removal, and that have reemerged in American culture in our time.

11. Extirpation: Disease and Removal

The smallpox blanket acquired legendary power in the wake of Francis Parkman's discovery and 1870 publication of eighteenth-century British officers' plans to infect Ohio Country Indians. Several modern scholars confirmed that the garrison at Fort Pitt indeed attempted to infect an Indian delegation, and they identified those responsible. This well-grounded scholarship provided the warp for the smallpox blanket as it gained symbolic power over the past century among critics of U.S. American expansion, Indian and non-Indian alike. The Indian experience of colonization provided the woof. Sturdy as a Pendleton, hideous as mass murder, the smallpox blanket wears well today as it unfolds in print and electronic media well beyond the singularly verified and atrocious actions of British and colonial officers in 1763.[1] Fabricated from the genuine terrors of history, full of truth, the legend is not history.

This chapter dwells on the 1830s, the age of forced Indian removal, another focal point in stories of smallpox and colonialism. It first briefly explores current scholarship on the most central site for the smallpox blanket stories of our time, the Upper Missouri epidemic of 1837. It then turns to a Jacksonian federal campaign against smallpox, a campaign that spun yarns about disease and mass murder that later wove their way into the blanket legend. Historical in nature but legendary in content, the stories harbor insights into the indigenous experience of American expansion.

Blankets on the Upper Missouri

The Mandan villages of the Upper Missouri River Valley provide one key setting for the modern smallpox blanket. The people of those communities, frozen in a series of 1832 paintings by George Catlin, suffered unspeakable losses when smallpox hit them in 1837. In that year, the Second Seminole

War and the national controversy over the removal of the Cherokee Nation raged to the east and south. Over the preceding decade, the United States had forced many Indian peoples from rich agricultural lands east of the Mississippi. Examining this violently aggressive national context, some scholars have pinned the origins of the Mandan epidemic on U.S. traders or federal officials who allegedly infected their Mandan hosts deliberately, using blankets.[2] Other scholars, while doubting that American citizens conspired to eliminate the peoples of the Upper Missouri Valley, nonetheless lodge a serious charge: some traders, although they did not disseminate infected blankets or plot to kill, knowingly risked the exposure of Indians to the disease; in that sense, the blanket legend, ungrounded in its particulars, comes close to the mark.[3]

Mandans had not encountered smallpox since 1781; the federal vaccination program of 1832 bypassed them. No Mandan under 56 years of age had survived a previous epidemic and thereby acquired immunity. They lived in compact communities. Their lack of exposure, lack of immunization, and way of life rendered them unusually vulnerable among American peoples to the virus. Reviewing the record, historian Elizabeth Fenn concludes that "federal authorities *intentionally* excluded the northern [Plains] tribes from the vaccination campaign." Business cupidity compounded federal negligence. Sent by a large trading company from St. Louis, the steamboat *St. Peter's* weighed in at the Mandan villages. Passengers and crew knew the vessel carried smallpox, but the *St. Peter's* continued up the Missouri. Fenn calls the decision of the crew of *St. Peter's* to land "a willful neglect of staggering proportions." Trade began, and the virus soon floated into the villagers' throats, latched onto mucous membranes, found good host cells, and began its lethal DNA dump. Fenn finds it remotely possible that cloth goods transmitted the disease, but she favors a human agent, "someone sick or recovering from the disease."[4]

In the period, no Mandan, Hidatsa, Arikara, or member of another affected Upper Missouri people implicated a blanket gift as the source of the epidemic. One U.S. citizen's story speaks generally of infectious cloth goods. Recorded shortly before the U.S. Civil War by Henry Boller, a trader among the Mandans, the story tells of accidental infection and renders the Americans more as blunderers than as mass murderers. It also racially renders the key American as black, not white. According to Boller, Mandans had told him that the famous black mountain man "Jim Beckwith" (James Beckwourth) had accepted unlaundered clothing for safekeeping from a fellow-trader

suffering from the disease. "Beckwith" himself then fell ill and infected others in his trading boat as it ascended to the Mandan villages. They unwittingly unleashed the disease, which spread among the Mandans and beyond. While the story reflects the idea, common to colonial and American elites in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that smallpox favored marginal folk (blacks, rough traders), it says nothing of intent to kill. Boller elsewhere related a Mandan rumor circulating around Fort Berthold in the 1850s that Americans conspired to infect Arikaras—with the measles, not smallpox, and via a written letter, not a dirty blanket.[5]

The Beckwourth story confabulates the famous black frontiersman with an anonymous "black deckhand," already by the 1850s rumored among U.S. citizens to have been the first to fall ill aboard the *St. Peter's*. Like a competing U.S. American story that the Mandan epidemic began when an Arikara stole a blanket from the ship, the legend functioned socially in Anglo-American society to "shift the blame" off white traders and onto blacks or Indians. The legends that black bodies or Indian misdeeds ignited the Mandan epidemic carried as much cultural power, though with contrary politics, as the later twentieth-century legend that American citizens routinely presented smallpox to Indians through an insidious gift.[6]

Villagers did blame the United States while smallpox raged. The dying Mandan leader Mah-to-toh-pah, or Four Bears, held the United States accountable. Four Bears called for vengeance, but he mentioned no gifts, no blanket, nor even an American intent to kill. His speech appears in trader Francis Chardon's 1837 journal. Chardon, trading on the Upper Missouri that year, tried to count the dead, but he gave up the effort: "they die so fast that it is impossible." His journal explodes with Mandan, Arikara, and Hidatsa calls for vengeance against the traders who brought them smallpox. It also drips with Chardon's disdain for Indians, particularly those who want him dead. He had some sympathy for those who suffered and he took some action for their benefit, as when he and his men prevented a woman from committing suicide upon the death of her family. Yet Chardon also raised a glass of whiskey to the honor of Andrew Jackson, indicating his political sympathies with the party that favored the removal of Indians from the East. That said, he hated smallpox and found the epidemic appalling.[7]

Only in later generations do stories about the gift of an infected blanket establish themselves as subversive and persistent fixtures of anticolonial critique and fix themselves to the Mandan catastrophe.[8] I posited, in chapter 2, that Francis Parkman's sixth edition of the *Conspiracy of Pontiac* (1870) first

exposed vicious genuine colonial plotting to deploy smallpox and initiated the media broadcast of the blanket gift story. But the nineteenth century saw a far more important development that made the murderous deployment of smallpox highly plausible, for on that century's eve science had, in fact, achieved a new mastery over this scourge. That achievement empowered rumor and legend anew.

Pox Removal

In the fourth year of Andrew Jackson's presidency, American agents moved deliberately through small portions of Indian Country to infect the inhabitants with pox. The disease they introduced, cowpox, would protect those who fell ill against smallpox. A so-called congressional Indian Vaccination Act of early May 1832 provided $12,000 for the task.[9] The federal government had for decades provided such vaccination to troops, and because the management of Indian affairs still fell to the War Department, it could field some experts. The program—although incomplete, deeply flawed, launched in the interest of Indian removal, and beset with the usual obstacles of corruption and incompetence—had some local success. Larger than any predecessors among the Indians in the United States, it also had some antecedents.

The colonial record notes minor efforts to inoculate Indians. Spanish and Portuguese colonies to the south and west waged serious smallpox inoculation campaigns as early as the 1760s, Guatemala saw a massive Spanish royal vaccination campaign in 1803, and Roman Catholic missionaries in Mexican Upper California reportedly vaccinated between three thousand and six thousand Indians in 1828. In the British North American colonies, Sir William Johnson billed the Crown for the inoculation of close to two hundred Indians, mostly Mohawks, between 1769 and 1773. British Canadian authorities, moreover, inoculated Grand River Valley Mohawks toward the end of the eighteenth century, and they vaccinated more vigorously beginning in 1823. In the United States, Thomas Jefferson diplomatically presented vaccines and vaccine matter to visiting delegations, including such eminences as the Miami Little Turtle, who brought them back to their peoples. Presbyterian and Moravian missionaries vaccinated Cherokees in 1824.[10]

As several historians have demonstrated, the Jacksonian campaign had multiple goals, which ranged from the humanitarian—particularly among Indians deemed already "pacified"—to the acceleration of eastern Indian

removal. Federal officials believed that few of the East's Native Americans would voluntarily move across the Mississippi unvaccinated when the trans-Mississippi West suffered under the frequent blows of the scourge. Fighting the pox on the southern plains and vaccinating some of the more than 70,000 eastern Indians slated for possible relocation made abundant sense to a government that sought voluntary removal (or its appearance) as matters of national peace, honor, economy, and profit. A catastrophic failure on the Missouri River where Mandans and their allies never received the vaccine, doomed generally by venality, lethargy, and racism, the vaccination program nonetheless protected thousands. On the eastern Plains, for example, it touched perhaps a third of the Osages in 1832.[11]

A final, often overlooked, rationale for the program may have been the most important. Even the most hardened racist could value the protection that the campaign might confer on the Republic's citizens and slaves. When he vaccinated Ottawas in northern Ohio earlier that year, Dr. Oscar White tied humanity to self-protection: "my object was to save the Indians from disease and death knowing that the small pox was already near them and that they would inevitably spread it among the white population." As white Americans in the 1830s rightly knew, unless they had survived the disease or been protected by one of the available forms of inoculation, smallpox could run riot in their bodies. Inert out of the body, with no thoughts or feelings, smallpox is truly blind to race and culture. Without will, it infects any vulnerable person it can. When in the 1790s the new, effective, and remarkably safe "vaccine" went public in England, smallpox reportedly killed close to 400,000 Europeans each year. Far greater numbers also suffered the horrible illness, but survived, usually with the famous scars. The new vaccine, so called because it derived from cowpox, conferred a temporary immunity, about seven years; arresting smallpox required repeated vaccination across all populations. The contagion's capacity to kill U.S. citizens remained deeply feared and spurred remarkable public health efforts into the twentieth century.[12] Destroying pox made more sense than deploying pox.

On the front lines in the Jacksonian war on pox marched young Douglass Houghton, surgeon and virtuoso scientist. He sought the "vaccine matter" within a week of the act's passage, and he performed his first western Indian vaccinations within two months. In his early twenties and energetic in his efforts to vaccinate, he toured Ojibwe villages and camps along the U.S.-claimed shores of Lake Superior and a portion of the Ojibwe interior to the west of the lake. He armed himself with vials and lancets, small surgical

instruments that resemble an old-fashioned pen nib, the tools of vaccination. He also carried orders from the federal Office of Indian Affairs to make an account of the history "of the small pox among them." As Houghton inserted cowpox into the arms of his patients, he sought out the Ojibwes' own record of smallpox. One of the more arresting episodes of that history, he heard, had happened some sixty-two years before.[13]

Ojibwes told Houghton that vengeful "Fur Company" men had deliberately infected them in 1770. Infuriated by the murder of an employee, the merchants, who worked out of Mackinac (probably Michilimackinac) in northern Michigan, meant to retaliate against whole villages and families that lived in the lake country of what is now north-central Minnesota. When approached by a delegation of these western Ojibwes, the traders feigned forgiveness, and they presented the visitors with insidious gifts: "a cask of liquor and a flag closely rolled." Like Pandora's box, the presents came with detailed instructions: the cask must remain closed and the flag under wraps until the peacemakers reached home. Traveling via Lake Superior, the Indian delegates followed the mysterious instructions until they reached their relatives at Fond du Lac. There, among kin but still more than 100 miles from their destination, they tapped the cask and unfurled the flag, releasing the smallpox that "swept off" almost everyone; "it is believed that not a single band of Chippewas (Ojibwes) north and west from Fond du Lac escaped its ravages." Houghton, without much comment, reports that Ojibwes widely understood that the disease had erupted from "the articles presented to their brethren," and that "it was done for the purpose of punishing them more severely for their offenses."[14]

When, almost two decades later, young William Whipple Warren drafted his *History of the Ojibway People*, he included much the same episode, though not entirely the same. He sets it in 1781, for example, a time of documented continental smallpox. Warren identifies the Pillager band of Leech Lake as that which had both attacked the trader and received the fatal gift. A British officer, not a trading company, issues the gift. Like Houghton, he places the outbreak at Fond du Lac. Through both Ojibwe and European heritage and an Ojibwe interpreter, Warren understood that "it is a common saying to this day, that the white men purposely inflicted [smallpox] on them." Believing it a harsh allegation, he obtained the story's confirmation from "the enlightened and thinking portions of the tribe."[15]

In some of its details, the episode reported by Houghton and Warren closely resembles the incident at Fort Pitt. But it holds a closer resemblance,

in date and in place (and in Houghton's mention of a cask), to a story filed in 1769 by the British commander of North American forces, General Thomas Gage, then in New York. Gage feared that Indians in the Straits of Mackinac region might attack the British. He had news that they had recently lost almost forty relatives after receiving a large quantity of rum at the British fort. The Indians, he added, "attribute such a Mortality to the Liquor's being poisoned." He says nothing of cloth or smallpox, but "poison" could signify disease.[16]

Not one of these three stories mentions a blanket. Houghton's version includes a cask of liquor and a furled (British) flag, both presented as desirable but each an affliction, given by a deceitful ally, that is, a foe. Casks and flags both carry obvious threats to identity, and the stories might well teach the error of dealing uncritically with often duplicitous colonizers. In Warren's later version of the episode, the smallpox-spiked alcohol disappears, and in its place appear "a medal, flag, coat, and bale of goods." As in Houghton's account, the delegates unfurl the flag at Fond du Lac. Warren adds that the leader also redistributes the British presents, unleashing the pestilence, and dons the British coat, which sickens him until he dies, alone, in the woods. The British coat, probably red, touched his body, tampered with his identity, and isolated and killed him. Perhaps, given the abundance of earlier stories describing colonizers as disease-givers, this story reflects a kind of suspicious, imprecise set of latent recollections of the Fort Pitt event, only later to revive as new rumor.[17] Or, as the Gage letter might suggest, perhaps something very like it did take place at Mackinac in the late 1760s. But even if the stories refer not to historical fact but instead to non-events, the stories alone are facts. And they indicate some modest evolution, from one to the next.

That the 1832 account accuses traders of the atrocity, while Warren's later version pins it on a British officer, raises interesting possibilities. In 1832 western Ojibwes had to worry about commerce. At war with Dakotas, they needed ammunition and firearms, secured mainly by trade. This threat of dependence, not only on the market, but also on particular trading companies, inspired rumor and legend. Ojibwes had long engaged in the market, but the 1832 tale reveals their "resistance and ambivalence," or, at the very least, their lack of identification with the merchants on whom they increasingly relied. For these reasons, too, alcohol—the most controversial item of exchange—made sense as a vector.[18] By the late 1840s, after several treaties with the United States, federal annuities played a larger role in the Ojibwes'

strategies, and their warfare with other Indians diminished. The federal government, an increasing presence in Indian Country, played an increasing role in Indian lives. The shift of concern from Houghton's trading company to Warren's government officer reflects these developments.

Houghton gathered his version while he worked to infect the Indians with the "vaccine disease." It was nonlethal, and, when the vaccine "took," it protected against smallpox for an epidemic or two. Houghton had found it easy to convince the Indians "of the efficacy of the vaccination." Vaccination, revealed and publicized by British physician Edward Jenner between 1796 and 1798, involved the transfer of matter gathered from one person's cowpox lesion to an incision in the arm of a second, healthy, patient. Until the eve of the twentieth century, until Louis Pasteur, working on anthrax, employed the term "vaccine" to refer to the deliberate introduction into the patient's body of a protective form of any disease, the term "vaccine" had suggested cowpox; it meant the vaccination against smallpox.[19] Houghton carried vaccine matter into Indian Country in the form of crusts furnished by the surgeon general, crusts that when effective produced the mild vaccine disease, a form of cowpox, providing considerable immunity against smallpox.

For all his youthful sweat and risk, for all the lives he protected, Houghton experimented on human subjects, and he did so under difficult conditions. Vaccine matter often failed, a major problem for the federal campaign. Some of the crusts that the government supplied spoiled before reaching him. Houghton probably carried threads, soaked in the "virus" or "lymph," as he called the infectious pus gathered from an actively ill patient. He likely employed absorbent cotton thread when performing arm-to-arm vaccinations—moving his lancet and its lymph from the arm of an infected person at the height of cowpox to that of an unexposed person. He lacked full confidence in his materials, he had ambitions to improve the procedures, and yet he had much to do. On the move, Houghton would visit a village, vaccinate large numbers in a single day, and generally leave the following day. A busy man at Leech Lake on July 17, Houghton dressed a ball wound, vaccinated "more than four hundred men, women, and children, pulled some 15 or 20 teeth and prescribed to the sick." Since he generally vaccinated from one arm to the next, he had to have on hand persons at the right stage of infection to effect the vaccination. The "vaccine disease," which lasts perhaps ten days, takes six to eight days to appear. Cowpox, in other words, provides the best infectious material when it has invaded the patient

for six to eight days. Yet Houghton never spent six or eight days in any one community. He rarely revisited a village within the prescribed time after the initial vaccination. At Leech Lake, for example, he arrived one day; the following day he vaccinated hundreds of people, and then he left, not to return.[20]

Not far to the north, at Cass Lake, on the other hand, Houghton vaccinated a very large number of people, then took a six-day side trip to meet other official obligations, before returning to Cass Lake to see satisfying results: people infected with relatively mild cowpox. The very next day he reached Leech Lake, undoubtedly accompanied by vaccinated, mildly feverish Cass Lake members with "virus" ripe for the transfer. They enabled him to vaccinate the huge congregation. His journal remains silent on these accomplices in vaccination, but he could not have done without them.[21]

Ojibwes participated actively in Houghton's vaccine campaign. They even agreed to carry on the procedure themselves. Probably because he knew that he would not see the results of his own work at Leech Lake, he presented the acclaimed leader Flat Mouth (Eshkibagikoonzhe) with a lancet and instructions on how to use it on those for whom the "vaccine matter should fail." He often informed leaders of communities about "the time and manner of vaccination," so that the "operation of revaccination" might be "performed by themselves."[22] Ojibwes likely carried on the process in the absence of the good doctor.

Michael McConnell and Paul Kelton, cutting against the grain of an older scholarship that emphasized misguided, counterproductive native treatments for smallpox (such as sweating), have separately instead discussed the ways in which eighteenth-century eastern Native Americans gained practical experience with smallpox and devised useful means, including the circulation of news, isolation, and quarantine, to arrest epidemics. McConnell points to the smallpox epidemic of 1763, which Delawares believed came out of the British settlements. According to one released British captive, the Delawares took informed action against the epidemic. They "immediately moved" stricken villagers to a remote encampment but placed them "under the care of one who had had the disease before." They knew that survivors acquired immunity; that quarantine benefited the community; and that patients, with basic care, might survive. Kelton finds much the same kind of evidence from the era before vaccination. Cherokees devised new ceremonies that ritualized quarantine and new religious offices that coordinated successful public responses to the disease. These endured into the nine-



Aysh-ke-bah-ke-ko-zhay, or Flat Mouth, sculpted in marble by Francis Vincenti, ca. 1855. The bust was sculpted while Eshkibagikoonzhe visited the national capital. Decades earlier, in 1832, he had accepted and participated in the smallpox vaccination campaign. U.S. Senate Collection.

teenth century. Ojibwes, given their long experience with Europeans and their many historic bouts with smallpox, undoubtedly investigated methods to battle the plague. Into the twentieth century, Ojibwe stories held that powerful medicine men had once defeated smallpox by turning into horned serpents or turtles and having their relatives rub against their bodies.[23]

Houghton vaccinated, counted, and experimented. His figures added up to some 2,070 individuals, almost all of them a version of the arm-to-arm technique, since he had carried but a limited amount of vaccine matter and could only use that matter directly on a few. He reexamined about 700 persons. He had originally treated fewer than 200 of these using matter gathered "directly from the pustules of the people laboring under" the vaccine disease. This, the preferred technique performed within that 6- to 8-day

window, proved highly effective. Some other patients (he provides no numbers here) he vaccinated using vaccine lymph gathered the same manner, but held outside the body for an additional several days. Here too, it seems, the vaccine usually took. A third set of patients had less luck. These people received, in each arm, a lancet tipped with fresh "crusts" from the arms of Ojibwes who, rather than at the height of the illness, had recovered. "An average of one in three of those vaccinated from crusts has failed" to develop cowpox, he wrote, and thus failed to gain any immunity. But "of those vaccinated directly from the arm of a person laboring under the [vaccine] disease, not more than one in twenty has failed." Exhausted, he nonetheless kept account, noting observations about the techniques he practiced on these human subjects. For those who failed to contract the "vaccine disease" through one of his methods, Houghton states that he attempted to re-vaccinate, but he succeeded with at most a third of these individuals, leaving perhaps 350 persons falsely vaccinated and therefore, he could only hope, under effective care by a leader like Flat Mouth, one of several to whom he presented lancets.[24]

Hurrying through Indian Country, Houghton probably did not prescribe the exact regimen that typically accompanied vaccination, and he does not tell us how or if he improvised. Robert Thomas's *A Treatise on Domestic Medicine* (1822) laid out the protocols: frequent saline drafts tinctured with "nitre" or opium (poppy syrup for children), and sometimes "purging" with "antimonial powders," and calming or fever reduction with rhubarb, or jalap, calomel, or another form of mercury. For delirium: wine, ether, and camphor. Thomas liked to "keep the bowels open." The Ojibwe pharmacopoeia provided mightily for that, but Houghton, luckily for his patients, does not appear to have prescribed anything.[25]

Houghton had other business. He accompanied an expedition whose express purposes included not only the discovery of the source of the Mississippi but the establishment of peace between Dakotas and Ojibwes. His initial orders said nothing of vaccination. He served as the expedition's physician and its recorder of "the natural history of the country." Only after passage of the Indian Vaccination Act did vaccination become "a special object" of his instructions. He took the task seriously, but he confessed to his brother that he found it "irksome, chiefly in consequence of the great numbers." He had undertaken a similar expedition sans vaccination the previous year, collecting extensive plant samples and sending them to the College of Surgeons in New York City. He packaged and sent many more in the course of the expe-

dition under discussion, along with a note describing himself primarily as a natural historian. Later in the century, a regional historian wrote that "from boyhood Houghton's passion had been the study of the natural sciences." A more recent admirer notes that, as an adult, Houghton liked to "tease" the family dog with bursts of electricity. The doctor would become the state geologist of Michigan and one of the founding scientists of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, before drowning in a snow squall on Lake Superior, at age 36. But one of his great achievements had come in 1832, when he could claim with some confidence that he had successfully vaccinated enough of the people of the American shores of Lake Superior to "secure them against any general prevalence of the small-pox," even as he ominously warned that in the country to the west, "it is not so." He recommended the vaccination of all Ojibwes. "The protection will be prized highly, and will give in return the only boon a destitute man is capable of giving; the deep-felt gratitude of an overflowing heart."[26]

Gratitude there was, but it joined other feelings. Federal officials had worried that Indians would have strong prejudices against vaccination. Instead, an overwhelming majority of Ojibwes sought the vaccine. Those who objected voiced the fear, perhaps expressing also their familiarity with the older practice of variolation or smallpox inoculation, that "the remedy must be nearly equal to the disease." Most Ojibwes, aware of the benefits, readily accepted this Jacksonian program. For the vaccinated bands, it indeed came as a "boon." But as they received the gift, they told stories of mass murder by smallpox and poison. The vaccine program provoked the telling of such stories, and it suggested that Euro-American governments had achieved some power over disease. Experience recommended that such power, even when sought and gained, be held in careful regard.[27]

Within the word "vaccine" there lows a cow. Houghton tells us he explained the procedure to the Ojibwes; we do not know if he spoke of the vaccine's bovine origins, but this was no secret. Ojibwes knew cows but not cowpox (uncommon even in England). They and their ancestors had long traveled very widely, east as well as west, and they met many a Bessie (or Belle). Cows and their ancestors had also traveled, and traders had kept them in Ojibwe Country for generations, which meant, in short, that Ojibwe families had kept cattle. In a piece set within a decade of Houghton's visit, historian Rebecca Kugel finds Ojibwe healers deploying images of cows in their medical practice at Fond du Lac—the very village in which the legendary smallpox epidemic had been unleashed. These healers sought to have their

patients "dream of [cattle] . . . by having the image before them." They invested cattle with "spiritual power." We cannot know whether Ojibwes connected the control of disease as manifested in vaccination with bovine herds, but if Kugel is right, some connected cows, sacredly, with sickness and healing.[28]

Considering the methods of vaccination, and the close participation of Ojibwes in the process, one can imagine a world of thoughts alien to Houghton. No one in 1832 vaccinated by sticking thin, hollow hypodermic needles into their patients' arms: such needles came decades later. Instead, vaccinations meant "inoculation," the transfer of infectious material from one person to another using, by Houghton's day, the lancet. Inoculation as a technique for fighting smallpox was older than vaccination. Apparently ancient in Asia and Africa, it had reached metropolitan Europe and the American colonies in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. British subjects and African slaves knew widely of inoculation with live smallpox (variolation) in the decades before inoculation with cowpox (vaccination). Far more dangerous to the patient than vaccination, variolation generally posed far less danger than the natural contraction of the disease. But because variolation propagated actual smallpox, a fabulous contagion, it posed a danger to the public. Inoculating the few with smallpox, in other words, put the vulnerable many at risk. Vaccination carried little such danger to the public. But because cowpox naturally communicated only rarely to humans, even in England, getting vaccine matter was difficult. When Americans procured vaccine matter from the Vaccine Institute of London or from Jenner himself, it came in several forms: between plates of glass, as crusted lymph matter; within the nibs of lancet blades; or, usually, as soaked, infected cotton thread in vials. Vaccination could mean inserting a piece of soaked string beneath the skin. Arm-to-arm inoculation might also employ a thread soaked in the lymph.[29]

By 1832, the Ojibwe bands Houghton visited had for centuries traded among, fought alongside, and raised children with people whose ancestors came from across the Atlantic. Ojibwes and their neighbors had moved with European officers and armies in wars since the seventeenth century, and as variolation, and, later, vaccination, made its way into the military services, they must have encountered it; they must have learned that pus, pieces of string, and crusts could enter the body and introduce disease to control it. The practice resembled certain Ojibwe medical techniques. That foreign matter placed into the body might have power echoed certain sacred prac-

tices of initiation into religious societies, which could involve the "shooting" or "insertion" of religiously charged shells into the bodies of initiates.[30] Sacred healing practices, moreover, might lead a healer to discover—and remove from the body by sucking or by other method—the poisonous or malevolent matter, often a "feather, stone, worm, or other small object," at the root of the illness. Father Claude Allouez, in Ojibwe Country near Lake Superior in the mid-1660s, noted that the Ojibwes saw some illnesses as caused by the invasion into the body of "certain little spirits, malevolent in their nature." The spirits might invade under their own energy or under the power of "some enemy." A healer, Allouez wrote, "falls upon the diseased part, applies his mouth to it, and, by sucking, pretends to extract something from it, as a little stone, or a bit of string." The practitioner might remove the offending item from beneath the patient's skin, and then display it in the course of the healing ceremony. Given these practices, one can only imagine what occurred to a woman who watched Houghton perform the procedure on her small daughter. Placing foreign matter beneath the girl's skin, perhaps a string soaked in "lymph" from another patient, Houghton undoubtedly stirred thoughts that went beyond gratitude.[31]

Andrew Blackbird, an Ottawa historian from northern Michigan with close ties to Michigan Ojibwes, wrote of an insidious British gift. He published his book in 1887, seventeen years after Francis Parkman revealed the Sir Jeffery Amherst correspondence. Blackbird tells of an item acquired by the Ottawas from the British at Montreal toward the end of the Seven Years' War. The gift, a tin box, came with special commands, as had the gifts of Houghton's and Warren's earlier accounts. The Ottawas should not open the box until reaching their villages. In this account, the Ottawas strictly conform. Arriving home, they open it. Inside, they found another box, and inside that, another. On it went, until "they found nothing but moldy particles inside the last little box!" Soon, there "burst out a terrible sickness among them . . . Lodge after lodge was totally vacated . . . entire families being swept off with the ravages of this terrible disease." Ottawas well-versed in Blackbird or in their own oral history recall the story to this day. It is fair to speculate that Blackbird's moldy particles derive from the "crusts" and vaccine matter employed in pre-hypodermic needle vaccination. The United States specifically promised such lymph to Blackbird's own band of Ottawas in the Treaty of Washington (1836), a treaty to which his father affixed an "X." One other federally ratified Indian treaty mentions "vaccine matter": the Treaty of Detroit (1837). Taken together, these treaties purported

to involve most of the Ottawa and Ojibwe bands in the new state of Michigan.[32]

Less than one year after the signing of the first treaty, Ottawas and Ojibwes rumored again about American plans to distribute infected goods. The 1836 treaty had provided for annuity payments in specie, but the great financial panic of 1837 had halted the circulation of hard money, had sucked up specie, and had led the United States to attempt to pay Indians partially in goods. Indians objected strongly to payments in kind, and with reason. They needed hard money in part to pay for the land that would allow them to remain in the East. They had determined to avoid removal by gaining fee-simple title to particularly productive properties, such as good farming sites, sugar bushes, berry patches, and fishing spots. Meanwhile, the Americans pressed them to remove westward, and they withheld the promised money, seemingly thwarting the Indians' efforts to secure Michigan property. At Mackinac Island, very near the site of earlier, storied insidious gifts, when Major Jonathan Garland and agent Henry Rowe Schoolcraft endeavored to persuade Ottawas and Ojibwes to accept the proffered American goods in lieu of cash, they ran up accusations of mass murder: "Among other fabrications to prevent the Indians from taking the goods, they were made to believe that their great Father (Van Buren) had caused them to be infected with some fatal malady."[33] More than a century later, an Ojibwe in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan also connected the federal manipulation of smallpox with the effort to remove Indians from the state. In a "tradition passed down" from his forebears, he said that federal agents enticed Ojibwe families onto a ship, captured them, carried them to the west, and there gave them "blankets infected with smallpox germs." Further, when the sick died, the agents absconded with their annuity payments. Still associating smallpox with removal, this twentieth-century memory includes a blanket.[34]

If anything, the federal program to vaccinate the Indians, coinciding with the program of Indian removal, far from convincing Indians of the benevolence of the government, as Houghton had expected, generated instead some alarm that Euro-Americans had, after all, mastered the scourge for their own purposes. In earlier centuries, colonists generally claimed no control over disease, especially when they knew they had none. Putting such control into the hands of Providence who, not coincidentally, favored His people, differs greatly from claiming the capacity to destroy on one's own. As smallpox inoculation gained a measure of acceptance in America following its introduction in the 1720s, it led to more speculation about the control

of disease, and it led to the verified blanket (plus hankie and linen) affair at Fort Pitt. Mooting that 1763 action, both General Jeffery Amherst and Colonel Henry Bouquet had used the word "inoculate" in their correspondence. But even as a medical procedure, inoculation with smallpox protected individuals more than the public: it transmitted the real disease. Indeed, Bouquet, who had neither been inoculated nor infected with the dreaded disease, worried that this weapon could backfire: on him. The vaccine, discovered at the end of the eighteenth century, was another "matter." With the vaccine, American physicians grew increasingly confident that they could win the war against smallpox.[35]

As Houghton inserted his pus-dabbed lancet, sometimes using infectious crusts, into the arms of Native Americans, the sinister deployment of infected cloth, here in the form of a British flag, becomes a standard feature of frontier rumor. Within twenty years, when Warren retold the story, the cloth formed not just a flag, but also a coat. Stories of liquor would continue, but cloth provided the perfect medium for the communication of native anxieties in the nineteenth century. Bits of string, used to carry vaccine matter over long distances, linked smallpox directly to textiles. What is more, cloth had an ideological charge. Once a major trade item, in the early nineteenth century cloth also lay at the heart of a debate over the American "civilizing mission" to the Indians. Since the Washington administration, federal officials had urged Indian women to take up spinning and weaving, to manufacture homespun cloth. Part of the idea had been to have them reduce their dependence on hunters and to encourage agricultural production by men. Native opponents, such as the Trout, an Ottawa leader of a spiritual movement in northern Lower Michigan, urged Indians not to wear cloth but to return to skins.[36] By Houghton's day, the industrial revolution, with its flood of cheap cloth, rendered spinning obsolete. Cloth items became instead fixtures of Indian annuities when given in kind. Cloth, in short, dressed the disruptions of native economic and gender arrangements in the face of the expanding world economy. Later, the "blanket" would come to symbolize these disruptions even more, as "blanket Indian" became shorthand for the native rejection of assimilation, a rejection read in the United States as favoring dependence. By the early twentieth century, the "smallpox blanket" entered the American vocabulary, and there it remains.

More directly, Houghton's own story about smallpox-infected cloth quickly went into print, published in 1834 as an appendix to a narrative by the expedition's leader, the Indian agent Henry Schoolcraft. Schoolcraft, also a leading

ethnologist of his day, had extensive Ojibwe connections through his marriage to Jane Johnston, daughter of a prominent Ojibwe woman. Jane and her brothers, literate and active among their Indian relatives and far beyond, read Schoolcraft's accounts. Houghton's published report, informed by Ojibwe teachings, became part of a feedback loop that reinforced the teachings themselves. Warren had likely read it before writing his own account. In 1769, 1832, 1837, 1888, and at many other times including in our own, Indians spoke and speak of European Americans killing on a massive scale using the invisible means of poison and disease. The stories of smallpox tell of atrocity, of vast, careless murder committed by Europeans and Euro-Americans. Told by survivors, they tell of survival.

Warren, the young historian who sought to ferret out the truth of British deployments of smallpox, learned a very different story from "the intelligent chief of the Pillagers." It bears some resemblance to the legend of Fort William Henry. Like that colonial story, Warren's legend involves an assault by warriors on prostrate victims of the scourge, the attackers' consequent contamination, and the vast epidemic that ensued. But there the similarity ends, for unlike these colonial stories, Warren's legend stresses not the violent atrocity of men, but the monstrous, ferocious, silent, faceless nature of the pox. Without dwelling on human agency, it nonetheless addresses the emergence of a dangerous new world.

According to Warren, a large troop of allied Crees, Ojibwes, and Assiniboines, outfitted for war, rode into the northern Plains and discovered their Gros Ventre (perhaps Hidatsa) enemies, gathered haphazardly in a wretched village. Meeting unaccountably feeble resistance, they burst into the dwellings, filled with fetid corpses and dying families. Taking scalps and plunder until they could no longer bear the horror, the victors returned homeward. Among the drying scalps, one they had torn from an enemy "giant" quickly seizes the narrative's core.

Each evening, the victors staked the scalp, large as a beaver belt, "erect in the ground" among the smaller scalps. Each morning, successively, they found the stake leaning strongly "towards the west," the place of death, under the scalp's mysterious power. Their fears increased as, even before they reached their homeland, men among them began to sicken and die. They ditched the scalp, but to no avail. Four men returned to their homelands alive, only to unleash the epidemic on their own people. Warren reported the legend around 1850. Dr. Houghton, vaccinating Indians in 1832, sketched a similar, vague story, guessing 1784 as the date of the scourge. "The most

western bands of the Chippewas," he wrote, "relate a singular allegory of the introduction of the small-pox into their country by a war-party, returning from the plains of the Missouri."[37]

These accounts contain much of the imminent sacred, but little sense of divine retribution. The warriors violated no code of honor, no ethical norm, in descending upon, killing, and plundering their enemies. The smallpox has no whiff of the divine judge, it is no terrible swift sword. The warriors instead confront a malevolent, mysterious, stealthy, and irresistible force, one new and unknown. The attackers achieve identity with their already dying victims; both suffer the new malevolent power, and the old enmities give way, at least in narrative. If the stories carry a lesson, it may be that the old fight on the Plains is trivial in the face of the new. The story entered the record at a time when Ojibwes and their enemies on the Plains contemplated, as they had many times before, putting an end to their frequent hostilities.

Stories such as this one abound in the record. They have nothing to do with what we call germ warfare. They have everything to do with colonization. They challenge, at the most basic level, any appreciation of colonization for its enlightenment, its technology, or its claimed superiority. They remind listeners that colonization brought waves of death and destruction. However invisible, however uncontrollable, however free of human intent or divine judgment, smallpox came to the continent in European boats. After a study of such stories in the Northwest Coast of the continent, Cole Harris notes that "the whole European engagement with the New World, which was not new at all, begins to appear in a different light."[38]

Extirpation, Rumor, and Truth

Eastern North American Indians widely rumored by 1800 that the colonial powers of Great Britain and the United States planned to "cut them off the face of the Earth." The stories Warren related at mid-century, the stories that Houghton captured even as he worked against smallpox in 1832, indulge deeply in that belief. The sense went way back, becoming an Indian commonplace by the mid-eighteenth century. From Creek to Six Nations Countries, Indians even rumored that colonial powers at seeming enmity—such as France and Great Britain, or Great Britain and its rebelling colonies—proposed to one another schemes aimed at extirpating entire Indian peoples. So deep was the concern that the formalized Code of Handsome Lake, an indigenous religious code developed among the Six Nations

in the nineteenth century, urged followers to surrender "the constant fear that the white race would exterminate you," for such fears neglected the care and protection offered by the Creator.[39]

American Indian history consists in dreadful part of a lengthy, actual list of European and Euro-American atrocities that firmly ground such concerns. But one can make the case that the Americans of the United States brooked the entire elimination of Native America even without examining the horrific, factual atrocities (such as Gnadenhutten) and certainly without the fictive blankets on the Missouri. When U.S. forces militarily invaded Indian Country, their preferred strategy amounted to not only the destruction of food and shelter but also the forced continual motion of the dislodged indigenous enemy. Exposure and famine opened the path for disease, which compelled total surrender. Military historian Russell Weigley termed it a strategy for "the annihilation of a people." It had colonial antecedents. Pequots, Iroquois, Miamis, Cherokees, Shawnees, Lenapes, Creeks, Seminoles, and many others by 1850 had experienced the entire destruction of villages, fields, and food stores by colonial, British, and U.S. American forces that worked to destroy a people's capacity not just to resist, but to survive.[40]

By 1850, the suspicion that the United States might intend Indian extermination resonated, too, with already open, loudly voiced, and conventional expectations among American citizens that the future entailed Indian death and disappearance. That Providence leveled natives with disease to assist the new Israel was a fixture of seventeenth-century New England Puritanism, but it also appears as early as Thomas Hariot, who in the sixteenth century considered a deadly scourge destroying coastal Algonquians to be a "speciall woorke of God for our sakes." Well into the eighteenth century, in the Anglican South as well as in the Congregational Northeast, the idea had force. Lieutenant Governor Spotswood of Virginia saw in female infertility among Indians a heavenly design to "make room for our growing settlements." Pennsylvania's enlightened Benjamin Franklin opined in the 1790s that hard liquor would do the job if it were the "design of Providence to extirpate these savages in order to make room for the cultivators of the earth."[41] Additional references abound.

Colonists knew that less divine hands attended to the work of extirpation, a task advocated by some in the heat of war. Opponents of annihilation more frequently and openly mooted it than did its advocates, but they clearly responded to some strong opinion. In 1763 Dr. George Milligan Johnston penned a description of South Carolina, arguing against the extirpation of

Indians, who served the colony well by preventing slaves from escaping bondage and dangerously settling the West. Writing to Thomas Gage at the height of Pontiac's War, Sir William Johnson advised the new British commander of North American forces that "A Total Extirpation" of the western Indians was neither possible nor desirable. That writers broached extirpation means that colonists talked extirpation. Thomas Jefferson, confronting Virginia's Shawnee enemies, contemplated that tribe's extirpation. By 1826, with the publication of James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans*, Americans read an exaggerated retelling of the 1757 events at Fort William Henry; they also read that America would see the end of both Native America and the uncultivated wilds. Even as young Houghton vaccinated Ojibwes in 1832 near the very northern reaches of the Mississippi, downriver the Sauk leader Black Hawk and his followers faced the prospect of total annihilation as they fled before overwhelming forces of Americans and allied Indians. The Illinois governor contemplated deploying the militia to "exterminate all Indians who will not leave us alone." The ensuing slaughter of Indian women and children in that conflict continues to startle its historians.[42]

Citizens of the Republic widely assumed that Indian peoples, at least as autonomous communities, would somehow fade away before the advance of settlers. A few would give history a push. Bruiting about extirpation by history, if not commonly advocating extermination by arms, U.S. citizens, like some English colonists long before them, stood but a few critical steps away from the worst of the Indians' accusations.[43] The stories long told of European and federal American responsibility for smallpox, the old stories of indiscriminate killing by devious means, and the newer stories of the routine distribution of smallpox-infected blankets, may be the stuff of legend, rumor, and polemic, they may be wrong in most of their particulars, and they may even obscure the real history of the European and U.S. assault on Native America. But they carry potent germs of truth.

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12. Murder: Mystery, Rumor, and Removal

He breathed well, his heart quickened, yet the obituary said he was dead. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft held in his hands the latest *Albany Argus*, a leading state paper for the Democratic Party to which he belonged. He read again: he had been murdered. Standing amazed on July 13, 1846, in the humid national capital, Schoolcraft wondered at this report of his assassination in remote Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan—a place he knew well but had not seen in years. He read it, considered it, and clipped it for his files. A gunman, hidden near his dwelling, shot him at close range, dead. The killer, "a half breed, named Tanner," then escaped, but "the entire population" of the Sault arose in hot pursuit.[1] Schoolcraft, feeling the sweat tickling his neck, felt also the startling error in the "rumor of my murder." He breathed easily, but he did not laugh; he knew in his gut that the story held, somewhere amid its obvious misinformation, a frightening and personally alarming truth.[2]

The false report of Henry Schoolcraft's murder joined the tail end of a great flock of rumors that shadowed the era of eastern Indian removal (1830–1847). In Michigan alone, rumors swirled as Indians struggled to remain in the new state and as the federal government attempted to dislodge them. Michigan's Indians felt the hard hand of Jacksonian policy, suffering enormous losses in land, facing powerful challenges to their independence. But they also had resources and allies. Indeed, most of the state's Indian peoples outlasted the removal policy designed to eject them. Regional circumstances favored Native American persistence. Ottawas and Ojibwes in particular lived mostly on lands that attracted only marginal interest among U.S. farmers, though they did produce crops in fertile microclimates unattached to the broadening band of U.S. settlement. Moreover, most of the land cessions came in 1836, on the eve of the great financial panic of 1837, an economic collapse that arrested in its tracks a developing land rush, allowing

many of the brand-new state's Indians a few extra and critical years, during which time federal removal policy lost its force. Finally, the proximity of still potentially dangerous British Upper Canada combined with the struggles and wars over removal to the south to restrain the United States from further deploying its scarce bayonets. Of the 8,000 Indians in the state, the United States forced as few as 651 people west, over what the Potawatomis call the "Trail of Death."[3]

The success of most Indians against removal did not make Michigan a multicultural safe haven. To their credit, Indians and settlers after the War of 1812 largely avoided the upheavals that killed thousands of citizens and Indians in Illinois and the South in the 1830s. But imagined violence exploded in rumor and alarm. A series of reports about mass murder, massacre, and assassination reveals that the prevailing political climate of Anglo-America shook even Michigan, a region relatively untouched by genuine removal. Tellers of these reports ranged from New England editors and midwestern governors to leading Ottawa and Ojibwe spokesmen. Less prominent settlers and natives also rumored one another's violent intentions or deeds. Rapid U.S. expansion and Jacksonian policies cast great insecurity over Indian lives, as Indians and settlers alike stood accused of crimes they had not committed.

Truth often flew with the false rumors. The early reports of Henry Schoolcraft's premature demise contained accurate detail. He had resided at the Sault. He had achieved scholarly eminence. He had married a woman of Indian descent. He had served as a federal Indian agent. Additionally, he had overseen seven treaties as commissioner and had participated in a handful of other treaty councils, gaining vast lands for his nation. He had published widely, often relying on his late wife, Jane Schoolcraft, daughter of Anglo-Irish trader John Johnston and prominent Ojibwe Oshaguacodaywaygua (Susan Johnston). Mentored by Lewis Cass, serving under President Jackson (and later, Van Buren), Schoolcraft had embraced Democratic policies, including removal. His marriage notwithstanding, he had also embraced a high-handed Anglo-Saxonism, even during Jane's lifetime.[4]

Sensing that a hard truth lay within the obvious rubbish in the rumor of his death, Schoolcraft grew anxious. He surmised that reports had confused him with his younger brother, James, or one of his "several nephews," all Michigan residents. He knew that James lived at the Sault, and he recalled that both he and James had an enemy in John Tanner, the alleged killer. His fears panned out, and the newspapers soon corrected themselves: public

"rumor" had "confounded" the brothers. James was dead; Henry, "now in the city of Washington," lived.[5]

Eastern editors deserve little blame for confusing the more visible Henry Schoolcraft with his obscure brother. The *Argus* excused itself with reference to an understandable faulty transmission of information. But rumor, itself a kind of medium, reveals and constitutes states of mind. The original misperception, the error in transmission, or the deliberate deception only gains power when opinion lifts its wings. Collective efforts to understand events or conditions of life best support a strong rumor.[6] As the public added details, the falsehoods in the Schoolcraft murder rumor went far beyond the victim's identity.

The Brothers Schoolcraft, Rumor, and Removal, 1838

James Schoolcraft, the real victim of 1846, had lived under the long shadow of his older brother. His opportunity to step into his own came in 1838, when he served as the federal "Conductor" of an expedition charged with advancing the "ultimate removal" of the many Ottawa and Ojibwe bands to the Plains. Under an 1836 treaty, for which Henry was commissioner, the participating peoples had promised not to remove, but to consider removal. The federal government had promised to provide them with both the means for removal and an ultimate Plains homeland. But the signing bands would decide. James Schoolcraft's "exploratory party," then, consisted of Michigan Ottawas and Ojibwes whose mission was to examine a western tract of land to which the government hoped at least some bands would relocate.[7]

As the brothers Schoolcraft knew, the Ottawa and Ojibwe leaders who had marked the treaty consistently opposed such deportation. They maintained this position in 1838, well into the third term of Democratic administrations committed to eastern Indian removal. Ojibwes of the eastern Upper Peninsula, from the Sault Ste. Marie to points west along Lake Superior, refused even to contribute men to the mission. Their spokesman, Szhegud, emphatically stated: "We all say, our chiefs and our young men, that we will not go with the officer sent by our great father, to visit the country west of the Mississippi; we do not wish to go there; we object to it entirely, this is all we have to say." The decision reflected badly on James Schoolcraft, who lived at the Sault and yet failed to persuade the local bands to cooperate.[8] Henry Schoolcraft saw that result as a small setback; he more keenly sought to rid the state of the Ottawas who lived in the more temperate Lower Peninsula,

especially those inhabiting the Grand River Valley. Here the brothers also met strong opposition, as regional Ottawas, closely affiliated with certain Potawatomi bands undergoing removal, heard "unfavorable stories"—many all too true—that escapees from deportation "told of the west."[9]

To advance Ottawa and at least limited Ojibwe removal, the brothers decided to secure the expedition members' collective approval of western removal "*before their return*" (emphasis in original). In other words, the brothers meant to transform a team of investigators that did not adequately represent even the participating bands into a diplomatic embassy that would formally undertake a momentous decision. They plunged deeply into the same terrain of disputed contracts and bait-and-switch tactics that had fertilized the still-raging Second Seminole War.[10] At Green Bay, as his expedition returned from the Plains toward Michigan, James Schoolcraft claimed that its undelegated and unrepresentative members agreed in a marked document "to remove" to the lands they had seen on the Plains, "in the event of our emigrating from our present country." The document meant little. The Indians in Michigan intended no such "event," as the younger Schoolcraft well knew. On the expedition's homecoming, he predicted that the peoples "will attempt to avoid emigrating."[11] When Henry Schoolcraft waved the flawed document at leading Ottawas and Ojibwes, they met him with "fixed opposition," denying "the power" of the explorers "to bind them to the location on the Osage" and expressing "their determination not to remove to it."[12] That determination raises a question: given the Ottawas' and Ojibwes' utter disavowal of the bogus removal agreement, and given their consistent opposition to removal, what had led any of them to join the expedition in the first place?

From the beginning of March through September 1838, as the exploring party formed and did its work, Ottawas and Ojibwas of the Lower Peninsula lived under especially high administrative pressure to remove from the state. The regional knowledge of the deadly Potawatomi removal, the national debate over Cherokee removal, and the catastrophic war in Florida provided general causes for concern. What's more, Indian bands in the Lower Peninsula faced rumors and charges of murder and massacre.[13] With all his might, Henry Schoolcraft leveraged the allegations against the Native Americans, urging their evacuation.

A New Hampshire Yankee, Ansel Glass, had moved with his family in 1837 to a new home, 4 miles from his nearest neighbor, in the Maple Valley of Michigan's south-central Lower Peninsula. The Maple River empties

southward into the Grand River, which in turn flows westward through historic Ottawa Country into Lake Michigan. The Maple's headwaters adjoin lands that drain into those of the Shiawassee River, which flows northward through historic Ojibwe Country into Saginaw Bay of Lake Huron. No one doubted that Glass had settled in a time of peace on lands belonging by treaty to the United States. By American custom, Indian treaty, and recent history, he should not have expected violence from anyone.

Hiram Brown, one of Glass's "nearest settlers," ascended the Maple in late March 1838, and encountered, not the vibrant farmstead of a rude pioneer, but the charred wreckage of the Glass cabin and the three fire-blackened corpses of Glass's wife and children, unnamed in the official records. No dead Ansel Glass lay among them, but newspapers soon reported the "strong presumption" that he had perished with his family, the victim of an Indian massacre. The house, after all, had been set aflame, a fact evoking legendary Indian violence. Moreover, "Several locks of the woman's hair" lay "near the door of the house, with the skin and flesh attached." At least that is what Americans read across the North, in a letter first printed on March 30 in the *Detroit Free Press* and later reprinted elsewhere, including Glass's home state, New Hampshire. News spread of the pioneer family murdered, burned, and scalped on the Michigan frontier.[14]

Federal Indian agent Henry Schoolcraft, then at Detroit, promised energetically "to punish the outrage." He held Grand River Ottawa bands collectively "responsible" for the guilty party's "apprehension, and surrendering to justice." Ottawas denied any involvement, and several skilled Ottawa hunters claimed to have found contrary evidence: a trail, partially concealed, leading from the Maple toward the Shiawassee and the Ojibwes. Schoolcraft accordingly expanded his dragnet to include Saginaw Ojibwes, though he maintained possible Ottawa guilt. Without much evidence, he gave both Ottawas and Ojibwes forty days to deliver the guilty party to U.S. justice. Without reflection, he noted the failure to discover Glass's remains.[15]

Some authorities doubted Schoolcraft's assumptions. Brigadier General Hugh Brady, commander of the Northwestern Department of the U.S. Army at Detroit, refused to act "until the outrage is proved to have been committed by the Indians." Ansel Glass's absent body recommended a different story: domestic homicide. Reverend Leonard Slater, Baptist missionary to the local Ottawas, proposed that Glass had "murdered his own family." But this cut against the popular grain; the preceding day almost two hundred Grand River Valley citizens had signed a petition to U.S. President Martin

Van Buren calling for protection from the supposedly hostile Ottawas and Ojibwes. The petitioners raised the specter of "another *Florida War*."[16]

At the same time, they proposed that the killings stemmed from a federal act of "injustice visited upon the Ottawa and Chippewa Nations." The federal Office of Indian Affairs and its agents, including Henry Schoolcraft, had failed in 1837 to deliver proper annuity payments owed to the Grand River Ottawas under the 1836 Treaty of Washington. The treaty required that the Indians receive the payments in coin, a small victory for Indian leaders who sought such specie payments so they would have hard money with which to purchase desirable Michigan lands for their people. As the financial panic of 1837 destroyed the national economy and contracted the money supply, U.S. agents had attempted to pay the 1837 annuities partially in goods that few Indians desired. Moreover, the government had sought to dispense these at Mackinac Island, a great distance from the Grand River. The petitioners alleged, then, that local Ottawas, infuriated by a genuine injustice, had slaughtered a citizen family in revenge, creating so great an alarm that "many of the settlers have left their farms." Calling for troops, the petitioners also demanded "Justice"—as they saw it—lest the settlers flee or "be sacrificed to Indian vengeance."[17]

Grand River citizens had sounded sharp alarms about the treaty violation before the Glass affair. A local editor protested the faulty payment in gory terms: "The exasperated feelings of those Indians, now in the immediate vicinity of impending war in Canada, where other Indians are engaged to enter the field of blood and carnage, their favorite pursuit, render the situation of the northern settlements of that State extremely exposed, not only to depredations upon property, but to massacre and Savage butchery!" Opportunism strengthened the rhetoric: annuities in hard coin, spent in the valley by local Indians, might rescue a local economy savaged by the national financial forces. The best of times made for scarce cash on the frontier; in these years of financial depression, citizens ached for gold and silver. Enterprising settlers saw possible salvation in solemn federal Indian treaty provisions, provisions the federal government had violated.[18]

As the rumored connection between faulty annuities and Indian violence spread eastward, it gained partisan overtones. Whig Party supporters, certain that Indians had massacred the Glass family, denounced the Democrats' treaty frauds and breaches. The far more national Cherokee removal controversy provided the context in the late spring of 1838: "authorities at Washington avow their determination to carry into effect treaties which are

clearly proved to have been fraudulently made," an obvious reference to the Cherokee Treaty of New Echota (1835), which presaged the military roundup of that people then under way and the forced and deadly removal soon to come. But, Whig reports continued, "we have to record the pitiful spectacle of the violation of those made in good faith by both parties, on the part of the stronger," a reference to, among other items, the 1837 violations of the Treaty of Washington. Whigs padded their allegations with the charge that a major New York government contractor had received a huge payment—in hard currency—to ship the illegal in-kind payments to Mackinac in 1837: "the darkest feature of this faithless transaction is the fact that Suydam, Jackson & Co. last summer obtained a draft for forty thousand dollars in *specie*." Against Democrats, Whigs rumored Indian removal and federal corruption; like Democrats, they assumed bloody Indian vengeance. These rumors both expressed opinions and harshly judged Democrats and Indians. Alleging Office of Indian Affairs corruption, Whigs drew on ideological impulses they shared with Democrats, impulses that evoked images of Indian corruption, degeneration, and vengeance. Against these legendary features, the reasoning of Reverend Slater failed to resonate. He insisted that Glass had killed his own family. Indians, he agreed, objected to the federal treaty violations, but they did not resort to violence. He observed wryly that "The white people have made more noise about the [missing annuity] money than the Indians have ever done."[19]

While Grand River citizens deployed imagined Indian murder to seek Indian annuities, while Whigs grabbed the allegations to cudgel their opponents, the Democrat Henry Schoolcraft found in the alleged massacre a step toward a Jacksonian goal. Amid the uproar over the horrid deaths, he and his brother pressed bands to contribute men for the exploring party to the Plains. The dominant Maple Valley story strengthened their hand. Meeting with the local Ottawas at Grand Haven in early June, Henry Schoolcraft reached a "compact" with them: the government would honor its obligations and conveniently make future annuity payments in the Grand Valley as long as the president deemed it proper. For their part, the Ottawas agreed in a gesture of good will to send men with the western expedition. The agreement finally reached, Schoolcraft announced in a letter to the *Detroit Free Press* that the Ottawas had no part in the killings.[20]

Schoolcraft, however, continued to nourish his own suspicions of Indian guilt. At his command, Saginaw subagent Henry Connor arrested and confined two Saginaw Ojibwe men. Although Schoolcraft duly asked that

authorities appoint counsel for the prisoners, he alerted his superiors in mid-June that "No doubt exists in my mind . . . that the Saginaws are alone guilty."[21] Saginaw Ojibwes, conveniently for the Democrat, had no part in the 1836 treaty, the violation of which Grand River settlers locally alleged as the source of Indian hostilities, and the violation of which Whigs nationally employed to attack the administration. Pressure on the Ottawa bands had lasted long enough to promote an expedition intended to forward removal. With Ottawas joining the expedition, Schoolcraft's assertions of Saginaw guilt provided additional evidence for the wisdom of removal. Indian communities and U.S. settlements must live apart.

As for the arrested Ojibwes, subagent Connor, against Schoolcraft's objections, quickly released the two men for lack of evidence. Schoolcraft insisted that Cobmoosa, a Grand River Ottawa leader, convinced him of Saginaw guilt, a guilt concealed by the Saginaw leader Keegido. But by mid-June, both Reverend Slater near the Grand River and subagent Connor at Saginaw doubted that Indians had massacred anyone. By September, Schoolcraft elected to remain silent about the killings at Maple River in his *Annual Report* of 1838. But in 1840, long after the local panic had subsided and long after local settlers had demanded action against Indians, he adverted to it in the most pessimistic, brooding, and racist *Annual Report* he ever penned. Deploying the killings to advocate Indian removal, Schoolcraft enshrined the Glass family in an official, published government document: "The murder of Glass and his family . . . in 1838, which yet remains unexpiated, indicates that it is impossible to shield the settlers, at all points, from occasional outbreaks of personal vindiction. The earlier the local separation is therefore effected between masses of population so wholly dissimilar as the white and the red, the more auspicious will it be for the peace and prosperity of both."[22] Schoolcraft wrote definitively in 1840 of the "murder of Glass," whose trail had gone cold but whose missing body may still have been warm, as Schoolcraft knew. He was aware that Slater and others suspected that Glass had slaughtered his own family. Although Schoolcraft's responsibilities did not embrace homicide among citizens, he publically and groundlessly asserted Indian guilt. The Indian expert and agent, charged with maintaining the peace, fed violent rumor.

The Grand Valley alarm of 1838 placed two Ojibwe men in brief confinement and it labeled Indians generally as killers. It also weakened Ottawa resistance to the party of exploration that James Schoolcraft led to Missouri and Kansas. Note, however, what did *not* happen. Grand River Ottawas re-

mained in Michigan; no troops forced them west. The jailed Saginaws faced neither trial nor lynch mob; they went free. Grand River citizens rumored war, but they did not mobilize against Indians or unite in calls for Indian removal. Henry Schoolcraft continued into late 1840 to connect the dots of the killing, the Indians, and removal, but by then most rejected his picture, or no longer cared to look at it. That year's national election led to the removal, of Henry Schoolcraft, from office.

A decade later, after the acquisition of Mexican lands rendered the Jacksonian removal policy obsolete, Schoolcraft included an account of the Maple River killings in his *Personal Memoirs*, a published and highly edited version of his journals. Under the date, March 30, 1838, he makes no case for policy, and he simply narrates the suspicions that "fell" first on the Ottawas and then on the Ojibwes, concluding that neither bore the blame and that the "horrible mystery" remained "unexplained." In a footnote, Schoolcraft added this, in the inconclusive, passive language of rumor: "Mr. Glass was subsequently, in 1841, found alive in Wisconsin."[23] The party that killed the woman and her two children went unpunished, but the killings unveiled a bizarre frontier, where settlers decried Indian vengeance while they cherished Indian coin; where partisan writers toyed with a probable Anglo-American domestic homicide to argue federal Indian policy; and where Ottawas and Ojibwes speculated in rumor about their highly uncertain futures.

Ottawa and Ojibwe Rumors of Removal, and Worse, 1834–1841

As the winter of 1838–1839 drew to a close, Michigan's Ottawas and Ojibwes had great cause for concern. James Schoolcraft's expedition had produced a fraudulent removal agreement. American troops had forcibly removed several Potawatomi bands from southwestern Michigan, bands with whom Ottawas had long connections. While typhoid, malnourishment, exhaustion, and exposure had killed many of the deportees, others escaped the dying columns, returned to Great Lakes Country, and joined Ottawas and Ojibwes, bringing personal accounts and hearsay. Saginaw Ojibwes felt removal pressures most strongly, having signed separate treaties surrendering their remaining lands. An ogema, or leader, Keegido, whom Schoolcraft described as "a man of strong passions and ungoverned will," had marked a removal treaty in 1837. In theory, they had to leave the state for western lands by the end of 1842. In the interim, in June 1839 Schoolcraft learned of Keegido's

death from a party of Saginaw Ojibwe migrants. They had come to Mackinac Island to visit the agent as they emigrated from their homeland. Federal policy was to settle them on the Plains, but this party instead made its way toward Manitoulin Island. Facing impending removal from Michigan, they crossed Lake Huron to British Canada.[24]

Nor were they alone. On the day that the Saginaw party brought the news of Keegido's death, Schoolcraft observed that the Indians around Lakes Michigan and Huron had already found a way to thwart federal removal to the West: they "have transferred their residence from the U.S. territories to the Manatouline Islands," choosing the British Great Lakes over the American Great Plains. A report "that the United States intended, this season, to send steamboats, and take them off, by force," spread "something like a panic."[25] Schoolcraft suspected that British "inducements" influenced the Indians, but he also knew they fundamentally opposed emigration from their wider homeland: "They fear going west: they cling to the north."[26]

Michigan's Indians had rumored federal plans to forcibly remove them throughout the 1830s. In 1834 the Roman Catholic Father Frederick Baraga noted that the Ottawas of Grand Rapids, years before signing any treaties even hinting at removal, "hear that perhaps they will have to . . . move far from here." Federal promises that any land cessions would only follow just purchases in treaty did nothing to dissuade the Ottawas from anticipating federal fraud and force. The Indians understood, Baraga noted, that the United States generally found ways to "deceive the Indians and deprive them of nice lands, as has been the case, until now, in all treaties of this kind." The Ottawas rumored, Baraga continued, that the governor of the Michigan Territory held a federal commission to treat with them for their remaining Michigan lands.[27]

That rumor was, in 1834 at least, false; the territorial governor possessed no such commission. But by late 1836, after agreeing to the Treaty of Washington, removal fears intensified. By the version of the treaty that leaders marked on March 28, Ottawas and Ojibwes ceded to the United States almost all of their remaining Lower Peninsular lands and much of the eastern Upper Peninsula, retaining fourteen permanent reservations, among the treaty's many provisions. The March treaty raised the prospect of westward removal to either Minnesota or, roughly, Kansas, but only (as we have seen) when and if the Indians desired it. Henry Schoolcraft served as the treaty's federal commissioner. Ratifying the treaty in May, the Senate drastically revised it, creating ripe conditions for the propagation of rumor. The Senate

imposed a five-year tenure on the hitherto permanent reservations, promising some compensation for the change. It also eliminated Minnesota as a potential future home in favor of the Central Plains. Despite these two drastic changes (there were others), the Senate did not alter any text that left the ultimate decision to emigrate in the hands of the bands themselves. The amendments increased the pressure to remove by terminating reservations after five years, but removal remained an Indian decision. A cautious historian of treaty making concludes that "no wholesale removal was involved."[28]

The Senate's unilateral revisions nonetheless provoked Indians from the Sault to the Grand River and intensified their distrust of the United States. From the Sault, James Schoolcraft wrote to his brother that John Holiday, a recently blinded fur trader and an official interpreter at the original treaty, now fed "much 'bad dog' talk amongst the Indians" in the Upper Peninsula. To the south at the Grand River, veteran fur trader Rix Robinson also heard "vague reports" about the Senate's changes "circulated amongst the Indians which has caused some uneasiness amongst them." Neither James Schoolcraft nor Robinson stated the exact content of the rumors, but both connected them to the Senate's alterations. While Schoolcraft assembled new delegations to agree to the Senate amendments in July, rumors continued to circulate, and they impelled Indians to action. Ottawas in the Little Traverse Bay region openly discussed emigration to Canada, and many actually left the United States. The Ottawa historian Andrew Blackbird, a boy in 1836, recalled in 1887 that his people "thought when signing the treaty that they were securing reservations of lands in different localities as permanent homes for themselves and their children in the future; but before six months had elapsed from the time of signing the treaty . . . they were told by their white neighbors that their reservations of land would expire in five years, instead of being perpetual, as they believed." Having accurately described a major difference between the document signed in Washington and that ratified by the Senate, Blackbird proceeded to describe a panic rumor: the government would send troops to remove Indians. After five years, "they would be compelled to leave their homes, and if they should refuse they would be driven at point of bayonet into a strange land, where, as it is almost always the case, more than one-half would die before they could be acclimated. At this most startling intelligence more than half of my people fled into Canada."[29]

Parties did head north and east, much to Washington's dismay. The rumors of forced removal, stimulating flights to Canada and talk of such flights, restrained American policy. The Office of Indian Affairs had no wish to see

the British shores of Lake Huron populated by skilled Indian gunmen who knew American territory. Difficulties remained between the United States and the British Empire following the War of 1812. The boundary between British territories and the United States remained unsettled in the Lake Superior region until 1842 and in Oregon until 1846. In the several years following the treaty of 1836, a minor Canadian rebellion, known as the "Patriot Movement," threatened peace along the border from Michigan to New York.[30] As Indian families urged their bulging canoes to Manitoulin Island, American authorities worried about an Indian emigration en masse from Michigan to Crown claims. Already Potawatomis had slipped back into Michigan, and some continued on into Canada. In his *Annual Report* of 1838, the U.S. commissioner of Indian affairs quoted Schoolcraft as he worried about British efforts "to colonize the Ottawas and Chippewas [Ojibwes] in Upper Canada." If the British sought such colonies, the commissioner thought to prevent them. Encouraging actions undesired by the United States, Indian alarms discouraged federal removal; they constituted a counter-power.[31]

Schoolcraft assembled delegations of Ottawas and Ojibwas to consider the Senate's surprising amendments, and he gained plausible approval, by his loose standards. The agreements did not becalm rumor, which rose again in the wake of the federal failure to provide adequate annuities in 1837, when Schoolcraft and other U.S. representatives offered goods rather than the promised cash. That decision fed, as described earlier in this chapter, the rumor among Michigan citizens that Ottawas had killed the Glass family, and it also led, as described in the previous chapter, to the rumor among Indians that the proffered goods harbored fatal disease.[32]

This last report, that the United States intended Indian extermination, reflected conventional expectations among American citizens that Euro-American expansion meant Indian elimination. Indians knew well such American thinking. In the Lower Peninsula in February, the Presbyterian missionary Reverend Peter Dougherty wrote to a trading company on behalf of Ahgosa, a leader among the Grand Traverse Bay Ottawas and Ojibwes. Ahgosa had complained to Dougherty that George Johnston (Schoolcraft's brother-in-law) had announced that the Indians "had better prepare for removing." Ahgosa and his people refused to do so, and would "hold on to this place as a bird clings to a branch of a tree waving and ready to fall." But they also distrusted the Schoolcrafts, and they wanted the trading company to "tell them the truth." Ahgosa's people knew about Henry Schoolcraft's 1840 report, and its frightening contents aggravated their fears.[33] Schoolcraft had

not only urged removal by citing the Glass murders, as we have seen, he had also written of the destruction of Indians who failed to remove. Nothing would stop, he ruminated, "the spread of the Saxon race over the whole continent, and it is not probable that any provision can be made for the preservation of the Aboriginal race, which promises to be so effectual as their colonization or transference to a separate territory."[34]

Reverend Dougherty told Ahgosa that Schoolcraft's cosmic vision was only the opinion of one overstimulated writer. He suggested that Whig President-Elect William Henry Harrison would have different views. But Dougherty did not know what the immediate future held, and Ahgosa's Ottawas and Ojibwes needed more information. As they rumored removal, they forced Dougherty to check with his sources of information. Bruiting their impending removal, they revealed their unwillingness to accept the government's word.[35]

Like their neighbors at Grand Traverse Bay, Grand River Ottawas also rumored "a general removal from the state." Farther to the north, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ojibwes told one another that "they were immediately to be removed, by the Department, to the West of the Mississippi river." Indeed, "so great was the alarm, that many of them would have gone over to the Canadian side," had not James Ord, the local agent, intervened to contradict the false news. Ord did not let his superiors forget that in his part of the world, war with Great Britain might lead to "atrocities of the worst kind." Michigan must instead maintain friendship with its Indians. Henry Schoolcraft, by contrast, did little in his last months in office to counter the false reports, telling Indians only that a new administration would take over Indian affairs in March 1840.[36]

Taking office amid swirling Indian stories, Schoolcraft's replacement as Michigan Indian agent, Robert Stuart, observed that Michigan's Indians remained "alarmed through malicious reports, that they should be forced (at the point of the bayonet) to go west of the Mississippi."[37] While citizen-settlers rumored outbreaks of Indian violence, Indians rumored federal plans for infectious mass murder and deportation. Waves of panic sent families to Canada, for fear of a long deadly march to the forbidding Plains. The shifting and incompletely fulfilled promises of the 1836 treaty, combined with the devious but bungled 1838 effort by the brothers Schoolcraft to secure agreement to removal, lofted Indian rumors of federal malevolence. The rumors not only contested Jacksonian policies and ideologies, they also modestly reshaped federal policy, restraining it by promoting an Indian

presence in the British territories, an outcome potentially dangerous to the United States.

John Tanner, Rumored Murderer of 1846

In July 1846 a gunshot killed one of the two brothers Schoolcraft; if the obituaries initially confused the living Henry for the dead James, they left little doubt as to who pulled the trigger, and state officials agreed. Governor Alpheus Felch of Michigan announced a $500 reward for the apprehension, not of the "suspected" or "alleged" killer, but of the "murderer of James Schoolcraft": John Tanner. That year, Michigan writer and early state historian Charles Lanman plainly identified Tanner as "the assassin." Reported as fact, it was rumor, constructed by many out of cultural assumptions about Tanner's character, his probable motives, and the circumstances of his disappearance from the Sault. In 1846 Henry Schoolcraft firmly believed that Tanner had murdered his brother, and he said so four years later in his published memoirs. Modern historians have generally shown more caution, some leaning toward his guilt, others away, but all admitting to uncertainties.[38] A good suspect, Tanner provided an excellent vessel for American rumor.

Tanner had in his life suffered many injuries: physical, psychological, and social. At about age 9, Shawnees stole him from his Kentuckian family. He then spent two miserable years among his captors before an Ottawa woman, Net-no-kwa, purchased him. She became his adoptive mother and cared for him greatly. After another two brighter years in northern Michigan, a brawl took the life of his adoptive Ojibwe father. Net-no-kwa then moved with Tanner, her other children, and several members of her band to lands west of Lake Superior, where they lived in the region between Rainy Lake, the Assiniboine River, the Upper Red River, and Lake Winnipeg. Tanner shallowly buried the English language, but he kept alive the memory of his Kentucky family. His injuries and ailments multiplied. He suffered permanent, partial hearing loss following a boyhood illness, a disease that, in his own words, had rendered him temporarily "insane." He fell from a tree at great height, breaking ribs and losing consciousness. An assault by a jealous hunter left him with a skull so badly cracked that he bore a permanent ridge beneath his scalp. And a gunshot, fired by a conspirator with Tanner's then wife, shattered his right arm before penetrating his chest. He lost the full use of that arm.[39]



John Tanner, Shaw-Shaw-wabe-na-se, engraving by Thomas Illman after painting by Henry Inman, in John Tanner and Edwin James, *A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner* (1830). Inman's copies of scores of American Indian portraits modeled the lithographs in the acclaimed Thomas L. McKenney and James Hall, *History of the Indian Tribes of North America*, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1838–1844). Tanner, a former white captive, is clothed in civility but carries his Anishinaabe identity in his second name. William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

His *Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner* records all this. Written in 1827 with army surgeon Edwin James (the illiterate Tanner could only sign his name), it reveals a highly combative man. He loved and trusted Net-no-kwa, and he struggled for the care and control of his children, but few individuals (certainly not his three wives) remained close to his heart. His marriages failed. He complained of "persecutions" by Indians and Euro-Americans. He spent long periods, with his children, in isolation from other band members.[40]

Much battered and in his forties, having twice already visited the United States, Tanner finally left the western Ojibwe lands and made his way to Mackinac Island in 1824, and, by 1828, to Sault Ste. Marie, where he settled. Some of his children joined him, but as a father he again failed. In 1830 the Michigan Territorial Legislative Council authorized the sheriff at Sault Ste. Marie to take away Martha, Tanner's daughter. Henry Schoolcraft, a council member, secured the passage of this extraordinary legislative order. The abuse prompting the special act went unrecorded, but several of the Sault's leading citizens supported it. Two Ojibwe marriages having failed, Tanner married a Euro-American woman unnamed in the archival record. The marriage was brief; in 1832 she left him. Tanner believed that leading members of the Sault, including Henry Schoolcraft and the Baptist minister Reverend Abel Bingham, had arranged her departure.[41] A damaged, violent, and abusive man, Tanner made a very good suspect in 1846.

As early as 1828 Indian Agent George Boyd, writing from Mackinac, asserted that Tanner had "repeatedly threatened the lives and property of individuals on the Island." Long after James Schoolcraft's murder, residents recalled that Tanner had included the Schoolcrafts and Bingham among those whom he might injure, particularly after they had interfered with his family. John Fierst, the leading Tanner scholar, adds that the brothers Schoolcraft exploited the impoverished, injured man for his knowledge of the Ojibwe language and defrauded him of his meager income. Tanner, Fierst reveals, had cause to act on his threats.[42]

In addition to the evidence of his arguably violent character, his threats, and his cause for anger, his contemporaries later alleged two matters as evidence of his guilt. First, in 1850 Bingham recalled that a page torn from a Baptist hymnal had wadded the musket, or so the fragment of paper found at the crime scene indicated. Not only had Tanner worshiped with Bingham's congregation before his ouster in October 1833, he had also assisted in the translation of a hymnal into Ojibwe.[43] But in 1846 a story at the Sault reported rather different evidence that the killer had loaded the piece with "buck [shot] and ball cartridge," marking the weapon and ammunition as probable standard U.S. Army issue, which would likely have meant an unbleached paper cartridge. Henry Schoolcraft years later explained Tanner's possession of such a gun as a loan from a soldier, whom he did not name.[44]

Second, and more compellingly to those who asserted his guilt, Tanner's neat, white cottage had exploded into flames on Independence Day, two days

before the shooting. William Cullen Bryant, poet and editor of the New York *Evening Post*, passed through the Sault later that fatal summer, and he there heard a rumor that Tanner had "himself set fire to his house . . . before murdering Mr. Schoolcraft." Bingham much later stated that Tanner had deliberately set the fire, having first scattered gunpowder about the place, "to give the impression that he himself was burned within it." Bingham further claimed (in the passive language of rumor) that Tanner, "a bundle at his side" and armed with a gun, "was seen in a thicket" the day between the fire and the shooting. Bingham's daughter, Angie Bingham Gilbert, sixty years later recalled that the Sault residents carefully investigated the ruins of the house, but found "no part" of Tanner's remains.[45]

Residents remembered reports of Tanner's semi-spectral visitation in arms for months following the shooting. Gilbert in 1906 recalled the "Tanner Summer" of 1846, during which residents reported sightings of Tanner, and the man's name was invoked to explain all manner of minor events. He became that year a "bogie man" to the town's children, who "shivered and shuddered throughout the entire summer." An 1846 letter written by John Hulbert verifies some of Gilbert's recollection: "We have frequent reports that Tanner has been seen in this vicinity, but little reliance is to be placed upon them, yet it is my opinion that he still lingers about the place, as I know of no section of the country he could flee to with any degree of safety." George Johnston, Henry Schoolcraft's brother-in-law, a year later said that the local customs inspector, one Richardson, "was seen" behaving suspiciously shortly after the murder. Richardson, "under pretense of hunting pigeons," allegedly "took provisions to Tanner." Richardson, Johnston added, had made himself unpopular among the "worthy part of our citizens." Certainly Johnston and other traders might have doubts about a customs inspector in a border town. Johnston noted the "idle reports" of local Tanner sightings, but he also observed that Ojibwes on the American side believed that Tanner had fled to the Red River region of Canada. James Schoolcraft's widow, Anne Maria Schoolcraft, reported that Tanner had been seen on the Canadian side.[46] As time passed, rumor more often placed him west of Lake Superior, though one source for this flying report soon retracted it as a case of mistaken identity: one of Tanner's Ojibwe sons still lived, hunted, and traded in the region. Novelist Louise Erdrich reminds us that we simply do not know Tanner's fate, but she also reports, in an echo of Gilbert's "bogie man," that "There are still Ojibwa who were frightened into good behavior, as children, by threats of Tanner's ghostly appearance."[47]

No one at the time questioned Tanner's ability to commit murder and get away with it. Lanman, in a "letter" from the Sault that summer, states that "A party of white men and Indians is now on Tanner's trail, but the prospect of capturing him is, alas, uncertain, and the white savage will probably seek a home in the Hudson's Bay Territory." Another report indicates that fear of Tanner's prowess inhibited his pursuers.[48] If his narrative is reliable, Tanner hunted with great skill in his youth, exciting jealousies that led to his "persecution" in the Red River region. He knew guns; he knew how to kill. As a member of an Ottawa-Ojibwe band, moreover, he had joined war parties against the Dakotas, and he saw action in a civil conflict between two rival Canadian trading companies. Yet his narrative reports no instance in which he slays a human being. He attends ceremonies in preparation for war, he ritually celebrates his first killings of bear and sturgeon, but he never commemorates the killing of an enemy. He fights fellow Ojibwes, but only barehanded or with blunt instruments. He takes no human life.[49]

Tanner's guilt would mean that a disabled man of 66 years shot James Schoolcraft in broad daylight, while others heard the shot and even saw the gun smoke, and that he then escaped without capture into the boreal forest pursued by young soldiers and skilled Indian hunters. Seeking government assistance in 1837, Tanner had stated that "I cant do any kind heavy work becaus I am cripple by Ojibyuay Indians."[50] Yet a decade later, having rounded his mid-sixties, he made a clean getaway, "the entire population" of the Sault in pursuit, with dogs.

Leading authorities and the public press alleged that very escape in 1846. They predicted Tanner's apprehension and even his lynching.[51] But if no one expressed doubt about Tanner's ability to flee, some did call into question the vigor of the manhunt. In 1847 Henry Schoolcraft wondered: "Are all efforts of the civil powers to bring him to justice, at an end?" In 1846 John Hulbert at the Sault saw something "very mysterious" in Tanner's apparent escape. Despite a considerable county and state reward totaling $600, "little effort is put forth; in fact but little interest is taken in the matter." Anne Maria Schoolcraft complained within three weeks of the murder that "With regard to the search for the murderer, nothing has been done—It is true that some of the people went out the very day the deed was done, but since that, no one troubles themselves about it." These last two letter writers, each related by marriage to Henry Schoolcraft, also separately alleged that Sault Indian agent James Ord and customs collector Richardson had dissuaded local Ojibwes

from tracking down Tanner—apparently fearing the legal consequences should these Indians kill Tanner, a white man, while trying to capture him.[52]

James Schoolcraft drank heavily, gambled energetically, and womanized, or so rumor had it. In 1830 he stabbed a man and escaped from jail. Some reports indicate that he spent his last earthly morning sleeping off a night on the town. Perhaps his death aroused more relief than fury. Perhaps, too, the nearby international boundary with British Canada, to which Tanner had reportedly fled, placed tall barriers before any U.S. posse. An important merchant urged Henry Schoolcraft to "demand," through Michigan's government, that Upper Canada permit "bold Chippewas" to flush Tanner out of the northern "fastnesses." Schoolcraft pursued the suggestion, but while Michigan's Governor Felch issued a high reward for Tanner's capture, he refused to demand anything of the British until he had good evidence that Tanner had crossed the watery border.[53]

Feelings against James Schoolcraft may have drained the manhunt's energy; relations with British Canada may have curtailed the manhunt's reach. But another likelihood demands attention: that Sault residents only sluggishly pursued Tanner because they suspected others of the crime. Their suspicions grew with time. George Johnston, visiting the Sault in 1848, learned from the local doctor that most residents by then fingered a different assailant: Lieutenant Bryant Tilden of the 2nd Infantry. From very early, reports indicated the weapon was army issue. Legend later had it that an empty musket—and therefore a fired one—had been returned to the Sault's garrison at Fort Brady only minutes after the shooting. Sault residents bruited about a simmering quarrel between Tilden and James Schoolcraft; they said that two men of the garrison, Samuel Peck and Captain Clark, had overheard Tilden uttering threats to kill the man. Tanner's daughter Martha, the very daughter removed from his care by legislative action, was later rumored to have received a letter from Tilden's wife revealing that he had confessed on his deathbed to the Schoolcraft murder. The story had it that Martha Tanner, a devout Catholic, showed the letter to a bishop, who, with the secrecy expected in an antebellum Protestant culture of Catholic confessors, set it aflame. As the murder story morphed into popular local legend, it experimented with nineteenth-century notions of Roman conspiracy. Providential intervention even enters the Tilden legend, in tales that he had acted in collaboration with two soldiers, both later struck dead, simultaneously, by a single bolt of avenging lightning. Tilden died peacefully in 1859.[54]

Legends aside, within weeks of the shooting, Tilden departed to Mexico for the war. While there, public prints soon reported, an American court martial found him guilty of a separate killing. Opinion against him at Sault Ste. Marie soared; George Johnston became convinced, at least for a time, that Tilden had killed James Schoolcraft. Henry Schoolcraft, however, remained publicly unshaken in his belief in Tanner's guilt, despite having read of Tilden's conviction by the U.S. Army commission.[55]

The initial rumor that Tanner killed Schoolcraft spread fast and nationwide; that the news could quickly reach metropolitan America from the distant north was news itself. A steamer had made it from Chicago to Buffalo in a mere three days, picking up the news along the way. From Buffalo, telegraph buzzed the story to Albany, and from there it dotted and dashed its way instantaneously across the nation. Speed did not make for accuracy, however, and the reports carried not only the false news of Henry Schoolcraft's demise and the unverified report of John Tanner's guilt, but also the intriguing misrepresentation of Tanner as a "half-breed." Most papers outside Michigan repeated the mistake well into the summer.[56] Tanner's false "half-breed" status led the Democratic press to opine that Indians poorly repay American generosity. Lavishing praise on the (mistakenly) late Henry Schoolcraft, *The Albany Argus* lamented that "one who has contributed so much to meliorate the condition of the aborigines, and to portray their character and history, should have met his death by violence from one of them—if indeed the half-breed can be strictly classed as such."[57]

Tanner had no known Native American ancestry; he was no "half-breed" in the conventional sense of the abusive term, and some papers did correct the error once Henry Schoolcraft alerted them to it; but why the error in the first place and why did it carry so widely?[58] Rumors involve interpretation; more than an individual reporter's slip, more than a single error, Tanner's false identity as a "half-breed" helped to make sense of the murder among those misinterpreting and exchanging the information.[59] The notion that passionate savagery came with native "blood," a notion consonant with Jacksonian removal, stains period literature. Walt Whitman provides us with a particularly fitting example. The great mid-Atlantic Democrat published a novella, "Arrow-Tip," in a party-line magazine in 1845. The following year he reissued it, the month before the Schoolcraft murder, in his Brooklyn newspaper in serial form. He gave it a new title, "The Half Breed." Its moral—that fatal disaster follows contact between rough but reasoning frontiersmen and noble but impulsive Indians—smacks of pure Democratic

Party rationalization. Its epilogue smacks of removal itself, as the Indian leader of a "remnant . . . led his tribe still farther into the West, to grounds where they never would be annoyed, in their generation at least, by the presence of white intruders." Its conclusion weirdly anticipates the stories of "half-breed" Tanner's escape. Whitman's character, "Boddo," a malignant, deformed, and guilty "half breed," disappears, perhaps into "the wilds."[60]

Eastern editors soon realized that Tanner was by birth an Anglo-American and citizen of the United States, a fact widely known in Michigan. Notwithstanding, Tanner's moral corruption by a life among Indians remained a compelling object lesson in the need for racial separation and Indian removal. Several American officials in the Great Lakes region described Tanner as a white man degenerated. The view surfaced long before that fatal buck and ball struck James Schoolcraft. In 1828 Indian agent George Boyd stated that Tanner "is an Indian . . . , about as bad a one as belongs to the agency." An anonymous "back-woods philosopher, who knew Tanner personally," echoed the view later in the century. He told antiquarian Judge Joseph Steere that Tanner "was a regular Injun; more of an Injun than any of the Injuns, and a d'd mean Injun too."[61] In 1846 Henry Schoolcraft described him as a "kind of outlaw," and a former captive "brought up among the Indians, whom he exceeds, in ferocity, ignorance, and evil passions." Schoolcraft's wording appeared, barely revised, two days later, in the Washington, D.C., *Union*. Schoolcraft's Tanner was "so inveterately savage that he cannot tolerate civilization."[62] Tanner's decades of wallowing "in the depths of Indian prejudices and superstitions" left him irretrievable: a "very savage in his feelings, reasonings, and philosophy," a true "realization of Shakespeare's idea of Caliban." Tanner, the older Schoolcraft reasoned, having returned to his nation of origin, wished an easy and idle life, and since civilization would not allow that, he became bitter and revengeful.[63]

Tanner's connections with and alleged contamination by Indians powered both suspicions that he might have killed and rumors that he did kill James Schoolcraft. His moodiness, his bad temper, his abusive character, his inability to shed Indian lessons for the lessons of gentle civility drove the conviction that, like an Indian, he had killed out of revenge. Stories circulated that Tanner had recently murmured his intent to kill James Schoolcraft to Reverend Abel Bingham and others in response to "some difficulty."[64] Others implied that he shot the younger Schoolcraft to avenge himself against the out-of-reach older brother. The New York *Evening Mirror* alleged that Henry Schoolcraft had written "something" that aroused Tanner's fury.[65]

Dr. Charles Lee published a dramatic account of his conversation with the troubled old man. Writing in New York City, Lee alleged that Tanner had held him as a virtual prisoner for hours in Tanner's Sault Ste. Marie house. According to Lee, Tanner—former captive turned captor, white man become savage—erupted into rage when Lee mentioned Henry Schoolcraft by name. Schoolcraft, Tanner charged, brought on "all his trouble and misery," having "been the cause of his wife and daughters leaving him." Lee, writing under the influence of the early false news that Henry Schoolcraft lay dead at the Sault, said that local residents commonly knew of Tanner's "state of mind, . . . feelings of revenge toward" and intention "to kill" Henry Schoolcraft. Tanner—"savage, vindictive, suspicious, and . . . demoniac"—had committed a crime of mad passion.[66]

Such an Indianized John Tanner formed a plausible killer. Unredeemable, having spent too many years among Native Americans, he exemplified the dangerous plunge into lawless violence that advocates of removal expected from Indian-white contact. "Half-breed" or not, he had absorbed the worst characteristics of Native America, and rumor had it that he killed.

Rumoring with a Vengeance

The execution of the federal Indian removal policy in the 1830s and early 1840s killed people by the thousands as it forcibly deported by the tens of thousands. It did far less direct harm to Michigan's Native Americans than it did to those of many other states, but it nonetheless hit them hard. Native Americans lost vast lands in the state during the 1830s, and they did so in unbalanced, practically dictated treaties that did not reduce Indian fears about American intentions. In 1838 Henry and James Schoolcraft exacerbated those fears as they urged the exploration of western lands and as they toyed with a fraudulent Michigan Indian agreement to remove. Rumors that the federal government would soon dragoon Ottawas and Ojibwes for a forced march to the central Plains induced individuals and families to leave Michigan for Canada. Removal, in short, screamed through the false reports that raced among Indians and citizens during the 1830s and 1840s, even when those reports, as in the Glass and Schoolcraft murders, had nothing to do with removal itself.

John Tanner's name became entangled in the struggle over removal, perhaps through no intent of his own. His *Narrative* appeared in the very month of the passage of the Removal Act. Its introduction, by collaborator Edwin

James, vigorously condemned Jacksonian policy, which, James said, brought more "injustice and cruelty to those people than any other." James described federal-Indian treaties as a "vain mockery," for the "*negotiation*, and the *reciprocity*, is all on one side." James called the federal civilizing mission "feeble and misdirected," and he saw no evidence that Americans have "either a regard for" Native American "rights, where they happen to come into contact with our interests, or a sincere desire to promote the cause of moral instruction among them." The "best" policy toward Indians, James argued, was "*to let them alone*."[67]

Edwin James's condemnations of the federal Indian office troubled his Sault Ste. Marie neighbor, Henry Schoolcraft, then Indian agent, advocate of removal, frequenter of treaties, and coordinator of federal "civilizing" efforts. Schoolcraft slammed the *Narrative* as inaccurate, accusing James of shoddy work and Tanner of being "more suspicious, revengeful, and bad tempered than any Indian I ever knew." Doing so, Schoolcraft revealed his affinities with Edwin James, who, for all his opposition to removal, for all his advocacy of the Indians' right to direct their own destinies, had absorbed critical elements of contemporary American ideology. His bold criticisms accompanied conventional Anglo-American thought.[68] On the first page of his introduction, James describes Tanner as filled with the "indomitable and untiring sprit of revenge, so prominent in the Indian character." James's Tanner shared with Indians, indeed drew from Indians, that very trait that would years later make the missing Tanner the leading suspect in the shooting of James Schoolcraft: vengeance. Imagined vengeance had also prompted citizens to allege Ottawa (and/or Ojibwe) guilt in the massacre of Ansel Glass and his family in 1838. Vengeful if unidentified Indian phantoms soared alongside rumor as they sought passionate satisfaction from the innocent citizens of a guilty nation.

Native Americans and some citizens contested the particulars, arguing, for instance, that Glass had massacred his own household. That argument gained strength, but Glass never faced formal indictment for the murder of his family. By contrast, Tanner's indictment for James Schoolcraft's murder accompanied a governor's proclamation and reward money from the county and the state. What's more, when the "white Indian" Tanner stood accused of domestic abuse, the legislature sprang into action to rescue Martha Tanner from her too-Indian father. Although citizens in Jacksonian America only slowly grappled with the possibility that Glass had murdered his family, lawless Native American violence against women and children rippled

through U.S. ideology; after all, the Declaration of Independence declares it. The understanding ran deep in 1838, as Grand River citizens anticipated an Indian war of revenge. Even without an Indian protagonist, the Tanner story reflected such expectations.

Shawnees assaulted American farmsteads in Tanner's *Narrative*, but they killed no one. They kidnapped Tanner without a shot. But when Angie Bingham Gilbert in 1906 described Tanner's boyhood abduction, the gore spilled. Gilbert's imaginary Shawnees killed almost everyone; they even swung "small children by the feet," dashing "their brains out." That similar instances of swinging infanticide appear in the writings of such notables as Cotton Mather, Michel-Guillaume Jean de Crèvecoeur, and James Fenimore Cooper suggests that it is a rhetorical convention. The rhetoric about the dashing of infants' heads goes deeper than real violence, which children on all sides suffered terribly in the wars of colonialism. Swinging infanticide enters the realm of scripture, recalling a promise, in the Psalms (138:9), of providential destruction to God's enemies: "Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones." The form turns in Hosea (13:16), where the dashing of little heads is Providentially threatened upon Israel as a severe punishment for apostasy: "Their infants shall be dashed in pieces." If Gilbert, Mather, and Cooper—who knew their scripture—devoutly configured this act of imagined Indian atrocity, then the biblical texts raise another issue, for in Hosea Providence punishes the people of God, not their enemies. In Gilbert, Mather, and Cooper, the mothers who witness the horror are Anglo-colonial or U.S. settlers. What sins had brought such retribution upon their houses? As American citizens rumored Indian vengeance, they knew that vengeance implied grievance, that grievance might imply wrong, and that those who had been wronged were those whom Gilbert herself called "the dark men whose homes we have taken."[69]

Marc Bloch long ago described rumor as a "mirror" with which the group reflects on its own ways of seeing the world. Tamotsu Shibutani, of the next generation, observed (and felt) the capacity of rumor to project a group's doubts and anxieties onto the construction of an imagined enemy.[70] Rumors that blamed vengeful Indians, phony "half-breeds," and unredeemed "white Indians" for murders that remained frightening and unsolved in an era of rapid Indian dispossession did more than denigrate Indian or "mixed blood" character; they raised even on an essentially peaceful borderland the concern among U.S. citizens that American misdeeds called for satisfaction. Rumor, in that sense, acknowledged and accommodated American

injustice. As American citizens, in far-flung rumor, falsely condemned Indians (and Indian character) for real crimes—as citizens spoke into Marc Bloch's mirror—they did not find much comfort in the opposing image. Michigan's Native Americans and newer settlers alike, rumoring forced deportations, mass poisonings, massacre, and murder in an atmosphere of relative peace, commented knowingly on the violence inherent in American expansion.

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Conclusion: "Tears of the Indians"

As a story told about violence in Indian Country, legendary swinging infanticide predates actual English colonization, but with a twist. Long before Angie Gilbert falsely charged Shawnees with the dashing of babies' heads, Bartolome de Las Casas's *Brief Relation of the Destruction of the Indies* charged Christian colonial forces, not Native Americans, with that biblical cruelty. English publishers appropriated Las Casas for anti-Spanish purposes that would have dismayed him. An early English translation, *The Spanish Colonie* (1583), lingered over Spanish attacks and the "straunge cruelties" they inflicted even upon infants: "They took the little soules by the heeles, ramping them from the mother's dugges, and crushed their heads against the cliffs." John Milton's nephew, John Phillips, said it in more modern tones in his even more polemical 1653 adaptation: "The children they would take by their feet and dash their innocent heads against the rocks." Introducing that volume, Phillips sounded old notes that would remain familiar for centuries; he called the "SPANIARDS, a Proud, Deceitful, Cruel, and Treacherous Nation,"[1] and he titled his adaptation of Las Casas, *Tears of the Indians*.[2]

This concluding chapter addresses not Spanish colonization but an aspect of its legendary mark on the early American Republic, and not Philip's *Tears of the Indians* but the "Trail of Tears," the forced expulsion of the Cherokee Nation in the Age of Jackson.[3] American critics, as they contemplated the execution of Jacksonian policies of Indian removal, found themselves uncomfortably thinking of Spain, of its legendary violence, and of its acquired riches. They also thought about gold, that shining flipside of the Black Legend. As discoveries of gold in the Cherokee Nation advanced the cause of Indian removal, some U.S. citizens wondered what stories of cruelty, violence, slavery, sickness, and even extermination might one day be told of them.

Gold

Two centuries after the appearance in print of the first English adaptation of Las Casas, Thomas Jefferson wrote, in *Notes on the State of Virginia*, that Spain and Portugal continued to hold Indians "under the accumulated pressure of slavery, superstition, and ignorance." Within the same chapter, he turned a skeptical ear to stories of gold in his state. Drafting the volume toward the very end of the American Revolution, he could point to only one, isolated goldfield within the expansive boundaries of his state, which then spread across the Appalachians to the Ohio River. The mine, low in yield, high in impurity, and located considerably east of the Blue Ridge, held no promise of mineral wealth.[4]

Jefferson lived through the late colonial, revolutionary, and early republican periods, and, like many of his fellows, his life touched on several of the longitudinal stories and singular episodes covered by this book. His words charging King George III with inciting the Indians to an "undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions" essentially survived congressional editing in the Declaration of Independence to epitomize citizens' expectations for Indian war. As governor, he held British General Henry Hamilton responsible for scalp bounties. As president, he promoted the federal civilizing mission, which many Indians would continue to rumor meant slavery and which helped to turn homespun cloth into an icon of U.S. expansion. Ten years before the American Revolution, he traveled to Philadelphia for a smallpox inoculation, and he would later, himself, inoculate his family, including, probably, slaves. He quickly embraced and promoted Jenner's vaccine—providing it to certain Indian leaders during his presidency.

Skeptical of gold in Virginia's mountains and eager to maintain peace with Indians as president, Jefferson thoroughly believed in an expansive empire of liberty. As president, he developed the policy of Indian removal, encouraging through a variety of tactics enormous cessions of land in the East, especially north of the Ohio River. He simultaneously encouraged eastern Native American migration into the Louisiana Purchase territories and beyond the Mississippi River, which he foresaw as a watery boundary between unassimilated Indians and settler-citizens. Jefferson also agreed to the Compact of 1802, a pact between the federal government and the state of Georgia promising to remove Cherokees and Creeks as soon as possible from their Georgia lands in exchange for Georgia's cessions of lands stretch-

ing west to the Mississippi.[5] While he lived, these Indian peoples largely rejected his vision for their western future. Several years after his death, a new discovery of gold would speed Cherokee removal, an aggression dark enough that contemporaries contemplated what we now call the Black Legend.

That Black Legend, an expression of Anglo-American national and religious vanity, bore nuggets of truth. On the islands of Española, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, colonizers indeed drove Indians to work gold, and entire societies collapsed under great suffering. As the first chapter of this book relates, English colonizers from the sixteenth century on, bruiting about Spanish cruelties but inspired by Spanish success, imagined that they would find gold in or near the Appalachians, and some thought the Spanish had already found such gold. In 1799 the poorly grounded legend of southeastern gold mutated into rock-solid history.

The discovery occurred in the North Carolina Piedmont, at a place called Little Meadow Creek (just to the east of today's Charlotte), which briefly promised to become "the real Potosi of North America," as one writer described it, conventionally associating Piedmont gold with South American mining. Well into the 1820s, the Philadelphia mint drew all of its native U.S. gold from North Carolina.[6] This successful southeastern strike, in roughly the same continental region so familiar to rumors of abandoned Spanish mines and Indian Country riches, spiked an already potent concoction of golden legends that enlivened the imagination of northerners. In places as distant as Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, and Vermont, citizens of the new Republic discussed the regional presence of lost "Spanish" treasure, and some went a-digging.[7]

When the Territory of Louisiana, only recently Spanish, fell under an American claim in 1804, it proved equally fertile for scores of tales rumoring locations of subterranean Spanish silver and gold. Like the southern Appalachians, the southern Louisiana Territory supported stories of lost or abandoned Spanish mines. In general, according to folklorists, the stories followed a formula convenient for the newly arrived American tellers. Cruel Spanish mine overlords had in centuries past provoked successful Indian uprisings, but without the Spanish to drive them, the Indians abandoned the mines for lack of interest, initiative, or understanding. Legendary Spaniards and phantom Indians proved to be unworthy stewards of a continent of riches. Such legends, two folklorists convincingly argue, salved "the consciences of Anglo-Americans who violently and methodically stripped the

Indians of their personal possessions, their land, their rights as human beings, and their natural wealth," a promising fortune that "still lies buried in the land."[8]

In stories of Louisiana gold, Americans condemned Spain and Native America while congratulating themselves for their enterprise and virtue. This would prove harder to do when the ancient dream of gold mines at the southern end of the Appalachians came true in the Cherokee Nation in 1829. For years thereafter, U.S. citizens jostled with each other and with Cherokees as they extracted the gold in fact and in good quantity. The gold strike went public on August 1, when the Milledgeville *Georgia Journal* announced that two mines had been discovered in the state, which had borders extending over a large portion of the federally recognized Cherokee Nation. The strike sparked the Cherokee gold rush, also known as the Dahlonega gold rush, after the Cherokee word for golden, *tahlonega*.[9]

It could not have come at a worse time for the consolidating Cherokee Nation. As James Mooney succinctly puts it in his late nineteenth-century work, the discovery "speedily resulted in the forcible eviction of the Cherokee from the gold-bearing region." If nothing else, as Mooney's contemporary, historian Ulrich Phillips, notes, it "tended to hasten some early solution" of Georgia's dispute with the Cherokee Nation. Even Phillips, a confident white supremacist, could observe that the "intrusion" of three thousand "miners into the Cherokee territory was unlawful under the enactments of several governments, each claiming jurisdiction": the United States, the state of Georgia, and the Cherokee Nation itself. The Cherokee Light Horse, the Cherokee Nation's law enforcement arm, attempted to preserve the lands, and its mounted deputies, careful to avoid physical injury, destroyed some of the American intruders' improvements. It was not enough. Alarm spread throughout the Cherokee Nation. Gold added urgency to crisis over Cherokee removal.[10] Stories ensued of mineral wealth, slavery, sexual violence, disease, and dispossession, as the United States wrote its own Black Legend.

Slavery, Gold, Removal

Cherokees had intensely experienced slavery: as targets of slave raiders in the seventeenth century, as Indian slave raiders and traders themselves in the early eighteenth century, as slave catchers of runaways later on, and, among some members of the rising elite, as themselves practitioners of race-based chattel slavery. The enslavement of Africans and African Americans

by Cherokees and other southeastern Indians became a social fact by the 1790s. Race-based chattel slavery did not characterize or dominate Cherokee society. According to their first census, in 1809, almost a third of the Cherokees, or about 3,500 people, lived in the rugged Valley Towns amid the southern reaches of the Appalachian Mountains. The census identified only five black slaves in this region.[11] At the time of Cherokee removal, about 7 percent of Cherokee families throughout the Nation owned slaves, and only a handful of these possessed more than twenty individuals.[12] Such measures of slaveholding suggest colonial Connecticut or colonial New York as better peers than neighboring antebellum South Carolina or Georgia. But if slaveholders were never numerous, black slaves were more so. They constituted about 6 percent of the combined populations of Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Choctaws in the 1830s.[13] With the statehood of Alabama in 1819, the Cherokee Nation was surrounded by slaveholding states, and its wealthy, powerful, and commercially engaged leaders intensified their efforts both to codify slavery and to secure the future of the Cherokee Nation on its lands, guaranteed by treaty with the United States.

Anti-black racism surfaced in written Cherokee laws regulating marriage. These laws reflect mainly elite opinion; they hardly represented the opinions of the Cherokee majority. Nonetheless, the laws themselves show a growing concern with the relationships of slavery, sex, and descent. Where tradition had reckoned descent, and therefore membership in clans and the Nation, through the maternal line, an 1825 law provided for the citizenship of children of Cherokee fathers born to white women, but it did not extend citizenship to children born to black women. Rather, an 1824 Cherokee law had already prohibited the marriage of blacks to whites or Indians. This dramatically narrowed the chances that descendants of Africans could obtain citizenship in the Cherokee Nation.[14] By this period, Cherokee lawmakers had agreed that slavery was black. While Cherokee racism resembled that of U.S. Americans in this peculiar regard, Cherokees also knew that their American neighbors held racial views highly threatening to Cherokee safety, both personal and national. The bonds that enslaved people of African descent among Cherokees developed within the larger context of the American Republic's assaults on Cherokee autonomy.[15] As Georgia began its sustained attack on the Cherokee Nation, the Cherokees could easily witness slavery and contemplate its meaning. They possessed, especially in that part of the Nation claimed by Georgia, slaves enough to present a constant reminder to avoid the condition at all cost.[16]

When gold surfaced in 1829, the Cherokee Nation had just adopted a new constitution that promised, however improbably in the face of the United States, to make a nation-state for Cherokees that might secure respect in Washington and across the Atlantic. The promise went unfilled. The constitution drew the state of Georgia's ire, for Georgia had long claimed Cherokee lands. Gold, and the desire to gain full control of its production, presented one strong encouragement for Georgia to act.[17] Another inducement came almost simultaneously: the inauguration of Andrew Jackson as president of the United States. Jackson's leadership cleared the way for Georgia to ignore legalities surrounding the Cherokee Nation, which the state, in any case, refused to recognize. Without risk of federal challenge, Georgia could extend its law over the part of Cherokee Country that lay within the state's own claimed borders. Georgia unilaterally abolished the Cherokee government. Meanwhile, it gave little protection to Cherokee individuals who might wish to become Georgians. State legislation passed in 1828, for example, prohibited non-English-speaking Indians—or any descendants of Indians—from standing as witnesses against whites in a Georgia court.

Miners, meanwhile, converged upon the region. Some entered into agreements with Cherokees to work the gold, but most made life more difficult. All miners added a new dimension to the national controversy over removal. The Cherokees' newspaper, the *Cherokee Phoenix*, in a piece republished in the North, reported on the federal failure to expel or punish those intruders and on the strong efforts by the newly formed Georgia Guard to arrest any Cherokees who tried their own hand at gold mining. Another *Phoenix* story noted that three thousand gold-seekers had entered the Nation. On June 3, 1830, Georgia Governor George Rockingham Gilmer issued a proclamation declaring that the state had the clear and absolute authority over all Cherokee lands within its claimed borders, including all the gold and silver that lay within. He gave the Cherokees no choice but to evacuate.[18] The state prohibited Cherokee mining as Cherokees suffered an invasion of Georgian miners.[19] The Jackson administration bowed to Georgia's demand for full authority over the lands and withdrew all federal troops from the mining district. The Georgia Guard—ready to enforce Georgia law and to obstruct Cherokee governance—more than replaced them.[20]

The state of Georgia moved forcefully against whites who cooperated with the Cherokees, most famously against pro-Cherokee missionaries. But the law of December 1830 prohibiting unlicensed white persons from enter-

ing or working in the Cherokee Nation aimed not only at missionaries. It also targeted U.S. citizen-miners who leased rights from Cherokees. Georgia insisted on sole control of the goldfields.[21] The state, to replace Cherokees and their slaves with citizen-settlers and noncitizen slaves, distributed Cherokee lands by lottery in 1832–1833.[22]

Cherokee leaders defended their possession of the gold mines, and they made the state's theft of the mines a critical argument in their appeals to the executive, Congress, and the American public in 1831.[23] But gold worked harder against the Cherokees than for them. Wilson Lumpkin, inaugurated governor of Georgia in 1831 and elected on the promise of "NO INDIAN TESTIMONY AGAINST WHITE MEN," pressed Cherokee removal forward. He later asserted that gold had made moot all other considerations. His book-length memoir argues that without removal under the 1830 provisions of the federal Removal Act, not only would Cherokees have lost everything without any compensation, but also that their country would have fallen to gold-seekers, "the most abandoned portions of society." The naive "intermeddling of 'busy-bodies,'" as he called missionaries and northern do-gooders, had forced the state to take decisive action in extending its laws over and sending armed men into the Cherokee Nation. He claimed that Georgia acted to preserve order, to enforce state law, and to "protect the gold mines from the depredations of all sorts of intruders."[24] Georgia's case against and pressure on the Cherokees went back decades; the gold strikes alone did not provoke it. After all, most Indian peoples still living south of Lakes Erie and Michigan on lands that yielded no gold found themselves forced westward under the Jackson and Van Buren administrations. Cherokees, however, felt the powerful effects of gold almost immediately.[25]

Their effective appeals to the conscience of U.S. citizens made the Cherokees' case a national issue. Legal challenges, through missionaries, led to the Supreme Court, and to the somewhat favorable decision in *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832), which pronounced the Cherokee Nation independent of Georgia's legal sovereignty. Personal lobbying by John Ross and other Cherokee leaders, combined with massive petition drives to Congress, persisted through most of the 1830s. But the Jackson and Van Buren administrations, supported by strong anti-Indian sentiment in the United States, stood firm, backing the state of Georgia. The federal government, determined to see the Cherokees removed, applied pressure by allowing its citizens to overwhelm the Cherokees under Georgia's authority.[26] But it also applied the bayonet.

A Presbyterian Las Casas

Reverend Daniel S. Butrick witnessed this destruction of Cherokee rights. Temperamentally slow to dissent openly, he left a searing private indictment. This man of faith, a Presbyterian evangelist so ascetic, even mystical, that he had experimented with a vow of celibacy, repeatedly objected to the involvement of religious ministers in politics. While other Presbyterian missionaries to the Cherokees, most notably Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, initially resisted Georgia's expropriation of the Cherokee Nation, Butrick succumbed for years to the dismal logic of removal, with his characteristic disappointment in his fellow citizens: "It seems generally admitted at the present day that the Indians are better than the whites around and among them . . . They cannot be surrounded by American citizens without having their property torn from them, their minds corrupted, and their virgins debauched, therefore they must leave American citizens and retire to the more virtuous and civilized inhabitants of the forest." That January 1832, Butrick observed U.S. citizens pouring into the Cherokee Nation, bringing, he asserted, "robbery, oppression and murder, the poor Indian must watch night and day to preserve one little pony to plough his field or one poor cow to nourish his family, or one creature of any kind to furnish his meat . . . The Indian must watch his wife and daughters with an eagle eye or they will be betrayed, debauched and worse than murdered by American citizens." Far better for the Cherokees, Butrick concluded, to "go to the western wilderness, and associate with the more virtuous Comanches."[27]

Butrick indulged in irony, but choices exactly that grim faced the Cherokees, especially once the federal government secured a removal treaty from an unofficial rump of discouraged Cherokee leaders at New Echota in late 1835. In those negotiations, the United States refused to budge on the inevitability of imminent removal, placing only such matters as compensation on the table. The resulting Treaty of New Echota provided a spurious if legalistic cover for Cherokee expulsion. Most Cherokees, including the legitimate leadership, called the treaty a groundless fraud.

Butrick, shunning politics and confirmed in his pessimism about human nature, saw no point to resistance. But as a keen observer of Cherokee life, he questioned Anglo-American assumptions. For example, he reported to John Howard Payne that "though I have been about nineteen years among the Cherokees, I have perceived nothing of that slavish, servile fear on the part of women, so often spoken of."[28] Many entries in his journal, moreover,

record both the violently criminal character of Cherokee removal and, in Butrick's own private view, its evisceration of vaunted American values. Once a quiet proponent of voluntary removal, as Butrick witnessed the seizure of Cherokee lands and the brutal assaults on individual Cherokees, he reimagined the United States as simply a newer, crueler, more hypocritical version of imperial Spain. And, as the early Republic drove the Cherokees west, Butrick cast his lot with them.[29]

During the crisis, Butrick's journal captured Georgia citizens abusing Cherokees in ways that practically performed slavery.[30] In 1832, while some might still have hoped that federal law would preserve the integrity of the Cherokee Nation, two Cherokee men took several Georgians to federal authorities for invading their property. Americans repaid their faith by freeing the Georgians, one of whom in turn sued a Cherokee named Old Fields in state court, quickly gaining ownership of Old Fields's property under Georgia law. Georgians seized Old Fields's house, and to drive home their mastery over Indians, they roughed up his family, manhandled his wife, tied a rope around her neck in the manner of Indian slavers, and dragged her about the grounds. Without further hope, Old Fields enrolled his family with federal agents for an early removal to Arkansas.[31]

In May 1838, as the vast majority of Cherokees still clung to their homes, the federal government, under General Winfield Scott, seized and detained them. According to Butrick, "there now commenced that work which will doubtless long eclipse the glory of the United States." Cherokees had been neighbors to Euro-Americans in the South for centuries. They had been at peace with the United States since the 1790s (or longer, depending on how one views the matter). Now, Scott's troops, aided by Georgia forces, concentrated them first in forts, then in festering open-air camps under the shadow of stockades, and finally, after months of unhealthful confinement, coerced them west. They departed in a series of poorly planned detachments under the leadership, first, of federal forces, and then, after the federal government relented, under Cherokee leadership. The vast majority of the 13,000 Cherokees who were so forcibly removed saw the last of their homeland between late September and early November. They left, poorly supplied and mostly on foot, the southern Appalachians for overland journeys of almost one thousand miles. The evidence does not permit a close accounting of the dead, but many perished. A recent "guess," lower than many others, suggests that one thousand people died in the relocation camps and another two thousand while relocating or shortly after arriving in the West. These casualties

of the United States, added to those of other removed Indians, make eastern Indian removal overall one of the nation's greatest continental atrocities. As Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green have remarked, earlier eastern Indian removals had been similarly devastating, so "proponents of removal should have known" the lethal consequences. Notable among the Cherokee dead in the course of removal, as a chilling example, was Elizabeth Brown Henley Ross, in her late forties when taken in February 1839. Also known as Quatie, she was John Ross's wife, mother to six children, one of them named after George Washington.[32]

Butrick recorded the escalating violence as he witnessed it that summer and fall. On May 26, 1838, he noted, "This day a number of Georgia citizens near New Echota took sixty Cherokees, and drove them to the fort and their requested permission of General [Winfield] Scott to take them out and whip them though in this they were not gratified."[33] For the next several pages, his journal contains disturbing accounts of families separated and property lost in the course of the military roundup. Troops shot a man who tried to flee. With one hundred lashes they whipped the back off another because he had struck back, with a stone, at armed men. Marched and goaded like animals, Cherokees suffered the bondage that recurring rumor had long predicted. The camps into which Americans drove them provided little sanitation or protection from the elements.

Rumors raced among those suffering in the camps. The missionaries, some internees said, had hatched the removal Treaty of New Echota, giving constitutional legitimacy to the cruelties Cherokees endured. Rumor had it that even Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, whose imprisonment by Georgia had occasioned an important if immediately useless Cherokee victory before the Supreme Court in 1832, had themselves designed that federal fraud.[34] The old, recurring rumors that missions meant enslavement revived in this new form: the evangelists conspired with American governments to deprive Indians of their land and personal liberty. Rumors further circulated in the wretched camps about the experiences of the Creeks during their removal several years before, including the slaughter of elderly women and the abandoning of the unfit to die alone, after which ravenous beasts devoured their bodies.[35]

Although he did not put it in exactly these terms, Butrick knew what Cherokees and others had long rumored: American incarceration raised the threat of sexual predation. Butrick paid particular attention to the situation of the captive women, forced to suffer the attentions, without privacy, of their

guards.[36] In June 1838 he visited the camp at New Echota. There, guided by a Methodist minister, he learned that the federal "volunteers go about the camps at night, endeavoring to find Cherokee women and girls. Last Friday night, as they went to a camp of women, and the women called aloud for help etc., they went out cursing them and calling them liars."[37] Reports of sexual predation and rape reached Butrick that month and the following. Six soldiers, he heard, tried to ply two imprisoned women with liquor, and despite complaints to the commander, who did nothing, the soldiers kept the women for the night. He noted separately the rape, by soldiers, of an interned Cherokee woman—a Methodist, he added.[38] Such disturbing news brought to his mind an account, from a few years prior to the actual forced removal but during the crisis that preceded it, of a grandmother forced to witness the rape of her granddaughter by Georgians at Cassville.[39] In the course of removal, Cherokees and their missionaries mixed dispossession and confinement with stories of sexual assault.

Butrick saw in Georgia's assault on the Cherokees the opening of hell's floodgates to all manner of wickedness. He viewed the confining of ill-fed young women in these impossible conditions as exposing them not only to violence but to degrading pressures, difficult to resist, to exchange sex for meager reward. Particularly vulnerable, he noted with irony, were those women who knew how to speak and read English: the "first victims" of American "emissaries of darkness." The "dark rhetoric of hell" he observed, had "an immediate and direct effect on their minds, and they are prepared into the service of darkness, and become the ring leaders of wickedness."[40]

The Christian missionary kept his faith the Lord but not in the Republic. Indians up and down the eastern continent rumored that such Christian missionaries formed the slaveholders' shock troops. By 1838, Butrick thought similarly dark thoughts about his nation. The United States did not deliberately kill Cherokees with smallpox blankets, nor did U.S. troops fire diseases out of guns to empty the woodlands. But they confined Cherokees in fetid and unsheltered camps, where conditions worsened, and where dysentery, tuberculosis, and other illnesses took so many lives, Butrick calculated that the United States could not have caused more human suffering by "directly" killing all "the infants under six months or a year and all the aged over sixty."[41]

He held the United States responsible. Federal and state aggressions worked viciously with gross federal negligence to permit real assaults on Cherokee persons and to spread devastating diseases. Butrick, moreover,

rooted the American crimes against the Cherokees in the Dahlonega goldfields. "Gold mines were found on Cherokee land worth millions of Dollars. These were taken by the sovereignty of Georgia, and any Indian found digging gold was condemned to severe punishments. The Cherokees at length became willing to dispose of some part of this country, but nothing would satisfy the avarice of the white man but the whole."[42]

Americans had almost exhausted Georgia's gold deposits, having minted about $6 million in coin, when the California gold rush began in 1848. Throughout the West, beyond the confines of this book, considerable Indian suffering accompanied assortments of miners to the fields of northern California, the Great Basin and Colorado Plateau, southwestern Colorado, northwestern New Mexico, the Columbia Plateau, and even the High Plains, where gold spurred Colonel George Armstrong Custer and the American seizure, in violation of treaty, of the Black Hills.[43] Even when peace largely held, as in the Klondike gold rush of 1898, Native Americans faced epidemics and social disruptions.[44]

The Gold and the Black

Not by chance did U.S. citizens christen the Dahlonega goldfields, forcibly taken from Cherokees by U.S. citizens and Georgia troops, with the early name "New Mexico." Recall that the North Carolina gold country had been termed, in 1831, a U.S. "Potosi."[45] In the sixteenth century, such outraged Spanish chroniclers as Las Casas had exposed the horrors attending the Christians' exploitation of Indians in the quest for gold. In the hands of Spain's English rivals, the evidence became less a plea for a truer Christian rule than a declaration of war on Spain: the Black Legend, that double-edged morality tale that rationalized the English invasion of North America and inspired hopes of great wealth.[46] Spanish rumors of gold in the southern mountains of North America shared the Black Legend's Caribbean, Mexican, and Peruvian origins, and those rumors of Appalachian gold informed English-language rumors that predated Roanoke and that persisted through the revolutionary, confederation, and early national periods of the United States.

Those rumors became reality in North Carolina and, with greater force, in Georgia, where the Dahlonega gold rush accelerated the dispossession and forced deportation of the Cherokees, and where outraged spiritual if

not denominational descendants of Las Casas dutifully chronicled American enormities. Daniel Butrick, steeped in the theology of human depravity and experienced in the Republic's cruelties, turned the Black Legend on the United States: "Let Spain know that the bloody hands of her Cortes and Pizarro are white when compared with those of American citizens, so that the poor Indians will doubtless be obliged to fly from their own land to seek refuge in her dominions."[47] Ralph Waldo Emerson, a less obscure critic, protested to President Martin Van Buren after hearing "sinister rumors" that the government would enforce the "sham treaty" of New Echota and remove the Cherokees. If true, he told the president, "the name of this nation, hitherto the sweet omen of religion and liberty, will stink to the world."[48]

No doubt Emerson and Butrick had, at least distantly, Las Casas in mind. In considerations of cruelty to Indians, Anglo-American tradition held legendary imperial Spain as the extreme standard. Henry Knox, the Republic's first secretary of war under the new Constitution, invoked the Iberian past as he sought a contrasting, honorable federal Indian policy. He feared the world's candid judgment: "If our modes of population and War destroy the tribes the disinterested part of mankind and posterity will be apt to class the effects of our Conduct and that of the Spaniards in Mexico and Peru together." During the Cherokee removal crisis, Alexis de Tocqueville rendered the very judgment that Knox had feared. While few today would accept his simple and harsh characterization of Spanish colonization as having as its "twofold purpose" the destruction of natural rights and the extermination of Indians, scholarship has demonstrated that great violence accompanied the European and U.S. American colonization of the Americas. In the aftermath of Cherokee removal, Tocqueville's potent but understated charge against the democratic Republic remains disquieting. The "Americans of the United States," he noted, efficiently manipulated legal principles while committing murder: "It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity."[49] In the British seaboard colonies and in the United States that followed them, as in Las Indias, the language and luster of gold accompanied the anti-Indian violence, the spread of diseases, the exploitative Indian bondage, the conquest of Indian lands, and the murderous forced deportation of tens of thousands. Much as the Black Legend bore nuggets of truth, its elements prompted rumors and legends that panned out in the mined gold, bound wrists, diseased bodies, and intended cruelties that belong to the long history of eastern North America.

These Nothings Matter

Indians did not collect grains of silver and gold from nonexistent lakes in the Appalachian Mountains. Spaniards did not intensively work those Indians in colonial mining operations. Moravian missionaries did not conspire to enslave Indians or to infect them with epidemic diseases. Imperial machinations did not determine Indian warfare or black rebellion. British colonial planters did not spend sleepless nights dreading slave conspiracies with free Indian Nations. British ministers did not conspire with Indian Nations to reduce the colonists to slavery. Colonists and U.S. officials did not routinely gift Indians with "smallpox blankets"; fire the disease from guns; or serve it up in boxes, bottles, jackets, or flags. The Cherokees had no plan to attack South Carolina in 1751, and vice versa. The French launched no massive assault against George Washington at Winchester in 1755, 1756, or 1757. We cannot be reasonably certain that an Indian epidemic began with the surrender and massacre at Fort William Henry in 1757; the notion is more legend than history. Minutemen did not scalp and eye-gouge British Regulars at Concord in 1775. No British officer accepted close to one thousand settlers' scalps in a single day in 1776 or sent bales of scalps to his superiors in the early 1780s. Slaves did not clearly conspire with militant Indians at Fort Mims in 1813, and those Indians did not attack a white settler stronghold. Neither Ottawas nor Ojibwes slaughtered, scalped, and torched settlers in 1838, and a "half-breed" did not murder a prominent American Indian agent and early ethnologist in 1846. Yet rumor or legend has had it. And this is but an infinitesimal fragment of the many powerful stories that swept across eastern North America from the early colonial age to that of Indian removal.

Such non-events could matter as much as dry black powder to a hunter or regular rain to a farmer. The groundless nothings of the past both had real impact and reveal something to us. Imagined gold propelled the expansion of Europe and the United States; real gold fed American brutalities that raised the Anglo-American memory of Spain. Alleged foreign imperial or Catholic conspiracies with free Indians or slaves shaped colonial action; forged documents purporting British conspiracies with Indians abetted the cause of independence and the American position at the treaty table in Europe. Indian charges that settlers brought them disease, often accurate in a general sense, measured their trust in settlers and their governments even as they reflected increasing colonial expectations for Indian disappearance. Flying reports among Indians about their women's and children's impending

enslavement influenced native approaches to colonial alliance, trade, and Christian missions. More expansive Indian rumors of slavery or other degradations led to war. Panic, settler or Indian, dislodged populations; moved governments; and altered the course of policy, diplomacy, and battle.

This book seizes upon the uncertainties in our evidence to attempt a new history of the eastern North American colonial encounter. Placing unreliability at the center of the project, it speaks to our time as well as of the past. I began this work intending mainly to explore rumoring in its context, and I hope that I have done some of that exploring well. But the exploration has repeatedly reminded me of the persistent grip of legend. I have learned that I, like much better historians, have been grabbed: I have, for example, elsewhere mistakenly stated that British colonists in South Carolina deeply feared that Indian Nations might conspire with colonial slaves. Broader research reveals that even in South Carolina, with its black majority and powerful Indian neighbors and its history of devastating Indian war and slave rebellions, colonial planters had little such fear—they did not rumor such conspiracies, at least not abundantly in writing. By the mid-eighteenth century, they did not identify Cherokees, Creeks, Catawbas, and Chickasaws with African slaves, and they did not expect any Indians to so identify. That free Indian peoples might league with enslaved black Carolinians barely occurred to them. Only after the American Revolution, only, perhaps after the Haitian Revolution, did such fears begin to circulate, but they did so narrowly, coming to only an incomplete fruition in the Second Seminole War.

When writers accept Franklin's fabrications that enemy Britons bought settler scalps and sent them, by the bale, to their superiors, or when scholars reduce Spanish colonization to an essentially violent mineral obsession, they ignore the stern grip of legend. Those who, especially since the 1960s, have adopted the smallpox blanket as the icon of treacherous settler colonialism, have generated folklore more than they have absorbed it, yet real history lies at the legend's taproot. Projected onto the entirety of expansionist history, a genuine 1763 atrocity unearthed by a conservative scholar has morphed since 1870 into a contemporary fable. That fable, now grounded in the popular culture, has truths: colonizers routinely anticipated, in writing, the disappearance of Indians; Indians unsurprisingly rumored widely that colonizers intended to wipe them off the face of the earth. Not only did the tactics of expansionist warfare allow for massacres, but broader colonial dislocations, including especially Jacksonian removal, proved to be atrociously lethal. Without truths, fables disappear.

When historians identify a spectacular act of Indian violence such as the attack on paroled British colonial soldiers at Fort William Henry as the fundamental source of a brutal epidemic in the Indian Great Lakes, we speak in mythical tones. Among those of us in the colonial tradition, these notions smack of "Providence" or of "poetic justice." There is a ring of history favoring the English-speaking colonial forces, even in defeat. There is a half-truth in this legend, too, for while I write, I sit in Upper Great Lakes Country, and yet I write in English. The Indian peoples of this region endure, to be sure, and maintain Nations, but we share a tongue—and much more. Conquest is not the whole truth. But history in fact saw much successful Anglo-American expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Popular writers, authors of young readers' histories, activist scholars, and professional historians all live in the shadow of such truths, half-truths, and legends.

On the one hand, this work has examined poorly grounded stories of riches, disease, violence, and slavery that repeated their basic elements longitudinally across time from early contact through antebellum America, forming recurring rumors and legends and surfacing in new contexts over generations. On the other hand, this work has dealt with questions of episodic violence. Examining moments when all hell seemed about to break loose—when poorly grounded reports spread that a phantom enemy had advanced as far as the next ridge, that British generals had purchased scalps on a massive scale, that American minutemen had scalped British Regulars, that Ottawas had massacred a family, that a "half breed" had murdered America's most prominent Indian agent—the book explores more than the workings and functions of rumor. Those caught in the throes of rumor-panics had not gone mad. They thought hard, they investigated, they questioned, they deployed. If rumoring generally escalated fear and violence, it sometimes increased conversation among colonizers and Indians. If legends generally firmed up emerging national and nationalistic sensibilities, some were told across such emerging boundaries in a spirit of exchange and explanation. Rumors could induce authorities to take action: that might mean intensifying the dispossession of Indians, but it could also mean, as with Ojibwe mass rumoring during the removal era, the blunting of a federal policy despised by Native Americans.

Although rumors and legends lack firm grounding, they have very real power, as the ancients understood. They dent their world, and they litter the archives. Their groundlessness generally repels historians, who seek origi-

nal matter. We seek "sources," figurative headwaters that originate upstream in solid hills or that bubble up from springs in the good, grounded earth. But because plausibility and sense sustain both the flight of rumor and the longevity of legend, these groundless tales give us entry into the concerns of those who took them seriously. Rumors and legends require collective acknowledgment. Far more than most other forms of information, we rightly invest rumors and legends with independent life, strong agency, and deep meaning.

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Abbreviations

AA: PG: Accessible Archives: Pennsylvania Gazette, 4 discs or "folios" (Provo, Utah, 1990–), Hesburgh Library, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana.

ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4*:* Daniel Butrick, "Journal," May 26, 1831, to September 22, 1838, in Cherokee Mission, Misc., *Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, Unit Six (ABC 18.3.3), reel 754, microfilm from Houghton Library, Harvard University, in Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City.

AHR: American Historical Review.

BHL*:* Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

BNA*:* British National Archives (formerly British Public Record Office), Kew, England, U.K.

CISHL 10*:* Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, *The Critical Period, 1763–1765,* ed. Clarence Walworth Alford and Clarence Edwin Carter, British Series, vol. 1 of 3, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, vol. 10 of 35 (Springfield, Ill., 1915).

CISHL 11*:* Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, *The New Regime, 1765–1767*, ed. Clarence Walworth Alvord and Clarence Edwin Carter, British Series, vol. 2 of 3, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, vol. 11 of 35 (Springfield, Ill., 1916).

CO [series/volume]*:* Colonial Office Papers (for example, CO5/1260), British National Archives (formerly Public Record Office), Kew, England, U.K.

CRG 12*: The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia*, ed. Allen D. Candler, vol. 12 of 26, *Proceedings and Minutes of the Governor and Council, August 6, 1771 to February 13, 1782* (Atlanta, Ga., 1904–1916).

CRG 13*: The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia*, ed. Allen D. Candler, vol. 13 of 26, *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, January 7, 1755 to December 16, 1762* (Atlanta, Ga., 1904–1916).

CRG 14*: The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia*, ed. Allen D. Candler, vol. 14 of 26, *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, January 17, 1763 to December 24, 1768* (Atlanta, Ga., 1904–1916).

CRNC: Colonial Records of North Carolina, ed. William L. Saunders, 29 vols. (Raleigh, N.C., 1886–1914).

DAR: Documents of the American Revolution: Colonial Office Series, ed. K. G. Davies, 21 vols. (Shannon, Ireland, 1972–1981).

DLC*:* U.S. Library of Congress.

DRCHSNY: Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. Edmund B. O'Callaghan and B. Fernow, 15 vols. (Albany, N.Y., 1853–1887).

DRIA: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, ed. William L. McDowell, 2 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1958–1970).

EAN Infoweb*:* Early American Newspapers, Series I, *Archive of America* (Infoweb Newsbank Readex) online, University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor.

f./ff.*:* folio/folios.

FHQ: Florida Historical Quarterly.

fr./frs.*:* frames

Gage Papers*:* Thomas Gage Papers, American Series, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Gage Papers (ES). Thomas Gage Papers, English Series, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

HRSP*: The Papers of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, 1782–1878*, microfilm edition, Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress (Washington, D.C., 1962), Archives and Regional History Library at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo.

JAH: Journal of American History.

JCHA: The Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, ed. J. H. Easterby, R. Nicholas Olsberg, and Terry W. Lipscomb, 14 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1951–1989).

JR: The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610–1791, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites, 73 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio, 1896–1901).

JSH: Journal of Southern History.

JUHA*:* "South Carolina, Journal of the Upper House of Assembly, 1751–1768," in *Records of the States of the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1941–1950), 1600 reels, S.C. A1a, reel 5, microfilm, U.S. Library of Congress.

MHR: Michigan Historical Review.

MPHC: Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections.

MVHR: Mississippi Valley Historical Review.

NAM[no.]R[reel]*: National Archives Microfilm series M* (for example, *NAM*1R68).

NEQ: New England Quarterly.

PBF: The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Leonard W. Labaree et al., 41 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1959–).

PGW: The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series A, ed. W. W. Abbot et al., 10 vols. (Charlottesville, Va., 1983–1995).

PRO [series/sub-series/volume]*:* Public Record Office papers (for example, PRO/30/55/69), British National Archives (formerly Public Record Office), Kew, England, U.K.

RSUS: Records of the States of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1941–1950), 1600 reels, S.C. A1a, microfilm, U.S. Library of Congress.

SCCJ*:* South Carolina Council Journal (BNA CO copies).

SCJHMC*:* South Carolina, "Journal of the proceedings of His Majesty's Honourable Council, 1750–1752," in *Records of the States of the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1941–1950), 1600 reels, S.C. E1p, reel 5.

SP(SPO) [series/volume]*:* State Papers, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles II, 1676–1677, Preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office*, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, vol. 18, March 1676–February 1677 (London, 1909), in *State Papers Online* (Gale Digital Collections, 2013).

WCL*:* William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

WGW: The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1931–1944).

WJP: The Papers of Sir William Johnson, ed. Milton Wheaton Hamilton et al., 13 vols. (Albany, N.Y., 1951).

WMQ: William and Mary Quarterly.

WO [series/volume]*:* War Office Papers (for example, WO34/49), British National Archives (formerly Public Record Office), Kew, England, U.K.

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Notes

Introduction

1. Sir William Johnson, "Journal of Indian Congress," September 1–28, 1763, *WJP*, 10:839. Although the Mohawk name Assarogoa often denominated the governor of Virginia, this Assaragóa was a speaker for the Kahnawake Mohawks, near Montreal.

2. My title, *Groundless*, acknowledges highly important titles in Native American studies: Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indian Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York, 1991); David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, *Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law* (Norman, Okla., 2001); Kathleen DuVal, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia, Pa., 2006); Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (New York, 2006); William Apess, *On our own Ground: The Complete Writings of William Apess, a Pequot*, ed. Barry O'Connell (Amherst, Mass., 1992); *Our Hearts Fell to the Ground: Plains Indian Views of How the West was Lost*, ed. Colin G. Calloway (Boston, Mass., 1996).

3. Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam (New York, 1953), 106–107; Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France*, trans. Joan White (New York, 1973). See the influence of Bloch and Lefebvre in Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford, Calif., 1987); Arlette Farge and Jacques Revel, *The Vanishing Children of Paris: Rumor and Politics before the French Revolution*, trans. Claudia Miéville (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); Carl Ramsay, *The Ideology of the Great Fear: The Souissonais in 1789* (Baltimore, Md., 1991); and especially François Ploux, *De bouche à oreille: naissance et propagation des rumeurs dans la France du XIX^{e} siècle* (Paris, 2003). Bloch's frequently examined work was published posthumously, after he was executed by the Nazis in 1944. He published some segments on rumor in 1921 (see the following note).

4. Marc Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien sur les fausses nouvelles de la guerre," *Revue de synthèse historique* 33 (1921): 13–35, 27; Ploux, *De bouche à oreille*, 7; Hans-Joachim Neubauer, *The Rumour: A Cultural History*, trans. Christian Braun (London, 1999 [1998]), 99; see 85–94 for his examination of Bloch's essay, which now appears in English as Marc Bloch, "Reflections of a Historian on the False News of the War," trans. James P. Holoka, *Michigan War Studies Review* (2013): 1–11.

5. Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien," 26. I hold with those who allow individual responsibility for false rumor, acknowledging the essential importance of the social context in which a rumor might spread.

6. Although Gordon W. Allport and Leo J. Postman's experiments with serial rumor transmission have drawn criticism, they viewed rumor as a social response to uncertainty, and hardly ignored the social and cultural milieu. Gordon W. Allport and Leo J. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York, 1947). Serial exchange is foregrounded in Ed White, *The Backcountry and the City: Colonization and Conflict in Early America* (Minneapolis, Minn., 2005), 31–34, 57.

7. Jean Noël Kapferer, *Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, and Images*, trans. Bruce Fink (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990 [1987]), 3, 60, 138–141. Raymond Firth noted the investigative characteristics of rumors, suggesting that they "trip the wire in advance, to bring the matter to the surface of discussion and obtain reassurances as to its impossibility." Raymond Firth, "Rumor in a Primitive Society," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 53 (1956): 132.

8. See Robert Darnton, "It Happened One Night," *New York Review of Books*, June 24, 2004, 60–64, who observes of eighteenth-century printing that "the news could hardly be distinguished from gossip, and the stories took the form of letters sent in by unnamed 'correspondents.' "

9. Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 3, 85, 91, 90, 94; Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien," 26; Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, 106.

10. Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1966), 190; William L. Shay, "On a Biography and Sociology of America," *Symbolic Interaction* 28 (2006): 521. Sudhir Kahar explores the role of rumor in identity formation in "Rumors and Religious Riots," in *Rumor Mills: The Social Impact of Rumor and Legend*, ed. Gary Alan Fine, Véronique Campion-Vincent, and Chip Heath (New Brunswick, N.J., 2005), 54, 58–59. Similarly, Prashant Bordia and Nicholas DiFonzo stress the "relationship-building" effect of rumoring in "Psychological Motivations in Rumor Spread," in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 87, 92–93.

11. Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 8; Shibutani, *Improvised News*, 3, 5, 7, 14, 17 (he treats Lefebvre on 106, 128, and elsewhere); "seek out," Kapferer, *Rumors*, 3.

12. Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien," 26.

13. I embrace the word "frontier" (though I will usually use it in the plural form) against the important cautions of Patricia Limerick and many others. See, for example, Patricia Limerick, *Something in the Soil: Legacies and Reckonings in the New West* (New York, 2000), 93, 351. There is a violence inherent in the word, and that suits the periods and places under study.

14. Kapferer observes that the "very essence of rumors . . . is that they involve speech that takes place outside the field of official speech. They constitute a counterpower. First and foremost, they allow one to avoid exposing oneself directly: others speak in one's stead, becoming the willing or unknowing bearers of rumors." *Rumors*, 215.

15. Shibutani, *Improvised News*, 213.

16. Kapferer, *Rumors*, 14.

17. Arlette Farge, *Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France*, trans. Rosemary Morris (Cambridge, 1994 [1992]), 57–58; Anjan Ghosh, "The Role of Rumour in History Writing," *History Compass* 6 (2008): 1238.

18. Luise White, "Social Construction and Social Consequences: Rumors and Evidence," in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 241–252.

19. Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 130–153; Cathy Faye, "Governing the Grapevine: The Study of Rumor during World War II," *History of Psychology* 10 (2007): 1–21. Jane Kamensky finds little success in similar efforts by the Plymouth colony; see *Governing the Tongue: The Politics of Speech in Early New England* (New York, 1997), 57–63.

20. Gary Alan Fine and Patricia A. Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line: Rumor and Race in America* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001), 222–229.

21. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, "Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17 (2009): 202–227, 204 and 206 (quotations). See also Cass R. Sunstein, *On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can be Done* (New York, 2009), 8, 27, 38, 39. Cass R. Sunstein, *Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas* (New York, 2014), ix–xi, discusses the controversy that the article generated.

22. Sunstein, *On Rumors*, 9.

23. Talk of the Raven, May 14, 1751, Euphersee, trans. Robert Bunning, *DRIA*, 1:74; Governor Glen to Tacite of Hywassee, June 8, 1751, ibid., 67–68; for Pontiac and "birds," see Howard H. Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (New York, 1970 [1947]), 306; for birds, also see Tod Arne Midtrød, "Strange and Disturbing News: Rumor and Diplomacy in the Colonial Hudson Valley," *Ethnohistory* 58 (2011): 92. The association of rumor with birds may derive from a biblical rather than a native source. Colonists read in Ecclesiastes 10:20 that "a bird of the air shall carry the voice, and that which has wings shall tell the matter." Galit Hasan-Rokem's "Rumors in Times of War and Cataclysm: A Historical Perspective," in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 32, guided me to the lines from Ecclesiastes. For rumor and disorder, see C. T. Onions et al., *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1955), 1767; Jeremiah 51:46; and Ezekiel 7:26. For Virgil, see Ralph L. Rosnow and Gary Alan Fine, *Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology of Hearsay* (New York, 1976), 8–9; Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 27–54; and, especially, *The Aeneid of Virgil*, ed. and trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York, 1964 [1970]), 204, book IX, line 628. In his glossary, Mandelbaum notes that Ru'mor Fama is the "personification of rumor" (334).

24. Virgil, "Aeneis" [Aeneid], book IV, lines 252–274, in *The works of Virgil containing his Pastorals, Georgics and Aeneis: adorn'd with a hundred sculptures / translated into English verse by Mr. Dryden* (London, 1697), 303–304, copy in Special Collections Library, University of Michigan Library.

25. Hesiod, "Works and Days," in *Theogony; and, Works and Days*, ed., trans., and intro. Catherine M. Schlegel and Henry Weinfield (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2006), 81, lines 763–764. I thank Henry for explaining that he and Dr. Schlegel settled on

the word "rumor," although others have translated it as "gossip" or "talk." The Greek word, he tells me, is pronounced *famay*, and it is related to the Latin *fama*. In each case, rumor is personified by an immortal.

26. Hesiod, "Works and Days," 81, lines 761–762.

27. Philip J. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence, Kans., 2004), 9–11.

28. Patrick Mullen, "Modern Legend and Rumour Theory," *Journal of the Folklore Institute* 9 (1972): 96, 105, 108; Linda Dégh, *Legend and Belief: The Dialectics of a Folklore Genre* (Bloomington, Ind., 2001), 84, 87–88, 97; Patricia Turner, "Ambivalent Patrons: The Role of Rumor and Contemporary Legends in African-American Consumer Decisions," *Journal of American Folklore* 105 (1992): 426; Sandy Hobbs, "Why Are They Called Urban Legends?" *Talking Folklore* 7 (1989): 14–25; David Cornwell and Sandy Hobbs, "Rumour and Legend: Irregular Interactions between Social Psychology and Folkloristics," *Canadian Psychology* 33 (1992): 612; Jan Harold Brunvand, *The Study of American Folklore: An Introduction* (New York, 1986), 158; Fine and Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line*, 18; Gary Alan Fine, "Rumor Matters: An Introductory Essay," in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 2; Véronique Campion-Vincent, "Introduction to 'The Social Production of Conflict and Prejudice,'" in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 13; Ingo Schneider, "Mafia in Meran? Rumors and Legends Surrounding the 'Leather Connection': A Case Study," in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 63; Patricia Turner, "Introduction to 'The Creation of Plausibility,'" in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 169. Historian Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in East and Central Africa* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000), 8, 15, 58, 89, 93, 126, researching what many folklorists would call contemporary legends, prefers to think of the stories she researches as genres, containing formulaic elements.

29. Mullen, "Modern Legend and Rumor Theory," 96–97; Dégh, *Legend and Belief*, 126; White, *Speaking with Vampires*, 56–57; Brunvand, *The Study of American Folklore*, 158. Janet Langlois glosses a rumor as an "incipient legend," in "'Celebrating Arabs': Tracing Legend and Rumor Labyrinths in Post-9/11 Detroit," *Journal of American Folklore* 118 (2005): 219.

30. Mullen, "Modern Legend and Rumor Theory," 98; Dégh, *Legend and Belief*, 128 (quotation).

31. Pamela Feldman-Savelsberg, Flavien T. Ndoko, and Song Yang, "How Rumor Begets Rumor: Collective Memory, Ethnic Conflict, and Reproductive Rumors in Cameroon," in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 145–147.

32. Chapters 2 and 7 of this book advance this provocation, but see, too, Sandy Hobbs, "Beyond Rumor and Legend: Some Aspects of Academic Communication," in *Rumor Mills*, ed. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath, 213.

33. A relevant and insightful entry into the explosive literature in memory and history is Christine DeLucia, "The Memory Frontier: Uncommon Pursuits of Past and Place in the Northeast after King Philip's War," *JAH* 98 (2012): 975–997.

34. As Neubauer puts it, whether rumors "are true or false counts for little. What is important is that they are up to date and that they do not hide their status as rumors." *The Rumour*, 1. Fine, Campion-Vincent, and Heath conclude that the

"scholarly definition of rumor . . . does not assume that rumors be false" (*Rumor Mills*, 255). Sociologist Edgar Morin and his research team in the late 1960s saw both falsehood and word of mouth as components of "rumor pure and absolute," but they nonetheless explored the elements of fact that contribute to false rumors, and they recognized "absolute" as an impossible standard. Edgar Morin, in collaboration with Bernard Paillard, Evelyne Bourguiere, Claude Capulier, Suzanne de Lusignan, and Julia Verone, *Rumour in Orléans*, trans. Peter Green (New York, 1971), 17.

35. *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 4th ed. (2000), www.bartleby.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu, courtesy University of Michigan Library, *Webster's 9th New Collegiate Dictionary*, and *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford, 2006), http://dictionary.oed.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu, courtesy University of Michigan Library. Shibutani, *Improvised News*, 55–160, reminds us that history, like legend, is contested. For a contrasting argument, see Kapferer, *Rumors*, 15–16, 122–123.

Chapter 1 · Gold

1. William Patterson Cumming, "Geographical Misconceptions of the Southeast in the Cartography of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *JSH* 4 (1938): 476–492. For a look at some of these maps, see William P. Cumming, *The Southeast in Early Maps*, 3rd ed., rev. and enlarged Louis De Vorsey Jr. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), color plates 2 (1606, map 26), 4 (1676, map 77), 11 (1713, map 155), 14 (1719, map 173), 15 (1722, map 191), 17 (1719, map 172), plates 11 (1585, map 7), 15 (1591, map 14), 22 (1612, map 30), 24 (1630, map 34), 26 (1640, map 41), 30 (1656, map 48), 31 (1656, map 49), 33 (1663, map 57), 35 (1671, map 65), 36 (1672, map 68), 37 (1672, map 70), 38 (1675, map 75), 43 (1703, map 137), 49 (1729, map 205).

2. Bartholomew de las Cases or Casaus [Bartolomé de las Casas], *The Spanish Colonie, or Brief Chronicle of the Acts and Gestes of the Spaniards in the West Indies, called the Newe World, for the Space of xl. Yeeres: Written in the Castilian Tongue by the Reuerend Bishop Bartholomew de las Cases or Casaus, a Friar of the Order of S. Dominicke*, ed. and trans. M.M.S. (London, 1583), images 11 and 16, Early English Books Online. George Peckham, "A true Report of the Late Discoveries" (1583), in *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation,* ed. Richard Hakluyt, 12 vols. (Glasgow, 1903–1905), 1:95, points to a number of works available in English on the Spanish Empire in America, and he emphasizes both the Spanish success in securing gold and English prospects in North America (116, 118, 125).

3. David J. Weber, "The Spanish Legacy in North America and the Historical Imagination," *Western Historical Quarterly* 23 (1992): 6–7, 11, 22–23; Anthony Pagden, "Introduction," in Bartolomé de las Casas, *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, ed. and trans. Nigel Griffin (New York, 1992), xiii, xiv. Philip Wayne Powell, *Tree of Hate: Propaganda and Prejudices Affecting United States Relations with the Hispanic World* (New York, 1971), exposes flaws in critiques of Spanish colonization, revealing his own prejudices: "Indians happily slaughtered each other in Spanish-Indian versus Indian alignments" (173 n. 33). Benjamin Keen, "The Black

Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 49 (1969): 719, finds the Black Legend "substantially accurate," but suggests that the debate over its veracity obscures rather than informs history.

4. Richard Hakluyt, "Preface to the Second Edition," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 1:xliii. Louis Hartz, "The Fragmentation of European Culture and Ideology," in *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, Canada, South Africa, and Australia*, ed. Louis Hartz (New York, 1964), 12, contains this taxonomy of European colonizers: "Spanish treasure seekers, transported convicts, or embattled pilgrims."

5. James Mooney, *Historical Sketch of the Cherokee: A Smithsonian Institution Press Book*, gen. ed. Herman J. Viola (Chicago, Ill., 1975 [1900]), 19, 210, 228 n. 41; David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), 52–55, 71. Following James Mooney, Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York, 1993), 19, speculates that Spanish intruders may actually have established mines with forced Indian labor. See also Charles C. Jones Jr., *Antiquities of the Southern Indians, Particularly of the Georgian Tribes*, ed. and intro. Frank T. Schnell (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1999 [1893]), 47–52.

6. Alan Taylor, "The Early Republic's Supernatural Economy: Treasure Seeking in the American Northwest, 1780–1830," *American Quarterly* 38 (1986): 6–34; Barbara Allen and Lynwood Montell, "Lost Treasure Legends of Old Louisiana Territory," *Fabula* 29 (1988): 290–301. I thank Barbara and Lynwood for passing this on to me.

7. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 24, 33; Carl Ortwin Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America: The Land and People as Seen by the Europeans* (Berkeley, Calif., 1971), 26–28, 35; Douglas T. Peck, "Anatomy of an Historical Fantasy: The Ponce de Leon-Fountain of Youth Legend," *Revista Historia de América*, no. 123 (1998): 63–87.

8. Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 32–33.

9. Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 69–76.

10. Pietro Martire d'Anghiera, *De Orbe Novo: The Eight Decades of Peter Martyr D'Anghera* [*sic*], trans. Francis Augustus MacNutt, 2 vols. (New York, 1912), 2:259; Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 19; Charles Hudson, "The Juan Pardo Expeditions," in *The Juan Pardo Expeditions*, ed. Charles Hudson (Washington, D.C., 1990), 156; Lynn Guitar, "Franciscano Chicorano: A North American Indian in King Charles I's Court," *Terrae Incognitae* 29 (1997): 1–9.

11. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 50–51; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 36–46, 107–125.

12. David Ewing Duncan, *Hernando de Soto: A Savage Quest in the Americas* (New York, 1996), 259; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 158–159; Jerald T. Milanich, *Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians* (Washington, D.C., 1999), 62–76; Kathleen DuVal, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia, Pa., 2006), 43.

13. Duncan, *Hernando de Soto*, 311–312; "The Account by a Gentleman from Elvas," ed. and trans. James Alexander Robertson, ed. John H. Hann, in *The De Soto Chronicles*, ed. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C.

Moore, 2 vols. (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1993), 1:74. I borrow obviously from Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1966), 4–9.

14. "Account by a Gentleman from Elvas," 89 (quotation); Rodrigo Rangel, "Account of the Northern Conquest and Discovery of Hernando de Soto," trans. and ed. John E. Worth, ed. Charles Hudson, in *The De Soto Chronicles*, ed. Clayton, Knight, and Moore, 1:280–281; Hudson, "The Juan Pardo Expeditions," 156–157; Duncan, *Hernando de Soto*, 347; Chester De Pratter, Charles Hudson, and Marvin T. Smith, "The Route of Juan Pardo's Expeditions in the Interior Southeast, 1566–1568," *FHQ* 62 (1983): 134–135. They point out that "deposits of native copper occur in the western Virginia section of the Appalachian Mountains, which lay just to the north." Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 174–179; DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 42 (quotation); there is much on gold in DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 34–43.

15. René Laudonnière, "The voiage of captaine René Laudonnière to Florida, 1564," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 9:55, 88; René Laudonnière, "A Description of the West Indies," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 8:452, 466, 467; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 191, 206. De Bry notes, "Auri legendi ratio in rivis en montibus Apalatcy decurrentibus," in Theodore de Bry et al., *Brevis Narration Eorvm Qvae in Florida Americae Provincia Gallis Acciderunt* (Frankfurt, 1591), 41, Hathi Digital Trust; Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 19 and figure 2; Howard Mumford Jones, *O Strange New World: American Culture—The Formative Years* (New York, 1964), 43; Cumming, "Geographical Misconceptions," 478, and Cumming, *The Southeast in Early Maps*, plate 15, map 14.

16. Hudson, "The Juan Pardo Expeditions," 158, underlines the ambiguity left in the de Soto chronicles. See also Juan de la Bandera, "The 'Long' Bandera Relation," trans. and ann. Paul E. Hoffman and Juan de la Bandera, "The 'Short' Bandera Relation," trans. and ann. Paul E. Hoffman, both in *The Juan Pardo Expeditions*, ed. Hudson, 255–258, 302, 303.

17. "The Relation of Pedro Morales" [1586], in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 9:112–113; Hudson, "The Juan Pardo Expeditions," 158; Peckham, "A true Report," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 8:125. Archaeologists believe they have discovered Fort San Juan (1567), about 300 miles in the interior of what is now North Carolina, not far from where the first significant gold strikes in the United States occurred. But there is as yet no evidence of Spanish mining. See Robin Beck, "Finding Fort San Juan in the Appalachians," http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2013/08/finding-fort-san-juan-in-the-appalachians/, viewed October 27, 2014; Robin A. Beck Jr., David G. Moore, and Christopher B. Rodning, "Identifying Fort San Juan: A Sixteenth-Century Spanish Occupation at the Berry Site, North Carolina," *Southeastern Archaeology* 25 (2006): 65–77.

18. "The Second Voyage of Jacques Cartier by the Grand Bay up the River of Canada to Hochelaga," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 8:237, 245; *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier*, ed. and trans. Henry P. Biggar, ed. Ramsay Cook (Toronto, Ont., 1993 [1924]), 75; see also Ramsay Cook, "Donnacona Discovers Europe: Rereading Jacque's Cartier's *Voyages*," in *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier*, ed. and

trans. Biggar, ed. Cook, esp. xxxv–xxxix, for a critical account. Samuel Eliot Morrison, *Oxford History of the American People*, 3 vols. (New York, 1972), 1:96–106; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 77–97.

19. For crystal, copper, and trade in North America, see Christopher L. Miller and George R. Hamell, "A New Perspective on Indian-White Contact: Cultural Symbols and Colonial Trade," *JAH* 73 (1986): 318; Neal Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," *WMQ,* 3rd ser., 53 (1996): 449; Joel Martin, *Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees' Struggle for a New World* (Boston, Mass., 1993), 25.

20. *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier*, ed. Biggar, 75; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 77–97; Shibutani, *Improvised News*, 4–9.

21. David Ingram, "Relation of David Ingram of Barking," in *The Principall Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nations* [electronic resource], ed. Richard Hakluyt (London, 1589), 557–562, facsimile of original from the University of Alberta, Hathi Digital Trust; Samuel Elliot Morrison, *European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages, AD 500–1600* (New York, 1971), 467–469, 488–491, 561–578; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 244.

22. Christopher Hall, "The First Voyage of Martin Frobisher," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 7:204–211; George Best, "A True Discourse of the Late Voyages of Discoverie," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 7:282–283; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 238.

23. Dionese Settle, "The Second Voyage of Master Martin Frobisher," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 7:220, 223; Best, "A True Discourse," 293–294, 305; Martin Frobisher, "A General and brief description of the Countrey, and condition of the people, which are found in Meta Incognita," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 7:370–371; Morrison, *European Discovery of America*, 500–550.

24. A concise discussion appears in Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (New York, 2001), 65–66; see also Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 190–191, 235–237.

25. "Letters Patents Granted by the Queene's Majestie to Sir Walter Ralegh," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 8:291; M. Philip Amadas and M. Arthur Barlow, "First Voyage to Virginia," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 8:302; Thomas Hariot, "A Brief and True Report," in *The Voyages of the English Nation to America Collected by Richard Hakluyt*, ed. Edmund Goldsmid (Edinburgh, 1889), 13:334, Hathi Digital Trust.

26. Ralph Lane, "An Account," in *The Principal Navigations*, ed. Hakluyt, 8: 328–330; "Ralph Lane's Discourse on the First Colony," in *The Roanoke Voyages*, ed. David Beers Quinn, 2 vols. (London, 1955), 1:268–270; Jones, *O Strange New World*, 43; Morrison, *European Discovery of America*, 624, 646, 667; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Captain John Smith: A Selected Edition of His Writings* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988), 20; Sauer, *Sixteenth-Century North America*, 250–265; James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: The Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989), 10–11.

27. Kupperman, *Captain John Smith*, 18, 20, 86, 166, 212. James Horn agrees that while Smith had a broader view than many others at the colony, he also was interested

in precious metals. James Horn, *A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America* (New York, 2006), 81. For the shipment of worthless ore, see ibid., 80–81; Taylor, *American Colonies*, 131. For metallurgists, see Horn, *A Land as God Made It*, 75; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *The Jamestown Project* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 238.

28. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "The Puzzle of the American Climate in the Early Colonial Period," *AHR* 87 (1982): 1262–1289; see also Thad W. Tate, "The Discovery and Development of the Southern Colonial Landscape: Six Commentators," *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* 93, pt. 2 (1983): 292. Tate, more than Kupperman, sees John Smith as wedded to an "extractive" rather than agricultural vision of colonization. See especially 295–298.

29. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Fear of Hot Climates in the Anglo-American Colonial Experience," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 41, no. 2 (1984): 218.

30. Samuel Cole Williams, "Introduction," in *Early Travels in the Tennessee Country, 1540–1800*, ed. Samuel Cole Williams (Johnson City, Tenn., 1928), 19.

31. Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670–1732* (Durham, N.C., 1928), 12–14, 16; "The Second Charter Granted by King Charles II to the Proprietors of Carolina" [1667], in John Lawson, *A New Voyage to Carolina*, March of America Facsimile series, no. 35 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966 [1709]), 240–242.

32. John Lederer, *The discoveries of John Lederer in three several marches from Virginia to the west of Carolina and other parts of the continent* (London, 1672), 19, Early English Books Online, http://wwwlib.umi.com/eebo/image/61341; http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home. For Lederer's cartographic influence, see Cumming, "Geographical Misconceptions," 479–484; John Locke, "Map of Carolina" [detail], 1671 MS, in Cumming, *The Southeast in Early Maps*, plate 35, map 65.

33. John Smith, memorial to Board of Trade, n.d. (received July 25, 1700), CO5/1260, ff. 232–232b, BNA.

34. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 19–21, 248 n. 11.

35. Jean Collture to the Crown and the Board of Trade, March 22, 1699–1700 (old/new style), CO5/1260, f. 236; Edward Loughton and Richard Tranter, Memorial to Board of Trade, March 1699–1700, CO5/1260, ff. 234–234b; James Moore to Thomas Cutler, Carolina, December 27, 1700, CO5/1270, f. 231, all in BNA.

36. John Lawson, *A New Voyage to Carolina; Containing the Exact Description and Natural History of That Country: Together with the Present State Thereof. And A Journal of a Thousand Miles, Travel'd Thro' Several Nations of Indians. Giving a Particular Account of Their Customs, Manners, &c.*, electronic edition, text transcribed by Apex Data Services, Inc, and encoded by Apex Data Services, Inc., Melissa Graham Meeks and Natalia Smith, Academic Affairs Library (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001 [1709]), 5, 163, 205; see also Tate, "The Discovery and Development of the Southern Colonial Landscape," 301.

37. *Secret Diary of William Byrd of Westover, 1709–1712*, ed. Louis B. Wright and Marion Tinling (Richmond, Va., 1941), 334, 534, 534 n. 1.

38. DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 78–79.

39. Samuel Eveleigh to Benjamin Martin, S. Carolina, January 17, 1734–1735, CO5/636, pt. 2, ff. 133–136, BNA.

40. Petition of James Maxwell and Cornelius Doharty, 1743, CO5/370, ff. 157–160b (158 blank), BNA.

41. "Copys of all the Minutes of the Upper and Lower Houses of Assembly and Council relating to the Discovery of a Silver Mine amongst the Cherokee Indians," October 7–14, 1743; Petition to King of the Commons House of Assembly, October 14, 1743; Proclamation by William Bull, November 11, 1743; Lords of Committee of Council for Trade and Plantation Affairs to the Board of Trade, April 24, 1744, all in CO5/370, ff. 64–74b, 75–76b, 79, 145; Lieutenant Governor Bull to Duke of Newcastle, November 22, 1743, CO5/388, pt. 2, f. 112; Georgia Office, Trustees for Georgia, January 23, 1743–1744, CO5/370, f. 6, all in BNA.

42. "De Brahm's Account (1756)," in *Early Travels in the Tennessee Country*, ed. Williams, 193.

43. George Milligan Johnston, "A Short Description of South Carolina, with an Account of the Air, Weather, and Diseases" [London, 1770], in *Historical Collections of South Carolina*, ed. Bartholomew R. Carroll (New York, 1836), 470.

44. Petition of John Evans, Esq., to King, Tallysarn, Cardigan County, Wales (received March 8, 1771), CO323/27, f. 36; The humble Petition of William Turner, called by the Cherokees, Connoquotee, October 22, 1771, CO5/114, f. 257; Towecke, Warrior and Head Chief of the Seven Towns in the Middle Settlements of the Cherokees, To the Great King, Commander and Beloved Man of the English, Brother and Friend to the Red People, called the Cherokees, Cowee, March 10, 1771, CO5/114, f. 259; Receipts of D. Bradbury, Assayer of Metals, n.d., n.p., CO5/114, f. 261; Certificate of Lieutenant Taylor, Keowee, January 6, 1771, CO5/114, f. 264, all in BNA.

45. Saluy quoted in Nancy Shoemaker, "An Alliance between Men: Gender Metaphors in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy East of the Mississippi," *Ethnohistory* 46 (1999): 247; James Adair, *Adair's History of the American Indians*, ed. Samuel Cole Williams (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966), 463; Bartram quoted in Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 43.

46. This 1609 description of Spanish colonization by Robert Johnson promoting the English Virginia Company is quoted in Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975), 47.

Chapter 2 · Pox

1. D. Peter MacLeod, "Microbes and Muskets: Smallpox and the Participation of the Amerindian Allies of New France in the Seven Years War," *Ethnohistory* 39 (1992): 42–64; Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies* (New York, 1997). Scholars who, conversely, emphasize "the disease factor" as an accidental force include Noble David Cook, *Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492–1650* (New York, 1998), especially 7–14, and David S. Jones, "Virgin Soils Revisited," *WMQ,* 3rd ser., 60 (2003): 703–742. Jones and Cook provide good recent summaries of the scholarship.

2. Elizabeth A. Fenn, *Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775–1782* (New York, 2001); Paul Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement: Biological Catastrophe*

in the Native Southeast, 1492–1715 (Lincoln, Nebr., 2007). For an earlier exploration of the relationship between disease and colonialism, see Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival* (Norman, Okla., 1987).

3. Folklorist Adrienne Mayor, in "The Nessus Shirt in the New World: Smallpox Blankets in History and Legend," *Journal of American Folklore* 108 (1995): 54–77, discusses the smallpox blanket as a motif that resonates with both classical literature and contemporary legend.

4. John Dryden, verse trans., Virgil, "Aeneis" [Aeneid,] book IV, lines 252–274, in *The works of Virgil containing his Pastorals, Georgics and Aeneis : adorn'd with a hundred sculptures / translated into English verse by Mr. Dryden* (London, 1697), 303–304, Special Collections Library, University of Michigan Library; Ranagit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (New York, 1983), 221, 224, 258. For examples of history corroborating and being informed by native legend, see Jay Miller, "The 1806 Purge among the Indiana Delaware: Sorcery, Gender, Boundaries and Legitimacy," *Ethnohistory* 41 (1994): 249–250, and Cole Harris, "Voices of Disaster: Smallpox around the Strait of Georgia in 1782," *Ethnohistory* 41 (1994): 591–626, especially 592.

5. Thomas Hariot, *A Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia: Facsimile Edition of the 1588 Quarto, with an Introduction by the late Randolph G. Adams* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1951), F–F2. If Hariot can be trusted, the sickness was probably influenza. See Peter B. Mires, "Contact and Contagion: The Roanoke Colony and Influenza," *Historical Archaeology* 28 (1994): 30–38. Joyce Chaplin, *Subject Matter: Technology, the Body, and Science on the Anglo-American Frontier* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), 32–33, points out that Hariot did not master the Roanoke language, but that he did have access to two Roanoke villagers who traveled with him to England.

6. Helen C. Rountree, *Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through Four Centuries* (Norman, Okla., 1990), 25, speculates about late sixteenth-century epidemics in the wake of the Roanoke settlement and other contact with Europeans. Major epidemics hit in 1617 and 1619, the latter affecting the English and Indians (67, 69). See also Chaplin, *Subject Matter*, 166. Cook, *Born to Die*, 208 n. 12, notes that while the diseases of the settlers are better understood, we know little about what illnesses befell Indians.

7. Robert Bennett (Bennett's Welcome) to Edward Bennett (London), June 9, 1623, in *The Records of the Virginia Company of London*, ed. Susan M. Kingsbury, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1906–1935), 4:220–223, WCL. Spellings modernized.

8. Grotius, *Law of War and Peace*, 2 vols., ed. James Brown Scott et al., trans. Francis W. Kelsey et al., in *The Classics of International Law*, 22 nos. (Oxford, 1911–1950), no. 3, vol. 2: bk. 3, chap. 4, 652; John Martin, "The Manner Howe to Bringe the Indians into Subjection," December 15, 1622, in *Records of the Virginia Company*, ed. Kingsbury, 3:704–707.

9. Hariot, *A Brief and True Report*, F1; Williams quoted in David S. Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics: Meanings and Uses of American Indian Mortality since 1600* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 58–59.

10. James Axtell, "Through Another Glass Darkly: Early Indian Views of Europeans," in *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Early America*, ed. James Axtell (New York, 1988), 123–143; Christopher Miller and George Hammel, "A New Perspective on Indian-White Contact: Cultural Symbols and Colonial Trade," *JAH* 73 (1986): 311–328. Bruce White, writing of Ojibwes and Dakotas, sees spiritual powers, understood in native terms that hardly equate with such an English term as "gods" or "spirits," as long being associated with items of European technology. Even after Indians stopped referring to the French with terms suggesting supernatural powers, they continued to use such terms for certain items of technology. See Bruce White, "Encounters with Spirits: Ojibwa and Dakota Theories about the French and Their Merchandise," *Ethnohistory* 41 (1994): 379, 381, 384–385.

11. Hariot, *A Brief and True Report*, F–F2; Kelly Wisecup, *Medical Encounters: Knowledge and Identity in Early American Literatures* (Amherst, Mass., 2013), 33–35, 44–49, 51–55. Bruce White notes an Ojibwe story from a later era and far distant place in which a man has his gun "speak to a partridge and the bird dropped dead, and then it spoke again and another dropped dead . . . and 'he told me it would speak to a deer and the deer would die, and if we were in battle it would speak to our enemies and they would die.'" White, "Encounters with Spirits," 376.

12. Paul Le Jeune, S.J., "Relation, 1636," *JR*, 9:207; Paul Le Jeune, S.J., "Relation, 1637," *JR*, 12:85–87.

13. Paul Le Jeune, S.J., "Relation, 1637," *JR*, 12:85–87.

14. Jerome Lalemant, S.J., "Relation, 1640," *JR*, 19:97; Paul Le Jeune, S.J., "Relation, 1637," *JR,* 12:237–239; for the eighteenth century, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region* (New York, 1991), 206.

15. Jerome Lalemant, S.J., "Relation, 1640," *JR*, 19:97.

16. Jerome Lalemant, S.J., "Relation, 1640," *JR*, 19:93; Paul Le Jeune, S.J., "Relation, 1637," *JR*, 12:239.

17. While the Puritans' frequent Providential explanations have been examined by many scholars, complicating these is the work of Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 46–57. Chaplin, *Subject Matter*, 158–160, 175, stresses English understandings not of Providence but of "corporal difference," which formed as early as the late seventeenth century. She also attributes high Indian death rates, in part, to the colonists' "willingness to leave them to die." The Providential idea was in any case hardly confined to New England. From Virginia, Governor Spotswood wrote that it was "as if Heaven designd by the Diminution of these Indian Neighbours, to make room for our growing settlements." Lieutenant Governor Spotswood to Board of Trade, December 22, 1718, Virginia, CO5/1318, f. 291, BNA.

18. William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620–1647* (New York, 1981), 109 (quotation). Bradford's discussion of an epidemic in 1633, while Providential, suggests that Indians and the English shared an epidemic. Bradford also fixes on the possible connection between "locusts," probably the "seventeen year cicada," and the illness, which modern editor Samuel Elliot Morrison calls smallpox. Bradford later hints that God, infecting Connecticut Valley Indians with smallpox in 1634,

favored English over Dutch trading interests in the Connecticut Valley (302). For the names of the native communities and for more on Squanto, see Neal Salisbury, "Squanto: Last of the Patuxets," in *Struggle and Survival in Colonial America*, ed. David Sweet and Gary Nash (Los Angeles, Calif., 1981), 228–246. For additional sources, see Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 247, 249.

19. Thomas Budd, *The Good Order Established in Pennsylvania and New-Jersey* (Cleveland, Ohio, 1902 [1685]), 70–71. See also James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York, 1999) 184.

20. See "Conference between Governor Hunter and the Indians," June 13, 1717, *DRCHSNY*, 5:485–486.

21. "Conference Between Governor Hunter and the Indians," June 13, 1717, *DRCHSNY*, 5:486–487; See also Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 82.

22. MacLeod, "Microbes and Muskets," 49.

23. Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore, Md., 1992), 30.

24. Amy Schutt, "Tribal Identity in the Moravian Missions on the Susquehanna," *Pennsylvania History* 66 (1999): 391; David Zeisberger, "1769 Diary," 28, 81, translated (from German) typescript, and Jungmann, "Diaries of Brother Jungmann, 1772," 217, translated (from German) typescript, both in the Miscellaneous File, Ohio Valley–Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archive, Glenn A. Black Archaeological Library, Indiana University, Bloomington. For Nanticokes, see Miller, "The 1806 Purge among the Indiana Delaware," 249, 250.

25. R. David Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1983), 43–44; Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 136–139; Alfred Cave, *Prophets of the Great Spirit: Native American Revitalization Movements in Eastern North America* (Lincoln, Nebr., 2006), 33, 79–90. For an analysis of the accused and for the smallpox rumors, see Miller, "The 1806 Purge among the Delaware," 245–266, especially 254.

26. Substance of a Talk delivered at La Maiouitang, entrance of Lake Michigan, by the Indian Chief Le Maigois, or the Trout, May 4, 1807, *NAM*222R2:L-1807.

27. See Rennard Strickland, *Fire and Spirits: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court* (Norman, Okla., 1975), 28, 54, 57. Cherokees adopted a new legal code that began to strictly distinguish between accidental and intended homicide in the early nineteenth century. Inevitably, there are qualifications here; there is some evidence that the accidental killer might flee to the protection of sacred ground or to one of four sacred towns under a religious leader.

28. Alexander McKee to Joseph Chew, Detroit, January 29, 1796, in *The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe*, ed. E. A. Cruikshank, 5 vols. (Toronto, Ont., 1926), 4:186. Richard White investigated attitudes toward homicide among Great Lakes region Indians in the pre-revolutionary era. The focus was far less on the "actual killer" than on those close to the victim. This meant, in part, that the killer himself "would not necessarily be the object of revenge" or other forms of satisfying the injured party. Richard White, "'Although I am Dead, I am not Entirely Dead. I have left a Second of Myself': Constructing Self and Persons on the Middle Ground of Early America," in *Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal*

Identity in Early America, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika Teute (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997), 414–415. For discussions of liability, see John Phillip Reid, *A Law of Blood: The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation* (New York, 1970), 76, 110, 263.

29. William Sturtevant, "Animals and Disease in Indian Belief," in *Indians, Animals and the Fur Trade: A Critique of Keepers of the Game*, ed. Shepard Krech III et al. (Athens, Ga., 1981), 182–185.

30. Patrick Graham et al., for Trustees of Georgia to Board of Trade, November 10, 1740, CO5/368, f. 49, BNA; Tiya Miles, *The Ties That Bind: The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), 33; Strickland, *Fire and Spirits*, 33. Strickland finds that a series of deviations from social norms, including adultery, various women's taboos, and violations of rituals might bring disease on the community (35). Witchcraft was another possible explanation for illness (37, 39).

31. Ogelthorpe to Harmon Verelst (duplicate), Savannah, October 19, 1739, CO5/640, f. 401, BNA. A half-century later, as Indians of Ohio Country debated whether to seek peace with the troublesome United States, Wyandots from the Sandusky region, crushed by a recent smallpox infestation, joined with militants from among the Shawnees in insisting on war. According to Indian accounts received by the Moravian missionary David Zeisberger, "They are ill-disposed, and wish to have revenge upon the white people for having lost so many people by small-pox." Zeisberger said nothing of deliberate dissemination; that the colonists brought the smallpox was enough to make them accountable. *Diary of David Zeisberger*, ed. Eugene Bliss (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1885), 407, entry for April 30, 1787. For the epidemic itself, see 364 and 373. Barbara Alice Mann discusses two Wyandot oral histories, collected in 1912, that implicate "settlers" in the deliberate unleashing of the disease. The medium is a bottle—in one case carried homeward by a Wyandot who had been hired by settlers, in another case unleashed directly by a settler in Indian Country. Barbara Mann, *Iroquois Women: The Gantowisas* (New York, 2000), 42–43, 377 n. 77, and Barbara Mann, *The Tainted Gift: The Disease Method of Frontier Expansion* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2009), 13. The linking of smallpox with alcohol has been widespread in North America.

32. Chaplin, *Subject Matter*, 160.

33. Veena Das, *Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary* (Berkeley, Calif., 2007), 119; Michael Willrich, *Pox: An American History* (New York, 2011), 22, 34.

34. Matthew Ward, "The Microbes of War: The British Army and Epidemic Disease among the Ohio Indians, 1758–1764," in *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754–1814*, ed. David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson (East Lansing, Mich., 2001), 67–78, especially 67; Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre,"* rev. ed. (New York, 1993), 17, 69, 79, 80.

35. Steele, *Betrayals*, especially 109–185.

36. Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York, 2000), 199. "Fort William Henry

fell into their hands. The fort was small and unsanitary and smallpox was raging. The Indians butchered the inhabitants, plundered and looted the fort, although Montcalm risked his life to stop them. Just retribution in the way of small-pox overtook them," writes John J. Heagerty, *Four Centuries of Medical History in Canada*, 2 vols. (Toronto, Ont., 1928), 1:41. For other examples, see David R. Starbuck, *Massacre at Fort William Henry* (Hanover, N.H., 2002), 58; Daniel Marston, *The French and Indian War, 1754–1760* (Oxford, 2002) 40: "Some of the Indians sickened and died of smallpox after their attacks on the sick and wounded British." Carl Benn and Daniel Marston, *Liberty or Death: Wars That Forged a Nation* (Oxford, 2006), 48. "Fort William Henry" was held by "Lt. Col. George Monro and a skeleton garrison of 2,372 men, of whom more than half were incapacitated by smallpox . . . Although Montcalm promised Monro safe conduct for his garrison, he simply stood by as his Indian auxiliaries massacred the English troops, beginning with those who languished in the smallpox hospital. (After scalping smallpox patients, the Indians acquired the disease themselves, creating a devastating tribal epidemic.)" Alan Axelrod, *The Complete Idiot's Guide to the American Revolution* (New York, 2000), 58.

37. William R. Nester, *The Epic Battles for Ticonderoga, 1758* (Albany, N.Y., 2008), 94.

38. Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York, 1988), 320.

39. R. G. Robertson, *Rotting Face: Smallpox and the American Indian* (Caldwell, Idaho, 2001), 123; John Duffy, "Smallpox and the Indians in the American Colonies," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 25 (1951): 337. Duffy says: "Retribution was swift and severe for the Pandora's box, once opened, brought them far more death and suffering than they had inflicted upon the whites." Historian William Fowler offers a more judicious account of the siege and "massacre" and does not link the atrocity itself directly with the epidemic. Still, he insists that Fort William Henry is where the Indians were infected. To the north, he asserts that Quebec had only a few cases, mostly among soldiers. But as Indians and soldiers milled around the fort in the August heat after the surrender, "it was one of the most populous and crowded places in North America. It was also a pest hole and a haven for smallpox. For the time being, however, only a few cases appeared, not enough to cause undue alarm." William M. Fowler, *Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754–1763* (New York, 2005), 118–129, 137 (quotation).

40. Montcalm to M. de. Paulmy, Montreal, April 18, 1758, *DRCHSNY*, 10:700.

41. Louis Antoine de Bougainville, *Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756–1760*, ed. and trans. Edward P. Hamilton, fwd. Colin G. Calloway (Norman, Okla., 1990), 197, see also 204; MacLeod, "Microbes and Muskets," 50.

42. Montcalm to M. de. Paulmy, Montreal, April 18, 1758, *DRCHSNY*, 10:700.

43. Examination of Cornelius Vanslyke, Johnson Hall, July 21, 1767, taken by Sir William Johnson, Native American History, Box 2, Item 655, WCL. For the nineteenth century, see my discussion in chapter 11.

44. MacLeod, "Microbes and Muskets," 48–50; Timothy J. Kent, *Rendezvous at the Straits: Fur Trade and Military Activities at Fort de Baude and Fort Michilimackinac, 1669–1781* (Ossineke, Mich., 2004), 382; D. Peter MacLeod, *Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War* (Toronto, Ont., 1996), 117; Steele, *Betrayals*, 132.

45. Jonathan Carver, *Three years travels through the interior parts of North-America, for more than five thousand miles; . . . with a description of the birds, beasts, . . . Together with a concise history of the . . . Indians . . . and an appendix, . . . By Captain Jonathan Carver . . .* (Edinburgh, 1798), Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale Group, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO 231232. First published in London in 1778, by 1781 it had appeared in French; see Steele, *Betrayals,* 233 n. 28.

46. Steele, *Betrayals*, 143, 160, 188, 195, 197.

47. Steele, *Betrayals*, 143, vouches not for Rogers's story. See Gregory Evans Dowd, *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore, Md., 2002) 7, for Rogers's credibility.

48. Pierre Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War in North America between France and England,* ed. Brian Leigh Dunnigan, trans. Michael Cardy (Youngstown, N.Y., 2005), 128–129. Thanks to Brian for loaning me his personal copy.

49. I. M. Hays, "A Journal Kept during the Siege of Fort William Henry" [August 1757], *American Philosophical Society, Proceedings* 37 (1898): 150; "Joseph Frye's Journal and Map of the Siege of Fort William Henry, 1757," ed. James Kochan, *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum* 15 (1993): 355, 356; "An Eyewitness Account," ed. Ewing, 307–315, especially 314; Steele, *Betrayals*, 133–134; Ian K. Steele, "Fort William Henry, Siege of 1757," in *Colonial Wars of North America, 1512–1763: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan Gallay (New York, 1996), 800.

50. [Pierre-Joseph Roubaud, S.J.], "Letter from Father . . . Missionary to the Abnakis," Saint François, October 21, 1757, *JR*, 70:175; Abbé Charles Nicolas Gabriel, *Le maréchal de camp Desandrouins, 1729–1792* (Verdun, 1887), 108: "Etant entrés à l'hôpital, où étoient nombre de malades et de blessés trop impotens pour avoir pu suivre la colonne, ils les massacrèrent tous inhumainement pour profiter de leurs *chevelures*." "The Siege of Fort William Henry: Letters of George Bartman," ed. John A. Schutz, *The Huntington Library Quarterly* 12 (1948–1949): 415–425.

51. Maria Liston and Brenda Baker, "Reconstructing the Massacre at Fort William Henry, New York," *International Journal of Osteoarchaeology* 6 (1996): 30 (quotation); Starbuck, *The Massacre at Fort William Henry*, 63, 66; David R. Starbuck, "Anatomy of a Massacre," *Archaeology* 46 (1993): 45–46.

52. Jonathan French, "Journal of Travels and Experiences in the Expedition, under the Earl of Loudoun, 1757," WCL. I thank Barbara DeWolf, curator of manuscripts, for explaining the journal's origins.

53. Jonathan French, "Journal, April 14–October 20, 1757," WCL; Steele, *Betrayals*, 143.

54. For the Mohawk epidemic and Little Abraham's scout, see William Johnson, "Journal of Indian Affairs" entries for May 29, 1757, August 24, 1757, August 28, 1757, and August 29, 1757, *WJP*, 9:779, 813, 820, 821; William Johnson to Peter and

Elizabeth Wraxall, Fort Johnson, July 17, 1757, *WJP*, 2:727, also in *WJP*, 9:800. For the distance from Fort William Henry to Mohawk Country, see *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*, ed. Helen Hornbeck Tanner, cart. Miklos Pinther (Norman, Okla., 1984), 13.

In the July 26 affair, eight French of the marines were headed by one Sieur d'Anglade, probably Charles Langlade, an Ottawa Métis, which strongly indicates that some of the ninety-two warriors were from the Upper Great Lakes. Montcalm to M. de Moras, Montreal, July 12, 1757; Montcalm to Vaudreuil, Carillon, July 27, 1757; and M. Doriel to M. de Paulmy, Quebec, July 31, 1757, *DRCHSNY*, 10:580, 591, 593–594. For more on this event, see "An Eyewitness Account by James Furnis of the Surrender of Fort William Henry, August, 1757," ed. William S. Ewing, *Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association* 59 (1961): 308. See also Jonathan French, "Journal," entries for June 12, July 21, and July 23, for captives and possibly scalps taken from Fort Edward. For winter raids, see Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War in North America*, 116. Steele notes smallpox on "the New York frontier" in October 1756 (*Betrayals*, 69).

55. Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War in North America*, 120; the prevalence of smallpox in late 1756 is corroborated in Vaudreuil to Machault, November 6, 1756, and "Conferences between Vaudreuil and the Indians," December 1756, *DRCHSNY*, 10:496, 499. In March 1756 William Johnson had word that the epidemic had broken out among the Kahnawake Mohawks (near Montreal), and he heard from Robert Rogers that a great many "in Canada Lettly [lately] Died with the Small Pox." William Williams to William Johnson, March 1756, *WJP*, 9:412; "Examination of Michael Greenleaf (a French prisoner) by Robert Rogers," Fort William Henry, July 15, 1756, *WJP*, 2:503; Steele, *Betrayals*, 69, 79, 80, 143, 160.

56. William N. Fenton, *The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy* (Norman, Okla., 1998), 501. MacLeod, who notes generally that Indian warriors "paid a terrible price for their support of the French," also doubts that the "massacre" was the point of infection. MacLeod, "Microbes and Muskets," 48–50.

57. Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 19. Delay these dates as many as five days if the disease were contracted, as in Fowler's scenario, while French forces remained at the bottom of Lake George.

58. Steele, *Betrayals*, 130–131, 134. Bougainville records his receipt of a letter of September 17 from Niagara, where western Indians returning from Montreal were still enthusiastic for war. Though by now their contagion should have reached visible proportions, Bougainville does not say anything about smallpox. His first mention of the disease following the siege is noteworthy because of what it does *not* say: anything about Indians. On November 8 he reports that smallpox had made great ravages in Quebec "this year," and that it had been raging in the Quebec area *for two years*. He identifies its arrival with "Acadians and British prisoners," but of the latter, he does not mean those from Fort William Henry alone. Bougainville, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 192. Steel, *Betrayals*, 138, notes the difficulty of distinguishing Fort William Henry prisoners from "the flood of English military prisoners" in

Canada at the time. With the Seven Years' War, contacts with the British army, and forcible removal by naval vessels, smallpox hit Acadians hard. See John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of French Acadians from Their American Homeland* (New York, 2005), 371, 376, 383, 385. The winter of 1756–1757 drove many Acadian holdouts in Nova Scotia to Quebec, where they may have provided fresh sources of infection for smallpox (398). Many prisoners from Fort William Henry, having been ransomed from the Indians by the governor, had indeed been sent in early September 1757 to Quebec, itself infested with both smallpox and "purple flux." On September 27, when several hundred prisoners—not all from the fort—clambered aboard three ships to sail toward home, smallpox came aboard with them and their symptoms peaked in mid-October; none could have contracted the disease at the fort. By then, twenty were ill and four were dead. Steele, *Betrayals*, 134–138, 188, 195, 197.

59. [Roubaud,] "Letter," October 21, 1757, *JR*, 70:90–203; Steele, *Betrayals*, 161–162; Bougainville, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 174–179.

60. Bougainville, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 193. A letter of Pouchot to M. de Paulmy, Montreal, November 3, 1757, does not mention smallpox, though it does deal with Indian affairs. Pouchot had been relieved of his command (*DRCHSNY*, 10:667–668). Contrast this timeline with Elizabeth Fenn's recent look at the outbreak among the Mandan, whose original point of infection is easier to pinpoint. That took place, at the earliest, on or around June 19, 1837. By the end of July, a mere six weeks, it was everywhere, and it continued through the winter. See *Encounters at the Heart of the World: A History of the Mandan People* (New York, 2014), 316–322.

61. Bougainville, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 197.

62. The quotation is a slight paraphrase of Guy Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, trans. Margaret M. Cameron (Toronto, Ont., 1969), 344.

63. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 26, 1776 [electronic edition], Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive, Massachusetts Historical Society, http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/; see also Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 74. Duffy, "Smallpox," 336, finds a similar story, circulating in Boston, of Lenapes contracting smallpox from scalps they had taken in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. This was in 1756, a year before Fort William Henry. Theodore Roosevelt relates yet another such tale, this time of retribution against Creeks and Cherokees in 1780, in his three-volume *The Winning of the West*, vol. 2, *From the Alleghenies to the Mississippi* (New York, 1889), 336–337.

64. Chevalier Pierre Joseph Neon de Villiers to Jean-Jacques-Blaise D'Abbadie, Fort Chartres, December 1, 1763, *CISHL* 10:51.

65. Discussions of the Fort Pitt affair are abundant; see, for example, Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 95–103; Philip Ranlet, "The British, the Indians, and Smallpox: What Actually Happened at Fort Pitt in 1763?" *Pennsylvania History* 67 (2000): 427–441; Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 88–92, 130–132; Elizabeth A. Fenn, "Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery Amherst," *JAH* 86 (2000): 1552–1580; David Dixon, *Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac's Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America* (Norman, Okla., 2005), 152–156. The

evidence for or against its effectiveness can never be conclusive, but Henry Gladwin noted that the Delawares "suffered much from the small pox last fall," in a letter to Thomas Gage, Detroit, June 7, 1764. Four days later he wrote to Gage that "every method should be fallen upon to extirpate" the Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and Ottawas. Gage Papers, American Series, WCL.

66. Howard Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (Detroit, Mich., 1994 [1947]), 226–227 n. 6; Wilber R. Jacobs, *Francis Parkman: Historian as Hero* (Austin, Tex., 1991), 84–86, 199–200 nn. 53–54; See also Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada*, intro. Michael N. McConnell, 2 vols. (Lincoln, Nebr., 1994 [1870]), 1:xx, 39–42.

67. Governor St. Clair to General Henry Knox, Fort Harmar, October 26, 1788, in *The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair*, ed. William Henry Smith, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1882), 2:92–93. Abraham Kuhn played a role in removing the Moravian missions to the Detroit region in 1781, when the British suspected they abetted the Americans. Paul A. Wallace, *Travels of John Heckewelder in Frontier America* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1958), 420. In 1782 American forces would commit a ferocious atrocity against these people; see chapter 9, below.

68. A. T. Volwiller, "William Trent's Journal at Fort Pitt, 1763," *MVHR* 11 (1924): 400; Levy, Trent and Company: Account against the Crown, August 13, 1763, in *Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1940–1943), ser. 21654, ed. Sylvester Stevens and Donald H. Kent, 218–219 (these mimeographed volumes use the British Museum series numbers); Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising*, 226–227; Bernard Knollenberg to editor, containing Donald H. Kent to Knollenberg, "Communications," *MVHR* 41(1955): 762–763; Alvin M. Josephy, *The Patriot Chiefs: A Chronicle of American Indian Resistance* (New York, 1993 [1961]), 122; Vine Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (New York, 1971 [1969]), 60.

69. John Porteous, Journal, Detroit Public Library; John Porteous to his parents, Detroit, November 20, 1763, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan; Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 94, 236; Extract of a letter of M. Desmazellieres to M. Dabbadie, [Point Coupée?] March 14, 1764, *CISHL* 10:236.

70. Mann, *Iroquoian Women*, 42–43, see also 377 n. 77; Barbara Mann, "Are You Delusional? Kandiaronk on Christianity," in *Native American Speakers of the Eastern Woodlands: Selected Speeches and Critical Analyses*, ed. Barbara Mann (Westport, Conn., 2001), 81. Her sources are Wyandot from 1912, with Allen Johnson interpreting for Catherine Johnson and John Kayrahoo; they are in C. M. Barbeau, *Huron and Wyandot Mythology, Memoir 80, No. 11 Canada, Department of Mines, Geological Survey* (Ottawa, Ont., 1915), 81, 268–270. In each telling, "white" people keep smallpox in a bottle. Blankets remain missing.

71. For the capacity of horror to erase memories, see Raymond Fogelson, "The Ethnohistory of Events and Non Events," *Ethnohistory* 36 (1989): 133–147.

72. Keith Basso, *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1996).

73. John R. Swanton, *Myths and Tales of the Southeastern Indians* (Norman, Okla., 1995 [1929]), 169.

74. Patrick Graham et al., for Trustees of Georgia to Board of Trade, November 10, 1740, CO5/368, f. 49, BNA.

75. Bruce M. White, "The Woman Married to a Beaver: Trade Patterns and Gender Roles in the Ojibwa Fur Trade," *Ethnohistory* 46 (1999): 121.

76. Peter C. Mancall, *Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995), 89–90, 150.

77. "Extracts from the Standing Laws of this Colony," *Providence Gazette*, March 17, 1764, vol. 2, iss. 74, EAN Infoweb; Willrich, *Pox*, 22–27.

78. On March 31, 2015, using "Google Books Ngram viewer" (a suggestive but not comprehensive online application that charts the appearance of a phrase in publications), I found that there were no instances of the phrases "blankets with smallpox," "smallpox blanket," "smallpox blankets," or "blankets infected with smallpox" in any of the publications the application mined until 1906. Use of at least one of the phrases spikes in the late 1930s, and climbs again to 1960, again to 1972–1973, and cumulatively, use of the four phrases has been higher than ever from 2002 until 2008, when the application currently stops measuring. The phrase "blanket Indian" first appears in 1847, and it spikes in the 1860s, 1900s, and 1920s.

Chapter 3 · Slaves

1. The literature on Indian servitude includes, for the West, Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven, Conn., 2008); Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002); Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007), 168–171, 246. For the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence: Michael Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early America* (Philadelphia, Pa., 2012); Brett Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2012). For the Southeast: Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010). For African American slavery on the frontiers: Peter Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion* (New York, 1974), 95–110; Timothy Silver, *A New Face on the Countryside: Indians, Colonists and Slaves in the South Atlantic Forests, 1500–1800* (New York, 1990), 106–107, 119–127, 171–174, 196. For British servants: Patrick Griffin, "The People with No Name: Ulster's Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 58 (2006): 37; Bernard Bailyn, with Barbara DeWolfe, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York, 1986), 166–355; David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York, 1989), 227–231, 374–376, 379, 437, 571. Alan Taylor provides a reminder of the slaves' frontier role in *The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772–1832* (New York, 2013), 48.

2. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Captain John Smith: A Select Edition of His Writings* (Williamsburg, Va., 1988), 157; Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World 1600–1815* (New York, 2002), 141; Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 6, 7, 21–28, 31.

3. John Stuart to Thomas Gage, Charleston, May 23, 1772, Gage Papers, WCL; Tiya Alicia Miles, *Ties That Bind: The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), 4, 51–52, 56, 72–76, 128, 142, 201; Tiya Alicia Miles, *The House on Diamond Hill: A Cherokee Plantation Story* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010), 81; Claudio Saunt, *Black, White, and Indian: Race and the Unmaking of an American Family* (New York, 2005), 21, 23, 45; Theda Perdue, *Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 1540–1856* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1979), 50–60; James H. Merrell, "The Racial Education of the Catawba Indians," *JSH* 50 (1984): 363–384; Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 159–196.

4. Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven, Conn. 2002), 8. Thomas Nairne to the proprietors, Carolina, July 28, 1708, noted, "it is our custom in this province to Make Merchandise of such other Savages as those" captured in wars by Carolina's Indian allies, CO5/306, f. 10, BNA. Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York, 1998), 150.

5. Brett Rushforth, "Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 63 (2006): 56–57; and Brett Rushforth, "A Little Flesh We Offer You: The Origins of Indian Slavery in New France," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 60 (2003): 4; Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 67–68, 78.

6. Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975); Evsey Domar, "The Causes of Slavery and Serfdom: A Hypothesis," *Journal of Economic History* 30 (1970): 18–32.

7. Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996).

8. The classic text is Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670–1732* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929), especially 3–161; see also Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*.

9. Bernard W. Sheehan, *Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1980), 103–104; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Settling with the Indians: The Meeting of English and Indian Cultures in America 1580–1640* (Totowa, N.J., 1980), 171–176; *Grenville and the Lost Colony of Roanoke*, ed. Andrew Thomas Powqell (London, 2011), 88–99; Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, 41, 77; Nicholas Canny, "England's New World and the Old, 1480s to 1630s," in *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century: Oxford History of the British Empire*, ed. Nicholas Canny, 5 vols. (New York, 1998), 1:156–160.

10. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, 100–101, 233, 264, 329.

11. Spotswood to Board of Trade, November 17, 1711, and Spotswood to Lord Dartmouth, November 11, 1711, in *Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood, Lieutenant Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1710–1722*, ed. R. A. Brock, 2 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1882), 1:121–123, 124–125; see also Spotswood to Lords of Trade, May 9, 1716, in ibid., 2:147, viewed online, digitized by Google; see also Alice C. Fletcher, *Indian*

Education and Civilization, Bureau of Education Special Report (Washington, D.C., 1888), 35, viewed online, digitized by Google.

12. Israel Stoughton to John Winthrop, ca. June 28, 1637, in *Winthrop Papers*, ed. Adam Winthrop et al., 5 vols. (Boston, Mass., 1929–1947), 3:481; Randolph Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England, 1675–1678* (New York, 1990), 76.

13. Lepore, *The Name of War*, 150–167, 163 (quotation); Shelburne F. Cook, "Interracial Warfare and Population Decline among the New England Indians," *Ethnohistory* 20 (1973): 1–24.

14. Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion*, 199, 222, 232; Ann Marie Plane, *Colonial Intimacies: Indian Marriage in Early New England* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000), 100–102; "Affidavit of Edmond Pateshall concerning the proceedings of the Massachusetts Government in 1665," April 3, 1677, abstracted in Proquest, Colonial State Papers, BNA Catalogue Reference: CO1/40, No. 41, Calendar of State Papers Item 168, Vol. 10 (1677–1680), 54–55 (quotation).

15. "Articles of high misdemeanour exhibited against Richard Waldern, Richard Martyn, and John Gillman of New Hampshire, by Robert Mason" [September 14, 1682], abstracted in Proquest, Colonial State Papers, BNA Catalogue Reference: CO1/49, No. 53, Calendar of State Papers Item 691, Vol. 11 (1681–1685), 295.

16. David J. Silverman, "The Impact of Indentured Servitude on the Society and Culture of New England Indians, 1680–1810," *NEQ* 74 (2001): 625, 665; Plane, *Colonial Intimacies*, 99–100; Jean O'Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650–1790* (New York, 1997), 142–143; Daniel Vickers, "The First Whalemen of Nantucket," *WMQ,* 3rd ser., 40 (1983): 560–583.

17. Carolina Proprietors to Governor and Deputies, Whitehall, September 30, 1683, CO5/288, ff. 8bff., BNA. See also Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 60.

18. David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), 126; Jerald T. Milanich, *Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians* (Gainesville, Fla., 1999), xiii, 1–3, 149–152.

19. John Worth, *The Timucuan Chiefdoms of Spanish Florida*, 2 vols. (Gainesville, Fla., 1998), 2:58–59; John Hann, "Demographic Patterns and Change in Mid-Seventeenth Century Timudua and Apalachee," *FHQ* 64 (1986): 371–392; Milanich, *Laboring in the Fields of the Lord*, 161–163.

20. Winstanley Briggs, "Le Pays des Illinois," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 47 (1990): 30–46.

21. Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance*, 276.

22. Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance*, 163 n. 46, 292, 397–398; Rushforth, "Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance," 54; Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations*, 142, 146, 227, 253; the number for Carolina is from Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 299.

23. Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance*, 144–145, and Rushforth, "A Little Flesh We Offer You," 22–23.

24. Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 131–132; see also Kathleen DuVal, The *Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia, Pa., 2006), 103.

25. Governor and Council of Carolina to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Carolina, September 17, 1709, CO5/1264, f. 152, BNA.

26. Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 144–145, 146–149.

27. Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 18–21.

28. Robbie Ethridge, *Creek Country: Creek Indians and Their World* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2003), 24; Paul Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement: Biological Catastrophe in the Native Southeast, 1492–1715* (Lincoln, Nebr., 2007), 143–159; James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989), 19–27; Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 299, provides the estimate.

29. Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 77.

30. Steven C. Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670–1763* (Lincoln, Nebr., 2004), 48–74.

31. Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 78; Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement*, 207; David Crawley to William Byrd, Carolina, July 30, 1715, CO5/1265, f. 2; Meeting of the Board of Trade, July 26, 1715, Whitehall, CO391/25, ff. 191–192, both in BNA.

32. Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 330–331; Richard L. Haan, "The 'Trade Do's Not Flourish as Formerly': The Ecological Origins of the Yamasee War of 1715," *Ethnohistory* 28 (1981): 341–358; Merrell, *The Indians' New World*, 65–75.

33. Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement*, 203.

34. William L. Ramsey, "'Something Cloudy in their Looks': The Origins of the Yamasee War Reconsidered," *JAH* 90 (2003): 58.

35. Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement*, 202, citing Caleb Heathcote to Lord Townsend, July 16, 1715, *DRCHSNY*, 5:433; Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 332.

36. Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement*, 202–203; Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 78.

37. Ramsey, "Something Cloudy in their Looks," 69; Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement*, 202. Both led me to the source: Captain Jonathan St. Lo to Honorable Secret'y Burchett, and Enclosure, July 12, 1715, Records of the Admiralty (Adm), series 1, vol. 2451, and the enclosed note: "Huspew King to Charles Craven King att Charlestown," no pagination, BNA.

38. David Crawley to William Byrd, Carolina, July 30, 1715, CO5/1265, f. 2; Meeting of the Board of Trade, July 26, 1715, Whitehall, CO391/25, ff. 191–192, both in BNA.

39. Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 67; Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex," in *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York, 1975), 157–210.

40. Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 335–337.

41. Governor and Council to the Proprietors, January 26, 1716–1717, Carolina, CO5/1265, f. 129, BNA.

42. "Proceedings Concerning the Coming of the Son of the Emperor of Caveta . . . [June–July 1717] in John Reed Swanton, Translations of [Spanish] Letters re. Florida," Numbered Manuscripts, 1850s–1980s (some earlier), 58-1-30 no. 68, National

Anthropological Archives 4170, Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

43. Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 338–339; Jane Landers, "Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose: A Free Black Town in Spanish Colonial Florida," *AHR* 95 (1990): 9–30.

44. Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 338; Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 76–78.

45. Adelaide Lisetta Fries, *The Moravians in Georgia, 1735–1740* (Raleigh, N.C., 1905), 127.

46. Claudio Saunt, "'The English has now a Mind to Make Slaves of them All': Creeks, Seminoles, and the Problem of Slavery," *American Indian Quarterly* 22 (1998): 163.

47. Saunt, "The English has now a Mind," 164; Creek Traders to Governor Lyttelton, July 31, 1756, *DRIA*, 2:152; Daniel Pepper to Governor Lyttelton, December 21, 1756, *DRIA*, 2:298–299; same to same, November 30, 1756, *DRIA*, 2:295.

48. Saunt, "The English Now has a Mind," 164; Raymond Demere to Governor Lyttelton, September 12, 1756, *DRIA*, 2:200.

Chapter 4 · Panic

1. Edmund S. Morgan, "Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox," *JAH* 59 (1972): 5–29.

2. Governor Glen to the Cherokee Emperor, June 8, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:173.

3. Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York, 1993), especially 72–75; David H. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740–1762* (Norman, Okla., 1962), 25–26.

4. Eugene Sirmans touches briefly on the panic in his *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663–1763* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1966), 288, 291.

5. Affidavit of Herman Geiger, May 11, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:114. Geiger competed with Broadway's employer, James Francis. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 85. The expression, "what news[?]," appears in other Cherokee documents; see Emperor of the Cherokees to James Glen, trans. and transcription Robert Bunning and Thomas Lepor, October 10, 1744, CO5/371, f. 6, BNA.

6. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 71–72.

7. John Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756–1763* (Baton Rouge, La., 2000), 7–15.

8. Affidavit of James Beamer, July 12, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:26–29; Deposition of John Bryant, May 4, 1751, ibid., 41; Affidavit of David Dowey, May 25 [or 23], 1751, Council Chamber, ibid., 57–58; James Adair to William Pinckney, Esq., Beaver Creek, May 7, 1751, ibid., 56; James Beamer to Richard Lambton, May 10, 1751, ibid., 65; Affidavit of James Maxwell, June 12, 1751, ibid., 68–69; Talk of the Raven, May 14, 1751, Eupher-see, trans. Robert Bunning, ibid., 74; Affidavit of Herman Geiger, May 11, 1751, ibid., 113; Deposition of James Maxwell, Esq., May 4, 1751, ibid., 116; June 11–12, 1751, *JCHA*, 10:485–493.

9. The White People of the Lower Towns to——, Tanisee, January 18, 1750[–1751], *DRIA*, 1:10; Deposition of John Bryant, May 4, 1751, ibid., 41; Petition of the Inhabitants of the So. Branch of the Santee River, South Carolina, JUHA, May 9, 1751, pt. 1:79–81; Affidavit of David Dowey, May 25 [or 23], 1751, Council Chamber, *DRIA*, 1:57–58; Brown, Rae, & Co., to William Pinckney, May 15, 1751, ibid., 59; W. Stitt Robinson, *The Southern Colonial Frontier, 1607–1763* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1979), 167–173.

10. James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989), 182.

11. JUHA, May 11, 1751, pt. 1:85 (quotation); ibid., April 27, 1751, pt. 1:56–57; SCJHMC, April 1, 1751, pt. 2:1–2; ibid., April 17, 1751, pt. 2:28–29; ibid., May 11, 1751, pt. 2:76–79; ibid., May 13, 1751, pt. 2:79–83; James Francis to Governor Glen, July 24, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:29; Roger Gibson to Governor Glen, Corinaca, July 22, 1751, ibid., 32–33; Talk of the Notowaga Indians, Keowee [May 1751], ibid., 47; John Fairchild to Governor Glen, Fairchild's borough, May 10, 1751, ibid., 48; J. Rattray to Governor Glen, May 10, 1751, ibid., 50; Roger Gibson to Governor Glen, Wateree, May 9, 1751, ibid., 50 (Gibson uses the phrase "Norward Indians"); John Fairchild to Governor Glen, n.d., ca. May 1751, ibid., 58; Affidavit of Alexander Rattray, May 24, 1751, ibid., 61–62; James Francis to Governor Glen, Seludy, May 14, 1751, ibid., 63; Roger Gibson to Governor Glen, May 28, 1751 [en route to Saluda], ibid., 78; John Hamelton to George Hunter, Esq., Saxagotha, June 4, 1751, ibid., 83; Affidavit of Mary Gould, May 8, 1751, ibid., 126–127; Talk of the Warrior of Keowee and the Raven of Hywassee [ca. December 20, 1751], ibid., 155; Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 15, 1751, ibid., 178.

12. Report of the Committee of Conference on Indian Affairs, June 13, 1751, JUHA, June 14, 1751, pt. 1:115; Affidavit of James Maxwell, June 12, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:68–69 (quotation).

13. Deposition of Stephen Creagh, Augusta, Georgia, March 22, 175[1], *DRIA*, 1:13–14; Talk of the Overhills Cherokees, Great Telliquo, April 9, 1751, ibid., 64; Governor Glen to the Town of Kewoochee [June 8, 1751], ibid., 84; Governor Glen to Tacite of Hywassee [June 8, 1751], ibid., 67–68.

14. Glen mistakes Hugh Murphey for Daniel Murphy in Governor Glen's Talk to the Cherokees, n.d., *DRIA*, 1:44; Governor Glen to the Head Men of Oustenalley, n.d., ibid., 81, referring to the victim simply as "Murphy" or "Murphey" in later documents; Governor Glen's Talk to the Cherokees, November 13, 1751, ibid., 157; Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, in Council, November 14, 1751, ibid., 178. For the shooting, see John Fairchild to Governor Glen, Fairchild's Borough, May 10, 1751, ibid., 48; Affidavit of Robert Gandey [Gaudey] June 5, 1751, ibid., 71; Deposition of James Maxwell, Esq., May 4, 1751, ibid., 117–118. For "Norward" culpability, see Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 15, 1751, ibid., 180.

15. For Hector, see entry for January 31, 1750–1751, JUHA, pt. 1:1, and for January 28, 1751, *JCHA*, 10:209–210.

16. Affidavit of James Beamer, July 12, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:26–29; Affidavit of William Turner, May 25, 1751, sworn before James Francis, J.P., ibid., 22–23; Deposition of

James Francis before Alexander Gordon [n.d.], ibid., 24–26; Affidavit of Charles Banks, June 1, 1751, before Roger Gibson, ibid., 23–24; Affidavit of Herman Geiger, May 11, 1751, ibid., 113; Talk of Governor Glen to the Cherokee Indians, November 20, 1750, ibid., 184–187. For the Carolinian suspects, see SCJHMC, September 6, 1751, pt. 2:293. In November, South Carolina agreed (on other stipulations that the Cherokees never met) to reimburse the Cherokees for their losses. The theft was compounded by Cherokee complaints of horse thefts by whites. Talk of the Warrior of Keowee and the Raven of Hywassee [ca. December 20, 1751], *DRIA*, 1:103.

17. George Duncan to Governor Glen, Congree Fort, May 8, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:18; Roger Gibson to Governor Glen, Wateree, May 9, 1751, ibid., 50–51; John Fairchild to Governor Glen, n.d., ibid., 58; Affidavit of Alexander Rattray, May 24, 1751, ibid., 61–62; James Francis to Governor Glen, Seludy, May 14, 1751, ibid., 63; John Hamelton to George Hunter, Esq., Saxagotha, June 4, 1751, ibid., 83.

18. *JCHA*, May 9, 1751, 10:411; JUHA, May 9, 1751, pt. 1:77; ibid., May 10, 1751, pt. 1:81–83; ibid., June 15, 1751, pt. 1:122; Roger Gibson to Governor Glen, Corinaca, July 22, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:32–33; John Fairchild to Governor Glen, Fairchild's borough, May 10, 1751, ibid., 48; John Gray to Governor Glen, Fort Moore, May 22, 1751, ibid., 59; James Francis to Governor Glen, Seludy, May 14, 1751, ibid., 63; John Hamelton to George Hunter, Esq., Saxagotha, June 4, 1751, ibid., 1:83.

19. JUHA, May 10, 1751, pt. 1:81–83; *JCHA*, May 10, 1751, 10:428–432.

20. Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 290–291; John Richard Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1944), 20–37.

21. Indeed, the lower house would the following year demand greater access to original Indian documents. Terry Lindscomb, "Introduction," *JCHA*, 11:3–13.

22. Merrell, *The Indians' New World*, 155–160; James H. Merrell, "'Their Very Bones Shall Fight': The Catawba-Iroquois Wars," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, ed. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse, N.Y., 1987), 115–133; JUHA, May 17, 1751, pt. 1:93; *JCHA*, 10:461–462.

23. JUHA, April 27, 1751, pt. 1:56; *JCHA*, May 13, 1751, 10:441; May 14, 1751, 10:447 (quotations); JUHA, June 14–15, 1751, pt. 1:116–117; Olsberg, "Introduction," *JCHA*, 10:16–17. For the lower house view, see ibid., June 14, 1751, 10:501–506.

24. Governor Glen to the Traders of the Cherokee Nation [June 15, 1751], *DRIA*, 1:66–67; Cornelius Dogherty to Governor Glen, Euphasee, July 31, 1751, ibid., 115; Talk of the Tassitte of Euphassee and others, Charles Town [sic], Saluda Old Town, July 30, 1751, ibid., 107–108.

25. Affidavit of James Maxwell, June 12, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:70, and JUHA, June 14, 1751, pt. 1:115. Betty Anderson Smith locates one of the towns, Oustanarle (Eustanale), as a Middle Settlement Town in her first reference to it, dated 1751 (Smith, "Distribution of Eighteenth-Century Cherokee Settlements," in *The Cherokee Indian Nation: A Troubled History*, ed. Duane H. King [Knoxville, Tenn., 1979], 54). It appears to have been a Lower Settlement town until that year. Talk of the Raven and Others, Hywassee, August 9, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:118–120; Captain Fairchild to Governor Glen, Near 96, August 24, 1751, ibid., 121–122; James Beamer to Governor Glen,

September 7, 1751, ibid., 125. That rumors precipitated the abandonment is clear from the Tacite of Great Tellico's statement in SCJHMC, September 6, 1751, pt. 2:294.

26. Talk of the Head Men of Chottee and Tanacy [August 9, 1751], *DRIA*, 1:100; Anthony Dean to Robert Bunning, Chota, August 12, 1751, ibid., 116; Talk of the Raven and Others, Hywassee, August 9, 1751, trans. Robert Bunning, ibid., 118–120; Talk of Ammouiscossitte to Governor Glen, September 22, 1751, ibid., 125–126; Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 14, 1751, ibid., 175–178; SCJHMC, November 14, 1751, 2:394–397; ibid., September 1, 1751, pt. 2:281; ibid., September 6, 1751, pt. 2:294; marginalia to Talk of Ammouiscossitte to Governor Glen, letter of September 22, 1751, ibid., October 25, 1751, pt. 2:342–343; Merrell, *The Indians' New World*, 222–223.

27. On Cherokee rumors of imminent northern raids: Talk of the Head Men of Chotee and Tanacy, [Chota, August 9, 1751], *DRIA*, 1:100; Deposition of Richard Smith, July, 12, 1751, ibid., 101–102; Anthony Dean to Robert Bunning, Chota, August 12, 1751, ibid., 116. On the British: William Bull Jr. to Governor Glen, New York, June——, 1751, ibid., 110; Alexander Gordon to——in the Creek Nation, August 1, 1751, ibid., 133–134; Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 15, 1751, ibid., 178; SCJHMC, August 1, 1751, pt. 2:206–207, 210; ibid., August 6, 1751, pt. 2:214; ibid., August 9, 1751, pt. 2:235–236; *AA: PG*, October 17, 1751; *South Carolina Gazette*, in *RSUS*, Supplement, S.C. NA reel, No. 913, November 13, 1751. On the French: La Jonquière to Minister of the Marine, Quebec, October 29, 1751, Archive Des Colonies, C 11 A/97, f. 148, Paris, photostat at DLC. La Jonquière called a Catawba a "Cheraki" delegation.

28. *Adair's History of the American Indian*, ed. Samuel C. Williams (New York, 1973 [1775]), 368.

29. Affidavit of Robert Gaudey, June 5, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:71; Governor Glen to Henry Parker, South Carolina, September 9, 1751, ibid., 120; Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 15, 1751, ibid., 183; SCJHMC, Examination of Richard Smith, July 12, 1751, pt. 2:201–202; *JCHA*, June 12, 1751, 10:489.

30. Talk of Governor Glen to the Cherokee Indians, November 20, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:186–187.

31. Edmund Gray to John Fallowfield, May 15, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:83; Deposition of Richard Smith, July, 12, 1751, ibid., 1:103, also, with marginalia, SCJHMC, July 12, pt. 2:204; Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 74.

32. Pledges to isolate: June 2, 1751, *JCHA*, 10:488. Restore goods and assure peace: Skier Rosskee to John Dunning, at Keewae [May 15, 1751], *DRIA*, 1:19 (quotation); Affidavit of John Williams, Fort Augusta, May 21, 1751, ibid., 19–20; Affidavit of James Beamer, July 12, 1751, ibid., 22–29; James Crawford to Richard Smith, Tucksigia, May 2, 1751, ibid., 55; Brown, Rae & Co. to William Pinckney, Esq., Augusta, May 15, 1751, ibid., 59; The Headmen and Warriors of the Lower Cherokees to Governor Glen, May 10, 1751, ibid., 62–63. Blame the French: Talk of the Overhills Cherokees, Great Telliquo, April 9, 1751, ibid., 68. Blame others: Talk of the Raven, Euphersee, May 14, 1751, ibid., 74; Talk of the Head Men of Chotee and Tanacy,

Chota, August 9, 1751, ibid., 100; Deposition of Richard Smith, July 12, 1751, ibid., 101–102; Talk of the Raven and Others, Hywasee, August 9, 1751, ibid., 118–120. The importance of geographic location and of Cherokee women to intercultural relations is suggested in Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 15, 54–62.

33. Betty Anderson Smith refers to this town as Iwasse in her maps and Little Hiwassee in her tables and text, to avoid confusion with Great Hiwassee; see Smith, "Distribution of . . . Cherokee Settlements," 46–59. On the Raven of Hiwassee, see Duane Champagne, *Social Order and Political Change: Constitutional Governments among the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Creek* (Stanford, Calif., 1992), 56–57.

34. Talk of the Raven, Euphersee, May 14, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:74.

35. Talk of the Raven, Euphersee, May 14, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:74–75; John Philip Reid, *A Law of Blood: The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation* (New York, 1970), 29–33; Mary U. Rothrock, "Carolina Traders among the Overhill Cherokees, 1690–1760," *East Tennessee Historical Society Publications* 1 (1929): 6; Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 10–12; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 19–24, 26–29.

36. Governor Glen to Tacite of Hywassee, [June 8, 1751], *DRIA* 1:67–68. For the efforts of others to squelch rumors, see Skier Rosskee to John Dunning, at Keewae [May 15, 1751], ibid., 19; Affidavit of John Williams, Fort Augusta, May 21, 1751, ibid., 19–20; James Crawford to Richard Smith, Tucksigia, May 2, 1751, ibid., 55; Brown, Rae, & Co. to William Pinckney, Esq., Augusta, May 15, 1751, ibid., 59; The Head Men and Warriors of the Lower Cherokees to Governor Glen, May 10, 1751, ibid., 62–63; Talk of the Cherokee Towns to Governor Glen, from Iorhee, May 6, 1751, ibid., 172. For Glen, see Robert M. Weir, *Colonial South Carolina: A History* (Millwood, N.Y., 1983), 119–120.

37. Glen to Board of Trade, South Carolina, February [3], 1747–1748, CO5/372, ff. 34–37, BNA.

38. Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution: How a Revolution Transformed a Monarchical Society into a Democratic One Unlike Any That Had Ever Existed* (New York, 1992), 60–61; Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 39 (1982): 401–441.

39. Glen to Board of Trade, South Carolina, February [3] 1747–1748, CO5/372, ff. 34–37, BNA.

40. Glen quoted from Glen to Commons, March 6, 1755, SCCJ, CO5/471, ff. 148–150, BNA; "Scheme for Regulating the Indian Trade," n.d., 1751, *DRIA*, 1:87–88. For Glen's authorship of the document, see SCJHMC, August 16, 1751, pt. 2:241. In extraordinary sessions of August 29–31, 1751, the lower house refused to follow the upper house and the governor's lead and did not adopt new trade regulations. Instead, it agreed to temporary "ordinances," giving regulatory power to the governor and the council. For upper house pleadings, see JUHA, August 30, 1751, pt. 1:125, 127; August 31, 1751, pt. 1:128–131.

41. James Adair to Wm. Pinckney, Esq. Beaver Creek, May 7, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:56. *Adair's History*, ed. Williams, 368; Olsberg, "Introduction," *JCHA*, 10:5–13; Hennig Cohen, *The South Carolina Gazette, 1732–1775* (Columbia, S.C., 1953), 170–171; Jour-

nal of the South Carolina Council, April 3, 1750, CO5/462, ff. 80–80b, BNA. For charges that traders powered the rumor mills, see Affidavit of Herman Geiger, May 11, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:113; Affidavit of David Dowey, May 25 [23], 1751, ibid., 57–58; Deposition of Richard Smith, ibid., 101–102; SCJHMC, May 23, 1751, pt. 2:98–100, 105–107. William M. Wiecek, "The Statutory Law of Slavery and Race in the Thirteen Mainland Colonies," *WMQ* 34 (1977): 263, 269, 279, implies that Indian testimony against whites was inadmissible.

42. "Ordinance for Regulating the Cherokee Trade," December 3, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:199. Rumors were more specifically targeted for prohibition in 1765, during an attempted imperial reform of southern Indian trade. The British Southern Indian Department, not yet in existence in 1751, then proposed a set of regulations, including this: "no Trader by himself [or] servant shall propagate any False Reports among the Indians or shall convene any meeting with them to deliver any messages to them," without express permission from the proper department officer. At the same time, however, they were to "communicate" to the proper officials "whatever report or Intelligence they may here." John Stuart, "copy of new trade regulations," Mobile, March 31, 1765, CO5/485, f. 90b, BNA.

43. See Robert M. Weir, "The Role of the Newspaper Press in the Southern Colonies on the Eve of the Revolution: An Interpretation," in *The Press and the American Revolution*, ed. Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench (Worcester, Mass., 1980), 111, 116.

44. *JCHA*, 10:338–39, April 23, 1751; *South Carolina Gazette*, May 6, 1751, iss. 886.

45. Timothy reported in May on the Catawba-Six Nations peace conference in Albany, co-sponsored by New York and South Carolina. A firm ally of the assembly, Timothy concluded his report with a veiled criticism of this pet project of the governor, implying that it was reckless to unite Indian tribes: "as we do not pretend to be skilled in *modern* Indian politicks, we do not assert this for truth." Cohen, *The South Carolina Gazette*, 13–14; *South Carolina Gazette*, May 27, 1751, iss. 889; Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 291.

46. In an unpublished statement Glen said that the assembly should find a method "to prevent the frequent and Expensive Alarms from that Country." SCJHMC, August 9, 1751, pt. 2:236; ibid., August 17, 1751, pt. 2:246; ibid., August 28, 1751, pt. 2:274.

47. *South Carolina Gazette*, September 2, 1751, iss. 903. For hurricanes: *South Carolina Gazette*, September 19, 1752, iss. 953; October 3, 1752, iss. 955.

48. Weir, "The Role of the Newspaper Press," 111 (quotation), 116; Cohen, *The South Carolina Gazette*, 242.

49. Council Replies to Governor Glen's Letter . . . , October 26, 1751, ed. W. Stitt Robinson, in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607–1789*, 18 vols., gen. ed. Alden T. Vaughan, *Virginia Treaties*, ed. W. Stitt Robinson (Washington, D.C., 1983), 5:122–124. Why Glen did not in June inform Virginia of the embargo is a mystery. He wrote an incomplete letter to Governor Henry Parker of Georgia in June; see *DRIA*, 1:170–172. The lower house requested that he write Georgia and Virginia to inform them of the embargo on June 14, 1751; see *JCHA*, 10:505.

50. Quoted in Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 291.

51. Peter Timothy to Governor Glen [n.d., but it must have been September 11, 1751, which is when the council discussed the matter], *DRIA*, 1:151; SCJHMC, September 11, 1751, pt. 2:296–301. The *Virginia Gazette* printed the piece on August 16, and the *Pennsylvania Gazette* on September 26 (see *AA: PG*). It is just possible that the report was printed in the *South Carolina Gazette*, October 14, iss. 909, which issue is apparently not extant. This however, is unlikely, as Timothy intended to print it, according to his letter to Glen, the following day (September 12). It should have appeared in the issue of September 13.

52. *South Carolina Gazette*, May 27, 1751, iss. 889; ibid., October 3, 1751, iss. 907, dateline Charles Town, October 3.

53. *South Carolina Gazette*, May 27, 1751, iss. 889; ibid., October 3, 1751, iss. 907.

54. *South Carolina Gazette*, March 18, 1751, iss. 879; ibid., February 18, 1751, iss. 875; ibid., July 1, 1751, iss. 894; ibid., July 29, 1751, iss. 898; ibid., November 8, 1751, iss. 912. I follow Kapferer, who writes that the press often encourages rumors by "adding 'information' to the fire every day, and feeding the rumors.";Jean Noël Kapferer, *Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, and Images*, trans. Bruce Fink (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990), 58.

55. [Glen's response in] Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 15, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:181.

56. Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1966), 17. See also Gordon Allport and Leo Joseph Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York, 1947); Gordon Allport and Leo Joseph Postman, "An Analysis of Rumor," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (1947): 502.

57. John Pearson to George Hunter, ESQ., Windsor Forest, May 26, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:77; Governor Glen's talk to the Cherokees, November 13, 1751, ibid., 158–159.

58. Sudhir Kahar, "Rumors and Religious Riots," in *Rumor Mills: The Social Impact of Rumor and Legend*, ed. Gary Alan Fine, Véronique Campion-Vincent, and Chip Heath (New Brunswick, N.J., 2005), 54–55. Prashant Bordia and Nicholas DiFonzo also stress the potential of rumors to build relationships among the tellers. See "Psychological Motivations and Rumor Spread," in ibid., 87–93.

59. Kapferer, *Rumors*, 3, 60, 138–141; Raymond Firth, "Rumor in a Primitive Society," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 53 (1956): 132.

60. Talk of the Tasitte of Euphassee and others, Charleston, July 30, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:107; H. Roy Merrens and George D. Terry, "Dying in Paradise: Perception and Reality in Colonial South Carolina," *JSH* 50 (1984): 533–550; Timothy Silver, *A New Face on the Countryside: Indians, Colonists, and Slaves in South Atlantic Forests, 1500–1800* (New York, 1990), 161–162; Peter H. Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion* (New York, 1974), 82; SCCJ, September 11, 1749, and January 18, 1749/1750, CO5/459, f. 156a, CO5/462, ff. 9b–11, BNA.

61. See, for example, James Mooney, "Myths of the Cherokee," in *Nineteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology* (Washington, D.C., 1900), 250–252; Raymond D. Fogelson, "An Analysis of Cherokee Sorcery and Witchcraft," in *Four Centuries of Southern Indians*, ed. Charles M. Hudson (Athens, Ga., 1975), 113–131.

62. Memorial of Robert Bunning and Others, November 22, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:148. For 1760 as the population nadir, see Peter Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region," in *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast*, ed. Peter Wood, Gregory Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hatley (Lincoln, Nebr., 1989), 65.

63. Talk of the Head Men of Chottee and Tanacy [August 9, 1751], *DRIA*, 1:100; Anthony Dean to Robert Bunning, Chota, August 12, 1751, ibid., 116; Talk of the Raven and Others, Hywassee, August 9, 1751, trans. Robert Bunning, ibid., 118–120; Talk of Ammouiscossitte to Governor Glen, September 22, 1751, ibid., 125–126; Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, November 14, 1751, ibid., 175–178; SCJHMC, November 14, 1751, pt. 2:394–397; ibid., September 1, 1751, pt. 2:281; ibid., September 6, 1751, pt. 2:294; Marginalia to Talk of Ammouiscossitte to Governor Glen, September 22, 1751, ibid., October 25, 1751, pt. 2:342–343. For the Savannah River Chickasaws, see Merrell, *The Indians' New World*, 222–223.

64. *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, ed. Wilmer L. Hall, 6 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1939–1954), 5:349–351.

65. Talk of Ammouiscossitte to Governor Glen, September 22, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:125–126; Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, in Council, November 14, 1751, ibid., 175–178; Governor Glen to the President and Council of Georgia, Council Chamber, June 15, 1751, ibid., 170–172; *JCHA*, June 14, 1751, 10:501–506; SCJHMC, August 9, 1751, pt. 2:235–236; JUHA, May 13, 1751, pt. 1:86; ibid., June 14, 1751, pt. 1:116–117.

66. Talk of Governor Glen to the Cherokee Indians, November 20, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:186.

67. Talk of Ammouiscossitte to Governor Glen, September 22, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:125–126.

68. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 30–34; SCJHMC, September 6, 1751, pt. 2:293; ibid., November 6, 1751, pt. 2:382; ibid., November 12, 1751, pt. 2:383–384.

69. Talk of Governor Glen to the Cherokee Indians, November 20, 1751, SCJHMC, 1:184.

70. James Beamer to Governor Glen, September 7, 1751, SCJHMC, 125.

71. Talk of the Cherokee Indians to Governor Glen, in Council, November 14, 1751, SCJHMC., 177; same to same, November 15, 1751, ibid., 179–180.

72. Ludovick Grant to Glen, February 8, 1753, CO5/469, ff. 38–38b, BNA; also in *DRIA*, 1:366–368.

73. The Catawba-Six Nations peace was brief. See Merrell, "Their Very Bones Shall Fight," 127–133. For the Cherokee-Creek peace, see Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 36. Hatley doubts South Carolina's role in forwarding this peace (*The Dividing Paths*, 93). But Cherokees as well as traders complimented Glen on the conclusion of this peace, however frequently it was disrupted. See Mankiller of Toquo to Glen, n.d., CO5/469, f. 39b, BNA; also see *DRIA*, 1:368, 366.

74. Talk of Governor Glen to the Cherokees Concerning their Treaty, November 26, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:187–196; Skittegunsta, SCCJ, May 25, 1752, CO5/467, f. 126, BNA. See also *DRIA*, 1:253.

75. Talk of Governor Glen to the Cherokees concerning their Treaty, November 26, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:191.

76. Talk of Governor Glen to the Cherokees concerning their Treaty, November 26, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:191.

Chapter 5 · Father

1. George Washington to Governor Robert Dinwiddie, June 16, 1757; same to Andrew Lewis, June 16, 1757; same to lieutenants of Fairfax, Prince William, and Culpeper Counties, June 16, 1757; same to Colonel John Stanwix, June 20, 1757, *WGW*, 2:62, 65–66, 66–67, 67–69, see also 63 ed.'s n. 6; William Trent to Washington, June 16, 1757, *PGW*, ed.'s n. 5, 4:214–215.

2. Washington to lieutenants, June 16, 1757, *WGW*, 2:66–67.

3. *WGW*, 2:62–63, 67–69.

4. *WGW*, 2:67–68.

5. Washington to Dinwiddie, June 21, 1757, *WGW*, 2:69–70.

6. Matthew Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 2003), 147–148.

7. Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 59, 147–148; see also Marquis de Vaudreuil to the minister, Montreal, July 12, 1757, in *Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania*, ed. and trans. Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent (Harrisburg, Pa., 1941), 100. For the identity of "Montisambert," see *Papiers contrecoeur et autres documents concernant le conflit Anglo-Français sur l'Ohio de 1745 à 1756*, ed. Fernand Grenier (Quebec, 1952), 39 n. 4.

8. Gary Alan Fine and Patricia Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line: Rumor and Race in America* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001), 54; Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York, 1975), 121.

9. Dagworthy to Washington, June 17, 1757, *PGW*, 4:266; Washington to Colonel William Fairfax, June 25, 1757, Washington to John Robinson, July 10, 1757, *WGW*, 2:75, 86. For the Dagworthy affair, see Fred Anderson, *The Crucible of War, the Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York, 2000) 159, 766 n. 2.

10. Pamela Donovan, "How Idle is Idle Talk? One Hundred Years of Rumor Research," *Diogenes* 54 (2007): 63.

11. Hans-Joachime Neubauer, *The Rumour: A Cultural History*, trans. Christian Braun (London, 1999 [1998]), 8; Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1966), 17. See also Jean Noel Kapferer, *Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, and Images* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990), 3.

12. Washington to Stanwix, June 20, 1757, *WGW*, 2:68.

13. Governor Sharpe to the Earl of Holderness, Annapolis, July 20, 1757, CO 5/18, ff. 90–90b, BNA. See also Mark J. Stegmaier, "Marlyland's Fear of Insurrection at the Time of Braddock's Defeat," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 71 (1976): 482.

14. Marc Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien sur les fausses nouvelles de la guerre," *Revue de synthèse historique* 33 (1921): 13–35, 26–27 (quotation).

15. Washington to John Augustine Washington, May 28, 1755, *WGW*, 1:129; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 62.

16. Washington to Dinwiddie, October 11–14, 1755, *WGW*, 1:200–208; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 63; for ear-witnessing in colonial America, see Jane Kamensky, *Governing the Tongue: The Politics of Speech in Early New England* (New York, 1997), 12.

17. Bill Ellis points out that ridicule and humor can be effective in stanching rumor, in "Legend/Anti-Legend: Humor as an Integral Part of the Contemporary Legend Process," in *Rumor Mills: The Social Impact of Rumor and Legend*, ed. Gary Alan Fine, Véronique Champion-Vincent, and Chip Heath (New Brunswick, N.J., 2005), 124.

18. "Advertisement," October 13, 1755, *WGW*, 1:208.

19. Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 130–153; Fine and Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line*, 222–229.

20. Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien sur les fausses nouvelles de la guerre," 27; Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 99; Kapferer, *Rumors*, 215.

21. Carville V. Earle and Ronald Hoffman, "Staple Crops and Urban Development in the Eighteenth-Century South," *Perspectives in American History* 10 (1976): 7–78.

22. Washington to Dinwiddie, August 14, 1756, *WGW*, 1:443–446.

23. Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien sur les fausses nouvelles de la guerre," 26; Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam (New York, 1953), 106; Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 3, 85, 91, 90, 94.

24. Washington to Stanwix, Fort Loudoun, June 15, 1757, *WGW*, 2:60–61. Pierre de Riaud de Vaudreuil, governor of Canada, dates the engagement June 5 in Vaudreuil to the minister, Montreal, July 12, 1757, in *Wilderness Chronicles*, ed. Stevens and Kent, 101.

25. Christopher Gist, "1753," in *Christopher Gist's Journals*, ed. William Darlington (Westminster, Md., 2002 [1893]), 84–85.

26. Washington to Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, *WGW*, 1:329–331.

27. Washington to Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, *WGW*, 1:300–304.

28. Washington to Bouquet, Fort Cumberland, July 16, 1758, British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, Colonel Henry Bouquet Papers, 21641 f. 13, London.

29. John Canup, *Out of the Wilderness: The Emergence of an American Identity in Colonial New England* (Middletown, Conn., 1990).

30. John M. Murrin, "Anglicizing an American Colony: The Transformation of Provincial Massachusetts" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1966); Don Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition* (Athens, Ga., 1985), 12, 15–23, 29.

31. Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), chapters 5 and 6; Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth Century North America* (New York, 2004), 134–135; Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York, 2008).

32. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000), 219–229.

33. Shibutani, *Improvised News*, 190.

34. Dinwiddie to Washington April 29, 1756, *PGW*, 3:66.

35. Virginia Historical Society, *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751–1758: Collections of the Virginia Historical Society*, vols. 3–4 (Richmond, Va., 1883–1884), 3:322, 406, 523–524.

36. Board of Trade to King, Whitehall, December 24, 1756, CO5/7, pt. 2:f. 212b, BNA. In response to fear of slave arson in 1741, New York authorities burned 13 black men at the stake, hanged another 17, along with 2 white men and 2 white women, and transported 84 people into island slavery. See T. J. Davis, *A Rumor of Revolt: The "Great Negro Plot" in Colonial New York* (New York, 1985); Jill Lepore, *New York Burning: Liberty, Slavery, and Conspiracy in an Eighteenth-Century Manhattan* (New York, 2005), xii.

37. Ed.'s n., *PGW*, 4:9 n. 22; Washington to John Robinson, November 9, 1756, *WGW*, 1:499–507.

38. Henry Fox to Duke of Devonshire, Whitehall, April 20, 1756, CO5/52, ff. 54–56; Duke of Halifax to Sir Charles Hardy, Bart., governor of New York, March 31, 1756, CO5/52, ff. 40–43b; Halifax to Hardy, Bart., March 19, 1756, CO5/52, ff. 26–29, all in BNA; see also copy of intercepted letters to the Duc de Mirepoix, America, January 6, 1757, March 1, 1756, March 19, 1756, CO5/52, ff. 7–11b, 12–22, 65–68, BNA. Francis Jennings tentatively pins the hoax on Reverend William Smith. See Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crown, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York, 1988), 226–227, 239–240, 247.

39. SCCJ, July 6, 1753, CO5/469, f. 150b, BNA.

40. Washington to Dinwiddie, April 27, 1756, *WGW*, 1:340–344.

41. Dinwiddie to Washington, September 13, 1756, Washington to Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, *PGW*, 3:404–406, 430.

42. Washington to John Stanwix, June 28, 1757, *WGW*, 2:82.

43. Washington to John St. Clair, April 18, 1758, *WGW*, 2:178–179.

44. General Forbes to William Pitt, Philadelphia, May 1, 1758, CO5/50, f. 407b, BNA.

45. Sharpe to Pitt, 18 May, 1758, CO5/18, f. 447, BNA.

46. Washington to John St. Clair, May 4, 1758, *WGW*, 2:191–192, 198–200.

47. Washington to John Forbes, November 17, 1758, *WGW*, 2:304.

48. John Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756–1763* (Baton Rouge, La., 2000), 6–8, 23, 32–33; see especially David Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740–1762* (Norman, Okla., 1962), 50–101.

49. Arlette Farge, *Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France*, trans. Rosemary Morris (Cambridge, 1994 [1992]), 71, see also 57–58.

50. Ammouiscossitte was the second so-called Cherokee emperor from the British point of view, and, like his predecessor, he belonged to the Overhills town of Great Tellico. The Overhills town of Chota claimed a more indigenous leadership. Attakullakulla worked diligently for this rival and ascendant town. There resided

the religious leader, "fire king," or *uku*, an office held by Connecorte in this period. See Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 6–8; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 4.

51. Extract of a Letter, Ludovick Grant to Glen, March 4, 1752, SCCJ, March 24, 1752, CO5/467, ff. 53–53b; governor's conference with Cherokee "Chiefs," Charleston, SCCJ, July 5, 1753, CO5/469, f. 144b, both in BNA.

52. Dinwiddie to Glen, Williamsburg, May 23, 1753, CO5/13, pt. 2, f. 329b, BNA.

53. Glen to Dinwiddie, June 21, 1753, CO5/13, pt. 2, f. 339, BNA.

54. It is possible that the beating was real, but I have not located it elsewhere, and when Glen saw Ammouiscossitte the following fall, however full of criticism Glen was of Virginia, he made no mention of it. Instead, he criticized the Cherokee leader for obtaining in Virginia "fine clothes" for himself and a "fine gown" for his wife when he could receive truly needed arms and ammunition in South Carolina. It appears that Ammouiscossitte's clothes were not stolen or destroyed after all. SCCJ, CO5/471, ff. 58–59, 61–63, BNA.

55. Grant to Glen, February 8, 1753, SCCJ, CO5/469, ff. 38–39, BNA.

56. Lachlan McGillivray to Glen, New Windsor, September 8, 1754, CO5/471, ff. 11b–12, BNA.

57. "Talk or Letter from the Tacitee of Hywasee to the Gov.," November 28, 1752, SCCJ, CO5/468, ff. 69b–70, and ibid., June 13, 1753, CO5/469, f. 118b, BNA.

58. Affadavit of John Shaw, August 27, 1754, SCCJ, CO5/471, ff. 8–10, BNA.

59. SCCJ, October 1, 1754, October 18, 1754, CO5/471, ff. 11–11b, 26b, BNA.

60. John Hamilton to James Glen, September 28, 1754, SCCJ, October 1, 1754, and ibid., February 10, 1755, CO5/471, ff. 11, 125, BNA.

61. SCCJ, February 7, 1755, CO5/471, ff. 120b–124, BNA.

62. SCCJ, March 4, 1755, CO5/471, ff. 135b–146, BNA.

63. SCCJ, March 7, 1755, CO5/471, ff. 146b, 149–149b, BNA.

64. Washington to Dinwiddie, August 4, 1756, *WGW*, 1:423. The attackers took their captives and plunder, not into the Cherokee Nation, but toward the Ohio. Letters between Dinwiddie and Washington of July 12, August 4, August 19, 1756, *PGW*, 3:260 (see also ed.'s n. 2), 318, 361. "J. C. B.," the anonymous French author of a Fort Duquesne memoir, states that in June 1756 some eight hundred Indians gathered to raid the British, returning with many prisoners. He does not provide strong evidence for a Cherokee presence, but it is likely that individual Cherokees had established good relations and even lived among peoples to the north and west. See *Travels in New France, by J. C. B.*, ed. and trans. Sylvester K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, and Emma Edith Woods (Harrisburg, Pa., 1941), 88, accessed at http://digital.library.pitt.edu. The Marquis de Vaudreuil summarized events at Fort Duquesne in 1756, noting that the raiding parties consisted of Shawnees and Mississaugas of Presqu'isle. He mentions efforts made to negotiate with "Têtes Plattes," a designation for southern Indians in general, but especially for Catawbas. See Vaudreuil to minister, Montreal, August 8, 1756, in *Wilderness Chronicles*, ed. Stevens and Kent, 93.

65. William Johnson, "Indian Intelligence," Fort Johnson, February 18, 1757, in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, ed. Milton Wheaton Hamilton et al., 13 vols. (Albany, N.Y., 1921–1962), 9:612–613; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 41.

The visit does not appear in the published letters of Vaudreuil to the minister of the Marine or in the J. C. B. memoir, neither of which, to be sure, is very informative on that year's campaign. William Anderson and James Lewis, *A Guide to Cherokee Documents in Foreign Archives* (Metuchen, N.J., 1983), 64, indicate a possible lead at the Archive Nationales, Archives des Colonies (A.C.) C13 A/49, f. 307. According to Anderson and Lewis, Vaudreuil writes to the minister, presumably of the Marine (Moras, then), that Cherokees seek to assist Ohio Indians in a war against the English. But he seems to get his information from Louisiana, not Fort Duquesne, which suggests that Vaudreuil refers to the better-documented Cherokee embassy to French posts on the Gulf.

66. Major Lewis to Goveronor Lyttelton, September 30, 1757, Rowan, N.C., CO5/297, ff. 376–376b, BNA; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 32–33; Gregory Evans Dowd, "'Insidious Friends': Gift-Giving and the Cherokee-British Alliance," in *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk to the Mississippi, 1750–1830*, ed. Fredrika Teute and Andrew Cayton (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 137. Kathleen Brown remarks on the sexual implications of the term "wench" in "Native Americans and Early Modern Conceptions of Race," in *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850*, ed. Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (London, 1999), 93–94.

67. Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 41.

68. Governor Dobbs to Board of Trade, Newbern, June 14, 1756, CO5/297, ff. 338–338b, BNA.

69. Copy of a conference held with the King and Warriors of the Catawbas by Mr. Chief Justice Henley at Salisbury, N.C., in May 1756, CO5/297, f. 341, BNA.

70. See the North Carolina Assembly's "Address to the King," October 14, 1756, CO5/348, f. 11b, BNA.

71. Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 41–43, 54, 55, 59, 72–74, 80–82; Dowd, "Insidious Friends," 146; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 166–168, 183.

72. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 190; Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 120–127.

73. Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 72.

74. A pun? The obsolete phrase, to "break no squares," meant to make no trouble. Attakullakulla was also known as "Little Carpenter," and the square is that trade's symbol.

75. Extract of a Letter from George Turner, Esq., Fort Prince George, Keowee, July 2, 1758, CO5/376, ff. 53–54b, BNA.

76. Governor Lyttelton to Board of Trade, August 7, 1758, CO5/376, f. 42; Virginia Council Minutes, January 23, 1759, CO5/1429, f. 190, both in BNA.

77. Intelligence from Judge's Friend to Rayd. Demere, Fort Loudoun, December 10, 1756, *DRIA*, 2:265.

Chapter 6 · Bonds

1. Samuel C. Williams, "An Account of the Presbyterian Mission to the Cherokee, 1757–1759," *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, 2nd ser., 1 (1930–1931): 136–137; see

also Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York, 1993), 106. Richardson later served as pastor to a Waxhaw, where Andrew Jackson, the future president, worshiped as a child. Samuel C. Williams, "Christian Missions to the Overhill Cherokees," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 12 (1934): 67.

2. See, for example, Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven, Conn., 2002), and chapter 3 of this book.

3. John Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756–1763* (Baton Rouge, La., 2001), 63, 66, 75, 79.

4. A South Carolina law of 1737 held that "all Negroes, Mullattos, Indians, and Mustees shall be deemed slaves and Chattels Personal and that their Offspring shall follow the Condition of the Mother, except such Persons can prove they were born free." See entry for December 13, 1737, *JCHA*, 1:362.

5. Michael Montgomery, "Searching for Security: Backcountry Carolina, 1760s–1780s," in *Ulster to America: The Scots-Irish American Experience, 1680–1830*, ed. Warren Hofstra (Knoxville, Tenn., 2012), 152–153, 158–160; Edward J. Cashin, *Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Shaping of the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Athens, Ga., 1992), 71–72, 257; Kathryn E. Holland Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1993), 45–46; Lieutenant Governor Alexander Spotswood to Lords of Trade, April 5, 1717, in *Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood, Lieutenant Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1710–1722*, ed. R. A. Brock, 2 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1885), 2:227.

6. Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels*, 83, 84–85.

7. SCCJ, April 16, 1748, CO5/456, f. 189, BNA; see also Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 152.

8. SCCJ, June 2, 1753, CO5/470, ff. 98–103, BNA.

9. Daniel H. Usner, *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), 124–125.

10. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths,* 107; *Adair's History of the American Indian*, ed. Samuel C. Williams (New York, 1973 [1775]), 261; SCCJ, Minutes, October 19, 1759, CO5/474, f. 206, BNA; William L. Anderson, "Cherokee War (1759–1761)," in *The Colonial Wars of North America 1512–1763*, ed. Allan Gallay (New York, 1996), 121–123; Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 89–90. The officer in question notes his drinking with a Cherokee woman in Richard Coytmore to William Henry Lyttelton, Fort Prince George, July 23, 1759, William Henry Lyttelton Papers, WCL.

11. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths,* 114–115; Gregory Evan Dowd, "'Insidious Friends": Gift-Giving and the Cherokee-British Alliance in the Seven Years' War," in *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750–1830*, ed. Andrew R. L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 147.

12. George Milligen Johnston, *A Short Description of the Province of South Carolina, With an Account of the Air, Weather, and Diseases, at Charles-Town, written in the year 1763* (London, 1770), 83, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale,

University of Michigan, viewed January 27, 2012; Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 122–123; *Adair's History*, ed. Williams, 265.

13. Anderson, "Cherokee War," 121; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 86–87, 111.

14. South Carolina Council Minutes, February 2, 1760, CO5/474, f. 39b, BNA.

15. Colonel Montgomery to General Amherst, Camp at Ninety Six, May 24, 1760, WO34/47, f. 401, BNA.

16. Theda Perdue, *Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1979), 25.

17. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 133; William Bull to Pitt, Charleston, April 28, 1761, CO5/20, f. 121, BNA.

18. Cashin, *Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader*, 173.

19. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths,* 133; Anderson, "Cherokee War," 122. The best account of the surrender and aftermath is Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 137–138.

20. SCCJ, August 11, 1760, CO5/477, f. 9b, BNA. On the treatment of Indian prisoners by the British and British colonial forces in the period, see Gregory Evans Dowd, *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore, Md., 2002), 189–190; Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York, 1988), 198.

21. SCCJ, September 25, 1760, CO5/477, ff. 15–16, BNA.

22. SCCJ, November 15, 1760, CO5/477, ff. 27–28, BNA.

23. SCCJ, January 20, 1761, CO5/477, f. 35, BNA.

24. SCCJ, June 16, 1761; June 18, 1761; September 12, 1761; September 1, 1761; September 10, 1761, all in CO5/477, ff. 65b–67, 67b, 77b, 78b–79, 79–81, BNA.

25. Philip Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Low Country* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 403–412.

26. Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 90.

27. SCCJ, January 12, 1762, CO5/477, f. 111, BNA.

28. Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1992 [1967]), 233 (quotation), 232–246; Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in the Age of Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980).

29. See Winstanley Briggs, "Le Pays des Illinois," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 47 (1990): 30–56; Brett Rushforth, "'A Little Flesh We Offer You': The Origins of Indian Slavery in New France," *WMQ* 60 (2003): 777–808; and Brett Rushforth, "Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance" *WMQ* 60 (2006): 50–80.

30. *The Life of John Brainerd*, ed. Thomas Brainerd (Philadelphia, Pa., 1865), 235.

31. Charles Thomson, *Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians* (London, 1759), 80, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.

32. Dowd, "Insidious Friends," 129; Dowd, *War under Heaven*, 63–78.

33. George Croghan to Sir William Johnson, July 25, 1761, *WJP*, 10:317; Dowd, *War under Heaven*, 105–107.

34. Gladwin to Amherst, Detroit, April 20, 1763, WO34/49, f. 176, BNA.

35. Brett Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2012), 375; Dowd, *War under Heaven*, 66.

36. Examination of Cornelius Vanslyke, Johnson Hall, July 21, 1767, taken by William Johnson, Native American History, Box 2, Item 665, WCL.

37. Speech of the Shawnees to Mons. de Neyon (Mes. Bebé interp.), December 21, 1763 (French), Gage Papers, American Series, vol. 11, WCL.

38. A Council held at the House of Mons. De Neyon de Villiers, April 15 to April 17, 1764, Robert Farmar to Thomas Gage, Mobile, December 21, 1764, Gage Papers, WCL. Pontiac's speech was translated into French by St. Louis de Chertre, and from the French document to English by Philip Pittman; Howard Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (New York, 1970 [1947]), 246, 249. Sir William Johnson said Indians supporting Pontiac "apprehend we design to enslave them." Johnson to Lords of Trade, August 30, 1764, *CISHL* 10:397.

39. Charles-Philippe Aubry à Thomas Gage, 21 Juin 1765, Gage Papers, WCL; "Speeches made by the Shawnee Chief . . . ," February 24, 1765, *CISHL* 10:448.

40. Examination of Cornelius Vanslyke, Johnson Hall, July 21, 1767, taken by Sir William Johnson, Native American History, Box 2, Item 655, WCL.

41. Intelligence from Kyashuta, May 9, 1765, Gage Papers, American Series, WCL.

42. George Croghan, "Croghan's Official Journal," entry for July 18, 1765, and George Croghan to Sir William Johnson, November 1765, *CISHL* 11:42, 54; George Croghan, "Croghan's Journal, May 15–September, 1765," and Croghan to Sir William Johnson, [n.d. but probably late 1765], in *Early Western Travels, 1748–1846*, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites, 32 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio, 1904–1907), 1:139, 171; Richard Middleton, *Pontiac's War: Its Causes, Course and Consequences* (New York, 2007), 196.

43. David Zeisberger, "1769 Diary," 167–170, translated typescript, Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archive, Glenn Black Archaeological Laboratory, Indiana University, Bloomington.

44. Zeisberger, "1769 Diary," 22, 144, 150; John Heckewelder, *Narrative of the Mission of the United Brethren* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1820), 116.

45. Zeisberger, "1769 Diary," 78.

46. David Jones, *A Journal of Two Visits Made to Some Nations of Indians on the West Side of the River Ohio in the Years 1772 and 1773* (Burlington, N.J., 1774), iv, 75–76; Herman Wellenreuther and Carola Wessel, "Introduction," in *The Moravian Mission Diaries of David Zeisberger, 1772–1781*, ed. Herman Wellenreuther and Carola Wessel, trans. Julie Tomberlin Weber (University Park, Pa., 2005), 40; Zeisberger, Diary, entries October 7, 1772 and February 13, 1772, ibid., 107–108, 129–130.

47. *The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe: with Allied Documents Relating to his Administration of the Government of Upper Canada,* ed. E. A. Cruikshank, 5 vols. (Toronto, Ont., 1923–1931), 1:227.

48. William Wells to Henry Dearborn, Fort Wayne, April 23, 1808, in *Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory of Indiana*, ed. Clarence Edwin Carter, 28 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1934–1975), 7:560.

49. Copy of Saluy's [Young Warrior of Estatoy] Talk to His Excellency Governor Boon, January 26, 1764, CO323/17, f. 172, BNA; Nancy Shoemaker, "An Alliance between Men: Gender Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East of the Mississippi," *Ethnohistory* 46 (1999): 247.

50. Quoted in Shoemaker, "An Alliance between Men," 248; "Minutes of Information Given to Governor Blount by James Carey," November 3, 1792, *American State Papers Indian Affairs*, ed. Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1832), 1:329.

51. Frank Speck, Leonard Broom, and Will West Long, *Cherokee Dance and Drama* (Norman, Okla., 1983 [1951]), 25–38; Raymond D. Fogelson and Amelia B. Walker, "Self and Other in Cherokee Booger Masks," *Journal of Cherokee Studies* 5 (1980): 90.

52. Jason Baird Jackson, "Making Faces: Eastern Cherokee Booger Masks," *Gilcrease Journal* 5, no. 2 (1997): 52–54.

53. Jackson, "Making Faces" 52–54; Fogelson and Walker, "Self and Other," 88–101.

54. *William Bartram on the Southeastern Indians*, ed. Gregory A. Waselkov and Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Lincoln, Nebr., 1995), 81; Charles Frazier, *Cold Mountain* (New York, 1997), 416.

55. George Germain to John Stuart (draft), November 6, 1776, CO5/77, f. 121, BNA.

56. "Journals of the South Carolina Assembly, Sept. 28, 1776," in *American Archives*, ed. Peter Force, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1837–1853), 5th series, 3:32.

57. Quoted in John P. Brown, *Old Frontiers: The Story of the Cherokee Indians from Earliest Times to the Removal to the West in 1838* (Chattanooga, Tenn., 1938), 276–278; for land, see Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York, 1993), 219, 232, 301 n. 15.

58. Methlogee to James Seagrove, Point Peter, June 14, 1799, enclosed in James Seagrove to James Jackson, Point Peter, June 17, 1799, Ayer Manuscripts, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill. "Kept," as the *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., puts it in definition "1.a.," means "maintained or supported by a paramour." The seven entries (1678–1969) are all sexual.

Chapter 7 · Solidarity

1. Timothy James Lockley's useful collection, *Maroon Communities in South Carolina: A Documentary Record* (Columbia, S.C., 2009), has some whites cooperating with maroons (10) but no maroon cooperation with free Native Americans. White servants at least once joined black slaves seeking the protection of the Spanish at St. Augustine (*CRG* 13:160). Philip D. Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), finds more evidence of (and planter fear of) plain white folk cooperation with black slaves than of free Indian collaboration; compare 301–309 with 479–485.

2. "The picture in the Colonial Southeast was this: a frightened and dominant White minority faced two exploited colored majorities." So, I think accurately, wrote William S. Willis, "Divide and Rule: Red, White, and Black in the Southeast," *Journal of Negro History* 48 (1963): 160. He continued: "It did not take much imagination on the part of Whites to put the two dangers, Indians and Negro

slaves, together . . . This was the biggest fear of all" (161). Later: "Whites were especially afraid that these two exploited races would combine against them" (176). Others have followed. I called a "Cherokee conspiracy with slaves" the "most powerful of all Carolinian fears" in Gregory Evan Dowd, "The Panic of 1751: The Significance of Rumors on the South Carolina-Cherokee Frontier," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 53 (1996): 552. See also Theda Perdue, *Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 1540–1866* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1979), 40; Daniel Littlefield, *Africans and Creeks from the Colonial Period to the Civil War* (Westport, Conn., 1979), 14; Peter Wood, *Black Majority* (New York, 1974), 303; Eirlys M. Baker, "Indian Traders, Charlestown, and London's Vital Links to America," in *Money, Trade and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina's Plantation Society*, ed. Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute, and Randy J. Sparks (Colombia, S.C., 2001), 151.

3. Quoting Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 348; Wood, *Black Majority*, 53, 116; *CRG* 13: 115, 272–273, 276, 301–302, 305.

4. Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint*, 477–485.

5. Glen to Board of Trade, South Carolina, February [3] 1747–1748, CO5/372, ff. 34–37, BNA.

6. "Journal of the Board of Trade," Whitehall, July 28, 1720, CO391/29, f. 270, BNA; Jane Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Urbana, Ill., 1999), 29; Jane Landers, "Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose: A Free Black Town in Spanish Colonial Florida," *AHR* 95 (1990): 9–30; Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670–1732* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929), 331, 239, 244, 247–248. The rebellious slaves identified not with Indians but religiously with the Spanish in St. Augustine. See John K. Thornton, "African Dimensions of the Stono Rebellion," *AHR* 96 (1991): 1101–1113; Mark M. Smith, "Remembering Mary, Shaping Revolt: Reconsidering the Stono Rebellion," *JSH* 67 (2001): 513–534.

When Le Jau discussed a rumored slave revolt in 1714, he did not mention rumors of free Indian involvement. Le Jau to the Secretary, St. James, S.C., January 22, 1714, same to same, S.C., May 10, 1715, same to same, St. James, S.C., May 14, 1715, same to same, S.C., May 21, 1715, same to same, S.C., August 23, 1715, in "The Carolina Chronicle of Dr. Francis Le Jau, 1706–1717," ed. Frank J. Klingberg, *University of California Publications in History* 53 (1956): 136–138, 152, 155, 156, 159, 163. Jane Landers discusses a 1738 memorial written well after the Yamasee War, by "Jorge," who claimed to have led both Yamasees and Carolinian slaves during that conflict. Jorge asks that four of Florida's enslaved blacks be freed, as they had been falsely betrayed by an allied Indian with the Muskogean war title Mad Dog. If true, these men spent more than twenty years in Spanish slavery after having allied with Yamasees. The story clearly cuts two ways, revealing potential for both free Indian alliance with enslaved Africans and for Native American dealing in African slaves. Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 28, 294 n. 20.

7. David H. Corkran, *The Carolina Indian Frontier* (Columbia, S.C., 1970), 37–42; *JCHA*, 6:132, 141, 173, 187; see especially Minutes of the S.C. Council for March 27, 1746, American Council of Learned Societies, *British Manuscript Project: Microfilms*

Prepared in England and Wales for the American Council of Learned Societies, 1941–1945 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1941–1945), reel 33, frs. 71–80.

8. "Buckra" and Johns: Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York, 1993), 111–112; John Langston Gwaltney, *Drylongso: A Self Portrait of Black America* (New York, 1980), xv, 221; J. William Harris, *The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah: A Free Black Man's Encounter with Liberty* (New Haven, Conn., 2009), 75–76, 117; Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint*, 648–649; Robert Olwell, *Masters, Slaves, and Subjects: The Culture of Power in the South Carolina Low Country, 1740–1790* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998), 136–137. Johns is a "free Mulatto" in William Lyttelton to Board of Trade, September 1, 1759, CO5/376, f. 105, BNA; William Henry Lyttelton, "Letter Book, August 1757–October 1759," 401–402, William Henry Lyttelton Papers WCL. Lyttelton's 1759 papers show very little interest in the affair, particularly compared with the Cherokee crisis, which abounded in rumor of Cherokee alliances with Creeks, Shawnees, and the French.

9. William Lyttelton to Board of Trade, September 1, 1759, CO5/376, f. 105, BNA; Lyttelton, "Letter Book, August 1757–October 1759," 401–402; South Carolina Assembly to Lyttelton, October 12, 1759, William Henry Lyttelton Papers, WCL.

10. Quoted in Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 111–112.

11. Lieutenant Colonel James Grant to General Jeffery Amherst, Charleston, April 17, 1760, WO34/47, f. 156, BNA.

12. Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven, Conn., 2002), 320–321.

13. William Fleming to Francis Fauquier, Staunton, July 26, 1763, in *The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, ed. George Reese, 3 vols. (Charlottesville, Va., 1981), 2:998; Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint*, 479 n. 67; William Hoyt Jr., "Colonel William Fleming in Dunmore's War," *West Virginia History* 3 (1942): 99–100.

14. Daniel H. Usner Jr., *Indians, Settlers and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), 46 (quotation), 58, 59, 67, 72–75 (quotations), 132; Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 86, 88–89, 148.

15. Copies of Certificates from Colonel Robert Daniel, August 13, 1716, CO5/1265, f. 94, BNA; Kathryn E. Holland Braund, "The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery," *JSH* 57 (1991): 610.

16. John Barnwell to Governor Nicholson, September 17, 1723, CO5/359, f. 61b, BNA.

17. Eliza Pinckney, extract from a letter of April 1746, in Harriot Horrey Ravenel, *Eliza Pinckney* (New York, 1896), 128.

18. Salmon to Minister Maurepas, New Orleans, October 4, 1741, in *Mississippi Provincial Archives: French Dominion, 1729–1748,* ed. Patricia Kay Galloway, Dunbar Rowland, and A. G. Sanders, 5 vols. (Baton Rouge, La., 1984), 4:192; John Stuart to Gage, September 7, 1772, Gage Papers, WCL.

19. Cherokee "Articles of Friendship and Commerce," September 7, 1730, CO5/4, ff. 211–214, BNA; Joshua Piker, "Colonists and Creeks: Rethinking the Pre-Revolutionary Southern Backcountry," *JSH* 70 (2004): 514; Entry for 2 April, 1739, *JCHA*, 1:681; Lieutenant Governor Broughton to Duke of Newcastle, Charleston,

February 6, 1736–1737, CO5/388, pt. 1, f. 125, BNA. Broughton moots Spanish collusion with Indians and fears the power of slaves, yet he does not moot native collusion with enslaved Africans. Abstract of a Letter from Colonel Bull, President of the Council, South Carolina, October 5, 1739, CO5/406, f. 22; William Bull to Board of Trade, Charleston, October 5, 1739, CO5/367, f. 114; William Bull to Duke of Newcastle, Charleston, October 5, 1739, CO5/388, pt. 1, ff. 164–165, all in BNA. Bull fears that Spanish invasion meant slave insurrection, not free Indian alliances with slaves. South Carolina Council Committee report, enclosed in Lord Charles Grenville Montagu to the Earl of Hillsborough, Charleston, April 19, 1769, CO5/379, f. 59, BNA.

20. Refuge: Littlefield, *Africans and Creeks*, 20; Argular: Piker, "Colonists and Creeks," 513; 1759: South Carolina Council, July 3, 1760, CO5/477, f. 2b, BNA.

21. Lockley, *Maroon Communities in South Carolina*, xvii.

22. Herbert Aptheker, "Maroons within the Present Limits of the United States," *Journal of Negro History* 24 (1939): 167–170, lists about ten maroon communities before 1775, using a broad definition of maroon. See also Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 67.

23. Marronage in South Carolina and Georgia increased after the Revolution (Lockley, *Maroon Communities in South Carolina*, 132). Piedmont Indians, meanwhile, lost much independence.

24. *CRG* 14:302–305; Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, January 19, 1766, in *The Papers of Henry Laurens,* ed. Philip M. Hamer et al., 16 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1968–2003), 5:53–54, also n. 9.

25. Sylvia R. Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, N.J., 1991), 50–51; Proceedings and Minutes of the Governor and Council, Georgia, December 4, 1771, and July 7, 1772, *CRG* 12:146–147, 325–326; Tim Lockey, "Runaway Slave Communities in South Carolina," *History in Focus: The Guide to Historical Resources* 12 (2007), http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Slavery/articles/lockley.html, viewed July 5, 2012.

26. Affidavit of James Maxwell, June 12, 1751, *DRIA*, 1:68–69. On Abraham, see Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 131–132; Entry for June 2, 1760, South Carolina Council, CO5/474, ff. 66–67, BNA; *French and Indian War Abstracts from Colonial Newspapers*, ed. Armand Francis Lucier, 5 vols. (Bowie, Md., 1999–2000), 4:117, 213.

27. Lieutenant Governor Bull to General Amherst, March 13, 1761, WO34/35, f. 19, BNA. See also Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 136; Craven to [Board of Trade], Charleston, May 23, 1715, CO5/1264, f. 295; Letter of John Carey, Nowyoowee, September 23, 1728, CO5/1337, f. 128, both in BNA.

28. "Meeting of the Commissioners for the Indian Trade," October 11, October 13, 1775, in *Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775–1777*, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison, Wisc., 1908), 104, 116.

29. Douglas Edward Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (New York, 1958), 24–26; Douglas Edward Leach, "The Question of French Involvement in King Philip's War," *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts* 38 (1953): 414–421; Kenneth Morrison, "The Bias of Colonial Law: English Paranoia and the Abenaki Arena of King Philip's War," *NEQ* 53 (1980): 374–375;

Emerson Baker, "New Evidence on French Involvement in King Philip's War," *Maine Historical Society Quarterly* 28(1988): 85–91.

30. Richard Watts to Williamson, August 28, 1676, SP(SPO), 29/385, f. 11; Thomas Holden to Williamson, November 9, 1676, SP(SPO), 29/386, f. 336. For other rumored links, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia* (New York, 1957), 25, 30, 40. For South Carolina, see Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 18–20.

31. Samuel Eveleigh to Gentlemen [in England], October 7, 1715, CO5/1265, f. 37, BNA.

32. Copies of Certificates from Colonel Robert Daniel, August 13, 1716, CO5/1265, f. 94 (quotations); Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 167; Memorial by Mr. Kettleby and several Merchants trading to Carolina, to the Board of Trade, received September 16, 1715, CO5/1265, f. 12; Journal of the Board of Trade, Whitehall, September 16, 1715, CO 391/25, f. 254, all in BNA.

33. Committee of Assembly to Joseph Boone, March 8, 1717–1718, CO5/1265, f. 229; "Letter from the Assembly of South Carolina," March 15, 1715, CO5/1265, f. 48, both in BNA.

34. Rory T. Cornish, "Charleston, South Carolina (1720)," in *Encyclopedia of Slave Resistance and Rebellion*, ed. Junius P. Rodriguez (Westport, Conn., 2007), 165.

35. "Draught of Instructions for a Governor of Carolina," August 30, 1720, CO5/381, f. 74, BNA.

36. J. Cheswynd, W. Bladen, and Edward Aske, "Representation upon the State of His Majesty's Plantations in America," September 8, 1721, CO324/10, ff. 148b–218, BNA.

37. Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 23–60; "Report to the South Carolina General Assembly on the Failed St. Augustine Expedition of 1740," in *Major Problems in American Colonial History*, ed. Karen Ordahl Kupperman (Lexington, Mass., 1993), 328–329; Wood, *Black Majority*, 309–312, 323, 325; "Account of the Negroe Insurrection in South Carolina," 1739, *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia: Original Papers, Correspondence, General Ogelthorpe and Others*, vol. 22, pt. 2 (1913), 232–236; Landers, "Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose," 14–15, 17, 19.

38. Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 35–37, 47, 55, 59, 69; Nathaniel Millett, *The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World* (Gainesville, Fla., 2013), 5; Daniel F. Littlefield Jr., *Africans and Creeks: From the Colonial Period to the Civil War* (Westport, Conn., 1979), 28; Wright, *Creeks and Seminoles*, 86.

39. Lieutenant Governor Broughton to Duke of Newcastle, Charleston, February 6, 1736–1737, CO5/388, pt. 1, f. 125, BNA; for the bounty: April 2, 1739, entry in *JCHA*, 1:681.

40. This and previous paragraph: Colonel William Bull to the Board of Trade, October 5, 1739, CO5/367, f. 114, and Bull to Duke of Newcastle, October 5, 1739, CO5/388, pt. 1, f. 164; William Bull to Board of Trade, March 20, 1740, CO5/368, f. 56, all in BNA; Peter Wood, *Strange New Land: Africans in Colonial America* (New York, 2003 [1996]), 93; Arrell M. Gibson, *The Chickasaws* (Norman, Okla., 1971), 54–57.

41. Mark J. Stegmaier, "Maryland's Fear of Insurrection at the Time of Braddock's Defeat," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 71 (1976): 467–483; Jill Lepore, *New York Burning: Liberty, Slaves and Conspiracy in Eighteenth-Century Manhattan* (New York, 2005), 7, 55, 178, 182–183, 198, 254, 267; Thomas J. Davis, *Rumor of Revolt: The "Great Negro Plot" in Colonial New York* (New York, 1985), especially 140–141; Daniel Horsmanden, *The New York Conspiracy by Daniel Horsmanden*, ed. and intro. Thomas J. Davis (Boston, Mass., 1971), 163–167, 172.

42. Henry Laurens to William Stone, Charleston, May 18, 1748, in *Papers of Henry Laurens*, 1:139.

Chapter 8 · Scalps

1. David Hackett Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride* (New York, 1994), 216–218.

2. Lieutenant William Sutherland to Clinton, April 20, 1775, Clinton Papers, vol. 9, WCL. In his letter to Major Kemble of April 27, 1775, Gage Papers, WCL, Sutherland does not mention the alleged scalping. See also Allen French, *General Gage's Informers* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1932), 91 n. 1, 105.

3. Percy, Acting Brigadier General, to Governor Thomas Gage, April 22, 1775, Gage Papers (ES), WCL; French, *General Gage's Informers*, 105; Acting Brigadier General Percy to Governor Thomas Gage, Boston, April 20, 1775, in *Letters of Hugh, Earl Percy, from Boston and New York*, ed. Charles Knowles Bolton (Boston, Mass., 1902), 49–51.

4. Ensign Jeremy Lister, "Narrative," in *Concord Fight: Being so much of the Narrative of Ensign Jeremy Lister of the 10th Regiment of Foot. . . .* , ed. Allen French (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), 27.

5. Thomas Gage, *A Circumstantial Account of an Attack that Happened on the 19th of April, 1775, on His Majesty's troops . . .* , enclosed in Gage to Lord Viscount Barrington, May 13, 1775, Gage Papers (ES), WCL; French, *General Gage's Informers*, 105–106.

6. Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 218.

7. Captain John G. Battier of the 5th Light Foot; Testifiers: Corporal Gordon, Thos. Lugg, Wm. Lewis, Charles Carrier, Richd. Grimshaw, all in Gage Papers, filed with papers for the end of April 1775, WCL; Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 215–220; French, *General Gage's Informers,* 106.

8. Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 348. French, *General Gage's Informers*, 105–109, titles a chapter, "The 'Scalping,'" and concludes: "There was no scalping at Concord Bridge."

9. Compare French, *General Gage's Informers*, 105–109, with Harold Murdock, *The Nineteenth of April, 1775* (Boston, Mass., 1925), 71–76.

10. J. Moir, *Obedience the best charter; or, law the only sanction of liberty. In a letter to the Rev. Dr. Price* (London, 1776), 55–56, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale Group, http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/servlet/ECCO. Elliot Gorn, "'Gouge and Bite: Pull Hair and Scratch': The Social Significance of Fighting in the Southern Backcountry," *AHR* 90 (1985): 19–20, points to the Upper South and frontier regions, but not to Massachusetts.

11. John Lind, *An Answer to the declaration of the American Congress* (London, 1776), Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale Group, http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/servlet/ECCO.

12. French, *General Gage's Informers*, 107; Provincial Congress, Massachusetts, "A Narrative, of the Excursion and Ravages of the King's Troops under the Command of General Gage . . . ," [Worcester, Mass., 1775], reprinted in *The Magazine of History* 44, no. 3 (1931): 119–150, see especially 145–146.

13. *Essex Journal,* May 26, 1775, vol. 2, iss. 74, 1; *Connecticut Courant,* May 22, 1775, iss. 543, 2; *New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, June 19, 1775, iss. 1236, 1, all in EAN Infoweb.

14. William Russell to William Fleming, Fort Blair, June 12, 1775, in *The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775–1777*, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison, Wis., 1908), 15.

15. James Wood, "Diary, 1775," in *Revolution on the Upper Ohio*, ed. Thwaites and Kellogg, 34, 36, 39, 42–43, 57–58. That the hostages had returned safely is strongly implied in "Meeting of the Commissioners for the Indian Trade," October 10 and October 16, 1775, ibid., 98, 120. For newspapers, see "Captain James Wood's Information to the Committee of Pittsburgh, Aug. 10, 1775," *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, September 8, 1775, vol. 1, *Providence Gazette*, September 30, 1775, vol. 12, iss. 613, 1, both in EAN Infoweb. Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (New York, 1995), 162–163.

16. Suggesting that the English introduced scalping, Vine Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (New York, 1969), 6, provoked a response from James Axtell and William Sturtevant, "The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 37 (1980): 451–472. See also Colin G. Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans and the Remaking of America* (Baltimore, Md., 1998), 103–104; Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675–1815* (Norman, Okla., 1998), 30–31; Peter Way, "The Cutting Edge of Culture: British Soldiers Encounter Native Americans in the French and Indian War," in *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850*, ed. Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (Philadelphia, Pa., 1999), especially 132–134.

17. This and the preceding paragraph: Henry Stuart and Alexander Cameron to the Inhabitants of Watauga and Nonatluchly, Toqua, Cherokee Nation, May 7, 1776; John Carter to Henry Stuart and Alexander Cameron, May 13, 1776; Henry Stuart and Alexander Cameron to John Carter, Toqua, May 23, 1776; Henry Stuart and Alexander Cameron to Aaron Penson, Toquah, May 23, 1776; and Henry Stuart to Edward Wilkinson, Toqua, May 28, 1776; all in "Correspondence of Henry Stuart and Alexander Cameron with the Wataugans," ed. Philip M. Hamer, *MVHR* 17 (1930): 451–59; Helen Louise Shaw, *British Administration of the Southern Indians, 1756–1783* (New York, 1980 [1931]), 100; James H. O'Donnell, *Southern Indians in the American Revolution* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1973), 38–39. Henry Stuart to Settlers in Wataugah, n.d., and Henry Stuart, "Account of his Proceedings with the Cherokee Indians about going against the whites," Pensacola, August 25, 1776, both in *The*

Colonial Records of North Carolina, ed. William L. Saunders, 29 vols. (Raleigh, N.C., 1886–1914), 10:606–607, 769–770; Virginia Convention, Thursday, June 6, 1776, in *American Archives*, ed. Peter Force, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1846), 4th ser., 6:1554.

18. Elbridge Gerry to President of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress (James Warren), Philadelphia, June 11, 1776; same to Joseph Trumbull, June 18, 1776; same to James Warren, July 2, 1776, all in Edmund C. Burnett, *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress*, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1921–1936), 1:484, 498, 526. A forged letter, represented as "Henry Stuart etc.," is in "Lee Papers," ed. Augustus Schell, Evert A. Buyckinck, and George H. Moore, *Collections of the New York Historical Society for the Year, 1872, Publication Fund Series*, no. 5 (1873): 28–30; *The Papers of General Nathanael Greene*, ed. Richard K. Showman et al., Dennis M. Conrad et al., 13 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005), 8:120; see also Jack Sosin, "The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-Assessment of Responsibility," *Canadian Historical Review* 46 (1965): 103.

19. Henry Stuart and Cameron to Aaron Penson, May 23, 1776, in "Correspondence of Henry Stuart," ed. Hamer, 456.

20. By late October 1775, Stuart had orders from Thomas Gage to hold Indians in readiness for war. Stuart alerted his subordinates, with the impractical proviso that the Indians must discriminate Loyalists from rebels. Gage to Stuart, Boston, September 12, 1775, *DAR,* 11:105; John Stuart to Henry Stuart, October 24, 1775, enclosed in John Stuart to Dartmouth, St. Augustine, October 25, 1775, *DAR,* 11:163–164. A fine treatment of the South Carolina panic is J. William Harris, *The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah: A Free Black Man's Encounter with Liberty* (New Haven, Conn., 2009), 84–87, 116, 125–126.

21. James Hadden, *Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books: A Journal Kept in Canada and Upon Burgoyne's Campaign in 1776 and 1777, by Lieut. James M. Hadden, Roy. Art Orders.,* ed. Horatio Rogers (Freeport, N.Y., 1970 [1884]), 61. See also "The following is Burgoyne's Pompous Proclamation, under Which Many of the Credulous Have Lost their Scalps," *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, August 21, 1777, vol. 3, iss. 394, 438, EAN Infoweb.

22. *Pennsylvania Packet*, August 26, 1777, vol. 6, iss. 302, 1, EAN Infoweb.

23. *Pennsylvania Packet*, August 26, 1777, vol. 6, iss. 302, 1; reprinted, for example, in *Norwich Packet*, September 8, 1777, vol. 4, iss. 207, EAN Infoweb.

24. *Boston Gazette*, August 11, 1777, iss. 1197, 3; *Connecticut Courant*, August 11, 1777, iss. 655, 2; *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, August 12, 1777, vol. 3, iss. 390, 423; *Continental Journal*, August 14, 1777, iss. 64, 3; *Massachusetts Spy*, August 14, 1777, vol. 7, iss. 328; *New England Chronicle*, August 8, 1777, vol. 9, iss. 468, 3, all in EAN Infoweb. Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York, 2008), 246–247.

25. Hilliard d'Auberteuil to BF, May 25, 1782, *PBF,* 37:420, see also ed.'s n. 7; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, *Miss McCrea (1784): A Novel of the American Revolution*, ed. Lewis Leary (Gainesville, Fla., 1958), 14–15.

26. Hadden, *Journal upon Burgoyne's Campaign*, 47; *Providence Gazette*, August 16, 1777, vol. 14, iss. 711, 3; *Connecticut Journal*, July 9, 1777, iss. 508, 3; *Pennsylvania*

Evening Post, September 2, 1777, vol. 3, iss. 399, 458; "Major Gates's Answer," *Boston Gazette*, September 15, 1777, iss. 1202, 3; *Continental Journal*, October 2, 1777, iss. 71, 2; *Providence Gazette*, September 6, 1777, vol. 14, iss. 714, 3; *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, September 9, 1777, vol. 3, iss. 402, 470; *New England Chronicle*, February 27, 1777, vol. 9, iss. 445, 3, all in EAN Infoweb.

27. Henry J. Young, "A Note on Scalp Bounties in Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History* 24 (1957): 213.

28. Anne M. Ousterhout, "Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees vs. Pennamites in the Wyoming Valley," *Pennsylvania History* 62 (1995): 330–363; Peter Mancall, *Valley of Opportunity: Economic Culture along the Upper Susquehanna, 1700–1800* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), 130–136.

29. Joseph R. Fisher, *A Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, July–September, 1779* (Columbia, S.C., 1997), 20, 27; Barbara Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1972), 167–171; Mancall, *Valley of Opportunity*, 136–137.

30. *Connecticut Courant*, July 28, 1778, iss. 705, 2; *Connecticut Journal*, July 29, 1778, iss. 563, 1; *New England Chronicle*, July 30, 1778, vol. 10, iss. 519, 3; *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, July 30, 1778, 1; *Norwich Packet*, August 3, 1778, iss. 253, 2; *Independent Ledger*, August 3, 1778, vol. 1, iss. 8, 4; *Continental Journal*, August 6, 1778, iss. 115, 4; *Connecticut Gazette*, August 7, 1778, vol. 15, iss. 769, 3; *Pennsylvania Packet*, July 7, 1781, vol. 10, iss. 752, 2; *Salem Gazette*, October 18, 1781, vol. 1, iss. 1., all in EAN Infoweb.

31. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 172–174; Fischer, *A Well Executed Failure*, 28.

32. *Pennsylvania Packet*, October 17, 1778, 1, EAN Infoweb.

33. Gary Alan Fine and Patricia A. Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line: Rumor and Race in America* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001), 54.

34. John Hale, "Landscape of Tragedy, Crèvecoeur's 'Susquehanna,'" *Early American Literature* 20 (1985): 39–63; J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, *Letters from An American Farmer* (New York, 1957 [1782]), 39 (quotation). In this work, too, Crèvecoeur evokes the violence the Revolution brought to the frontier (192–205). Ed White, *The Backcountry and the City: Colonization and Conflict in Early America* (Minneapolis, Minn., 2005), 51–52.

35. Charles Duffy, "Thomas Campbell and America," *American Literature* 13 (1942), especially 350–355; Thomas Campbell, *Gertrude of Wyoming and Other Poems*, 5th ed. (London, 1814), 67, digitized by Google, original from Oxford University.

36. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 171–172; Fischer, *A Well-Executed Failure*, 28.

37. Quoted in Fisher, *A Well Executed Failure*, 28.

38. Mancall, *Valley of Opportunity*, 130.

39. Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Delhi, 1983), 251, 254.

40. Fischer, *A Well Executed Failure*, 28–30; Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 123–125; Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier* (Norman, Okla., 2000 [1973]).

41. Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 183–191; Fischer, *A Well Executed Failure*, 30–31.

42. Gregory Evans Dowd, *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore, Md., 2002), 191–203.

43. *The Continental Journal*, December 3, 1778, vol. 132, 3; reprinted in *Connecticut Gazette*, December 18, 1778, vol. 16, 1; *Pennsylvania Packet*, December 19, 1778, 2, all in EAN Infoweb.

44. Philip J. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence, Kans., 2004), especially 7–10, on expectations.

45. Young, "A Note on Scalp Bounties," 213, 215; Joseph Reed to George Washington, Philadelphia, May 1, 1779, in *Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed*, ed. William B. Reed, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1847), 2:99.

46. Young, "A Note on Scalp Bounties," 213, 215.

47. Fischer, *A Well Executed Failure*, passim; Graymont, *Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 192–222, 224–240, 240 (quotation).

48. Young, "A Note on Scalp Bounties," 214–217; the bounty Proclamation is on 214.

49. Extract of letter from Camp near Seneca, August, 18, 1776, Charleston, September 11, 1776, *Essex Journal*, December 5, 1776, vol. 3, iss. 153, 2, EAN Infoweb.

50. Gorn, "Gouge and Bite," 33.

51. *New Jersey Gazette*, November 11, 1778, vol. 1, iss. 42, 2, and September 8, 1779, vol. 2, iss. 89, 3, EAN Infoweb; for other such reports of the scalping of Indians by American forces, see *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, August 25, 1780, vol. 6, iss. 689, 102 (reprinted in *Connecticut Journal*, August 31, 1780, *New England Chronicle*, September 14, 1780, and *Independent Ledger*, September 18, 1780); *Pennsylvania Packet*, March 13, 1781, vol. 10, iss. 715, 4 (reprinted in *Independent Ledger*, March 19, 1781, *New Jersey Gazette*, March 21, 1781, and *American Journal*, March 24, 1781); *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, July 2, 1781, vol. 7, iss. 751, 102 (reprinted in *New Jersey Gazette*, July 8, 1781), all in EAN Infoweb.

52. *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, May 11, 1779, vol. 5, iss. 597, 118 (reprinted in *Pennsylvania Packet*, May 11, 1779, *New Jersey Gazette*, May 19, 1779, *Norwich Packet*, June 1, 1779, *Connecticut Journal*, May 26, 1779, *Massachusetts Spy*, May 27, 1779, *Providence Gazette*, May 29, 1779, and *New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, May 31, 1779), all in EAN Infoweb.

53. *Connecticut Courant*, June 2, 1778, iss. 697, 3, EAN Infoweb.

54. "Journals of the South Carolina Assembly, Sept. 27, 1776," in *American Archives: Containing A Documentary History of the United States of America*, ed. Peter Force, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1853), 5th ser., 3:32.

55. Bernard Sheehan, "'The Famous Hair Buyer General': Henry Hamilton, George Rogers Clark, and the American Indian," *Indiana Magazine of History* 79 (1983): 13, 25, 26; John D. Barnhart, " A New Evaluation of Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark," *MVHR* 37 (1951): 650; *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, July 3, 1779, vol. 5, iss. 612, 173, EAN Infoweb; John Dodge, "A Narrative of the Capture and Treatment of John Dodge, by the English at Detroit," *Connecticut Gazette*, February 9,

1780, vol. 17, iss. 848, 1; *Pennsylvania Ledger*, March 9, 1776, iss. 59, 2, both in EAN Infoweb; "Daniel Sullivan's Deposition," Fort Pitt, March 20, 1778, in *Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio*, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (Madison, Wis., 1912), 231–232; C. W. Butterfield, *Leith's Narrative: A Short Biography of John Leith* (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1883 [1831]), 28–30.

56. Sosin, "The Use of Indians," 103.

57. Sheehan, "The Famous Hair Buyer General," 14; see also Hamilton to Frederick Haldimand, Detroit, September [n.d.], 1778, Detroit, September 16, 1778, "Haldimand Papers," *Collections of the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society* 9 (1886): 464–465, 477.

58. Sheehan, "The Famous Hair Buyer General," 14.

59. *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, January 13, 1781, vol. 7, iss. 713, 12; *Pennsylvania Packet*, January 13, 1781; *New Jersey Gazette*, January 17, 1781; *New England Chronicle*, February 1, 1781; *New Hampshire Gazette*, February 5, 1781; *Providence Gazette*, February 10, 1781, all in EAN Infoweb.

60. *Pennsylvania Evening Post,* October 17, 1780, vol. 6, iss. 700, 126; *Pennsylvania Packet*, October 24, 1780; *Continental Journal*, October 26, 1780; *Massachusetts Spy*, October 26, 1780, all in EAN Infoweb.

61. Historian Ian K. Steele discusses scalp bounties as an adaptation of European traditions. Ian K. Steele, "A Captive's Right to Life? The Interaction of Amerindian, Colonial, and European Values," The Lawrence F. Brewster Lecture in History (East Carolina University, 1995), accessed online, August 21, 2006, http://www.ecu.edu/history/brewster/bl95.htm; John Demos, *The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from Early America* (New York, 1994), 42.

62. James Alton James, "Introduction," and Henry Wilson, "Account of the Campaign against the Shawnee Indians," in *George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771–1781*, ed. James Alton James, 2 vols., in Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, gen. ed. Clarence Walworth Alvord et al., 38 vols. (Springfield, Ill., 1906–1978), 8:cxl–cxli, 483. See also Sheehan, "The Famous Hair Buyer General," 20. Clark sent parties out "for scalps and prisoners." George Rogers Clark to Francisco Leyba, Kaskaskias, January 23, 1779, in Lawrence Kinnaird, "Clark-Leyba Papers," *AHR* 41 (1935): 105.

63. Sheehan, "The Famous Hair Buyer General," 20; George Rogers Clark, "The Journal of George Rogers Clark," in *Clark Papers*, ed. James, 8:167; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York, 1991), 374–375; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 12; Calloway, *New Worlds for All*, 103–104.

64. Henry Hamilton to Shelburne, April 9, 1782, "Narrative of the Case of Henry Hamilton," in Shelburne Papers, vol. 66, 190, 195–196, WCL; Sheehan, "The Famous Hair Buyer General," 21–22.

65. *American Journal*, May 7, 1779, vol. 1, iss. 8, 3.

Chapter 9 · Hoax

1. Samuel Wharton to Franklin, January 17, 1777, *PBF*, 23:203–204.

2. James O'Donnell, *Southern Indians in the American Revolution* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1973), 17–53; *DAR*, 10, a calendar, for example, abstracts no such meeting. The collection's entries 2353, 2366, and 2403 reveal no scalp parades. An electronic search reveals no such story in American newspapers. The papers in 1776 report Cherokees scalping in numbers up to the low twenties. See, for example, *Pennsylvania Packet*, August 13, 1776, vol. 5, iss. 251, 2; *New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, September 2, 1776, iss. 1299, 1, both in EAN Infoweb.

3. Jack Sosin, "The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Reassessment of Responsibility," *Canadian Historical Review* 46 (June 1965): 101–121.

4. O'Donnell, *Southern Indians in the American Revolution*, 43.

5. William Ellery to Governor Cooke, Philadelphia, October 11, 1776, in *American Archives*, ed. Peter Force, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1851), 5th series, 2:990.

6. Total American military dead for the entire Revolutionary War stood at about 25,000. Howard Peckham, *The Toll of Independence: Engagements and Battle Casualties of the American Revolution* (Chicago, Ill., 1974), 132. The highest number of U.S. American military dead in any single engagement with enemy Indians—ever—falls short of 700. Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore, Md., 1992), 52–55, 106.

7. William Stiles and Robert Earl to Commissioners of Customs, December 18, 1776, Custom House, Portsmouth, England, CO5/148, f. 339, BNA.

8. *PBF*, 23:118.

9. Anonymous [Benjamin Franklin], in *The London Chronicle*, December 27, 1759, reprinted in Walter Isaacson, *A Benjamin Franklin Reader* (New York, 2003), 188.

10. *Indian Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Julian P. Boyd, intro. Carl Van Doren (Philadelphia, Pa., 1938); Timothy Shannon, *Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Conference of 1754* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000).

11. *AA: PG*, issues dated February 24, 1730, and March 5, 1730.

12. Proclamations: *AA: PG*, August 26, 1731, March 1, 1748. Crimes: *AA: PG*, November 5, 1730; April 26, 1744; May 10, 1744; August 23, 1744; November 8, 1744; November 15, 1744. Runaways: *AA: PG*, April 29, 1731; April 21, 1737; October 2, 1740; July 9, 1741; October 1, 1747. Negotiations: *AA: PG*, October 14, 1736; February 2, 1743; March 10, 1743; September 1, 1743; June 21, 1744; June 12, 1744; September 6, 1744; November 12, 1747; November 19, 1747; July 28, 1748; July 17, 1732; July 24, 1732; May 17, 1733; July 5, 1733; August 16, 1733; October 21, 1736; July 19, 1746; June 26, 1746; May 14, 1747; August 21, 1746. Battles/episodes: *AA: PG*, January 29, 1740; January 27, 1743; January 16, 1745; September 12, 1745; September 4, 1746; July 16, 1747; December 3, 1747; July 12, 1733; August 2, 1733; November 25, 1736; May 15, 1740; May 29, 1740; September 30, 1742; October 7, 1742; March 31, 1743; May 5, 1743; November 6, 1746; July 25, 1747; March 15, 1748. Raids: *AA: PG*, August 10, 1738; December 21, 1738;

March 31, 1743; August 7, 1746; August 28, 1746; October 23, 1746. Discounting raids: *AA: PG*, January 9, 1743. Milk white: *AA: PG*, October 18, 1744.

13. *AA: PG*, September 1, 1748.

14. Shannon, *Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire*, 103.

15. Luther S. Livingston, *Franklin and His Press at Passy* (New York, 1914), 58–67; for a brief notice, see Esmond Wright, *Franklin of Philadelphia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 285; Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York, 2008), 250.

16. See editor's comments, "Supplement to the Boston Independent Chronicle," ed. Ellen R. Cohn et al., *PBF*, 37:184–185. For the best treatment of its place in print history, see Carla Mulford, "Benjamin Franklin's Savage Eloquence: Hoaxes from the Press at Passy, 1782," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 152 (2008): 490–530.

17. Eric Bronner, *A Rumor about the Jews* (New York, 2000), 1, 114.

18. Gary Alan Fine and Patricia A. Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line: Rumor and Race in America* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001), 26, 51, 59, 60.

19. Vicente L. Rafael, "Collaboration and Rumor: The Philippines under Japanese Occupation," *Culture and History* 8 (1990): 99.

20. Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1966); Fine and Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line*, 41, 52, 58, 59. For Walpole, see Carl Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 1938), 673.

21. The British journal *The Remembrancer; or Impartial Repository of Public Events* reprinted the piece, without disclosing the hoax, as did *The London General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer*, June 29, 1782. For the first, see *PBF*, 37:185–186; for the second, see *New Jersey Gazette*, December 18, 1782, vol. 6, iss. 260, 1, Burlington; for the American papers, see ibid., and *Pennsylvania Packet*, December 26, 1782, vol. 11, iss. 981, 1; *Connecticut Courant*, January 14, 1783, iss. 938,; *Providence Gazette*, January 18, 1783, vol. 20, iss. 994, 4; *Continental Journal*, January 23, 1783, iss. 372; *Massachusetts Spy*, January 23, 1783, vol. 12, iss. 612, 4; *New York Gazetteer*, January 27, 1783, vol. 1, iss. 35, all in EAN Infoweb.

22. *Freedman's Journal*, Philadelphia, September 18, 1782, vol. 2, iss. 74, 3; *Salem Gazette*, October 3, 1782, vol. 1, iss. 51, 3; *Continental Journal*, October 3, 1782, iss. 346, 2; *Massachusetts Spy*, Worcester, October 3, 1782, vol. 12, iss. 596, 3, all in EAN Infoweb.

23. Mulford, "Benjamin Franklin's Savage Eloquence," 526–529.

24. Allan W. Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart: The Life of Tecumseh* (New York, 1992), 236–237.

25. *Independent Chronicle*, February 28, 1782, vol. 14, iss. 705, P. Supplement, Boston, EAN Infoweb, viewed January 12, 2015. An illegible handwritten notation appears at the top of the facsimile in the downloadable pdf version. The one barely legible word is probably "Paris." Newsbank has been alerted to this problem. The editors note, under the heading "Newspaper Titles,=" and in the digital column titled "Publication Information," the fact that this is Franklin's "hoax." But the fraudulent item does not belong in a newspaper collection, where readers will easily

mistake it for an actual edition. As of April 2, 2015, the "hoax" is not noted, for example, on the digital page on which it appears.

26. Peter Oliver, *Origins and Progress of the American Rebellion: A Tory View* (Stanford, Calif., 1961), 79; Charles L. Sanford, *Benjamin Franklin and the American Character* (Boston, Mass., 1955), 22.

27. *PBF*, 37:197.

28. David Zeisberger, *The Moravian Mission Diaries of David Zeisberger, 1772–1781*, ed. Hermann Wellenreuther and Carola Wessell, trans. Julie Tomberlin (State College, Pa., 2004), 568–572.

29. Peckham, *The Toll of Independence*.

30. Peckham, *The Toll of Independence*, ix.

31. "Burning of Towns": Franklin to David Hartley, Passy, April 5, 1782, *PBF*, 37:96; "Notes for a Conversation with Oswald," on or before April 19, 1782, *PBF*, 37:170, "something": "Journal of Peace Negotiations," May 9–July 1, 1782, *PBF*, 37:296; "Canada": Richard Oswald to Shelburne, Paris, July 8, 1782, and Oswald to Shelburne, Paris, July 10, 1782, Shelburne Manuscripts, 70:3946–3948, WCL. Two versions: Mulford, "Benjamin Franklin's Savage Eloquence," 496.

32. For a detailed modern account, see Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 262–274. See also M. M. Quaife, "The Ohio Campaign of 1782," *MVHR* 17 (1931): 515–517; Earl P. Olmstead, *Blackcoats among the Delaware: David Zeisberger on the Ohio Frontier* (Kent, Ohio, 1991), 72.

33. Franklin to James Hutton, Passy, July 7, 1782, *PBF*, 37:587, and ed.'s nn., ibid., 37:586 n. 5, 588 n. 8; *Continental Journal*, Boston, May 2, 1782, iss. 323, 3; *The New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury*, iss. 1593, 3, both in EAN Infoweb.

34. James Hutton to Benjamin Franklin, July 23, 1782, *PBF*, 37:666–667.

35. Wright, *Franklin of Philadelphia*, 312–313; Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (Bloomington, Ind., 1957 [1935]), 217–220.

36. Benjamin Franklin to Robert Livingston, Passy, August 12, 1782, *PBF*, 37:733–734.

37. Governor Frederick Haldimand to Thomas Townshend, Quebec, October 23 1782, *DAR*, 21:126.

38. Brigadier-General Allan Maclean to General Frederick Haldimand, Niagara, May 18, 1783, *DAR*, 21:169–170.

39. Talk from the Head Warrior of the Euphalies, St. Augustine, May 10, 1783, and Brigadier General McArthur to Sir Guy Carleton, St. Augustine, May 19, 1783, Headquarters Papers of the British Army in North America (Carleton Papers), PRO30/55/69, docs. 7654, 7717, BNA.

Chapter 10 · Slavery

1. William S. Willis, "Divide and Rule: Red, White, and Black in the Southeast," *Journal of Negro History* 48 (1963): 170; J. Leitch Wright Jr., *Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge People* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1987), 87; Robert Olwell, *Masters, Slaves, and Subjects: The Culture of Power in the South*

Carolina Low Country, 1740–1790 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998), 241; Sylvia R. Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, N.J., 1992), 66.

2. John Stuart to the Earl of Dartmouth, St. Augustine, July 21, 1775, *CRNC*, 10:118.

3. William Campbell to Dartmouth, Charleston, August 31, 1775, *DAR*, 11:93–94; Gage to Stuart, Boston, September 12, 1775, ibid., 105; William Harris, *The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah: A Free Black Man's Encounter with Liberty* (New Haven, Conn., 2009), 1–3, 88.

4. Campbell to Dartmouth, Charleston, August 31, 1775, *DAR*, 11 93–98, 96 (quotation); Harris, *The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah*, 88, 96–97, 135, 147.

5. Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Charleston, June 23, 1775, in *The Papers of Henry Laurens*, 10:188; Harris, *The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah*, 87.

6. Jane Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Urbana, Ill., 1999), 159; the abuse of Brown: Campbell to Earl of Dartmouth, onboard *Cherokee*, October 22, *DAR*, 10:108; Brown's activity: Thomas Brown to Tonyn, Chehaw, May 2, 1776, CO5/556, ff. 322–323, BNA.

7. Jeffrey J. Crow, "Slave Rebelliousness and Social Conflict in North Carolina, 1775 to 1802," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 37 (1980): 84.

8. Josiah Martin to the Earl of Dartmouth, onboard *Cruiser*, Cape Fear River, July 16, 1775, *CRNC*, 10:96.

9. Dunmore's Proclamation, November 7, 1775, *CRNC*, 10:309; Dunmore to Germain, Gwyn's Island Harbour, June 26, 1776, CO5/1373, ff. 130–132; Dunmore to Germain, Potomac River, July 31, 1776, CO5/1373, ff. 133–135, both in BNA.

10. Jonathan Boucher to George Germain, [London?], November 27, 1775, Sackville-Germain Papers, vol. 4, WCL; Frey, *Water from the Rock*, 68.

11. Extract of a Letter from London, February 10, 1775, *Pennsylvania Packet*, Philadelphia, May 1, 1775, vol. 4, iss. 184, 2 (quotation); also in *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Philadelphia, May 5, 1775, iss. 2419, 4, both in EAN Infoweb. Harris, *The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah*, 90–91.

12. Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 67; Governor Patrick Tonyn to George Germain, St. Augustine, August 21, 1776, *DAR*, 12:186–187.

13. Tonyn to Germain, St. Augustine, October 30, 1776, *DAR*, 12:243–244.

14. That slaves were conscripted is implied in Lieutenant William Grant to Captain Graham, aboard the *St. John* in the St. Mary's River, August 6, 1776, copy in CO5/556, f. 360, BNA. For land—in part as a reward for loyalty—see Tonyn to Germain, St. Augustine, November 1, 1776, CO5/557, ff. 20–21, copy in CO5/568, ff. 152–154, BNA.

15. Tonyn to Dartmouth, St. Augustine, February 16, 1776, copy in CO5/568, f. 92; also a duplicate in CO5/556, ff. 128–129; Thomas Brown to Tonyn, Chehaw, May 2, 1776, expressed confidence in the Seminoles, CO5/556, ff. 322–323, all in BNA; Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 67–68; Jane Landers, *Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 181–182.

16. David Holms to David Taitt, Halfway House, September 24, 1775, CO5/592, ff. 173–174; David Taitt to Governor Chester, Little Tallassie, September 26, 1775, CO5/592, ff. 169–170, both in BNA.

17. Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 72, 76–106, 202–226; Landers, *Atlantic Creoles*, 98.

18. Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 213, 220, 227–233.

19. See Landers, *Atlantic Creoles*, 101–110, for a different recent approach to Bowles.

20. Winthrop Jordan, *Tumult and Silence at Second Creek: An Inquiry into a Civil War Slave Conspiracy* (Baton Rouge, La., 1993), 6; Daniel Rasmussen, *American Uprising: The Untold Story of America's Largest Slave Revolt* (New York, 2011).

21. "A letter from N. Orleans, dated August 4," *Poulson's American Daily Advertiser* (Philadelphia), September 3, 1812, vol. 41, iss. 11163, 3; "The Naked Truth," *Orange County Patriot; or, The Spirit of Seventy-Six* (Goshen, N.Y.), September 15, 1812, vol. 4, iss. 33, 2, both in EAN Infoweb.

22. Thomas Marshall Thompson, "National Legislative Reactions to Louisiana's Deslondes Slave Revolt of 1811," *Louisiana History* 33 (1992): 5–29; Robert L. Paquette, "'A horde of brigandes?': The Great Louisiana Slave Revolt of 1811 Reconsidered," *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques* 35 (2009): 72–96. The Point Coupée slave "conspiracy" of 1795 involved Indians as planters' allies. See Jack D. L. Holmes, "The Abortive Slave Conspiracy at Point Coupée, 1795," *Louisiana History* 11 (1970): 345, 349–350, 360–362. For France and Haiti, see Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, "The 1795 Slave Conspiracy in Point Coupée: Impact of the French Revolution," *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 15 (1992): 130–141.

23. Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 220–226, 222 (quotation); James G. Cusick, *The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the American Invasion of Spanish East Florida* (Gainesville, Fla., 2003), 47–49, 298 (quotation).

24. Anonymous communication said to be a "Proclamation," W. Craig, Chairman, Head-Quarters, Camp before St. Augustine, May 11, 1812, *Alexandria Daily Gazette, Commercial & Political*, June 3, 1812, vol. 12, iss. 3663, 2, Alexandria, Virginia, EAN Infoweb.

25. Cusick, *The Other War of 1812*, 213–216, 299.

26. "Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman at St. Mary's to His Friend in Philadelphia, Dated 14th April, 1813," *Boston Gazette*, May 17, 1813, vol. 38, iss. 42, 1, EAN Infoweb.

27. Edwin C. McReynolds, *The Seminoles* (Norman, Okla., 1957), 50 (quotation); Daniel F. Littlefield, *Africans and Creeks: From the Colonial Period to the Civil War* (Westport, Conn., 1979), 6, 67–68; Roger Brown, *The Republic in Peril: 1812* (New York, 1971), 126–127, 225; Marshall Smelser, *The Democratic Republic* (New York, 1968), 108; J. H. Alexander, "The Ambush of Captain John Williams, U.S.M.C.: Failure of the East Florida Invasion," *FHQ* 56 (1977–1978): 280–282.

28. Littlefield, *Africans and Creeks*, 63.

29. Nashville, Tennessee, May 23, extract: General Thomas Johnston, to John Hutchinson, Esq., of Springfield, dated Humphrey's Courthouse, Tennessee, May 17, 1812, *The Enquirer* (Richmond, Va.), June 19, 1812, 2, EAN Infoweb.

30. Extract of a letter from an officer in West Tennessee to General Winchester, Vincennes, *Western Sun*, September 29, 1812, vol. 4, iss. 23, 4, Indiana Historical

Society. For these rumors, see also Robert M. Owens, *Red Dreams, White Nightmares: Pan-Indian Alliances in the Anglo-American Mind* (Norman, Okla., 2015), 203; Frank Owsley Jr., *Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815* (Gainesville, Fla., 1981), 18, 39–40; William C. C. Claiborne to James Monroe, August 8, 1813, in *Official Letterbooks of William C. C. Claiborne*, ed. Roland Dunbar, 6 vols. (Jackson, Miss., 1917), 6:250; Robert P. Collins, "'A Packet from Canada': Telling Conspiracy Stories on the 1813 Creek Frontier," in *Tohopeka: Rethinking the Creek War and the War of 1812* , ed. Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2012), 53–83.

31. Karl Davis, "'Remember Fort Mims': Reinterpreting the Origins of the Creek War," *Journal of the Early Republic* 22 (2002): 629–631.

32. Gregory A. Waselkov, *A Conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Redstick War of 1813–1814* (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2006), 126, 127, 147 (quotation), 148–149, 151; Davis, "Remember Fort Mims," 631–633; Joel Martin, *Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees' Struggle for a New World* (Boston, Mass., 1991), 156; Littlefield, *Africans and Creeks*, 61–62; Owsley, *Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands*, 39–40, for the ensuing panic.

33. Davis, "Remember Fort Mims," 633. The quotations are from the *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, D.C.), October 4, 1813, 3, EAN Infoweb. Alan Taylor discusses the idea of British racial treachery during the War of 1812 in *The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772–1832* (New York, 2013), 10, 138.

34. Extract of a communication from the chiefs at Coweta to Colonel Hawkins, Coweta, September 16, 1813, Benjamin Hawkins to Secretary of War, Creek Agency, September 17, 1813, both in *American State Papers Indian Affairs*, ed. Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1832), 1:853.

35. William C. C. Claiborne, "Circular to Colonels of the Militia," New Orleans, September 8, 1813, in *Official Letterbooks of William C. C. Claiborne*, ed. Dunbar, 6:265.

36. Waselkov, *A Conquering Spirit*, 148–149; Littlefield, *Africans and Creeks*, 65, 67.

37. Ove Jensen, "Horseshoe Bend: A Living Memorial," in *Tohopeka*, 153.

38. Adam Rothman, *Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 137.

39. Littlefield, *Africans and Creeks*, 61–62, 65; Martin, *Sacred Revolt*, 160–161; Waselkov, *A Conquering Spirit*, 148–149; Claudio Saunt, *New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816* (New York, 1999), 263–264; Owsely, *Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands*, 4, 98, 103, 177, 183.

40. Nathaniel Millet, *The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World* (Gainesville, Fla., 2013), 17–18, 44, 57–58, 152–159; Taylor, *The Internal Enemy*, 328.

41. David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, "Fort Bowyer and the War on the Gulf, 1814–1815," in *Tohopeka*, 182–199, especially 184–185; Millet, *The Maroons of Prospect Bluff*, 6–7, 71, 78–79, 101, 151–152, 169, 191–193, 214, 219, 226, 232–234; Littlefield, *Africans and Seminoles*, 7.

42. John Missall and Mary Lou Missall, *The Seminole Wars: America's Longest Conflict* (Gainesville, Fla., 2004), 40–41. For the extensive bibliography on Jackson

in Florida, and for a "hoax" that was not a hoax, see Daniel Feller, "2009 Catherine Prescott Lecture: The Seminole Controversy Revisited: A New Look at Andrew Jackson's 1818 Florida Campaign," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 88 (2010): 309–325.

43. Matthew Clavin, "'It is a Negro, not an Indian War': Southampton, St. Domingo, and the Second Seminole War," in *America's Hundred Years War: U.S. Expansion to the Gulf Coast and the Fate of the Seminoles, 1763–1858*, ed. Steven Belko (Gainesville, Fla., 2010), 187, 190, 193; Proceedings of Meeting of Citizens of Alachua County [January 23, 1832] and Petition to the President by the Citizens of Alachua County, January, 1832, in *Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory of Florida*, ed. Clarence Carter, 28 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1959), 24:643–645.

44. Alachua County Citizens to Andrew Jackson, January 1834, in U.S. Congress, House, in *Seminole Hostilities: Message from the President of the United States, a Supplemental Report Respecting the Causes of the Seminole Hostilities, and the Measures taken to Suppress Them,* June 3, 1836, 24th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. 271, House of Representatives, in *House documents, otherwise publ. as Executive documents: 13th Congress, 2d session—49th Congress, 1st session* (Google eBook), Doc 271, p. 31, hereafter *Seminole Hostilities*. Daniel Littlefield moderately states that by the 1830s it was possible for Seminoles and blacks to identify on the basis of a "common distrust of Americans." Littlefield, *Africans and Seminoles*, 10. See also Clavin, "It is a Negro, not an Indian War," 186; Thomas L. McKenney and James Hall, *The Indian Tribes of North America: with Biographical Sketches and Anecdotes of the Principal Chiefs,* ed. Frederick Webb Hodge and David Bushnell Jr., 3 vols. (Totowa, N.J., 1977 [1836]), 2:262.

45. But not in broad terms completely unique: see, in a radically different context, the expressions of William Apess, *On Our Own Ground: The Complete Writings of William Apess, a Pequot*, ed. Barry O'Connell (Amherst, Mass., 1992), lxx, 155–160.

46. Wiley Thompson to William P. Duval, Tallahassee, January 1, 1834, *Seminole Hostilities*, 9–10; Elbert Herring to Major John Phagan, June 4, 1832, ibid., 20; William P. Duval to Elbert Herring, Tallahassee, Indian Office, January 16, 1834, ibid., 17; see also Littlefield, *Africans and Seminoles*, 10–11.

47. See, for example, Thompson to Duval, January 24, 1834, *Seminole Hostilities*, 3–4, and Duval to Herring, January 26, 1834, ibid., 17.

48. Clavin, "It is a Negro, not an Indian War," 200, cites *Jacksonville Courier*, October 8, 1835; Joseph Hernandez to Governor Eaton, St. Augustine, October 26, 1835, in *Territorial Papers*, ed. Carter, 25:189–190; McReynolds, *The Seminoles*, 120, 193–194.

49. Emilia Viotti da Costa, *Crowns of Glory: Tears of Blood: The Demerara Slave Rebellion* (New York, 1994), 169; William Lloyd Garrison, "The Insurrection," in *The Antebellum Era: Primary Sources on Documents from 1820 to 1860*, ed. David A. Copeland (Westport, Conn., 2003), 31.

50. Clavin's thesis, in "It is a Negro, not an Indian War," is stated plainly on 182.

51. Clavin, "It is a Negro, not an Indian War," 193–195.

52. Clavin, "It is a Negro, not an Indian War," 193.

53. Litttlefield, *Africans and Seminoles*, 18, 19, 26; Kenneth W. Porter, *The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-Seeking People* (Gainesville, Fla., 1986), 95–96, 106, 115–116; Missall and Missall, *The Seminole Wars*, 128–129, 132–133, 178, 207; John W. Hall, "A Reckless Waste of Blood and Treasure: The Last Campaign of the Second Seminole War," in *Between War and Peace: How America Ends its Wars*, ed. Matthew Moten (New York, 2011), 69–70; Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 242–243.

Chapter 11 · Extirpation

1. The "smallpox blanket" stories abound online. See the performance piece by Norman K. Denzin, "Remembering to Forget: Lewis and Clark and Native Americans in the Yellowstone," in Norman K. Denzin, *Searching for Yellowstone: Gender, Family, and Memory in the Postmodern West* (Walnut Creek, Calif., 2008), 73–76. For Fort Pitt, see chapter 2, above.

2. Ward Churchill, *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present* (San Francisco, Calif., 1997), especially 151–156. His charges against the army were debunked even before his corpus of work faced an unusual national attack. For smallpox in that controversy, see Bruce Elliott Johansen, *Silenced: Academic Freedom, Scientific Inquiry, and the First Amendment* (Westport, Conn., 2007), 85–86. Johansen supports the rhetorical thrust of Churchill's smallpox argument, pinning the blame on traders who knowingly risked exposing Mandans to smallpox in 1837. Barbara Alice Mann posits a circumstantial (as she acknowledges) case for the possibility that "the small pox epidemic was a conspiracy encompassing" U.S. officials and trading company directors who sought both American expansion and profit. More moderately, she identifies actors and charges them, like Johansen and others, with a "criminally reckless disregard for human life." Barbara Mann, *The Tainted Gift: The Disease Method of Frontier Expansion* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2009), 43–81, especially 73, 81.

3. David Shumway Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics: Meanings and Uses of American Indian Mortality since 1600* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), has an excellent discussion of the Mandan outbreak (103–110). He agrees that traders knowingly risked exposing Indians to smallpox, a substantial charge leveled at the time by a member of the company. What is more, he adds, they shipped buffalo robes that they suspected of contamination back East, overruling worries that they might infect U.S. citizens. The robes were not likely to be dangerous, but the traders did not know that. The demands of trade trumped risks to Plains Indians—and American citizens.

4. Elizabeth A. Fenn, *Encounters at the Heart of the World: A History of the Mandan People* (New York, 2014), 316–325, 319 and 324 (quotations).

5. Henry Boller, "Journal of a Trip to, and Residence in, the Indian Country," ed. Ray H. Mattison, *North Dakota History* 33 (1966): 312, entry for December 23, 1858. For a much earlier example of writing as infection, see Paul Le Jeune, S.J., "Relation, 1636," *JR*, 9:207.

6. R. G. Robertson, *Rotting Face: Smallpox and the American Indian* (Caldwell, Idaho, 2001), xii, 61–62, 70, 81, 183 n. 5, 299–300. Robertson assesses "blame," rea-

sonably condemning the captain of the *St. Peter's* for an act of extreme criminal negligence (297–311). Chardon noted in 1837 that Gros Ventres (Hidatsas) held the *St. Peter's* responsible and that many among the Arikaras and Mandans also held white traders accountable. See journal of Francis Chardon, published as "The Smallpox Epidemic on the Upper Missouri," ed. Milo Milton Qaife, *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 17 (1930): 283–284, 299. Michael Willrich notes that rumors pinned the spread of a national epidemic at the turn of the twentieth century on a black actor. Such scapegoating reflected, he writes, "an American culture of race that scorned black bodies as vessels of moral and physical danger." Michael Willrich, *Pox: An American History* (New York, 2011), 7.

7. See "The Smallpox Epidemic," ed. Quaife, 281, 285 (quotation)

8. Steven Katz allows that a history of "abuses of the most sordid kind," including the dispensing of smallpox- and cholera-ridden "blankets which the Indians were known to have no immunity to, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths," Steven T. Katz, "The 'Unique' Intentionality of the Holocaust," *Modern Judaism* 1 (1981): 170. Mann sees blankets as a vector in *The Tainted Gift*, 62.

9. Robertson, *Rotting Face*, 224.

10. Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 88, 113; Martha Few, "Circulating Smallpox Knowledge: Guatemalan Doctors, Maya Indians and Designing Spain's Smallpox Vaccination Expedition, 1780–1803," *British Journal for the History of Science* 43 (2010): 519–537. Guy Johnson, son of William Johnson, exaggerated when he said that "Sir Wm Johnson caused most of the Mohawks to be Inoculated. " "Guy Johnson's Opinions on the American Indian" [1775], ed. Milton W. Hamilton, *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 77 (1953): 326. See also Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (New York, 1995), 5; enclosures in Thomas Gage to Abraham Mortier, New York, December 15, 1769, same to Thomas Barrow, New York, October 26, 1772, and same to same, New York, April 13, 1773, Gage Papers, WCL; *WJP*, 12:763, 1000, 1011; Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant, 1743–1807: Man of Two Worlds* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1984), 532; Carl F. Klink and James J. Talman, *The Journal of Major John Norton, 1816* (Toronto, Ont., 1970), 5, 13; J. Diane Pearson, "Medical Diplomacy and the American Indian: Thomas Jefferson, the Lewis and Clark Expedition, and the Subsequent Effects on American Indian Health and Public Policy," *Wicazo Sa Review* 19 (2004): 107–109; Paul Kelton, "Cherokee Medicine and the 1824 Smallpox Epidemic," in *Indigenous Knowledge and the Environment in Africa and North America*, ed. David Gordon and Shepard Krech III (Athens, Ohio, 2012), 163.

11. Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 75–76, 89, 113–116; J. Diane Pearson, "Lewis Cass and the Politics of Disease: The Indian Vaccination Act of 1832," *Wicazo Sa Review* 18 (2003): 9, 12, 15; "Indian Vaccination Act," May 1832, in "Records of the Michigan Superintendency of Indian Affairs, Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records, Letters Received, 1829–1833," *NAM*1R68; Robertson, *Rotting Face*, 225.

12. White vaccinated Indians before the congressional act. Oscar White to George Porter, Maumee, Wood County, September 30, 1832; Stevens T. Mason to James Jackson, Detroit, April 12, 1832, both in "Letters Received by the Office of Indian

Affairs, 1824–1881, Michigan Superintendency, 1824–1851 (1832–1835)," *NAM*234R421, fr. 125. For fear of smallpox in a later period, see Willrich, *Pox*, 22–27.

13. Douglass Houghton to Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Fredonia, New York, May 12, 1832 (photocopy), Douglass Houghton Papers, BHL; Elbert Herring to Schoolcraft, Washington, D.C., May 3, 1832, "Records of the Michigan Superintendency of Indian Affairs, Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records, Letters Received, 1829–1833," *NAM*1R68, frs. 382–385. The vaccine matter was sent on either May 3 or, more probably, May 30. See ibid. and Herring to Schoolcraft, May 30, 1832, *NAM*1R68, fr. 420.

14. Houghton to Schoolcraft, "Report of Vaccination of Indians," Sault Ste. Marie, September 21, 1832, *NAM*234R421, frs. 156–170, closely followed in Henry Schoolcraft, *Narrative of an Expedition through the Upper Mississippi to Itasca Lake* (New York, 1833), 250–257, and Philip P. Mason, *Schoolcraft's Expedition to Lake Itasca: The Discovery of the Source of the Mississippi* (East Lansing, Mich., 1993), 299–303. For Pandora's box, see Adrienne Mayor, "The Nessus Shirt in the New World: Smallpox Blankets in History and Legend," *Journal of American Folklore* 108 (1995): 63, 66.

15. William Warren, *History of the Ojibway People* (St. Paul, Minn., 1984 [1885]), 260; for the continental epidemic, see Elizabeth A. Fenn, *Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775–1782* (New York, 2001).

16. Gage to Hillsborough, April 1, 1769, New York, CO5/87, ff. 86–88b, BNA. A trader who knew Michilimackinac, John Porteus, spent that winter in New York. He noted on April 2 news via Detroit that "the Indians are much dissatisfied, and that some rupture may possibly ensue." John Porteus, *Letter Book B*, WCL.

In 2005 on the Whitefish River Reserve near Manitoulin Island, a mere 150 crow-flight miles from Mackinac Island, two Ojibwe elders told me of an event similar to that told by Gage. They located the atrocity precisely at nearby "Bell Rock." They assigned no date and did not mention smallpox, but instead "spiked" liquor. The episode included a trader's deliberate poisoning, through a keg of tainted liquor, of a great many Ojibwe people, with mass murder as the result. The episode is also related in Alan Edmonds, "Trouble in Rainbow Country: Indians vs. Americans vs. the Men who Make Cement," *The Gazette: The Canadian Magazine*, September 15, 1973, 16 news.google.com, viewed December 3, 2014. For smallpox and bottled liquor: Oklahoma Wyandots would in the early twentieth century recall such infections in the East; and George Catlin would, in Houghton's day, deplore the threats of traders on the Missouri River that they had smallpox corked up in a bottle. Barbara Mann, *Iroquoian Women: The Gantowisas* (New York, 2000), 42–43, see also 377 n. 77; Barbara Mann, "Are You Delusional? Kandiaronk on Christianity," in *Native American Speakers of the Eastern Woodlands: Selected Speeches and Critical Analyses*, ed. Barbara Mann (Westport, Conn., 2001), 81; C. M. Barbeau, *Huron and Wyandot Mythology, Memoir 80, No. 11 Canada, Department of Mines, Geological Survey* (Ottawa, Ont., 1915), 81, 268–270; Hugh A. Dempsey, "Smallpox: Scourge of the Plains," in *Harm's Way: Disasters in Western Canada*, ed. Anthony Rasporich and Max Foran (Calgary, Alb., 2004), 36.

17. Warren, *History of the Ojibway People*, 260; Mayor, "The Nessus Shirt," especially 62, 66; Veena Das, *Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary* (Berkeley, Calif., 2007), 109, 110.

18. Gary Alan Fine and Patricia A. Turner, *Whispers on the Color Line: Rumor and Race in America* (Berkley, Calif., 2000), 83 (quotation).

19. Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 33.

20. Douglass Houghton, "Journal," in *Schoolcraft's Expedition*, ed. Manson, 259–260; Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 89–92.

21. Houghton, "Journal," 244, 245, 248, 259–259. John W. R. McIntyre and C. Stuart Houston, "Smallpox and Its Control in Canada," *Canadian Medical Association Journal* 161 (1999), online version, mention an 1803 Spanish expedition in which orphaned children were vaccinated every nine or ten days "in sequential pairs," as living vessels to spread the vaccine around the empire. They state that in British India, boys of low caste were considered "suitable for that purpose."

22. Houghton, "Journal," 262; Houghton, "Report of Vaccination."

23. Michael McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724–1774* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1984), 195; Paul Kelton, "Avoiding the Smallpox Spirits: Colonial Epidemics and Southeastern Indian Survival," *Ethnohistory* 51 (2004): 45–71; Kelton, "Cherokee Medicine and the 1824 Smallpox Epidemic," 151–157; Frances Densmore, *Chippewa Customs* (Washington, D.C., 1929), 181–182.

24. I calculate from Houghton's "Report of Vaccination." E. Wagner Stearn and Allen E. Stearn, *The Effect of Smallpox on the Destiny of the Amerindian* (Boston, Mass., 1945), 58.

25. Thomas excerpted in Stearn and Stearn, *The Effect of Smallpox*, 68–69.

26. Schoolcraft to John Torrey, Sault Ste. Marie, June 2, 1832, Henry Rowe Schoolcraft Papers, BHL; Houghton to Richard Houghton, Fond du Lac, June 24, 1832, in *Schoolcraft's Expedition,* ed. Mason, 298; Houghton to John Torrey, Lac La Bichu, July 13, 1832, Houghton Papers; Ralph D. Williams, *The Honorable Peter White: A Biographical Sketch of the Lake Superior Iron Country* (Cleveland, Ohio, 1907), 5–6; Donald R. Hays, "Douglass Houghton, Chemist," *Michigan History Magazine* 50 (1966): 341–348; Houghton, "Report of Vaccination."

27. Herring to Schoolcraft, Washington, May 30, 1832, *NAM*1R68, fr. 420; Houghton, "Report of Vaccination," and Douglass Houghton to Richard Houghton, Fond du Lac, June 24, 1832, in *Schoolcraft's Expedition*, ed. Mason, 298.

28. Rebecca Kugel, "Of Missionaries and Their Cattle," *Ethnohistory* 41 (1994): 228–229, 239.

29. Efforts to attenuate the strength of the smallpox virus preceded vaccination. Robert Sutton at mid-century in Suffolk, England, inoculated from the recently inoculated, which became common in the very late British colonial period. Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 32, 33, 35–36; Stearn and Stearn, *The Effect of Smallpox*, 57–58; Andrea Rusnock, *Vital Accounts: Quantifying Health and Population in Eighteenth Century England and France* (Cambridge, 2002), 43–44, 92; McIntyre and Houston, "Smallpox and Its Control in Canada."

30. Basil Johnston, *Ojibway Heritage* (New York, 1976), 88–89; Christian Feest, *Indians of Northeastern North America: Iconography of Religions,* section 10, no. 7 (Leiden, 1986), 18.

31. Christopher Vescey, *Traditional Ojibwa Religion and Its Historical Changes* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1983), 146, 152; Allouez quoted in François Le Mercier, "Relation, 1666–1667," *JR*, 50:293; Peter Grant, "The Saulteaux about 1804," in *Les Bourgeois de la Compagnie du Nord-Ouest*, ed. L. R. Mason (Quebec, 1890), 363–364; A. Irving Hallowell, "Ojibwa World View and Disease," in *Contributions to Anthropology: Selected Papers of A. Irving Hallowell* (Chicago, Ill., 1976), 435; Frances Densmore, *Chippewa Customs* (Washington, D.C., 1929), 46. For string, see Robertson, *Rotting Face*, 220.

32. Andrew Blackbird, *History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan* (Ypsilanti, Mich., 1887), 9–10; *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, vol. 2, *Treaties*, ed. Charles J. Kappler (Washington, D.C., 1904), 452, 483.

33. Jonathan Garland to C. A. Harris, Detroit, September 24, 1837, *NAM*234R402, frs. 315–319.

34. Richard M. Dorson, "Ethnohistory and Ethnic Folklore," *Ethnohistory* 8 (1961): 17.

35. Jones, *Rationalizing Epidemics*, 68.

36. "Substance of a Talk delivered at La Maiouitang, entrance of Lake Michigan, by the Indian Chief Le Maigois or the Trout," May 4, 1807, *NAM*222R, fr. 2:L-1807. Clothing was at issue among Cherokees in 1811–1812. R. J. Meigs, "Some reflections on Cherokee Concerns, manners, state &c., not a letter," in Return Jonathan Meigs Jr. to William Eustis, March 19, 1812, *NAM*208R5.

37. Warren, *History of the Ojibway People*, 261–262; Houghton, "Report of Vaccination," 302. Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 215–216, 220–222, also includes, and corroborates, a Piegan Blackfoot account from the Canadian High Plains (1787) that resonates with this story. She sets it in the early 1780s. The story resembles that told to David Thompson in 1786 of a Piegan Blackfeet raid on the Shoshonis in 1781. Gros Ventres and Arapahos were being devastated (population losses of perhaps 25 percent each) by a smallpox epidemic in 1831–1832, as Houghton collected stories and dispensed lancets in Ojibwe Country. Robertson, *Rotting Face*, 128, 223.

38. Harris, "Voices of Disaster," 617.

39. For such common stories, see, for example, McConnell, *A Country Between*, 166, 171, 241 (quotation). For such rumors in Creek Country, see "In the Council Chamber," South Carolina, examination of "Maximillian More and his Half/breed Son Johnny," June 6, 1759, Council Chamber, South Carolina, CO5/376, f. 132b, BNA; for mid-eighteenth century Creek and Cherokee Countries, see Kelton, "Avoiding the Smallpox Spirits," 50–52; for the 1750s in Ohio Country, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York, 1991), 252; for the same a decade later, see McConnell, *A Country Between*, 221; for revolutionary-era Creek Country, see Charles Shaw to George Germain, Savannah, August 7, 1779, CO5/80, f. 260b, BNA; for Handsome Lake, see Alfred Cave, *Prophets of the Great Spirit: Native American Revitalization Movements in Eastern North America* (Lincoln, Nebr., 2006), 219.

40. Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1973), xxi, 19, 68, 159, 160, 162, and title of chapter 8 (quotation).

41. Thomas Hariot, *A Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia: Facsimile Edition of the 1588 Quarto, with an Introduction by the late Randolph G. Adams* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1951), F2; Spotswood to Board of Trade, Virginia, December 22, 1718, CO5/1318, ff. 296b–297, BNA; Franklin quoted in Richard Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800–1890* (Norman, Okla., 1998 [1985]), 79.

42. For advocates, see Gregory Evans Dowd, *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore, Md., 2002), 198–203; for opponents, see "Introduction," in *The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution: The Journal and other Writings of Charles Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant*, ed. Richard J. Hooker (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1953), xxii; George Milligen-Johnson, "A Short Description of the Province of South Carolina" (London, 1770), cited in *Colonial South Carolina: Two Contemporary Descriptions*, ed. Chapman J. Milling (Columbia, S.C., 1951), 136; William Johnson to Gage, April 27, 1764, *WJP*, 4:164; Cave, *Prophets of the Great Spirit*, 55 n. 29 (for Jefferson) and 236 n. 28 (for Illinois); Patrick Jung, *The Black Hawk War of 1832* (Norman, Okla., 2007), especially 60–89; for the Indian allies of the United States, see John W. Hall, *Uncommon Defense: Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).

43. For the importance of this view in the removal era, see Jean O'Brien, *Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians out of Existence in New England* (Minneapolis, Minn., 2010); Brian W. Dippie, *The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Policy* (Middletown, Conn., 1982), 56–78; see also Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment*, 62, 222, 408–409, 426, 492–493.

Chapter 12 · Murder

1. Richard Bremer, *Indian Agent and Wilderness Scholar: The Life of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft* (Mount Pleasant, Mich., 1987), 290–291; Schoolcraft's clippings from the *New York Express*, the New York *Evening Mirror*, the New York *Herald*, the New York *Evening Post*, the *Albany Argus*, and the New York *Commercial Advertiser* of July 11, 1846, HRSP, 86:41226–41234; Henry Rowe Schoolcraft to Edwin Croswell, July 13, 1846, ibid., 48:443; *Morning News* (New London, Conn.), July 13, 1846, vol. 2, iss. 208, 3; *New Hampshire Sentinel* (Keene, N.H.), July 15, 1846, vol. 47, iss. 28, 3; *The Farmer's Cabinet* (Amherst, N.H.), July 16, 1846, vol. 44, iss. 48, 3; *Argus* quoted in *Barre Patriot* (Barre, Mass.), July 17, 1846, vol. 2, iss. 52, 2, all in EAN Infoweb.

2. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft to Croswell, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1846, HRSP, 48:443.

3. Susan E. Gray, "Limits and Possibilities: White-Indian Relations in Western Michigan in the Era of Removal," *MHR* 20 (1994): 71–91; James McClurken, "Ottawa Adaptive Strategies to Indian Removal," *MHR* 12 (1986): 29–55; Charles Cleland, *Rites of Conquest: The History and Culture of Michigan's Native Americans*

(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1992), 198–233; Elizabeth Neumeyer, "Michigan Indians Battle against Removal," *Michigan History* 55 (1971): 276–278.

4. Robert E. Bieder, *Science Encounters the Indian, 1820–1880: The Early Years of American Ethnology* (Norman, Okla., 1986), 146–193; Han-Joachim Neubauer, *The Rumour: A Cultural History*, trans. Christian Braun (London, 1999 [1998]), 1.

5. Bremer, *Indian Agent and Wilderness Scholar*, 291; H. Schoolcraft to Edwin Croswell, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1846, HRSP 48:443. *Albany Argus* quoted in *Pittsfield Sun*, July 16, 1846, vol. 46, iss. 2391, 2; *Morning News*, July 15, 1846, vol. 2, iss. 210, 3, both in EAN Infoweb. The papers added errors: James was Henry's "uncle," and the murder took place in the "neighborhood of Detroit." Jeremy Mumford, "Mixed-Race Identity in a Nineteenth-Century Family: The Schoolcrafts of Sault Ste. Marie, 1824–27," *MHR* 25 (1999): 1–23.

6. Neubauer, *The Rumour*, 8; Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1966), 3, 5, 7, 14, 17; Jean Noel Kapferer, *Rumors: Uses Interpretations, and Images* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990), 3.

7. H. Schoolcraft to C. A. Harris, Detroit, March 1, 1838, *NAM*234R423, frs. 119–121, also in *NAM*1R37, fr. 422; H. Schoolcraft to James Ord, Michilimackinac, May 14, 1838, *NAM*1R37, fr. 484; C. A. Harris to H. Schoolcraft, Washington, D.C., May 11, 1838, *NAM*1R44, fr. 225; *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, vol. 2, *Treaties*, ed. Charles J. Kappler (Washington, D.C., 1904), 453.

8. Reply of the Sault Ste. Marie, Carp River, Tequimenon [*sic*] River and Grand Island Indians . . . [Sault Ste. Marie, June 5, 1838], *NAM*234R415, frs. 615, 617. James Schoolcraft blamed traders for "circulating erroneous reports . . . connected with the objects of this expedition." Henry, meanwhile, accused Baptist Reverend Abel Bingham of speaking falsely against the government, but Bingham responded that Indians of the Sault had made their own sound decision. See J. Schoolcraft to C. A. Harris, Sault Ste. Marie, May 28, 1838, *NAM*234R415, fr. 609; same to same, Mackinac, June 9, 1838, *NAM*234R415, fr. 612; Abel Bingham to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, June 22, 1838, *NAM*1R44, frs. 420–422. For Ottawa responses to the expedition, see McClurken, "Ottawa Adaptive Strategies," 39–40. For Bingham's relations with the Schoolcrafts, see John T. Fierst, "Return to 'Civilization': John Tanner's Troubled Years at Sault Ste. Marie," *Minnesota History* 50 (1986): 23–36, and Bremer, *Indian Agent and Wilderness Scholar*, 128–129.

9. H. Schoolcraft to C. A. Harris, Detroit, March 1, 1838, *NAM*234R423, frs. 119–121, also in *NAM*1R37, fr. 422. Potawatomi rumor: Mr. Patrick to H. Schoolcraft, Grand Rapids, June 9, 1838, *NAM*1R44, fr. 379. Removal seized many Indians and a sizeable minority of Michigan Potatwatomi bands. R. David Edmunds, *The Potawatomis: Keepers of the Fire* (Norman, Okla., 1978), 258–272; Gray, "Limits and Possibilities," 75.

10. Quotation: H. Schoolcraft to Isaac McCoy, Mackinac, June 23, 1838, *NAM*1R37, fr. 515. For the Seminole War, see, for example, Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1984), 231–232. Of the twenty-four Ottawas and Ojibwes who joined the expedition, few had rank. Only bands on Beaver Island, in Manistique in the Upper

Peninsula, and in the western Lower Peninsula from Grand River northward sent men. McClurken, "Ottawa Adaptive Strategies," 40, indicates that only five appear in the text of the Treaty of Washington (1836) as worthy of annuities, and only two of these had been listed as "chiefs of the first class." Yet James Schoolcraft described them as "fully" representative. He identified three as "principal chiefs": Maxadawazha of Grand River, Kemene jaw gan of the northern Ottawas, and Keway quo skum of North Manistee (or Manistique); the last, however, appears only as a third-class chief from Chenos on the Treaty of 1836. See J. Schoolcraft to C. A Harris, June 26, 1838, Mackinac, *NAM*234R415, frs. 623–626; James Ord to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, June 5, 1838, *NAM*1R44, fr. 363.

11. The "Agreement" contains the usual inconsistencies: marked by three Native American names (Shagnonano, Peentonwan, and Ishkewabick) absent from the original exploring party, it is unmarked by four from that original list (Kesiswabay, Naw a ge qua bay, Saw saw ge to, and Chingo no quom). "Memorandum of an Agreement," August 23, 1838, *NAM*234R415, fr. 459; J. Schoolcraft to C. A. Harris, Sault Ste. Marie, August 29, 1838, *NAM*234R415, fr. 641. See also McClurken, "Ottawa Adaptive Strategies," 40.

12. H. Schoolcraft to Harris, Michilimackinac, September 29, 1838, *NAM*1R37, fr. 546.

13. James McClurken, "We Wish to Be Civilized: Ottawa-American Political Contests on the Michigan Frontier" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1988), 202–203.

14. Quotations in both "Extract of a letter," Lyons, Michigan, March 30, 1838, *NAM*234R423, fr. 140, and *The New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette*, April 30, 1838, vol. 4, iss. 187, 2, EAN Infoweb. For houses in lore, see Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York, 1998), 71–96.

15. Quotations: H. Schoolcraft to W. Lyon, Detroit, April 6, 1838, *NAM*1R37, fr. 452; H. Schoolcraft to Henry Connor, Detroit, April 10, 1836, *NAM*1R37, fr. 458; H. Schoolcraft, "To the Chippewas of Saginaw and to the Ottawas of Grand River" [April 10, 1838], *NAM*1R37, fr. 460.

16. Lieutenant F. Sibley [writing for Brady], to H. Schoolcraft, Detroit, April 7, 1838, *NAM*1R44, fr. 195; for Hugh Brady, see "The Brady Guards" at www.michigan.gov/dmva; Leonard Slater to H. Schoolcraft, Ottawa Colony, Richland P.O., April 20, 1838, *NAM*1R44, fr. 237; Adam L. Root, Philo Bates, and 194 others to the President of the U. S. A., April 19, 1838, *NAM*234R402, frs. 705–708.

17. Adam L. Root, Philo Bates, and 194 others to the President of the U S. A., April 19, 1838, *NAM*234R402, frs. 705–708. The petitioners' explanation could not apply to the Saginaw Ojibwes, who were not party to the 1836 treaty in question.

18. Editor N. H. Finney to C. A. Harris, March 1, 1838, *NAM*1R44, frs. 127–129; Gray "Limits and Possibilities," 71–91, finds much settler intolerance but establishes that annuity cash inclined settlers against removal in specie-poor Michigan during the depression that followed the panic of 1837. See also McClurken, "Ottawa Strategies," 45–46.

19. *New Hampshire Sentinel*, May 31, 1838 (citing *Detroit Daily Advertiser*, May 3), vol. 40, iss. 22, 3, EAN Infoweb. H. Schoolcraft later blamed such stories for his 1841 removal from office by Whig Secretary of War John Bell: H. Schoolcraft, "Memorandum for the President," August 1846, HRSP, 48, n.p.; Slater to H. Schoolcraft, Ottawa Colony, Richland P.O., April 20, 1838, *NAM*1R44, fr. 237. My analysis is informed by Arlette Farge, *Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France*, trans. Rosemary Morris (Cambridge, 1994 [1992]), 57–58.

20. H. Schoolcraft to John Garland, Grand Haven, June 7, 1838, H. Schoolcraft to Harris, Mackinac, June 12, 1838, and H. Schoolcraft to J. Bragg, Mackinac, June 16, 1838, *NAM*1R37, frs. 493, 494, 505; McClurken, "We Wish to Be Civilized," 202–203.

21. H. Schoolcraft to Harris, Mackinac, June 15, 1838, *NAM*1R37, fr. 501.

22. McClurken, "We Wish to Be Civilized," 202–203; H. Schoolcraft to Henry Connor, Mackinac, June 15, 1838, *NAM*1R37, fr. 504; H. Schoolcraft to T. Hartley Crawford, *Annual Report*, September 24, 1840, *NAM*1R38, frs. 366–390.

23. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs of a Residence of Thirty Years with the Indian Tribes of the American Frontiers* (New York, 1978 [1851]), 591. Bremer notes that journal and memoirs overlap: Schoolcraft wrote much of the material in 1850, and its "credibility . . . varies greatly from one paragraph to the next." Bremer, *Indian Agent and Wilderness Scholar*, 303–304, 418 n. 18. Glass's survival is also a rumor.

24. Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 658; Edmunds, *The Potawatomis*, 264–268.

25. H. Schoolcraft to T. Hartley Crawford, Mackinac, June 26, 1839, *NAM*234R423, frs. 374–377. Entries in Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, for June 26, 28 and 29, reveal similar concerns.

26. Entry for May 16, 1839, Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 648.

27. Reverend Fred. Baraga to the Leopoldine Foundation, June 26, 1834, Mission of St. Mary on Grand River [typescript translated from German], ALF. XIV. VI. #35. BBC. Mf. 66-2, 29–32, courtesy Clarke Historical Library, Mount Pleasant, Michigan, and the Notre Dame Archives, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana.

28. Quotation: Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994), 197; *Treaties*, ed. Kappler, 2:451–452; "In the Senate of the United States," May 20, 1836, *NAM*1R72, fr. 478; Bremer, *Indian Agent and Wilderness Scholar*, 158–174; McClurken, "Ottawa Adaptive Strategies," 35–36.

29. Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 538–539; J. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, June 29, 1836, and Rix Robinson to H. Schoolcraft, Grand River, June 27, 1836, HRSP 41:14323–14324, 14318–14319; Andrew J. Blackbird, *History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan* (Ypsilanti, Mich., 1887), 98.

30. Samuel Eliot Morrison, *The Oxford History of the American People*, 3 vols. (New York, 1972), 2:209–213; "The Brady Guards," H. Schoolcraft to T. Hartley Crawford, New York, February 26, 1839, *NAM*1R37, frs. 624–626.

31. Quotation: Extract of a report by Henry Rowe Schoolcraft in T. Hartley Crawford, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs," November 25, 1838, in *The New American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, gen. ed. Thomas C. Cochran, 4 vols.

(Wilmington, Del., 1972), 1:532. For U.S. concerns about the British, see William Clark and Lewis Cass to the Senate, "Proposed Revision of Laws on Indian Affairs," December 27, 1828, in ibid., 1:188–189; H. Schoolcraft to C. A. Harris, August 29, 1837, and September 15, 1837, *NAM*1R37, frs. 299, 318; McClurken, "We Wish to Be Civilized," 205; Janet Chute, *Legacy of Shingwaukonse: A Century of Native Leadership* (Toronto, Ont., 1998), 80. "Counterpower" belongs to Kapferer, *Rumors*, 215.

32. Major Jonathan Garland to C. A. Harris, Detroit, September 24, 1837, *NAM*234R402, frs. 315–319.

33. P. Dougherty to Biddle and Drew, Grand Traverse, February 15, 1841, *NAM*1R50, fr. 75.

34. H. Schoolcraft to T. Hartley Crawford, *Annual Report*, September 24, 1840, *NAM*1R38, frs. 366–390.

35. P. Dougherty to Biddle and Drew, Grand Traverse, February 15, 1841, *NAM*1R50, fr. 75.

36. James Ord to Robert Stuart, Sault Ste. Marie, September 8, 1841, *NAM*1R51, frs. 271–274; H. Schoolcraft to L. Campau and Dr. Charles Shepard, Detroit, March 2, 1841, *NAM*1R38, fr. 478.

37. Robert Stuart to T. Hartley Crawford, Detroit, June 25, 1841, *NAM*1R38, fr. 511.

38. Felch proclamation reprinted in *Morning News* (New London, Conn.), September 10, 1846, vol. 2, iss. 259, 2, EAN Infoweb; Charles Lanman, *Adventures in the Wilds of the United States and British American Provinces* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1856), 123–124; Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 316–317. Bremer, *Indian Agent and Wilderness Scholar*, 304, notes the former agent's "personal bitterness" toward both Tanner and a later agent, Robert Stuart. Fierst, "Return to 'Civilization,'" 23–36, allowing that the murder is unresolved, makes the best case that Tanner had reason to hate the Schoolcrafts. For similar views, see Joseph H. Steere, "Sketch of John Tanner, Known as the 'White Indian,'" *MPHC* 22 (1899): 246–254.

39. John Tanner and Edwin James, *A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner (U.S. Interpreter at the Saut de Ste. Marie) during Thirty Years Residence among the Indians in the Interior of North America* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1956 [1830]), 1–14, 21–40, 95–98, 204, 231–232, 266–276.

40. Tanner and James, *Narrative of the Captivity*, 209, 228.

41. Fierst, "Return to 'Civilization,'" 25, 27 n. 12, 30, 32–36; John T. Fierst, "Strange Eloquence: Another Look at *The Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner*," in *Reading Beyond Words: Contexts for Native History*, ed. Jennifer S. H. Brown and Elizabeth Vibert (Peterborough, Ont., 1996), 226; Steere, "Sketch of John Tanner," 246–247. Gordon M. Sayer, "Abridging Between Two Worlds: John Tanner as American Indian Autobiographer," *American Literary History* 11 (1999): 480–499, sees Tanner's family identity as far stronger than any national or racial identity. A son lived with Tanner in 1836. John W. Edmonds to C. A. Harris, Hudson, February 9, 1837, in "1836 Mixed Blood Census Register," ed. Larry M. Wyckoff, http://www.grboi.com/pdf/1836mb.pdf. A fourth marriage (in 1843), to Lake Superior Ojibwe Betsy Ge-zhe-go-qua, is noted in John H. Pitezel, *Lights and Shades of Missionary Life* (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1861), 44.

42. George Boyd to McKenney, Mackinac, July 27, 1828, *NAM*234R402, frs. 8–15; Angie Bingham Gilbert, "The Story of John Tanner," *MPHC* 38 (1912): 200; Steere, "Sketch of John Tanner," 246–247, 253; Ralph D. Williams, *The Honorable Peter White: A Biographical Sketch of the Lake Superior Iron Country* (Cleveland, Ohio, 1907), 104–105. Abel Bingham, "Reminiscences of Rev. Abel Bingham," in Anon., *History of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan* (Chicago, Ill., 1883), 224; the editor says it was "proven conclusively that" Tanner "was not the assassin of Schoolcraft," see ibid., 222. Fierst, "Return to 'Civilization,'" 23–36.

43. Fierst, "Return to 'Civilization,'" 36; Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 316–317; Williams, *Peter White*, 105; Gilbert, "Tanner," 199.

44. Steere, "Sketch of John Tanner," 249. H. Schoolcraft's daughter reported hearsay from Dundas, Upper Canada (near Hamilton), that the fatal projectiles were "ball and two buck shot," Jane A. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, Dundas, July 16, 1846, HRSP, 48:549; Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 316–317 footnote.

45. Bingham, "Reminiscences," 224; Gilbert, "Tanner," 200; Steere, "Sketch of John Tanner," 249; William Cullen Bryant to the *Evening Post*, Sault Ste. Marie, August 13, 1846, in *The Letters of William Cullen Bryant*, ed. Thomas G. Voss, 2 vols. (New York, 1977), 2:454.

46. Gilbert, "Tanner," 200; Williams, *Peter White*, 103–106; John Hulbert to H. Schoolcraft, Sault, September 14, 1846, HRSP, 48:591; George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, November 8, 1849, HRSP, 49: pt. 2, n.p. Reverend Bingham notes rumors that Tanner had fled to the Red River, only to die within a few months (Bingham, "Reminiscences," 224). A. M. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, July 27, 1846, HRSP, 48:499–500.

47. George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, July 26, 1849, HRSP, 51:485; John Ballenden to George Johnston, Fort Gary, Red River, July 27, 1849, ibid., 489; Louise Erdrich, "Introduction," in *The Falcon: A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner* (New York, 1994), xv.

48. Lanman, *Adventures in the Wilds*, 124; John Hulbert to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, September 14, 1846, HRSP, 48:591.

49. Tanner and James, *A Narrative of the Captivity*, 108–114, 141–144, 209–210, 214–216. Walter O'Meara states that Tanner was never convicted of any violence in *The Last Portage* (Boston, Mass., 1962), 256, and Noel M. Loomis maintains that "no major act of violence has ever been proved against him," in "Introduction," ibid., ix–x.

50. Tanner to President Martin Van Buren, November 10, 1837, reproduced in Fierst, "Return to 'Civilization,'" 25. One of Tanner's daughters recorded this letter for him.

51. Tanner "fled Sault Sainte Marie just ahead of bloodhounds and a lynch mob," according to P. Richard Metcalf, "Tanner, John, 1780?–1847?" in *Handbook of North American Indians*, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant, 15 vols., vol. 4, *History of Indian-White Relations*, ed. Wilcomb E. Washburn (Washington, D.C., 1990), 689; for the "entire population," see this chapter, opening paragraph; for authorities, see John R. Livingston to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, July 9, 1846, HRSP, 48:465;

Governor Alpheus Felch to H. Schoolcraft, Detroit, September 9, 1836, ibid., 581; for lynching, see Charles Lee to H. Schoolcraft, New York City, July 14, 1846, ibid., 449; George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, November 8, 1847, ibid., 49: pt. 2, n.p.

52. Henry Schoolcraft to George Johnston, Washington, D.C., August 23, 1847, in Chase S. Osborn and Stellanova Osborn, *Schoolcraft, Longfellow, Hiawatha* (Lancaster, Pa., 1942), 593; John Hulbert to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, September 14 and November 12, 1846, HRSP, 48:591, 706; A. M. Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, July 27, 1846, ibid., 498–499; George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, November 8, 1847, ibid., 49: pt. 2, n.p.

53. Quotations: Ramsay Crooks to H. Schoolcraft, July 18 and July 23, 1846, HRSP, 38:463, 483. Alpheus Felch to H. Schoolcraft, September 9, 1846, ibid., 48:581; Osborn and Osborn, *Schoolcraft, Longfellow, Hiawatha*, 510; Bremer, *Indian Agent and Wilderness Scholar*, 112.

54. George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, June 29, 1848, HRSP, 50:482; Gilbert, "Tanner," 201; Williams, *Peter White*, 106–107. Maxine Benson, "Schoolcraft, James, and the 'White Indian,'" *Michigan History* 54 (1970): 327, following Osborn and Osborn, *Schoolcraft, Longfellow, Hiawatha*, 511–512, calls the rumored confession a "local tradition" favored by the Johnston family. See the Osborns for Tilden's biography. Metcalf, "Tanner, John," treats the confession as a fact, as does O'Meara in *The Last Portage*, 269. Martha was baptized on Mackinac Island and became a teacher in a Catholic school for Métis children. Keith R. Widder, *Battle for the Soul: Métis Children Encounter Evangelical Protestants at Mackinaw Mission, 1823–1837* (East Lansing, Mich., 1999), 97, 123.

55. George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, June 29, 1848, HRSP, 50:482. Benson, "Schoolcraft, James, and the 'White Indian,'" 311–328, makes the strongest case for Tilden's guilt. For similar views, see Osborn and Osborn, *Schoolcraft, Longfellow, Hiawatha*, 510–512; Noel M. Loomis, "Introduction," in Tanner and James, *A Narrative of the Captivity*, ix–xi. A. R. Jones to Henry R. Schoolcraft, Adjutant General's Office, July 13, 1848, HRSP, 50: n.p.; and copy, sent to George Johnston, in Osborn and Osborn, *Schoolcraft, Longfellow, Hiawatha,* 596. For Tilden and his subsequent career, see ibid., 511–512, and Benson, "Schoolcraft, James, and the 'White Indian,'" 326–327. Tilden resigned in 1848; personal communication, Professor Samuel Watson, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, August 21, 2007.

56. The Charleston *Southern Patriot*, July 20, 1846, identifies the killer as "a drunken savage." Clipping in a collection by Henry Schoolcraft, "Notices of the Murder of James Lawrence Schoolcraft, supposed, at first, to have been Henry R. Schoolcraft," HRSP, 86:41226–41234. The *New York Express*, July 11, 1846; the New York *Evening Mirror*, July 11, 1846; the New York *Herald*, July 11, 1846; the New York *Evening Post*, July 11, 1846; the *Albany Argus*, July 11, 1846; the *Philadelphia Ledger*, July 13, 1846; the New York *Sun*, July 13, 1846; the Albany *Atlas*, July 11, 1846; the Albany *Morning News* (quoting the Albany *Evening Journal*), July 13, 1846; the Albany *Evening Journal*, July 13, 1846 (all in HRSP, 86:41226–41234); the *New Hampshire Sentinel*, July 15, 1846, July 22, 1846; *Farmer's Cabinet*, July 16, 1846; and the

Barre Patriot (quoting the *Albany Argus*), July 17, 1846, all identify the killer as "a half breed." The *Pittsfield Sun* (quoting the *Albany Argus*), July 16, 1846; the *Farmer's Cabinet* (quoting the *Detroit Advertiser*), July 23, 1846 (all in EAN Infoweb); and the *Albany Evening Journal*, n.d., and the New York *Sun*, July 15, 1846, HRSP, 86:41226–41234, name Tanner but do not note race. Tanner was not a "half breed Indian," said the New York *Evening Mirror* of July 11, but a former captive. Tanner is identified as "of white parents," raised by Indians, a man who bore a "savage malignant expression," in the New York *Commercial Advertiser* of July 11, 1846, quoted also in the New York *Journal of Commerce*, July 14, 1846. He is called "a captive brought up among the Indians, and more than an Indian in the ferocity of his character," a "sort of out-law" in the Washington, D.C., *Union*, July 15, 1846. He is described as "of white parents," captured by Indians, and a man who had tired "of civilized society," in the *Albany Evening Journal*, July 14, 1846, and as a "desperado, . . . who had been raised by the Indians, and had sworn vengeance against the Rev. Mr. Bingham," in the *Detroit Free Press*, July 10, 1846, quoted also in the *Albany Argus*, July 14, 1846. He is a "captive taken by Indians . . . who returned to civilized life, but would not conform to its customs and requirements," in the Philadelphia *Ledger and Transcript*, July 14, 1846. He is a "partially deranged" former captive who had "resided with the Indians nearly all his life," in the New York *Globe*, July 14, 1846, all in HRSP, 86:41226–41234.

57. *Albany Argus*, July 11, 1846, HRSP, 86: 41226–41234; reprinted also in the *Barre Patriot*, July 17, 1846, EAN Infoweb.

58. "Original Notes to Mr. Croswell respecting the report of my murder," Washington, July 13, 1846, HRSP, 48:443. For the term "half-breed," see, for example, Thomas N. Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers: Indian Mixed Bloods in the United States from Earliest Times to the Indian Removals* (Albuquerque, N.M., 2005), xxi.

59. Marc Bloch, "Réflexions d'un historien sur les fausses nouvelles de la guerre," *Revue de synthèse historique* 33 (1921): 26.

60. Walt Whitman, "The Half Breed; A Tale of the Western Frontier," in *The Half Breed and other Stories by Walt Whitman*, ed. Thomas Ollive Mabbott (New York, 1927), 76 (quotation); see also editor's introduction, 11–12, 14. For attitudes of Whitman and other writers of the period, see Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers*, 195. Ingersoll points out that Jacksonian policy was particularly hostile to "mixed blood" Indians (221–236).

61. Boyd was in a dispute over Tanner's pay, in the course of which Tanner apparently accused Boyd's son of the murder of an Indian girl. George Boyd to McKenney, Mackinac, July 27, 1828, *NAM*234R402, frs. 8–15; Steere, "Sketch of John Tanner," 254.

62. "Original Notes to Mr. Croswell respecting the report of my murder," Washington, July 13, 1846, HRSP, 48:443; 86:41226–41234. Tanner, Schoolcraft explains, "long looked on the dark side of human nature" (Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 316).

63. For Schoolcraft on racial corruption, and for quotations, see Joshua David Bellin, *The Demon of the Continent: Indians and the Shaping of American Literature* (Philadelphia, Pa., 2001), 142, 144–145, 245 nn. 27–28. Schoolcraft saw in Tanner a man who had been defeated by "Indian notions." Orin Edwin Wood, *Historic Mackinac: The Historical, Picturesque and Legendary Features of the Mackinac Country* (New York, 1918), 234. Sayer suggests that Schoolcraft saw in Tanner a rival with a superior grasp of Ojibwe culture ("Abridging between Two Worlds," 493).

64. Extract from John R. Livingston, Sault Ste. Marie, July 9, 1846, HRSP, 48:465; George Johnston to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, July 26, 1849, ibid., 51:485.

65. Anne Maria Schoolcraft to H. Schoolcraft, Sault Ste. Marie, July 27, 1846, HRSP, 48:498; New York *Evening Mirror*, July 11, 1846, ibid., 86:41226–41234.

66. Charles Lee in New York *Commercial Advertiser*, July 11, 1846, reprinted in the Albany *Evening Journal*, July 14, 1846, *New York Journal of Commerce*, July 14, 1846, HRSP, 86:41226–41234. Once Lee learned that James was the victim, he described Tanner in a letter to Henry as, again, "devilish," "malicious," and "revengeful." Charles Lee to H. Schoolcraft, New York, July 14, 1846, ibid., 48:449. Schoolcraft, *Personal Memoirs*, 316: Tanner was "his own judge and avenger in every question." Angie Bingham Gilbert states that "Like an Indian," Tanner "nourished his feeling of revenge and hatred." Gilbert, "Tanner," 199.

67. Edwin James, "Introductory Chapter," in Tanner and James, *Narrative of the Captivity*, xxvii–xxviii. See also Fierst, "Strange Eloquence," 230–236, and Sayer, "Abridging Between Two Worlds," 480–499.

68. Schoolcraft, 1838, quoted in Wood, *Historic Mackinac*, 234–235; for a concise, relevant discussion of ideology and discourse, see Philip J. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence, Kans., 2004), 7–11.

69. Gilbert, "Tanner," 196, 197; [attrib. to Cotton Mather] *Humiliations follow'd with Deliverances* (Boston, Mass., 1697), 43, online at NewsBank, Archive of America, accessed through the University of Michigan Library; J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, *Letters from An American Farmer* (New York, 1957 [1782]), 200; James Fenimore Cooper, *The Last of the Mohicans: A Narrative of 1757* (New York, 1854), 255–256.

70. Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam (New York, 1953), 106; Shibutani, *Improvised News*, 190.

Conclusion

1. *The Spanish Colonie, or Briefe Chronicle of the Acts and Gestes of the Spaniardes in the West Indies, Called the Newe World, for the Space of xl. Yeeres: Written in the Castilian Tongue by the Reuerend Bishop Bartholomew de las Cases or Casaus, a Friar of the Order of S. Dominicke*, ed. and trans. M.M.S. (London, 1583) image 12, facsimile viewed on Early English Books Online; *Tears of the Indians: Being an Historical and True Account of the Cruel Massacres and Slaughters of Above Twenty Millions of Innocent People Committed by the Spaniards in the Islands of Hispaniola,*

Cuba, Jamaica, etc. As also in the Continent of Mexico, Peru, and other Places in the West Indies, to the Total Destruction of those Countries, ed. and trans. John Phillips (Stanford, Calif., 1953 [facsimile of London, 1653]) www.hathitrust.org, image 47, p. 8, and John Phillips, "To all True Englishmen," in ibid., image 28, p. 21; Roberto A. Valdeón, "*Tears of the Indies* and the Power of Translation: John Phillips' Version of *Brevísima Relación de la Destrucción de las Indias*," *Bulletin of Spanish Studies: Hispanic Studies and Researches on Spain, Portugal and Latin America* 89 (2012): 839–838. As the English appropriations indicated, Las Casas did include swinging infanticide—a rhetorical device with, as we saw in the previous chapter, biblical antecedents. For a modern translation, see Bartolomé de las Casas, *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, ed. and trans. Nigel Griffin, intro. Anthony Pagden (London, 1992 [1552]), 15.

2. Phillips uses "Tears of the Indians" on the title page and "Tears of the Indies" on the first page (Philips, *Tears of the Indians*, image 8, image 38).

3. The phrase "Trail of Tears" surfaced earlier with Choctaw removal; see Gary Clayton Anderson, *Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian: The Crime That Should Haunt America* (Norman, Okla., 2014), 157, 170.

4. Thomas Jefferson, *Jefferson's Notes on the state of Virginia; with the Appendixes—Complete* (Baltimore, Md., 1800), 26, 70–71 n., WCL; James Mooney, *Historical Sketch of the Cherokee: A Smithsonian Institution Press Book*, gen. ed. Herman J. Viola (Chicago, Ill., 1975 [1900]), 228 n. 41.

5. Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), 273–275, 337; Anderson, *Ethnic Cleansing and the American Indian*, 114–126; William L. Anderson, "Introduction," in *Cherokee Removal: Before and After* (Athens, Ga., 1991), xi.

6. U.S. National Park Service, "The First Gold Rush," North Carolina, Department of Archives and History (Raleigh, N.C., 1972), http://statelibrary.dcr.state.nc.us/nc/ncsites/gold.htm; Richard B. Drake, *A History of Appalachia* (Lexington, Ky., 2001), 71; Fletcher Melvin Green, "Gold Mining: A Forgotten Industry of Ante-Bellum North Carolina," *North Carolina Historical Review* 14 (1937): 3, 7.

7. Alan Taylor, "The Early Republic's Supernatural Economy: Treasure Seeking in the American Northwest, 1780–1830," *American Quarterly* 38 (1986): 9, 10, 26. Among Taylor's fabled buriers of treasure, pirates predominate, but the "Spanish" begin to appear after 1799.

8. Barbara Allen and Lynwood Montell, "Lost Treasure Legends of Old Louisiana Territory," *Fabula* 29 (1988): 292, 298, 300, 301.

9. David Williams, "Gold Rush," The New Georgia Encyclopedia, www.georgiaencyclopedia.org.

10. Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, "The Expulsion of the Cherokees" (from *Georgia and State Rights* [1902]), in *The Removal of the Cherokee Nation: Manifest Destiny or National Dishonor?* ed. Louis Filler and Allen Guttman (Boston, Mass., 1962), 5–6; Mooney, *Historical Sketch*, 228 n. 41; Mary Young, "The Exercise of Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia," *Journal of the Early Republic* 10 (1990): 50, 53.

11. William G. McLoughlin, *Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic* (Princeton, N.J., 1992), 171.

12. *Michael F. Doran*, "*Negro Slaves of the Five Civilized* Tribes," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 68 (1978): 339–340, quoting commissioner of Indian affairs, *Annual Report* (Washington, D.C., 1844).

13. Seminoles, at war, did not cooperate with census takers in the 1830s; see Doran, "Negro Slaves of the Five Civilized Tribes," 346, 347.

14. Fay Yarbrough, "Legislating Women's Sexuality: Cherokee Marriage Laws in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Social History* 38 (2004): 385–406; Tiya Alicia Miles, *The House on Diamond Hill: A Cherokee Plantation Story* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010); Tiya Alicia Miles, *Ties That Bind: The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), 51v52. For Creeks, see Claudio Saunt, *Black, White, and Indian: Race and the Unmaking of an American Family* (New York, 2005), 71–79.

15. Miles, *Ties That Bind*, 100–114.

16. Theda Perdue, *Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 1540–1866* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1973), 36–70.

17. Rennard Strickland, *Fire and Spirits, Cherokee Law from Clan to Court* (Norman, Okla., 1975), 66; Miles, *Ties That Bind*, 132–133.

18. "From the Cherokee Phoenix, New Echota," July 3, 1830, *Connecticut Current*, July 27, 1830, vol. 46, iss. 3418; "Gold Mines," *New Hampshire Sentinel*, June 25, 1830, vol. 32, iss. 26; *Connecticut Mirror*, July 31, 1830, vol. 21, iss. 1100, all in EAN Infoweb; Grant Foreman, *Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians* (Norman, Okla., 1953), 229; Mary Hershberger, "Mobilizing Women, Anticipating Abolition: The Struggle against Indian Removal in the 1830's," *Journal of American History* 86 (1999): 23.

19. A.F.C. Wallace, *The Long Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians* (New York, 1993), 75. For the state's efforts to control miners, see Young, "Exercise of Sovereignty," 50–51.

20. Phillips, "The Expulsion of the Cherokees," 6.

21. Ronald N. Satz, *American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1974), 18, 47.

22. David Williams, *The Georgia Gold Rush: Twenty-Niners, Cherokees and Gold Fever* (New York, 1993), 4.

23. Foreman, *Indian Removal*, 232, 238.

24. Wilson Lumpkin, *The Removal of the Cherokee Indians from Georgia* (New York, 1907), 96, 97, 185, online under *The Making of Modern Law*, http://gaelnet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/servlet/MOML?af+RN&ae=F151227630&srchtp=a&ste=14. For the campaign, see Young, "Exercise of Sovereignty," 48.

25. Historian D. W. Meinig, in his magisterial history of the North American continent since 1500, places gold at the center of a series of events conspiring to force out the Cherokees: "First came the election of Andrew Jackson as president, soon followed by the rush into the Dahlonega goldfields within the Cherokee lands,

and the extension of Georgia law over all Georgia territory, with specific provision to exclude all Indians and their properties from its protection." D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, vol. 2, *Continental America, 1800–1867* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), 88.

26. "Thousands of intruders," writes Anthony F. C. Wallace, "swarmed over the Indian country in a frenzied quest for land and gold, destroying Indian farms and crops." Wallace, *The Long Bitter Trail*, 75.

27. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, frs. 159–160. Worcester and Butler stood as the plaintiffs in *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832). But shortly after the decision, which Georgia simply refused to honor, they secured a pardon from Georgia, while the Presbyterian mission board dropped its opposition to removal, urging the Cherokee leadership to negotiate a favorable a treaty, as the United States became swept up in the South Carolina Nullification Crisis. Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green, *The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears* (New York, 2007), 94–95.

28. Butrick to Payne, Carmel, December 15, 1835, in 14 vols., 4:28, "Letters to Payne from John Ross, Daniel Butrick, and Others," in John Howard Payne, "Papers Concerning the Cherokee Indians," manuscripts at the Newberry Library, Chicago.

29. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, frs. 130–133, 137, 145, 151–152, 157, 159–160, 193, 218–219.

30. For an analysis of violence along these lines, see Hannah Rosen, *Terror in the Heart of Freedom: Citizenship, Sexual Violence, and the Meaning of Race in the Postemancipation South* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2009), 62, 189, 217.

31. ABC 18.3.3. r754, v. 4, frs. 191–192.

32. ABC 18.3.3. r754, v. 4, fr. 256; for a superb summary of Cherokee removal and its human cost, see Perdue and Green, *The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears*, 123–140, 138 ("proponents"); Russell Thornton, *The Cherokees: A Population History* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1990), 63–73; and Wallace, *The Long Bitter Trail*, 93–94. Thornton, the leading historical demographer for the Cherokees, estimates that the population declined in the removal years from a high of more than 22,000 to "perhaps only 16,000 by the early 1840s." Russell Thornton, "Demographic History," in *Handbook of North American Indians,* gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant, vol. 14, *Southeast,* ed. Raymond D. Fogelson (Washington, D.C., 2004), 51. In his *The Cherokees*, 73–77, Thornton speculates about the effect of removal on the previously increasing Cherokee population and concludes that without removal, the world would have seen "10,138 more Cherokees" in 1840. He repeats, however, that "it is impossible to state the mortality of the Trail of Tears with any precision." For the "guess," see Anderson, *Ethnic Cleansing and the American Indian*, 171. For Quatie, see Gary E. Moulton, "John Ross," in *Encyclopedia of North American Indians*, ed. Frederick E. Hoxie (New York, 1966), 561.

33. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, fr. 256.

34. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, frs. 275–278. See note 28, above.

35. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, frs. 276–278.

36. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v, 4, frs. 256–262, 270.

37. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, fr. 267.

38. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, fr. 281.

39. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, fr. 288.

40. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, frs. 283, 288.

41. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, frs. 262, 270, 274, 287, 271 (quotation).

42. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, fr. 298.

43. Perdue and Green, *The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears*, 106; Walter Nugent, *Into the West: The Story of Its People* (New York, 1999), 64–65; John D. McDermott, "The Military Problem and the Black Hills, 1874–1875," *South Dakota History* 31 (2001): 188–210, examines the role of gold in the Plains Wars of the 1870s; Robert F. Heizer, "Introduction," in *The Destruction of California Indians*, ed. Robert F. Heizer (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1974), vi, see also 243–269, and *Exterminate Them: Written Accounts of the Murder, Rape, and Slavery of Native Americans During the California Gold Rush, 1848–1868*, ed. Clifford Trafzer and Joel R. Hyer (East Lansing, Mich., 1999), 113–133.

44. Robert J. Wolfe, "Alaska's Great Sickness, 1900: An Epidemic of Measles and Influenza in a Virgin Soil Population," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 126, no. 2 (1982): 95.

45. Drake, *A History of Appalachia*, 71; Green, "Gold Mining," 3.

46. Charles Gibson, *Spain in America* (New York, 1966), 40–47.

47. ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4, frs. 159–160.

48. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Letter to Martin Van Buren," in *The Removal of the Cherokee Nation: Manifest Destiny or National Dishonor?* ed. Louis Filler and Allen Guttman (Boston, Mass., 1962), 94–97.

49. Alexis de Tocqueville, "The Present and Future Condition of the Indians" [from *Democracy in America*], excerpted in *The Removal of the Cherokee Nation*, ed. Filler and Guttman, 92–93; Ronald Satz, "Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era: The Old Northwest as a Test Case," *Michigan History* 60 (1976): 74, 75, 83. Knox as quoted in Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, 2 vols. (Lincoln, Nebr., 1984), 1:65–66. Howard Mumford Jones, a founder of American studies, picked up the theme in *O Strange New World: American Culture—The Formative Years* (New York, 1964), 49. For brief treatments of the Black Legend, see David Weber, "The Spanish Legacy in North America and the Historical Imagination," *Western Historical Quarterly* 23 (1992): 21–23; Donna J. Guy, "The Morality of Economic History and the Immorality of Imperialism," *AHR* 104 (1999): 1249–1250.

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Essay on Sources

It is neither rumor nor legend nor even news that historians of eastern Native North America before the mid-nineteenth century must face starkly the question of uncertainty in their sources. We are hardly alone in working with tricky data, but more than most early Americanists we work with largely stateless peoples who did not manage archives and scribbling bureaucracies, who did not keep detailed written records, and among whom relatively few individuals were literate and prolific before 1850. The problem is decidedly not the absence of sources, but the obvious, relative absence of sources written by Indians, and especially by Indians for Indians. Imperial and colonial sources, on the other hand, abound, and they often pay close attention to events on the "frontiers." While social historians of the seaboard colonists can mine local colonial collections—court and property records, church records, business records, pamphlets, and newspapers—scholars interested in Indian Country often find that imperial or federal records get closest to the ground, in part because the metropolitan archives are so full of reports by traders, soldiers, diplomats, missionaries, and, as bureaucracies developed, Indian agents. Although this imperial archive is indeed rich with the writings of close observers (even relatives by marriage or adoption) of Indians, the evidence remains largely hearsay. And poorly grounded hearsay is the problem that this volume confronts.

Uncertainty, a key element of hearsay, rumor, and legend, remains the cloud that hangs over the documentary record, and historians know well to keep it in mind. Although notable scholars have issued cease-and-desist orders, most working historians of native North America in the British colonial and early U.S. national eras assume, reasonably, that the colonial record "can convey something of the Indian experience—either through colonial descriptions of Indian peoples or colonial renditions of Indian speeches—and that reading them with care while buttressing (or revising) them with oral, archaeological, and linguistic evidence is a wiser course than merely discarding them."[1] This work partakes of that approach, but it broods on uncertainty, examining rumor and legend, the most uncertain forms of information of all.

For this book, several organized and indexed metropolitan manuscript series compiled and curated by the British National Archives at Kew, England, and the

1. James H. Merrell, "Indian History During the English Colonial Era," in *A Companion to Colonial America: Blackwell Companions to American History*, ed. Daniel Vickers (Malden, Mass., 2003), 118–137, 120–121 (quotation); Daniel K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?," *WMQ* 50 (1993): 379–393; James Axtell, "Ethnohistory: An Historian's Viewpoint," *Ethnohistory* 26 (1979): 1–13.

William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, provided the richest data for the period up to and through the American Revolution. These contain imperial, provincial, and personal papers of units and administrators closely involved in Indian affairs.[2] For the U.S. early national period, and particularly for the removal era, this work relied heavily on National Archives Record Administration materials and Library of Congress records, often available on microfilm. These metropolitan records have counterparts in colonial and early state records, widely available in printed collections and on microfilm.[3] The edited and published or microfilmed personal and official papers of such major figures as the "founding fathers" and of such lesser-known eminences as metropolitan Indian agents Sir William Johnson and Henry Rowe Schoolcraft also proved indispensable.[4] This study has followed a generation of scholars and examined records of the religious denominations that shadowed the imperial bureaucracies. These often contain rich commentary, however filtered through pious interlocutors, by Indians.[5]

Researchers now easily access digital sources and finding aids that provide facsimile reproductions of all manner of publications. Particularly noteworthy among sources used in this book are Early English Books Online and especially Newsbank's Early American Newspapers.[6] Breathtaking developments, like Google Books and the Hathi Digital Trust, increase our access not only to books, but also to the data within them. Word and phrase searches (for example, for "pox") can yield hundreds of sources that never, in the pre-digital dispensation, would have been catalogued under a beckoning heading. Treated as digital finding aids, these resources should actually encourage the acquisition of real books in hard copy. Yet, awash as scholars are in increasingly available and accessible primary and secondary sources, as available as are imperial and colonial materials, we continue to face the problem of unfounded, groundless, and uncertain evidence.

What makes rumors and legends most exciting as sources is precisely what makes them so irritating. They generally have no known origin. They have plausibility, to some, but not proof. Truly living texts, they are by definition—and in some cases by intention—divorced from their authors. Rumors, far more than most other forms of information, have been rightly held to possess a certain agency, even power.[7] They configure, and sometimes trigger, events. This work, stretching from

2. Particularly the following series in the BNA: Admiralty Papers, CO, PRO, and WO. Abstracts of a small portion of these are available in calendar fashion in SP(SPO). Full text and abstracts are also available for the revolutionary era in *DAR*. A remarkable finding aid for the Southeast is *Cherokee Documents in Foreign Archives*, comp. and ed. William L. Anderson and James Allen Lewis (Metuchen, N.J., 1983). In the WCL, particularly the Gage Papers.

3. Vast microfilm collections include *NAM* and the remarkable collection *RSUS*, which I examined mostly in the DLC. Examples of printed collections of government records most used in this work include *CISHL*, *CRG*, *CRNC*, *DRIA*, *DRCHSNY*, *JCHA*, and *MPHC*.

4. HRSP, *PBF*, *PGW*, *WGW*, *WJP*, for example.

5. For example, *JR* and ABC 18.3.3.r754, v. 4.

6. *AA: PG*, EAN Infoweb, for example.

7. Timothy Breen's chapter, "The Power of Rumor: The Day the British Destroyed Boston," in his *American Insurgents: American Patriots: The Revolution of the People* (New York, 2010), 150,

the age of early transatlantic encounters to the era of Indian removal, hardly exhausts the enormous potentially available archive. Not a tight archival investigation of a single community or a single war, this book has examined frontier rumors from the sixteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries, and it has explored the transformation of rumor into dynamic legend that still buffets our current understanding of the past.

Compared to historians of France, South Asia, Southeast Asia, or Africa, relatively few influential historians of antebellum eastern North America have chosen to foreground rumor in their investigations.[8] That said, early American history boasts many works, including those that have gained accolades and influence, that confront or bear weightily on the topic of rumor; this is particularly true of the African American history of the period. Currents of scholarship that consider the importance of reputation and honor in British North American and early national U.S. society have contributed to the study of rumor.[9] Scholars of gender, religion, law, and society have examined slander and libel, cousins of the rumor phenomenon.[10] Several historians of the eastern North American colonial frontiers have put unreliable information, if not always rumor, at the center of their works.[11] Probably

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155, has rumor both propelling popular action and, through it, compelling elite decisions that advanced the colonial drift toward arms in 1774.

8. For India and Southeast Asia, see, for example, Ranajit Guja, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Oxford, 1983), 251–277; Veena Das, *Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary* (Berkeley, 2007), 108–134; Ann Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, N.J., 2009), 181–236. An excellent treatment of rumor overall leaning toward South Asia is Anan Ghosh, "The Role of Rumor in History Writing," *History Compass* 6, no. 5 (2008): 1235–1243; for Africa and France, see sources cited in the introduction.

9. For African American history and rumor, examples include Thomas J. Davis, *A Rumor of Revolt: The "Great Negro Plot" in Colonial New York* (New York, 1985), 250–253; Julius Sherrard Scott III, "The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the Era of the Haitian Revolution" (Ph.D. diss. Duke University, 1986), 114–173; Robert A. Gross and Michael Johnson, "Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part I," *WMQ* 58 (2001): 913–976; Robert A. Gross, Edward A. Pearson, Douglas R. Egerton, David Robertson, Philip D. Morgan, Thomas J. Davis, Winthrop D. Jordan, James Sidbury, Robert L. Paquette, and Michael P. Johnson, "Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part II," *WMQ* 59 (2002): 135–202; Wim Klooster, "Slave Revolts, Royal Justice, and a Ubiquitous Rumor in the Age of Revolutions," *WMQ* 71 (2014): 401–424, and Cynthia Kierner, *Scandal at Bizarre: Rumor and Reputation in Jefferson's Virginia* (New York, 2004), 64–65, 67–71, which also treats the importance of rumor to honor and reputation in early America. On this topic, see especially Patricia Bonomi, *The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), and Joanne B. Freeman, *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic* (New Haven, Conn., 2001), 62–103.

10. Cornelia Hughes Dayton, *Women before the Bar: Gender, Law and Society in Connecticut, 1639–1789* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995), 285–327; Susan Juster, *Disorderly Women: Sexual Politics and Evangelicalism in Revolutionary New England* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), 88–96; Jane Kamensky, *Governing the Tongue: The Politics of Speech in Early New England* (New York, 1997).

11. Joshua Piker advances the related study of outright lies, suggestively emphasizing the multi-vocal and yet cross-cultural nature of much artful political conversation in the early age of transatlantic empire. Joshua Piker, "Lying Together: The Imperial Implications of Cross-Cultural Untruths," *American Historical Review* 116 (2011): 964–985; Joshua Piker, *The Four*

the most influential body of scholars to approach the rumor phenomenon in antebellum America, although they have not claimed to be doing so, are those students of American political ideology who seriously consider American conspiratorial thought.

A half-century ago, two historians independently launched what soon amounted to a program of investigation into conspiracy theory. Richard Hofstadter, in his *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, and Bernard Bailyn, in the introduction to his *Pamphlets of the American Revolution*, examined fears of conspiracy as robust ideological expressions. The works diverged radically in one respect. As John M. Murrin observes, "Hofstadter investigated a recurring phenomenon on the fringes of American public life. Bailyn had taken the fringe and almost turned it into the center," locating it at the very heart of the American Revolution, the defining event for the early nation.[12] In antebellum America, according to early work by David Brion Davis, that core fissured as rumors of conspiracies, expressions of "the deepest fears and needs of a people," conjured the embattled menaces of the Slave Power and the Black Republicans. However unreliable the expressions may have been (and there was accuracy on both sides), for historians they might point "to truth of a most revealing kind."[13] This study has chased the prospect offered by a study of unreliable rumor and legend that illuminates early American conflict.

Conspiracy theory tends to suggest anxiety, and certainly the word "paranoid" suggests a psychological state. American Indian rumors about colonial designs and colonial rumors about Indian dangers, conspiracies with the enemy, or Spanish gold do in fact reveal extreme anxiety, but the anxiety is less pathological than it is grounded in a rough but genuine empiricism, grounded to be sure in vastly different cultural assumptions, and practiced in the messy laboratory of the frontiers. Multiple parties, in circulating rumors, in passing along unconfirmed reports of dubious authorship that nonetheless somehow rang true, profoundly revealed their

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Deaths of Acorn Whistler: Telling Stories in Colonial America (Cambridge, Mass., 2013). Rumors are not lies, though they may begin as lies or hoaxes. On rumors specifically, Tod Arne Midtrød, "Strange and Disturbing News: Rumor and Diplomacy in the Colonial Hudson Valley," *Ethnohistory* 58 (2011): 91–112, follows their movement to illuminate intercultural networks. Similarly centering rumors in a study of Creek information networks, Alejandra Dubkovsky, "One Hundred-Sixty One Knots, Two Plates, and One Emperor: Creek Information Networks in the Era of the Yamasee War," *Ethnohistory* 59 (2012): 489–507, adds that they reveal structures of power. Unlike this study, literary historian Ed White emphasizes rumor as a serial phenomenon in *The Backcountry and the City: Colonization and Conflict in Early America* (Minneapolis, Minn., 2005), 33–58.

12. John M. Murrin, "Political Development," in *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era*, ed. Jack Greene and J. R. Pole (Baltimore, Md., 1984), 415; David Brion Davis, *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style* (Baton Rouge, La., 1969), 11; Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York, 1965), 3–40; Bernard Bailyn, "Introduction," in *Pamphlets of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 3–202. For a different look at Hofstader's and Bailyn's work, see Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 39 (1982): 401.

13. Davis, *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style*, 6.

concerns with what those other people offered, or intended. Native and colonial interpretations depended alike on both customary modes of thought and rugged analyses of data. Indians could fear enslavement, for slave raiding and the sale of Indian prisoners of war were a part of the American Indian experience throughout the colonial period. Disease did emanate from European sources, the identification of cities such as Charleston and Philadelphia with sickness was objectively warranted, and in at least one case colonizers attempted to infect an Indian delegation with smallpox. War and forced removal entailed privations and disease. Native Americans, for their part, gave credence to Anglo-American rumors because Indians did often ally with powers hostile to Anglo-America, although they did so for their own strategic ends. Not without reason did the English-speaking settlers view such alliances as conspiracies. Hofstadter himself insisted that in calling his subjects' desire to expose conspiracy a "paranoid style," he did not speak "in a clinical sense," but merely employed a "clinical term for other purposes."[14]

This book has examined rumors of wealth, violence, and sickness that circulated along the frontiers between far-flung eastern North American Indian groups and English-speaking colonizers from the sixteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries. It has treated rumors less as the expression of the psychic desires or fears, and more as part of the objective reality left to us from the past, texts that both yielded and shaped perceptions on the colonial and revolutionary frontiers. Moreover, since the kinds of rumors under consideration demanded action, they provide the ideal subject matter for an inquiry into the relationships between thought and events. They reveal the power of both perception and symbolic action in the most traditional matters of historical inquiry: the formation of alliances, the making of revolutions, the expropriation of labor and resources, and the origins of war.

Historians, like the recipients of contemporary rumor, must assess the power, purpose, and accuracy of the stories found in their sources. In those efforts, as in the accounts themselves, there are openings that we have largely neglected. By addressing the problem of rumor and legend, with aid from studies of rumor in the fields of anthropology, sociology, communication, and psychology, historians, especially those of us who study colonial and indigenous worlds, can turn our greatest disadvantage—our dependence on indirect testimony—to advantage. Instead of stripping "away the fictive elements in our documents so we [can] get at the real facts," we can foreground and analyze the uncertainties.[15] Doing this, we need not treat our sources as screens separating us from the past; we may still mine them for truth. We can even hone those efforts and indulge in the empiricist's pleasure in exposing fictions and finding facts. As portions of this book have suggested, close examinations of uncertainties in our old sources reveal not only the multiple and conflicting ideologies of the past, but also those of the present. Not only does an

14. Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style*, 3. That said, he emphasizes the misguided, as does Glenda Riley in an early work treating rumors and Indians: "The Specter of a Savage: Rumors and Alarmism on the Overland Trail," *Western Historical Quarterly* 15 (1984): 427–444.

15. Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford, Calif., 1987), 3.

examination of groundless rumor and legend reveal to us the collectively held understandings that configured the actions of Indians or settlers on the early American frontiers, that examination better informs us about those actions. Rumor and legend have been realities, and they have had as much effect as, say, signed treaties, exchanged furs, birthed babies, well-cultivated cornfields, or well-aimed cannons.[16]

Every historian understands that official documents at every level of colonial governance, though important enough to be copied, bound into leather volumes, and shipped to the metropole, are shot through with doubt. Closer attention to rumor, while essential for students of oral cultures, can lead all early American historians to deal more effectively with "the inescapable uncertainty about truth in documents relied on for order" in the contested and often frightening colonial world.[17] At the same time, attention to rumor and attention to legend can reveal how our own ungrounded assumptions might structure our own histories. If a legend or a rumor, to return to Marc Bloch's metaphor, becomes a "mirror in which the collective consciousness surveys its own features,"[18] we historians might keep in mind our own susceptibility, and so gaze confidently into the glass.

16. Stephen Hahn, "'Extravagant Expectations' of Freedom: Rumour, Political Struggle, and the Christmas Insurrection Scare of 1865 in the American South," *Past and Present* 157 (1998): 122–157.

17. Davis, *Fiction in the Archives*, 113.

18. Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam (New York, 1953), 106–107; Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France*, trans. Joan White (New York, 1973), 106, 107.

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